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Development is the most secure basis for peace.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War has presented the United Nations with
significant opportunities. The development of peace through law rather
than through self-interested unilateral military action by states is, and
should be, one of the most important agendas of the United Nations.'
In his Agenda for Peace,3 United Nations Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali identified post-conflict peace-building as an integral part
of the United Nations' efforts to maintain international peace and
security. As explained by one author, "[tihe United Nations must de-
velop the ability to address the root causes of the ethnic strife, poverty,
and anarchy that give rise to the need for multilateral peace opera-
tions," and such operations "should be viewed as crisis management of
the last resort."' Indeed, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944,
the United States, Great Britain, and the then Soviet Union articulat-
ed the very foundations of the United Nations to be "both to prevent
aggression and to remove the political, economic and social causes of
war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving
peoples."5 History has demonstrated that military operations cannot
create peace, but at most can stabilize a conflict so that peace-building
* Partner, Braverman & Linarelli, Washington, D.C. Adjunct Professor,
Georgetown University Law Center and the Catholic University of America Colum-
bus School of Law. Duquesne University, BA. 1981; the American University Wash-
ington College of Law, J.D. 1985; Georgetown University Law Center, L.L.M. (Inter-
national and Comparative Law) 1996. The author thanks Lt. Col. Walter Gary
Sharp, Sr., USMC, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, for his
encouragement and guidance.
1. An Agenda for Development: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR,
48th Sess., Agenda Item 91, U.N. Doc. A/48/935 (1994) [hereinafter Agenda for De-
velopment].
2. Myres S. McDougal, Law and Peace, 18 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1
(1989).
3. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary General
Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council
on 31 January 1992 [hereinafter Agenda for Peace).
4. GARY S. SHARP, SR., UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS: A COLLECTION OF
PRIMARY DOCUMENTS AND READINGS GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF MULTILATERAL
PEACE OPERATIONS xii (1995)..
5. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, UNITED NATIONS, EVERYONE'S UNITED
NATIONS: A HANDBOOK ON THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 8 (10th ed. 1986).
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can be given an opportunity to work.6 With the shortcomings of peace-
building efforts in Somalia' and ongoing efforts to build a democratic
state in Haiti, it is unknown whether the United Nations in the post
Cold War period will by itself prove able to conduct credible and effec-
tive peace-building activities.
Peace-building as well as preventive diplomacy are viewed, in the
United Nations scheme, as adjuncts to peace-keeping and peace-mak-
ing efforts under Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter."
In essence, these functions can be viewed as part of a seamless web of
activities designed to create the conditions for long-term peace and
ultimately to maintain peace. The preferred view is that peace-building
should occur prior to a conflict as a preventive measure as well as
after a conflict to avoid recurrence of the conflict.9 As explained in
Agenda for Peace:
(T]he concept of peace-building as the construction of a new envi-
ronment should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplo-
macy, which seeks to avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions.
When conflict breaks out, mutually reinforcing efforts at peace-
making and peace-keeping come into play. Once these have
achieved their objectives, only sustained, cooperative work to deal
with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian prob-
lems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation. Preven-
tive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; post-conflict peace-building is to
prevent a recurrence."°
This article will explore the theoretical and pragmatic foundations for
peace-building." It will examine the possibilities for "an integrated
approach to human security" proposed by the Secretary General in his
Agenda for Peace."
A comprehensive definition of peace-building is not possible. No
definition could fully encompass all of the relevant differences that
6. This point was suggested by Lieutenant Colonel Gary S. Sharp, Sr. Deputy
Counsel, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense and Adjunct
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. All points as referenced herein were
made by Professor Sharp in a purely personal capacity.
7. The United Nations undertook peace-building in Somalia as part of
UNOSOM II, its last effort in Somalia. This effort is widely perceived to have been
unsuccessful. This is in contrast to United Nations humanitarian relief efforts in
Operation Restore Hope, designed to alleviate mass starvation in the country. Opera-
tion Restore Hope is widely perceived to be successful. See JOHN L. HIRSCH & ROB-
ERT B. OAKLEY, SOMAUA AND OPERATION RESTORE HOPE 49, 101 (1995).
8. See Agenda for Peace, supra note 3, at 11.
9. This point was suggested by Professor Gary S. Sharp, Sr., supra note 6.
10. Agenda for Peace, supra note 3, at 33.
11. It is beyond the scope of this article to address the "doability" of achieving
peace-building initiatives. The enormity of this task should not be downplayed. I
leave this topic to other articles and other authors.
12. Agenda for Peace, supra note 3, at 8.
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exist in rebuilding failed states. Each situation tends to pose difficul-
ties based on historical circumstances of the country and region. Sec-
tion II will nevertheless seek to define the concept in general terms by
identifying substantive criteria that can be used to delimit the concept.
These criteria have their basis in empirical and theoretical analysis of
events and situations that mitigate or minimize conflict among nations
and, hence, build peace. Section II will show remarkable congruences
between domestic economic development and minimization of civil and
international conflict. It is very important to define norms to govern
peace-building in order to, among other things, avoid intervention in
the domestic affairs of states and to critically assess what should be
done to rehabilitate failed states and place them on the path of sound
economic, political, and social development.
Section III will address the legal authority for the United Nations'
conduct of peace-building initiatives. It will examine the state of inter-
national law on the subject and attempt to interpret some arguments
and principles in conjunction with one another that have heretofore
not been considered contemporaneously. It will examine whether the
Security Council has the authority to impose peace-building, or wheth-
er other organizations, both inside and outside of the United Nations,
should undertake peace-building. Section III will address the structur-
al inadequacies in the presently ordered international system. These
inadequacies prevent comprehensive peace-building efforts on a multi-
lateral scale. Section WV of the article will provide concluding observa-
tions.
II. PEACE-BUILDING CRITERIA - THE STATE OF EMERGING NORMS
The United Nations Secretary General has described peace-build-
ing as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into con-
flict.""3 What are the norms which govern peace-building? Can one
articulate which "action" and "structures" will "tend to strengthen and
solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict?""' This section
13. I. at 11; Agenda for Development, supra note 1, at 6.
14. Agenda for Peace, supra note 3, at 11. A related question is whether the
United Nations must wait for a conflict, and resolve the conflict, before it engages in
peace-building. The Secretary General's definition may be unduly narrow. His defini-
tion skirts the issue of whether peace-building in the absence of conflict would result
in intervention in violation of Article 2 (7) of the Charter. A "conflict" can be defined
to be almost anything to the creative draftsman, although to give the term an overt-
ly political meaning could threaten the credibility of the Security Council. In my
view, given current social science and international relations studies on the issue of
what constitutes a threat to international peace and security, namely non-democratic
public order, it would seem that peace-building should not have to wait for the exis-
tence and termination of a conflict. See infra part IIIA A policy-oriented definition
of peace-building would be something like "realization of community expectations
about peace and security," with the United Nations Charter and other international
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tries to fill in the details of what peace-building should entail based on
legally-centered analytical principles.
In order to derive norms governing peace-building, two points
should be assessed. First, the identified norms are policies, or basic
principles, rather than rules. An excessively rule-based order would be
unduly difficult to describe and apply. There is no set of rules that
could be applied successfully in every peace-building effort. Each situa-
tion poses unique problems. There are, however, certain characteristics
or properties, that, when present, could result in effective peace-build-
ing. The more important of these characteristics are examined in this
section.
Second, norms should be segregated from tasks. For example, a
peace-building norm may be to ensure the human rights associated
with security of the individual; another may be promote sustainable
agricultural development. A task intended to implement these norms
would be the clearing of mines from a country. The United Nations has
undertaken a number of peace-building efforts, beginning virtually
from its creation forward. 5 A good deal of these efforts were under-
taken during the decolonization process and by assisting states in the
transition from trust territory status. 6 The tasks that the United Na-
tions has undertaken include election monitoring, establishment of
conditions for elections by beginning the reconstruction of civil society,
rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, repatriation and resettlement
of refugees, supervision and monitoring of cease fires, disarming of
armed factions, mine-clearing, and training and supervision of law
enforcement personnel."
These are the initial tasks in peace-building. Established develop-
ment thinking holds that development is a long-term process, particu-
larly in lesser developed countries marred by armed conflict. These
countries suffer from egregious problems relating to poverty and to
lack of development. Serious peace-building efforts would have to re-
flect a coherent development strategy based on achievement of goals or
norms that promote peace. Set forth below are the most important
norms that the above tasks and other, longer term efforts should strive
to meet in order to promote international peace and security.
A. Good Governance and Democracy
International relations theorists have asserted that non-democrat-
ic national orders constitute a threat to international peace and securi-
documents providing guidance on what those community expectations would be.
15. See Sonia K Han, Note, Building A Peace That Lasts: The United Nations
And Post-Civil War Peace-Building, 26 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 837 (1994).
16. Id. at 841.
17. Id. at 847-49.
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ty because non-democratic regimes tend to go to war with one another.
As explained by Professor John N. Moore:
[LJiberal democracy and the rule of law (in the broadest sense) are
valuable to the new world order centrally and fundamentally be-
cause an impressive body of human knowledge now tells us unmis-
takably that there is a direct correlation between these concepts
and: human rights, the avoidance of government-sponsored
"democide" (the massive killing of a nation's own population and
the most extreme human rights failure of government), vigorous
economic progress, and the avoidance of a synergy that has pro-
duced the major international wars of this century. In short, the
spread of liberal democracy, or at least the minimization of totali-
tarianism, is of the greatest importance in realizing fundamental
human aspirations. 8
These conclusions are based on the empirical analysis of Professor
Rudy Rummel, Professor Bruce Russett, and others." The proposi-
tions of these scholars have not gone unchallenged.' One study in the
international relations area suggests that states in the early stages of
democratization are more likely to engage in military conflict than
states that have had no change in regime."' This new evidence, or
interpretation of old evidence, does not alter the basic proposition that
states which have completed the transition to democracy virtually
never engage in military conflict with each other. These competing con-
clusions on the empirical data also suggest that the reconciliation of
this data may be based on how one defines democracy. A democracy
that reflects significant and enduring participatory pluralism, in which
citizens have the ability and actually do more than merely vote in
elections and in which rule of law is of importance to the state and
reflects democratic values, provides the basis for a mature democracy
highly unlikely to engage in, or at least start, armed conflict. Elections
alone do not qualify a country as a democracy;' there must be some
other long-term indicia. Haiti held presidential, parliamentary, and
18. John N. Moore, Morality and the Rule of Law in the Foreign Policy of the
Democracies 1-2 (Nov. 14, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author,
prepared for the Andrew R. Cecil Lectures on Moral Values in a Free Society, Uni-
versity of Texas at Dallas); see also Robert F. Turner, Haiti and the Growth of a
Democracy Entitlement, in THE UNITED NATIONS AT FIFrY: SOvEREIGNTY, PEACEKEEP-
ING, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 18, 23-24 (Don M. Snider & Stuart J.D. Schwartzstein
eds., 1995).
19. RUDY J. RUMMEL, DEADLIER THAN WAR: NON-FREEDOM (1986); RUDY J.
RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT (1994); BRUCE M. RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMo-
CRATIC PEACE: PRiNCIPLES FOR A PosT-CoLD WAR WORLD (1993).
20. See JOHN N. MOORE ET AL., NATONAL SECURITY LAW 77-78 (1990).
21. Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Democratization and War, 74 FOREIGN
AFF. 79, 79-80 (May/June 1995).
22. See Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARv. INTL
L.J. 1 (1995); Tom Farer, The Hierarchy of Human Rights, 8 AM. U. J. INTL L, &
POL" 115, 116-17 (1992).
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local elections in 1990. These elections did not make Haiti a democracy
by any stretch of the concept, particularly since the elected President,
Jean Bertrande Aristide, was forcibly removed from office by the Hai-
tian military less than one year later.'
International relations theorists have avoided normative conclu-
sions about preferences in governing political systems, leaving the
tasks of norm prescription to others. International law scholars have
taken on the task and have found an emerging norm of democratic
governance.2 Although this democratic norm is nascent and not with-
out its detractors, it has been persuasively argued that democratically
elected governments may in some cases provide legitimacy to a govern-
ment on the international level.'
Recent events in Haiti provide significant support for the demo-
cratic norm. On July 31, 1994, the Security Council voted 12-0 to pass
Resolution 940 which, among other things, authorized force "to use all
necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military
leadership ... [and] the prompt return of the legitimately elected
President"' and directed United Nations officials to "assist the legiti-
mate constitutional authorities of Haiti in establishing an environment
conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections,"'
to be monitored by the United Nations and the Organization of Ameri-
can States. China, a permanent member of the Security Council, ab-
stained and its delegate expressed concern that the Resolution created
a "dangerous precedent."'
23. Oversight of the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Prac-
tices for 1993 and U.S. Human Rights Policy: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1994).
24. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46, 47 (1992) [hereinafter Democratic Governance); Ibrahim J. Gassama,
World Order in the Post-Cold War Era: The Relevance and Role of the United Na-
tions After ifty Years, 20 BROOK J. INT'L L. 255 (1994); Richard Lee Gaines, On
the Road to a Paz U.N.: Using the Peace Tools at Our Disposal in a Post-Cold War
World, 25 N.Y.U.J. INTL L. & POL. 543, 585 (1993); Thomas M. Franck, United
Nations Based Prospects for a New Global Order, 22 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 601,
621 (1990) [hereinafter New Global Order].
25. Democratic Governance, supra note 24. Because of the overwhelming number
of burgeoning democracies today in the United Nations, given the demise of the Cold
War, it is apparently much easier today to make an argument for a democratic
norm, or against an authoritarian regime. The major "norm blocker" in this effort is
China - approximately one in four people are still governed by an authoritarian
regime. If sovereignty is based on the contemporary notions of popular sovereignty of
people legitimizing governments through proper elections, China and other authori-
tarian regimes are in violation of international law.
26. Turner, supra note 18, at 21-22.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 22.
258 VOL. 24:2,3
PEACE-BUILDING
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights mandates that popu-
lar government is an internationally protected human right. Article
21(1) provides that "[elveryone has the right to take part in the gov-
ernment of his country, directly or through freely chosen representa-
tives."' 9 Article 21(3) of the Universal Declaration provides as follows:
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of govern-
ment; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures."0
Philosophers and ethicists have proffered further normative justi-
fication for democracy. Immanuel Kant posited that peace could be
predicated upon a "pacific union" of democratic states." Democracy
has been asserted by one historian to be an ethical standard.32
The United Nations itself has recognized the relationship of de-
mocracy to peace. In fact, in its peace-building initiatives to date, the
United Nations has proffered participatory democracy as the model for
building post-conflict societies.3 In Agenda for Peace, the Secretary
General explained as follows:
There is an obvious connection between democratic practices -
such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making - and
the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable
political order. These elements of good governance need to be pro-
moted at all levels of international and national political communi-
ties.'
The Secretary General has also stated:
There can be no flowering of development without the parallel
advance of another key concept: democratization. Peace is a prereq-
uisite to development; democracy is essential if development is to
succeed over the long term.
The real development of a State must be based on the participation
of its population; that requires human rights and democracy.'
29. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21 1, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
217A (III), pt. 1, at 75, U.N. doc. A/777 (1948).
30. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21 13, U.N. GAOR, d. Sess.,
217A (I1), pt. 1, at 75, U.N. doc. A/777 (1948).
31. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE (1795).
32. James T. Johnson, Is Democracy an Ethical Standard? 4 ETHICS [N INVL
AF. 1, 17 (1990). "Democracy as an ethical standard for life in political community
is the counterpart of freedom as an ethical standard in the life of the individual -
both are needed for the moral life within the conditions of history as we know it."
Id.
33. Han, supra note 15, at 837-38.
34. Agenda for Peace, supra note 3, at 34.
35. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Report on the World of the Organization from the
Forty-Seventh to the Forty-Eighth Session of the General Assembly 2-3 (1993), quot-
ed in Michael Stopford, Locating the Balance: The United Nations and the New
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The Secretary General extends the Moore/Rummel analysis of
democracy as necessary for peace maintenance by finding that democ-
racy is necessary for development as well. Democracy has two interre-
lated dimensions - domestic and international - gover-
nance/development and maintenance of peace. The interconnection be-
tween democracy and development is explained in Agenda for Develop-
ment as follows:
Democracy and development are linked in fundamental ways. They
are linked because democracy provides the only long-term basis for
managing competing ethnic, religious, and cultural interests in a
way that minimizes the risk of violent internal conflict. They are
linked because democracy is inherently attached to the question of
governance, which has an impact on all aspects of development
efforts. They are linked because democracy is a fundamental hu-
man right, the advancement of which is itself an important mea-
sure of development. They are linked because people's participation
in the decision-making processes which affect their lives is a basic
tenet of development."
It is significant that the Secretary General relates democracy to
good governance. In this manner, political difficulties with the promo-
tion of democracy may be defused. The World Bank imposes the con-
cept of good governance on the developing countries, although the
Bank is precluded by its Articles of Agreement from involvement in
political affairs and does not require that states be democratic in order
to qualify for financing. 7 The Bank justifies conditions relating to
governance as affecting the ability of a country to administer and pay
back World Bank loans and as affecting the ability of a country to
effect economic development.' The United Nations appears to be bor-
rowing the governance concept, which has been interpreted as non-
political in order to mitigate criticism."9 The relationship between de-
velopment and democracy is similar in robustness to the relationship
between peace and democracy. Empirical studies have shown that "no
substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with a democratic
form of government and a free press."' ° Current thinking in develop-
ment economics suggests that democratic pluralism and the small
entrepreneur are the engines of development. Participatory pluralism
has been shown to be a motivator of economic development." A civil
World Disorder, 34 VA. J. INTrL L. 685, 687 (1994).
36. Agenda for Development, supra note 1, at 22.
37. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
38. Id.
39. But see Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World
Bank and the Democratization of Development, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 159 (1993).
40. Jon Elster, The Impact of Constitutions on Economic Performance, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
209, 213 (Michael Bruno & Boris Pleskovic eds., 1994).
41. See James H. Weaver & Kevin M. O'Keefe, Whither Development Economics?,
VOL. 24:2,3260
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society is necessary for economic development; a country cannot truly
have laws and a legal system, which are necessary for development
and for a market-oriented economic system necessary for development,
without democracy."2 Democracy can be viewed as necessary to the
development of a legal system that will be complementary and benefi-
cial to economic development.
B. Sustainable Development
Contemporary thought on issues of the development of nations
identify sustainable development as the goal of development efforts.'
Principles of sustainable development require that development poli-
cies "incorporate environmental considerations." Sustainable devel-
opment is viewed as "inherently an intergenerational question as well
as an intragenerational question."' In other words, sustainable devel-
opment "relies on a commitment to equity with future generations."'
The United Nations' Agenda for Development sets forth a strong com-
mitment to sustainable development.'7 Certainly, sustainable develop-
ment must be a norm in peace-building.
Sustainable development policies may be implemented through
environmental assessment procedures developed by the United Nations
with the broad-based support of its members. All of the development
banks now make environmental assessments in their lending process-
es. The United Nations may refer to the experiences of the develop-
ment banks for guidance. In any process of developing and applying
environmental assessment procedures, attempts to encourage the tar-
get state to implement environmental assessment should be maxi-
mized. Responsibility of the target state should serve to maximize pop-
ular participation by the indigenous population of the target state and
should serve to result in local solutions to environmental problems. In
this sense, the United Nations can promote participatory pluralism in
addition to environmental protection.' The probability of compliance
SAIS REV. 113 (1991); John Linarelli, The European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development: Legal and Policy Issues, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 361, 364-65
(1995); Thomas M. Franck, The New Development: Can American Law and Legal
Institutions Help Developing Countries?, 1972 WiS. L. REv. 767, 773 (1972); see gen-
erally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVIsIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE
THIRD WORLD (1989).
42. See David M. Trubeck, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the
Study of Law and Development, 82 YALE L. J. 1, 6-10 (1972).
43. Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable Devel-
opment, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 19 (1992); see Linarelli, supra note 41, at 370-
73.
44. Agenda for Development, supra note 1, at 14.
45. Weiss, supra note 43, at 19 (emphasis in original).
46. Id.
47. Agenda for Development, supra note 1, at 13-17.
48. See Han, supra note 15, at 853.
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should increase with the involvement of the local populace in decisions
affecting their own welfare and the welfare of their succeeding gen-
erations. This approach should also serve to alleviate the "confidence
crisis" that is perceived to be ongoing in the developing countries.'
The maximization of local popular participation in environmental
decision-making does not mean that the target state should bear sole
responsibility for the costs of environmental protection. Environmental
problems inevitably involve externalities; countries other than the
target state may benefit significantly from environmental projects in
the target state. Environmental problems do not respect political
boundaries.'
C. Human Rights
Peace and respect for human rights are closely interconnected.
Professor Myres McDougal has described the relationship between
peace and human rights as follows:
The most relevant conception of peace must make reference to the
least possible application of violence and coercion to the individual
human being and to the freedom of access of the individual to all
cherished values. For community members and their decision-mak-
ers alike, a viable conception of peace cannot today be limited to
reference to a mere absence of armed, and international, conflict.
The peace demanded by contemporary humankind is not that of the
concentration camp (however large) or that of the living dead
(whatever the community).6'
Peace thus may be broadly based on "optimum order" rather than
on "minimum order," that is, on "the greatest access of the individual
human being to the shaping and sharing of all of the values of human
dignity."52 In this sense, sovereignty is "popular sovereignty" held by
individuals and not by a state or in substance by the elites of a
state."
Development and respect for human rights are also closely inter-
connected. As explained by Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, General Counsel of
the World Bank, "the essence of development encompasses not only
higher incomes but also better education, higher standards of health
and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner environment, more equality of
opportunity, greater individual freedom and a richer cultural life.""
49. This point was made by Abdikarim A. Omar, former Ambassador of Somalia
to the United States, in a presentation in the course, United Nations Peace Opera-
tions, held at the Georgetown University Law Center in Summer 1995.
50. See Linarelli, supra note 41, at 372-73.
51. McDougal, supra note 2, at 5.
52. Id at 6.
53. W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies,
18 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 794, 795 (1995).
54. Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Human Rights, Development, and International Finan-
VOL. 24:2,3
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According to Mr. Shihata, "a guarantee of human rights protection
does not merely relate to development but is central to the develop-
ment process."" Human rights protections in the development process
thus refer to economic and social rights as well as civil and political
rights.
Without human rights protections, economic growth cannot be
achieved in the long-term. An effective human rights system protects
the rights of labor and industry. Certain human rights, such as free-
dom of speech, have a routing-out function as they serve to publicize
corruption and governmental abuses of power. A strong sense of civil
society is vital to any truly free economic system; without it, economic
freedom could degenerate into unprincipled greed. Capitalism must be
regulated by the mores and ethics of a society.
The United Nations Charter provides ample authority for human
rights promotion as an important role in peace-building. The purposes
and principles set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter reflect hu-
man rights, economic, and social concerns as well as concerns over the
maintenance of international peace and security.' As explained by
one authoritative text:
In the preamble of the Charter, the peoples of the United Nations
have reaffirmed their "faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men
and women and of nations large and small," and their determina-
tion "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larg-
er freedom." Article 1 of the Charter lists among the main purposes
of the United nations the achievement of international cooperation
"in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion." Similarly, in accordance with Article 55 of
the Charter, the United Nations has the duty to promote "universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or
religion." In Article 56, all Members of the United Nations "pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Arti-
cle 55.
The Charter of the United Nations contains also significant grants
of power to various organ of the United Nations. Thus, under Arti-
cle 13, the General Assembly has the duty to initiate studies and
make recommendations for the purpose of "assisting in the realiza-
tion of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Responsibility for the
discharge of the functions set forth in Chapter IX of the Char-
cial Institutions, 8 Am. U. J. INVL L. & POLY 27, 28 (1992).
55. Id
56. See Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of
State Responsibility, 43 INVL & COMP. L. Q. 55, 91 (1994).
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ter... is vested by Article 60 in the General Assembly, and "un-
der the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and
Social Council." In discharging this responsibility, the Economic
and Social Council may, according to Article 62, "make recommen-
dations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all ....
Indeed, a convincing argument can be made that certain human
rights are jus cogens and must be respected regardless of the terms of
the Charter." It would be an impermissible leap of logic, however, to
say that the United Nations and its member states are obligated to
enforce peremptory norms. It would be problematic to have the United
Nations involved in interpreting international law to determine when
to override the Charter.
The United Nations, since the adoption of the Charter, has pro-
moted human rights as an integral aspect of peace. It has promulgated
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights,'" the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,6 and numerous other conven-
tions, declarations, and resolutions promoting human rights. The Unit-
ed Nations in this manner has been one of the primary actors in the
development of customary international law in the human rights area.
Neither the United Nations nor other international institutions in-
volved in peace-building could credibly ignore human rights issues in
peace-building.
D. Rule of Law
Democratic governance and rule of law are closely related." Rule
of law is separated here for purposes of analysis.
Rule of law, broadly defined, has a direct relationship to the main-
tenance of peace.' It operationalizes the most important character-
istics of a participatory democracy and of a system designed to protect
human rights. It facilitates stability, accountability, and credibility of
regimes." According to Professor McDougal:
The basic community policies that underlie conceptions of peace
and human rights are in any democratic community the same poli-
57. Eighteenth Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace,
the United Nations and Human Rights, 1-4 (1968), reprinted in MOORE ET AL, su-
pra note 20, at 676.
58. See Shihata, supra note 54, at 35.
59. See Turner, supra note 18.
60. G.A Res. 2200, 21 GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
61. GA. Res. 2200, 21 GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).





cies that underlie all law. Hence, it is no metaphor to conclude that
peace and law may appropriately be described as one side of the
coin (of community process and effective power) of which arbitrary
violence and coercion are the other side.M6
Rule of law also has a direct relationship to development and
hence to maintenance of peace. As one prominent scholar of law and
development posits, "[like a power grid or transportation network,
modern law is viewed in the core conception as a functional prereq-
uisite of an industrial economy."" There has been a serious decline in
scholarly inquiry in law and development."7 Nevertheless, law plays a
significant role in the development of a nation-state, although its ef-
fects may be extremely difficult to identify, categorize and quantify.
Despite the decline in scholarly inquiry, multilateral development
institutions, such as the World Bank, and bilateral agencies, such as
the U.S. Agency for International Development, continue to fund nu-
merous projects for legal reform in developing countries.'
Law is critical to the sustenance of a market-oriented economic
system. A market-oriented economic system is currently viewed as the
most promising economic system for development. Market institutions,
such as commercial banking, central banks, currency, market pricing,
market commodity distribution, and the commodification of real prop-
erty, depend on law for their existence. Law is essential to the exis-
tence of such institutions. Law serves these institutions by identifying
and preserving property rights and contract rights, and by defining
and facilitating such concepts as negotiable instruments, commercial
paper, juristic personhood, secured transactions, and title to real prop-
erty. It makes for predictability "as a set of universal rules uniformly
applied," 9 which "encourages men to engage in new forms of econom-
ic activity and guarantees that the fruits of this activity will be pro-
tected.7 Law "assures the individual that his decisions will be en-
65. McDougal, supra note 2, at 6.
66. Trubek, supra note 42, at 6.
67. See John H. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Ori-
gins, Style, Decline and Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J.
CoM. L. 457 (1977); Elliot Burg, Law and Development: A Review of the Literature
and a Critique of "Scholars in Self-Estrangement," 25 AM. J. CoMP. L. 492 (1977);
Philip von Mehren & Tim Sawers, Revitalizing the Law and Development Movement:
A Case Study of Title in Thailand, 33 HARV. IN'L L. J. 67 (1992).
68. See HARRY BLAIR & GARY HANSEN, WEIGHING IN ON THE SCALES OF JUS-
TICE: STRATEGIc APPROACHES FOR DONOR-SUPPORTED RULE OF LAW PROGRAMS,
USAID PROGRAM AND OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT REPORT NO. 7 (1994); U.S. General
Accounting Office, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: PROMOTING JUDICIAL REFORM TO STRENGTH-
EN DEMOCRACIES (1993).
69. Trubek, supra note 42, at 7.
70. Id.
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forced by state authority and that his acquisitions protected from the
depredations of others."7
Moreover, law can serve as an instrument through which a state
implements development plans.72 This role of law has been
downplayed in recent years as development economists and planners
have reasoned that economic growth is impracticable to manage and
government intervention is sometimes worse than no, or limited, inter-
vention despite good intentions.73 This second role for law, however,
still appears significant to the extent that it promotes an open, mar-
ket-oriented economy. For example, given the intense competition of
the capital importing countries for foreign capital, developing countries
have been promulgating foreign investment laws that are favorable to
the foreign investor and that serve to protect foreign investments with-
in a country. Today's trend is privatization, not nationalization. Devel-
oping countries use law to attempt to direct foreign investment into
their borders as part of their development plans, which include in-
creasing foreign investment.
E. Market-Oriented Economics and Liberalized Trade
A substantial relationship exists between international trade
policy and the prevention of armed conflict. 4 This relationship has
been demonstrated in modern history leading to World War II. The
Smoot Hawley Tariff Act, signed into law in June of 1930, dramatically
increased United States tariffs in an unequivocal protectionist or isola-
tionist approach to international relations.7 5 The result was retalia-
tion by trading partners of the United States. As other countries dra-
matically increased their tariffs, the volume of world trade substantial-
ly decreased, eventually leading to the Great Depression. The Great
Depression was a substantial contributing factor to the decline of the
political moderates in Japan and to the electoral victory of the Nazis in
Germany. 6 A dire economic situation created the conditions for the
rise of extreme, totalitarian or authoritarian, non-democratic regimes,
which in turn started one of the most aggressive wars in recorded
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Clive Crook, The Gains from Trade, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 1989, at 25;
Clive Crook, Distracted by Debt, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 1989, at 52.
74. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC
RELATIONS 37 (1995).
75. RICHARD N. COOPER, TRADE POLICY AND FOREIGN POLICY 291-92, reprinted in
JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
38 (1995); John Linarelli, International Trade Relations and the Separation of Powers
Under the United States Constitution, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 203, 210 (1995).
76. COOPER, supra note 75.
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history." Thus, flawed protectionist trade policies can be viewed as
one contributing cause of World War II.
U.S. leaders during World War II understood the close connection
between protectionist trade policy and war. As explained by one State
Department official in 1944:
We've seen that when a country gets starved out economically, its
people are all too ready to follow the first dictator who may rise up
and promise them all jobs. Trade conflict breeds non-cooperation,
suspicion, bitterness. Nations which are economic enemies are not
likely to remain political friends for long.7"
The United States at the end of World War II promoted the cre-
ation of three multilateral economic institutions - the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (known as the World Bank),
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Trade
Organization. Only the first two of these organizations came into exis-
tence. The World Bank at the time served to rebuild war ravaged
countries. The IMF was created to promote orderly fluctuations and
adjustments of currencies and exchange rates. The International Trade
Organization, however, did not come into existence because of the
opposition of the U.S. Congress. The proposal of the United States
Executive Branch for the creation of the International Trade Organiza-
tion stated:
The fundamental choice is whether countries will struggle against
each other for wealth and power, or work together for security and
mutual advantage .... The experience of cooperation in the task
of earning a living promotes both the habit and the techniques of
common effort and helps make permanent the mutual confidence
on which the peace depends."9
In the post Cold War era, "economic diplomacy" has acquired
increased prominence. "U.S. national security policy no longer focuses
primarily on the conventional notions relating to the use of force, arms
control and arms proliferation, national defense, and superpower con-
flict." There has been a dynamic linkage in United States foreign
policy of international economic and non-economic relations.
National security provides an even less convincing justification for
deviating from free trade principles. National security was even cited
by Adam Smith for permitting the protection of certain strategic
industries."' Nevertheless, as linkages between free trade, mutually
77. Id
78. U.S. Dept. of State, Commercial Policy Series 74, at 3 (Pub. no. 2104, 1944),
quoted in JACKSON ET AL, supra note 74, at 38.
79. United States Proposals, Dept. of State Pub. No. 2411, at 1-2 (1946), quoted
in JACKSON ET AL, supra note 74, at 38-39.
80. Linarelli, supra note 75, at 203.
81. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF IN-
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pursued, and conflict minimization become ever more apparent, the
national security argument loses force.
The developing countries, which are the countries in which the
United Nations peace-keeping efforts are most likely to occur, have
moved quite steadily towards trade liberalization.82 The trend in the
developing countries toward trade liberalization is consistent with
trends in development economics toward privatization, private sector
development, aggressive export orientation trade strategies, and the
promotion of entrepreneurship, particularly the entrepreneurship of
small and medium sized enterprises, as the engine of development.'
Once again, these concepts reinforce and complement the ultimate goal
of the creation and maintenance of a stable state. Entrepreneurship is
also viewed as the engine of democratic pluralism. "
Unfortunately, as the developing countries embrace trade liberal-
ization, it appears that the developed countries' commitment to free
trade may be diminishing.8 A lack of commitment to trade liberaliza-
tion on behalf of the developing countries would be a serious mistake.
Such retrenchment often has its roots in politics, such as when one
region of a developed country demands protection from a developing
country's imports.8 Despite the dangerous temptation to succumb to
such protectionism, it is not in the long-term interests of peace- build-
ing. It appears dangerously reminiscent of the Smoot Hawley debacle.
F. Structural Adjustment
Closely related to the concept of building peace through trade is
the concept of implementing structural adjustment in countries experi-
encing serious economic problems. Structural adjustment "refers to the
process by which economic factors such as land, labor and capital are
reallocated within a country as it adapts in order to function more
efficiently as part of the global economy.""7 The structural adjustment
process typically results in hardships to a country and its populace in
the short-run, including unemployment, currency devaluation, and
closing of inefficient industries."
The IMF and the World Bank, as part of their conditions for pro-
viding credits or loans to countries, may impose strict economic criteria
TERNATIONAL ECONOMic RELATIoNs 18-19 (1992).
82. Bertram S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade Order, 14
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 347, 374-76 (1994).
83. Unarelli, supra note 41, at 364-65.
84. Id.
85. Brown, supra note 82, at 374-75.
86. See Brown, supra note 82, at 365-69, 398-99. The author explains the delete-
rious economic effects of such protectionism.




that a country must meet in order for the country to draw on its loan
or credit." These conditions reflect an essentially capitalist view of
the world and have been the subject of political consternation among
the developing countries that view these conditions as an encroach-
ment on sovereignty and a continuation of colonialism.9 Nevertheless,
structural adjustment is critical for long-run economic growth. Ulti-
mately, structural adjustment will promote economic well-being and,
hence, peace.
Structural adjustment may prove necessary in order to mitigate
the externalities of armed conflict. Armed conflict may result in shocks
to the world economy. Countries dependent on resources from warring
countries may suffer severe economic disadvantages. For example,
Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in August 1990 caused a sharp increase in
oil prices and a severe weakening of the balance of payments posture
of many oil importing countries. 1 Some countries were adversely af-
fected by physical dislocations and lost receipts of remittances from
their nationals working in Iraq and Kuwait. 2 Countries in the pro-
cess of structural adjustment had to adapt their policies to the changed
circumstances.93 After the conflict, reconstruction and recovery in the
region was necessary.9 Both the IMF and the World Bank played
roles in alleviating the adverse economic consequences of the con-
flict.95
G. Deterrence Mechanisms to Avoid Reversion to Conflict
In the nation-state ordered system of international relations that
presently exists, deterrence plays a key role in maintaining peace.
"[Dleterrence has served as a central component of governmental poli-
cies in this contemporary Charter era.... .' Professor Donald
Kagen, a noted historian, has examined the causes of war since the
Peloponnesian War to the contemporary period and concludes as fol-
lows on the importance of deterrence:
What seems to work best, even though imperfectly, is the posses-
sion by those states who wish to preserve the peace of the prepon-
derant power and of the will to accept the burdens and responsibili-
ties required to achieve that purpose. They must understand that
no international situation is permanent, that part of their responsi-
89. PAUL B. STEPHAN [I ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BusINESS AND EcoNoMics: LAW
AND POLICY 245-46 (1993).
90. Id
91. DAVID M. CHENEY, DEALING WITH THE UNEXPECTED: THE IMFS RESPONSE
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bility is to accept and sometime even assist changes, some of which
they will not like, guiding their achievement through peaceful
channels, but always prepared to resist, with force if necessary,
changes made by threats or violence that threaten the general
peace. But this condition is not easy to achieve. In the first place,
the natural distribution of power does not necessarily coincide with
the needs of peacekeeping, Sometimes the balance is so close as to
prevent effective deterrence and to make it tempting to risk war to
gain or prevent a preponderance of power .... Sometimes the
power and will are present but the responsible states are arrogant
and careless."
An effective deterrence system could be implemented by one state
or by a group of states. The United Nations, particularly the operation
of the Security Council through Chapter VII of the Charter, could come
to represent an effective deterrence mechanism. 8 Based on current
events in Bosnia and previously in Somalia, it would appear that the
United Nations has a long road ahead in order to become effective in
this area. The primary burden thus falls upon individual states, either
unilaterally or though the United Nations, to serve as the primary
implementers of deterrence throughout the world.
H. Disarmament and Nonproliferation
Peace-building requires both disarmament and nonproliferation.
The end of the Cold War and the advance of technology have resulted
in more complex scenarios and in a multiplicity of actors with the
ability to initiate armed conflict and, in some instances, to even ini-
tiate nuclear conflict."
An effective system of disarming states and of engaging states in
nonproliferation obligations is plainly in the interests of peace-build-
ing. The United Nations has on occasion sought to disarm factions in a
conflict." In the case of Somalia, the United Nations has been criti-
cized for not disarming the Somali factions at the outset of the Chap-
ter VII operation in that country."1 This type of ad hoc disarmament
is clearly prudent. But, disarmament as a peace-building effort must
be extensive, systematic, and permanent in nature.
97. DONALD KAGAN, ON THE ORIGINS OF WAR AND THE PRESERVATION OF
PEACE 570 (1995); see also JOHN N. MOORE, CRISIS IN THE GULF (1992).
98. See SHARP, supra note 4, at 82-85.
99. David A. Koplow & Philip G. Schrag, Carrying a Big Carrot: Linking Multi-
lateral Disarmament and Development Assistance, 91 COLuM. L. REv. 993, 997.98
(1991).
100. See Han, supra note 15.
101. Remarks by Abdikarim A. Omar, former Ambassador of Somalia to the Unit-
ed States, in course, United Nations Peace Operations, held at the Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center, Summer 1995.
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Disarmament alone is not enough."'2 There must exist the presence
of other, more powerful factors, such as participatory pluralism and an
effective deterrence system, in order to create the conditions for disar-
mament. As explained by one scholar, "[e]ffective security must pre-
cede disarmament.""
III. STRUCTURAL INADEQUACIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS' °4
This section sets forth a critical examination of the authority and abili-
ty of the United Nations to credibly and effectively implement peace-
building as defined in the preceding section. Can the United Nations
implement or enforce the above norms in a manner that is lawful un-
der international law? If not the United Nations, do other institutions
exist that could lawfully implement all or some of these norms? As
demonstrated below, serious structural inadequacies preclude the
meaningful implementation of peace-building. The United Nations and
other existing institutions were created at the end of World War II, at
the beginning of the Cold War, and to implement the transition from
the colonial period. The structure of these organizations and the princi-
ples upon which they are built are not grounded in the transformation
to which the post Cold War era global community is witness in present
times. 5
A. The United Nations and the United Nations Charter
1. The Potential Role of the Security Council
Attempting to apply the provisions of the United Nations Charter
to a peace-building context presents some difficult questions. Can the
Security Council deploy forces in order to implement or enforce the
above norms? Is an unstable regime, characterized by a lack of democ-
racy, sufficient reason for the Security Council to take some form of
action? Does the Security Council have to use force, or can it under-
take other, i.e. economic or social, measures?
There are two important chapters of the United Nations Charter
for purposes of Security Council action. Chapter VI of the Charter,
entitled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," permits consensual, impartial
activity initiated by the Security Council within a state'06 The Unit-
ed Nations' personnel involved in a Chapter VI effort operate in a
102. MOORE ET AL., supra note 20, at 555.
103. Id.
104. The concept of structural inadequacies is from Koplow & Schrag, supra note
99, at 993.
105. See Donald F. McHenry, Ambassador, Peacekeeping in the Post Cold War
Era, 19 S. ILL U. L.J. 107 (1994).
106. U.N. CHARTER art. 36, 9 1.
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country or region with the consent of the parties to the dispute and
cannot take sides in the dispute."7 The Security Council may only
"recommend" actions to resolve the dispute."8 As part of its Chapter
VI functions, the Security Council "may investigate any dispute, or any
situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a
dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute
or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security."'"
In contrast to Chapter VI of the Charter, Chapter VII permits the
Security Council to use coercive, non-consensual force on the basis of a
finding under Article 39 of the Charter."' Article 39 provides as fol-
lows:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accor-
dance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.'
Article 41 provides for the implementation of sanctions not involv-
ing the use of force, such as economic sanctions; 2 Article 42 provides
for the use of military force." Thus, the issue is whether the breach
of the above norms, or the absence of characteristics in a state or re-
gion of these norms, could constitute a "threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression,"114 allowing either economic or mili-
tary "actions" under Chapter VII of the Charter.
Two schools of thought exist on the interpretation of Chapter VII.
One school of thought contends that Chapter VII should be relied upon
to deal only with the more traditional acts of armed force and not to
stop human rights violations, to depose a repressive regime, or to im-
pose stability in a purely civil context.1 5 For purposes of analysis, I
call this school of thought the "interpretivist" school."1
107. SHARP, supra note 4, at 37, 44.
108. Id.
109. U.N. CHARTER art. 34.
110. SHARP, supra note 4, at 37, 44.
111. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
112. 112 U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
113. U.N. CHARTER art. 42,
114. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
115. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
How WE USE IT 254-57 (1994); Michael J. Glennon, Sovereignty and Community
after Haiti: Rethinking Collective Use of Force, 89 AM. J. INTL L. 70 (1995); Oscar
Schachter, Editorial Comment, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 645 (1984).
116. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND MISTRUST 11-40 (1980). The idea for the
term "interpretivist" was drawn from Professor Ely's discussion of this term in the
context of the U.S. Constitution.
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There is a great deal of appeal to the interpretivist school. It is
easily read to be consistent with core principles in the Charter. Article
24(1) of the Charter confers on the Security Council "primary responsi-
bility for the maintenance of international peace and security ....
n11 However, Article 24(2) provides that "fi]n discharging these du-
ties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations."" The Purposes of the United Na-
tions are set forth in Article 1 and its Principles in Article 2. Article 1
of the Charter provides, among other things, that the Purposes of the
United Nations are to maintain international peace and security in
accordance with the "principles of justice and international law.""9
Article 2(7) of the Charter provides:
[niothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members
to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter;
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.'
Furthermore, Article 2(4) of the Charter provides that "[aill Members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."'
Rosalyn Higgins, recently appointed as a judge to the Internation-
al Court of Justice," explains Article 39, in the context of human
rights violations, as follows:
It is ... clear that measures under Articles 41 and 42 depend upon
there having been a finding under Article 39 of the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. No
matter how much one may wish it otherwise, no matter how policy-
directed one might wish choice between alternative meanings to be,
there is simply no getting away from the fact that the Charter
could have allowed for sanctions for gross human-rights violations,
but deliberatively not do so. The only way in which economic or
military sanctions for human-rights purposes could lawfully be
mounted under the Charter is by the legal fiction that human-
rights violations are causing a threat to international peace.'
117. U.N. CHARTER art. 24 J 1; see SHARP, supra note 4, at 37.
118. U.N. CHARTER art. 24 2; see SHARP, supra note 4, at 37.
119. U.N. CHARTER art. 1 1; see SHARP, supra note 4, at 37.
120. U.N. CHARTER art. 2 7.
121. U.N. CHARTER art. 2 4.
122. ICJ Holds Special Elections; Unanimously Elects First Woman to the Court,
ASIL NEWSL, June-Aug. 1995, at 19.
123. HIGGINS, supra note 115, at 255 (emphasis in original).
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Professor Higgins concludes that it is too early to determine whether a
norm is emerging but that there is an "increasing tendency" for the
Security Council to characterize humanitarian problems as threats to
or breaches of the peace and to thus bring them within the scope of
Chapter VII. 2
An analysis of the articles in Chapter VII, particularly Articles 41
and 42, indicates that Chapter VII was not intended to cover peace-
building situations. A teleological interpretation of Chapter VII indi-
cates that it is designed to address acts of armed aggression in an
international conflict. For example, Article 41 allows for "interruption
of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio,
and other means of communication. .. . "" These are hardly mea-
sures that appear to be required for peace-building based on the above
norms. Chapter VII seems designed mainly to deal with short-term in-
ternational crises involving armed force.
A broad reading of Chapter VII to address human rights prob-
lems, repressive regimes, or humanitarian needs has been viewed as
inconsistent with the principle of sovereignty." In traditional inter-
national law parlance, the form and structure of a government, a
government's tendency to commit human rights violations within its
borders, and a government's respect for rule of law are irrelevant to
triggering Chapter VII Indeed, the United Nation's is in part
"based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Mem-
bers."1" The core of the United Nations' collective security system is
the sovereignty of the nation-state. Broadly based Security Council
actions focused on domestic conditions in a country would, the argu-
ment goes, allow powerful states to interfere in the domestic affairs of
weaker states.' As explained by Professor Michael Glennon in the
context of Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda, the terms necessary to trigger
Article 39, namely, a breach of or threat to the peace:
... are left undefined by the Charter. At a minimum, breach of the
peace would seem to imply some violation of sovereignty or cross-
border intervention causing armed conflict, and a threat to the
peace would thus entail the creation of an unreasonable risk of
such an occurrence. Absent these elements, the possibility of Secu-
rity Council interference in member states' internal affairs is too
great, and the Charter flatly prohibits the United Nations from in-
terfering in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of states. True,
124. Id. at 256-57.
125. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
126. See Mark R. Hutchinson, Restoring Hope: U.N. Security Council Resolutions
for Somalia and an Expanded Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 34 HARV. INT'
L.J. 624, 636 (1993).
127. Glennon, supra note 115, at 71.
128. U.N. CHARTER art. 2 1.
129. Hutchinson, supra note 126, at 636.
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this provision does indicate that it ought not to be construed as
prejudicing the application of enforcement measure under chapter
VII; but that proviso need merely be read as requiring that the two
provisions be construed together, as allowing only those enforce-
ment measures that do not conflict with a state's domestic jurisdic-
tion." '
Professor Glennon concludes that without "safeguards," which he ar-
gues do not yet exist, the United Nations should adhere to the princi-
ple of non-interference in domestic affairs of states."3 ' Professor
Glennon's analysis is clearly grounded in the language of Article 2(4)
which requires that members of the United Nations "refrain... from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state ....
The second school of thought contends that Chapter VII covers a
broad array of activities which might be deemed a breach of or threat
to peace, including serious human rights violations and other ostensi-
bly domestic actions.' For purposes of analysis, I call this school of
thought the "substantivist" school. This school of thought appears to be
emerging as the dominant school, both in inquiry by scholars and in
action by the Security Council. Without a proper legal framework for
this school, however, the world is left with a basic indeterminate as to
the role of the Security Council.
This competing school of thought, in its basic conception, contends
that a framework for international law, based solely on a set of rules,
is impracticable; international law should serve conceptions of commu-
nity-based policy, particularly because of rapid change in the interna-
tional community. "" Substantivists seek a basis for authority on a
supranational basis which transcends the nation-state. Sovereignty, in
this conception, is held by the people of a country and not by the rul-
ing elites who have been able to use sovereignty as a shield against
scrutiny of repression and corruption.3  Within this framework, sov-
ereignty has as its base a conception that results in rules or principles
to determine who is entitled to assert it on behalf of a state.
The Charter could be read to be consistent with this approach,
too. The Charter's Preamble and its statement of Purposes in Article 1
"clearly recognized the intimate interdependence, if not identity, of
peace and human rights and made the protection of human rights
130. Glennon, supra note 115, at 72.
131. Id. at 74.
132. U.N. CHARTER art. 2 1 4.
133. See McDougal, supra note 2; W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determi-
nation: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984); Reisman,
supra note 52; Turner, supra note 18.
134. McDougal, supra note 2, at 4.
135. Reisman, supra note 53, at 795.
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coordinate with the maintenance of peace."3 ' The drafters of Article
2(7) of the Charter, however, intended to preclude the Charter's hu-
man rights provisions from being construed to provide the United
Nations with the authority to intervene in states' domestic affairs.'"
Notwithstanding the original intent for Article 2(7), subsequent
developments allow for new interpretations of the Charter while main-
taining the rule of law. International law evolves as a matter of cus-
tom and state practice.' The Charter should be interpreted in accor-
dance with this evolving nature of international law. International law
has changed dramatically since 1945. Subjecting the Charter to some
type of "framers' intent" analysis could be deleterious to the evolution
of international law and could render the Charter of limited signifi-
cance or even meaningless. Further, freezing the Charter in time
would seriously distort the purposes of the Charter and hamper efforts
to allow the collective security system envisioned by the framers to
respond to change in the international legal and political order. This
does not mean that the Charter should be interpreted in an undisci-
plined, result-oriented manner, but looking to the framers' intent as
the sole or primary focus would prove pedantic. The world is undergo-
ing transformation in the post Cold War era; some countries are able
to agree on political provisions in international agreements and for
international institutions, the content of which they could never agree
upon during the Cold War." Any sound interpretation of the Char-
ter must reflect developments in international law; such an interpre-
tation would enhance, not injure, the concept of world order through
law.
Indeed, this evolving approach to Charter interpretation is the
only approach which would seem to be consistent with the doctrine of
jus cogens. Certain international law principles are so fundamental so
as to be non-derogable. These principles must be respected regardless
of the Charter provisions; these principles supersede treaties." Since
jus cogens can evolve over time, the Charter also must evolve, or it will
become an unworkable instrument.
The substantivist approach to interpreting the Charter is consis-
tent with the manner in which the United States Constitution has
been interpreted throughout most of United States history. It is a
method of interpretation that acknowledges the difficulties of seman-
136. McDougal, supra note 2, at 13.
137. 10 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 83 (1945), quoted in MOORE ET AL, supra note 20, at
677.
138. See International Court of Justice Statute art. 38; Restatement of the Law of
Foreign Relations §102.
139. See John W. Head, Supranational Law: How the Move Toward Multilateral
Solutions is Changing the Character of "International* Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 605
(1994).
140. Shihata, supra note 54, at 35.
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tics and linguistics, and how abstractions in language can fail to allow
for definitive resolutions in a consistent manner in each case."' As
explained by Karl Llewellyn, postulated in the context of the United
States Constitution, the Charter should be viewed as an institution
rather than as a document."2
Under the substantivist approach, the scope of Article 2(7) shrinks
considerably." Security Council actions to enforce democracy and
rule of law do not implicate Article 2(4) because there is no violation of
"political independence" or "territorial integrity."'" "Threats to the
peace" or "breaches of the peace" under Article 39 could conceivably en-
compass a wide range of peace-building initiatives. Security Council
actions consistent with this approach have already occurred in Haiti,
Somalia, and Rwanda.
The substantivist approach provides the United Nations with
considerable flexibility. Of course, this method of interpretation must
be principled. As explained by Professor Reisman:
there is a limit to 'institutional elasticity,' i.e., the extent to which
institutions created and still used for other purposes can be
'stretched' in order to get them to perform human rights functions,
especially when these functions are accomplished at the expense of
their manifest functions. Institutions simply cannot do everything
we think they are capable of, if this requires them to move too far
from their manifest mandate." 6
Even if one concludes that the Security Council does have the
authority to engage in peace-building, that conclusion does not answer
the question of the specific measures available to the Security Council.
The implications for Security Council involvement are radical in na-
ture. Could the Security Council use or approve military force by its
members to overthrow a non-democratic government? One can see the
need for such action in certain contexts. But repressive regimes often
commit other destabilizing actions, such as genocide and armed at-
tacks of neighboring countries, so that reliance by the Security Council
on the lack of democracy alone may prove unnecessary. '
141. See KN. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 1
(1934); ELY, supra note 116, at 1-41. Cf McDougal and Feliciano, Goal Clarification
by Configurative Analysis: An Alternative Conception 154-55, in LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961), quoted in MOORE ET AL., supra note 20, at 94.
142. Llewellyn, supra note 141.
143. See MOORE ET AL, supra note 20, at 678.
144. Turner, supra note 18, at 24-25.
145. Hutchinson, supra note 126; Turner, supra note 18.
146. W. Michael Reisman, Through or Despite Governments: Differentiated Respon-
sibilities in Human Rights Programs, 72 IOWA L. REV. 391, 395 (1987).
147. New Global Order, supra note 24, at 640.
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In some cases, a coercive force would be unnecessary or imprudent
for peace-building.1" Election monitoring, non-violent pressure, and
proactive development assistance may prove sufficient in some situa-
tions. The Security Council, however, may not be the appropriate body
to undertake such actions.
The -extent of United Nations involvement in peace-building hing-
es to a great degree on whether the United Nations relies upon Chap-
ter VI or Chapter VII of the Charter. Although effectively used in the
past, Chapter VI may prove ineffective in post Cold War peace-
building. It is intended primarily to facilitate the process of decoloniza-
tion and the achievement of independence of former colonies. "9 An
examination of the peace-building efforts of the United Nations to date
reveals that these efforts have been limited in scope and that they
have been, with a few notable exceptions, Chapter VI actions."
Chapters VI and VII of the Charter provide awkward and difficult
authority for United Nations peace-building. Reliance on the Security
Council seems to be unsatisfactory for effective peace-building.
2. If Not the Security Council, Then What Other Body?
Looking elsewhere for peace-building authority, outside of the
jurisdiction of the Security Council, leaves one pessimistic. The Eco-
nomic and Social Council would seem at first blush to be either an
alternative or a complement to the Security Council, depending on the
situation. The Charter provides that the Economic and Social Council
"may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the
Security Council upon its request.""'
The Economic and Social Council has proven to be ineffective. Its
ineffectiveness is largely due to the fact that it is a body of inquiry and
not of action, subservient to the General Assembly and the Security
Council. It essentially functions as an organization to study problems.
Given the problems of that plague many bureaucracies, it is doubtful
whether the Economic and Social Council could be remade, even if the
applicable Charter provisions were rewritten.
The anachronistic character of the Charter is further illustrated
by a review of Chapter XII, which established the trusteeship system
for territories that are not yet states, and Chapter XIII, which estab-
lished the Trusteeship Council. If any section of the Charter shows the
Charter's emphasis on decolonization, it is these sections. Today, these
148. Id. at 628.
149. DEPARMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, UNITED NATIONS, EVERYONE'S UNITED
NATIONS: A HANDBOOK ON THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 98-99 (10th ed.
1986).
150. See generally Han, supra note 15.
151. U.N. CHARTER art. 65.
278 VOL. 24:2,3
PEACE-BUILDING
sections take up an inordinate amount of space in the Charter, al-
though they once dealt with pressing issues. Most trust territories
have made the transition to statehood; therefore, the Trusteeship
Council has very little to do. In fact, current members of the United
Nations are exempt from the trusteeship system."5 2 It would be offen-
sive to place a country into such a system; it could appear to be a re-
version to colonial rule. Trust administration has a very small role in
the post Cold War world. The Trusteeship Council is on the extreme
margins of the pressing problems of the world.
There have been other organizations established under the auspic-
es of the United Nations, in response to problems of the day, which are
not specified in the Charter. For example, the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development was established as an alternative to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to provide developing
countries with stronger representation in international trade mat-
ters.' The Human Rights Commission, another example, was estab-
lished to promote human rights.1 ' These organizations are not well
funded, are ad hoc in nature, and spend most of their time in the in-
quiry stages. In their present structure, these organizations would not
be effective in implementing peace-building.
B. The "Economic" Institutions
In 1944, during the same time period in which the United Nations
Charter was being formulated at Dumbarton Oaks and later in San
Francisco, the Monetary and Financial Conference was held in Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire.1" The IMF and the World Bank were
formed as a result of the Bretton Woods Conference.15
The IMF was created to promote and to maintain relative ex-
change rate stability, to alleviate short-run balance of payments prob-
lems, and to establish an orderly method for countries' exchange rate
payments. 57 Although not created with any special emphasis on de-
veloping countries, since, at the time of its creation, many countries
were only at the beginning of their decolonization, the IMF role has
evolved and the IMF has been involved in the efforts of developing
countries to promote structural adjustment.' The IMF will make
loans and stand-by arrangements with countries only on the basis of
152. U.N. CHARTER art 78.
153. Brown, supra note 82, at 360.
154. New Global Order, supra note 24, at 619.
155. Brown, supra note 82, at 352.
156. Id.
157. See DAViD D. DRiScOLL, THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK- How Do THEY
DimaE? 2-3 (1994).
158. Brown, supra note 82, at 352-53.
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strict conditionality.W The lenders must adhere to rigorous macro-
economic policies in order to draw down IMF facilities. This condition-
ality also helps to establish the creditworthiness of borrower countries
for loans from other sources." °
The World Bank was initially established in order to finance the
reconstruction of countries ravaged by World War II and to finance the
development of developing countries.'61 The Bank's focus today is on
the elimination of poverty. It has evolved considerably over the years
and is now the primary development banker in the world. The World
Bank makes project-based as well as policy-based loans, structural
adjustment. 2 There exist also regional development banks, such as
the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank,
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and
the African Development Bank; however, their portfolios are far small-
er than the World Bank's portfolio.
Although these institutions can do a great deal to promote devel-
opment throughout the world, they are far from the ideal institutions
for peace-building. As a threshold matter, all of these institutions, with
the exception of the EBRD, are expressly prohibited from taking politi-
cal considerations into account." With the exception of the
EBRD,' these are institutions of the Cold War. Moreover, these in-
stitutions require a fairly stable environment in which to work. They
lend and otherwise deal with money. As lenders, they must protect the
159. Id. at 352; STEPHAN III ET AL, supra note 89, at 244-46.
160. Brown, supra note 82, at 352.
161. Brown, supra note 82, at 353; DRISCOLL, supra note 157, at 6-7.
162. For a general description of the World Bank's activities, see STEPHAN III ET
AL, supra note 89.
163. Article 1 of the World Bank's Articles of Agreement provides as follows:
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of
any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the polit-
ical character of the member or members concerned. Only economic
considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these consider-
ations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes
stated in Article I.
Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, amended by Dec. 16, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 1942. A similar
provision appears in Article 1 of the Articles of Agreement of the International Mon-
etary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401 (1947); amended by July 28, 1969, 20
U.S.T. 2775 and Apr. 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203. See Cahn, supra note 39, at 163
(arguing that the World Bank violates the above provision); Margaret Conklin &
Daphne Davidson, The LM.F. and Economic and Social Human Rights: A Case
Study of Argentina, 1958-1985, in INTERNATIONAL BORROWING: NEGOTIATING AND
STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL DEBT TRANSACTIONS 209 (Roberto G. MacLean et al
eds., 1994).
164. "The EBRD, a post Cold War institution created in May 1990, is overtly
political in character and has the ability to exercise political conditionality over its
loans. It finances projects in Central and Eastern Europe, in the Newly Independent
States, and in the Russian Federation." Linarelli, supra note 41, at 361-65.
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assets of their shareholders and creditors and must avoid transactions
in which there is an undue amount of political risk.' The World
Bank must consider political risk just as any other lender.'" Al-
though a development bank, such as the World Bank, can take risks
which are greater than a commercial bank, there still must be an ac-
ceptable minimum level of political stability and security in a country
or loan proceeds would be wasted. Good governance in the borrowing
country is an important precedent to development lending."7
. The Bretton Woods institutions can do little to assist those coun-
tries at the early stages of peace-building. They can become involved
only at a point of time in which a country is substantially on the road
to political stability. Thus, there is a void between United Nations
functions in peace-building and that of the Bretton Woods institutions.
Situations can conceivably arise in a country in which there is no live
conflict or dispute which the United Nations can seek to resolve but in
which the Bretton Woods Institutions can have no or marginal involve-
ment.
C. Regional and Non-governmental Organizations
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter addresses "Regional
Arrangements."'" Article 52 of Chapter VIII provides as follows:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to
the maintenance of international peace and security as are appro-
priate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or
agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations."
Regional organizations have played roles mainly in the pacific settle-
ment of disputes under Chapter VI and not in coercive actions under
Chapter VII." But, certain non-governmental organizations, such as
the International Committee for the Red Cross, can play significant
roles in Chapter VII operations. 7'
The roles of regional organizations and non-governmental organi-
zations in peace-building are limited. Many of these organizations
suffer from even more financial and bureaucratic constraints than
those from which the United Nations suffers. 7 ' They are further con-
165. See IBRAHiM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SE-
LECTED ESSAYS 62-78 (Franziska Tschofen & Antonio R. Para eds., 1991).
166. 1&
167. Id
168. U.N. CHARTER Ch. VIII.
169. U.N. CHARTER art. 52.
170. SHARP, supra note 4, at 69.
171. Id at 70-72.
172. This point was suggested by Professor Gary S. Sharp, Sr., in the course,
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strained by their limited mandates and the often lukewarm support of
their membership. Non-governmental organizations can be granted
consultative status with the Economic and Social Council. 73 Thus,
they can have only a restricted role in an organization that at present
itself has only limited role in peace-building. 7 " These organizations
do not present an effective supranational ability to implement peace-
building. At most, in their present state, they can perform complemen-
tary or subsidiary functions.
D. Unilateral Actions
An alternative to collective action in the peace-building area is
unilateral action by single states. This approach may work in limited
circumstances. As a general method of peace-building, unilateral action
is imprudent for a number of reasons.
No one state could be able to take on such a daunting task. In-
deed, no one state could afford to take on such a role from a financial
point of view. Multilateral actions are prudent because they allow a
"leveraging" of principles as well as resources. 7
Unilateral action may violate international law principles of non-
intervention. Some have suggested that unilateral intervention to sup-
port new democracies would be appropriate. T' Such an approach
could serve to avoid the problem of instability in new democracies. 7
The concept of non-intervention or non-interference in the internal
affairs of a state are sometimes used to prop up oppressive elites with-
in a country.
The problem of determining when and in what circumstances
action to support a democracy would be appropriate provides strong
justification for the collective security system which forms the basis for
the United Nations Charter based order. Peace-building should be
implemented within a collective structure to avoid problems of credibil-
ity and charges of neocolonialism and selective and unjust en--
forcement. As explained by Professor Franck in the context of the
emerging right to democratic entitlement, "Itihat a new rule might au-
United Nations Peace Operations, offered at the Georgetown University Law Center,
Summer 1995.
173. U.N. CHARTER art. 71; see SHARP, supra note 4, at 70.
174. See supra part III.A.
175. See James A. Leach, A Republican Looks at Foreign Policy, 71 FOREIGN AFF.
17, 22 (Summer 1992). "[I]n addition to leveraging dollars, these (multilateral finan-
cial] institutions allow the West to leverage principles. Few governments are prone
to bow to pressure for market-oriented reform coming from a single country. Many,
however, will institute politically difficult reforms as prerequisites for IMF and
World Bank support." Id.
176. W. Michael Reisman, supra note 53.
177. See supra part IIA
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thorize actions to enforce democracy still conjures up just such chilling
images to weaker states, which see themselves as the potential objects
of enforcement of dubious democratic norms under circumstances of
doubtful probity."' The challenge of peace-building remains in the
possibilities of implementing effective collective action, outside of mili-
tary action, under Chapter VII of the Charter. That the collective secu-
rity system has failed in some cases to provide relief to new democ-
racies does not justify its abandonment. Rather, it would seem that a
strengthening of the collective system would prevent egregious situa-
tions from "falling through the cracks."
IV. CONCLUSION
A significant evolution of international law principles relevant to
peace-building appears to be taking place. Changing principles of sov-
ereignty and non-intervention are causing a shrinking domaine reserve
for states and expanded views on the appropriateness of humanitarian
intervention. 79 The veil of sovereignty is being pierced by the evolu-
tion of human rights principles. Traditional principles governing state
succession are giving way to concepts of popular sovereignty and legiti-
mization of governments through proper elections."s Some scholars
have asserted an emerging norm of democratic entitlement.'' Ex-
panded views of the principle of self determination, beyond the view
that it is merely a concept applicable to decolonization, are
emerging.
18 2
Whether these principles are aspirational ideas of scholars or
positivist conceptions of international law has yet to be definitively
determined. Peace-building can provide the framework for that deter-
mination. From a pragmatic standpoint, however, it is doubtful that
the United Nations, or any other institution, can provide a comprehen-
sive institutional base for peace-building. Coordination among insti-
tutions should help but will not result in an effective institutional
structure. Structural inadequacies in the current state of affairs create
a chasm between the United Nations and other institutions.' Some
countries and regions in dire need of peace-building will go unserviced,
with the result being continued conflict and need for traditional United
Nations peace operations. In this article, I have attempted to lay the
groundwork for some new thinking about peace-building and world
peace through law.
178. Democratic Governance, supra note 24, at 84.
179. See supra part III.A.
180. See supra parts 1IA, III.A.
181. See supra part II.A.
182. See Christian Tomuschat, Self-Determination in a Post-Colonial World, in
MODERN LAW OF SELF DETERMINATION 1 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993).
183. See supra part III.
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Enforcement of the Law in International and
Non-International Conflicts - The Way
Ahead
L. C. GREEN*
In his great work on war, Quincy Wright says comparatively little
on the law of war and virtually nothing on its breaches or enforce-
ment.' More concerned with problems of prevention and alternatives
to war, in fact no reference to war crimes or crimes against humanity
appears anywhere in his index. Under the rubric of "law of war," the
index indicates a fairly lengthy chapter on the "theory of modern war,"
yet the mention of jus in bello offers no discussion. A reference to
Nuremberg in the index under "Nurnberg charter, and aggression,
1540," leads nowhere. Despite the finding by the Nuremberg Tribunal
that Hague Convention V2 constituted customary international law,'
Wright seems more concerned with the fact that the 1899 and 1907
conferences dealt with arbitration, although he does concede that "they
contributed to the codification of the law of war."
In Appendix XV, Wright draws attention to the "military characteris-
tics of the historic civilizations," beginning with ancient Egypt and
pursuing the subject through to the nineteenth century. Still, nowhere
does he refer to the means by which these civilizations regulated the
conduct of their forces. However, after commenting upon the intense
enmity that usually accompanies ideological conflict (reverberating for
the contemporary reader in Bosnia) he points out that:
the law of war, particularly that part dealing with the conduct of
war (the jus in bello), has sought to counteract this tendency by
setting limits to the methods which may be used in order to reduce
destructiveness and to make future reconciliation possible. When
war is fought for broad, ideological objectives, such rules have tend-
ed to break down because the end is thought to justify all means
and war has tended to become absolute. Though the development of
civilization has tended to the emphasis upon such objectives in war,
it has also tended to the development of sentiments of humanity
0 C.M., LL.B., LL.D., F.RIS.C., University Professor Emeritus, Honorary Profes-
sor of Law, University of Alberta; Visiting Professor, University of Denver College of
Law
1. QUINCY WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR (1965).
2. Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, reprinted in
SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CoNFLlcTs 63 (1988).
3. Nuremberg Judgment, 41 AM. J. INTL L. 172, 249 (1946).
4. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 339.
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and more longsighted expediency. Consequently, the rise of a civili-
zation has meant more legal regulation of war, but also more ap-
peal to military necessity as a ground for evading such rules in
practice.6
This reference to "civilization" and the "sentiments of humanity,"
especially the current tendency to refer to the laws of armed conflict as
"international humanitarian law,"" cause one to recall the comment of
Clausewitz:
War is an act of force, there is no logical limit to the application of
force .... Attached to force are certain self-imposed imperceptible
limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as international law
and custom, but they scarcely weaken it.... [In fact,] kind-heart-
ed people might... think there was some ingenious way to disarm
or defeat an enemy without bloodshed, and might imagine that is
the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy
that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the
mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.... [How-
ever,] if civilizations do not put their prisoners to death or devas-
tate cities and countries, it is because intelligence plays a larger
part in their methods of warfare [than was the case among savag-
es] and has taught them, more effective ways of using force than
the crude expression of instinct.7
In fact, history indicates that some of the peoples that Clausewitz
would undoubtedly have described as "savages" were aware of the need
to limit the horrors of conflict and, in many instances, were prepared
to threaten punishment of those in breach of the law, even if that law
was only regarded as the law of the gods. Already in the Old Testa-
ment we find clear references to the obligation to treat both wounded
and prisoners with humanity. Thus, the Israelites were instructed,
"rejoice not when thine enemy falleth, and let not thine heart be glad
when he stumbleth; Lest the Lord see it, and it displeases Him, and he
turn His wrath away from him."' Again, "if thine enemy be hungry,
give him bread to eat; and if he be thirsty, give him water to drink."9
But perhaps the most significant comment is to be found in the answer
given by the prophet Elisha when asked by the king whether he
should slay his prisoners: "Thou shalt not smite them: wouldest thou
smite those whom thou hast taken captive with thy sword and with
thy bow? Set bread and water before them, that they may eat and
5. Id. at 160-161.
6. BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 vii (1994): "The parts of international law
supposed to control and moderate [war], the Laws of War as they were formerly
known, have become, in our age, more highly developed than ever before and popu-
larly known as International Humanitarian Law."
7. VON CLAUSEWrrz, ON WAR bk. I, ch.1, 9 2, 3, 75, 76 (Howard and Paret
eds., 1976).
8. Proverbs, 24, 21.
9. Proverbs, 25, 21.
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drink and go to their master. And he prepared great provision for
them: and when they had eaten and drunk, he sent them away and
they went to their master."' °
The sacred writings of ancient India also seek to introduce some
measure of humanitarianism. Both the Ramayana" and
Mahabharata" lay down a series of principles which have only re-
cently become recognized as part of the modem law of armed con-
flict: 3
When he fights with his foes in battle, let him not strike with
weapons concealed in wood, nor with such as are barbed, poisoned,
or the points of which are blazing with fire. Neither poisoned nor
barbed arrows should be used. These are weapons of the wicked. A
car warrior should fight a car warrior. One on horse should fight
one on horse. Elephant riders must fight with elephant riders, as
one on foot fights a foot soldier. When the antagonist has fallen
into distress he should not be struck; brave warriors do not shoot at
one whose arrows are exhausted.14 No one should strike another
that is retreating... let him remember the duty of honourable
warriors; do not kill a man when he is down; even a wicked enemy,
if he seeks shelter, should not be slain.... Car-drivers, men en-
gaged in the transport of weapons... should never be slain. No
one should slay him who goes out to procure forage or fodder, camp
followers or those that do menial service.' No one should kill him
that is skilled in a special art. He is no son of the Vishni race who
slayeth a woman, a boy or an old man. Let him not strike one who
has been grievously wounded. A wounded opponent shall either be
sent to his own home, or if brought to the victor's quarters, have
his wounds attended to, and when cured he shall be set at liberty.
This is eternal duty. Night slaughter [is] horrible and infamous.
With death our enmity has terminated... Customs, laws and
family usages which obtain in a country should be preserved when
10. Kings, 6, 22-23.
11. Sanskrit epic composed in 3rd century B.C.
12. Epic Sanskrit poem based on Hindu ideals, probably composed between 200
B.C. and 200 A.D.
13. The examples given are taken from Armour, Customs of Warfare in Ancient
India, 8 TRANSACTIONS OF ThE GROTIUS SOcIETY 71, 73-77, 81 (1922).
14. This should be compared with the argument put forward by Kapitanleutnant
(Ing) Lenz for his part in firing upon survivors after the sinking of The Peleus, 1
U.N. War Crimes Commission, 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRLAS OF WAR CRIMINAIS 1, 3-4
(1947). A full report of the trial will be found in CAMERON, THE PELEUS TRIAL
(1948).
15. This should be compared with the statement by Fluellen at Agincourt in
1415, as reported by WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V, act 4, scene 7, 11.5-20: "kill
the boys and take the luggage! 'is expressly against the law of arms: tis as arrant
a piece of knavery as can be offer'd" This statement was made in connection with
Henry's order to kill the French prisoners as a reprisal for the slaughter of the
'boys.* It would seem that Shakespeare based his account on Holinshed's CHRONI-
CLES, but a somewhat different version is given by VATrEL, DROIT DES GENS, liv. III,
ch. VIII, §.152 (1758).
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the country has been acquired. Having conquered the country of his
foe, let him not abolish or disregard the laws of that country. A
king should never do such an injury to his foe as would rankle in
the latter's heart.
Perhaps the leading commentator on the international law of
classical times is Coleman Phillipson. 6 He tells us, 7 in both Hellas
and Rome, the rules of war applied only to "civilized sovereign States,
properly organized and enjoying a regular constitution; .... [HIence
barbarians, savage tribes, bands of robbers and pirates, and the like
were debarred from the benefits and relaxations established by inter-
national law and custom." War in general practice in Hellas, recorded
in the narratives of Greek writers, wavered between brutal cruelty and
generosity:'8
In Homer... hostilities for the most part assumed the form of
indiscriminate brigandage, and were but rarely conducted with a
view to achieving regular conquests, and extending the territory of
the victorious community. Extermination rather than subjection of
the enemy was the usual practice.... Sometimes prisoners were
sacrificed to the gods, corpses mutilated and mercy refused to chil-
dren, and to the old and sickly. On the other hand, acts of mercy
and nobility were frequent.... The adoption of certain cowardly,
inhuman practices, such as, for example, the use of poisoned weap-
ons, was condemned.
The conduct of war, Phillipson continues, was affected by the size of
these States:
Hostility against the State, in the eyes of the individual living in
such a small State, provided the glue to tie individual with country
more closely, whose subjects were to an extraordinary degree ani-
mated by patriotism and devotion to their mother-country, that ev-
ery individual was more affected by hostilities than are the cities of
the large modern States, that every individual was a soldier-politi-
cian who saw his home, his life, his family, his gods, at stake, and,
finally, that he regarded each and every subject of the opposing
States as his personal enemy.... [Nevertheless,] temples, and
priests, and embassies were considered inviolable. The right of
sanctuary was universally recognized. Mercy was shown to suppli-
ants and helpless captives. Prisoners were ransomed and ex-
changed. Safe-conducts were granted and respected. Truces and
armistices were established and, for the most part, faithfully ob-
served. Solemn oaths were fulfilled. Burial of dead was permitted,
16. PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSMM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND
ROME (1911).
17. Id. at vol. 2, 195, 207-209, 210, 221-3; See also, THUCYDIDES, THE
PELEPPONESAN WAR 79 et seq. (Hobbes trans., 1676).
18. See, e.g., HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 34, bk. I, 11. 260-63, 221-3 (Lattimore ed.,
1965).
19. PHULLIPSON, supra note 16, at 17.
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and graves were unmolested. It was considered wrong and impious
to cut off or poison the enemy's water supply, or to make use of poi-
soned weapons. Treacherous stratagems were condemned as being
contrary to civilized warfare. And ... it is essential to emphasize
that the non-existence of the law and universally accepted custom
relating to them is not necessarily proved when we point here and
there to conduct of a contrary nature.... [The Roman practice]
varied according as their wars were commenced to exact vengeance
for gross violations of international law or for deliberate acts of
treachery. Their warlike usages varied also according as their ad-
versaries were regular enemies.., or uncivilized barbarians and
bands of pirates and marauders .... Undoubtedly, the belligerent
operations of Rome, from the point of view of introducing various
mitigations in the field, and adopting a milder policy after victory,
are distinctly of a progressive character. They were more regular
and disciplined than those of any other ancient nation. They did
not as a rule degenerate into indiscriminate slaughter and unre-
strained devastation. The ius bell imposed restrictions on barba-
rism an condemned all acts of treachery .... [Livy tells us]
20
there were laws of war as well as peace, and the Romans had
learnt to put them into practice not less justly than bravely....
The Romans [says Cicero]" refuse to countenance a criminal at-
tempt made on the life of even a foreign aggressor...."
In classical times the only sanction for breaches of the law of war
appears to have been condemnation by the gods, although Justinian
informs us that "any person who in war commits any act forbidden by
his commander shall suffer death, even if his mission be successfully
accomplished."' A similar situation existed in Islam: the ninth centu-
ry Siyar by Shaybani' bans the killing of women, children, the old,
the blind, the crippled, and the helpless insane. Muslims were under
legal obligations to respect the rights of nonMuslims, both combatants
and civilians; prisoners of war were not to be killed, but ransomed or
set free as an act of grace, although, if it were advantageous to Mus-
lims, non-Muslim prisoners could be killed unless they converted.2 '
Apparently, the presumption was that true believers in Islam would
comply with the teachings of the Prophet. However, Shaybani consid-
ered that if the governor of a city or province entered "the territory of
war" he was competent to impose religious penalties or retaliation in
cases of theft, adultery or fornication. However, the fact that the drink-
ing of wine was also condemned suggests that these punishments were
not directed to the protection of victims but to the punishment of Mus-
20. Livy, 27 HISTORY OF ROME.
21. CICERO, DE OFncIs i, 11.
22. De re militari, DIGEST XLIX, title 16.
23. TH ISLAMIc LAW OF NATIONS §§ 29-32, 47, 81, 110-111 (Khadduri trans.,
1966).
24. Id. at 13, §§ 44, 55, 95-109.
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lims breaking the laws of the faith.25
The medieval Christian church too relied on divine punishment.
As early as 1096-7 Urban II had condemned the action of crossbowmen
and archers against Christians. In 1139, the Second Lateran Council
anathematized all those using the crossbow and arc, 6 a view which
coincided with the concepts of chivalry as understood by the orders of
knighthood: such weapons could be used from a distance by an unseen
foe, including villeins, enabling a man to strike without risk of himself
being struck. As such, they were considered disgraceful." The use of
darts and catapults was similarly anathematized by the Corpus juris
canonici, 1500, "in order to reduce as far as possible the engines of
destruction and death," although by 1563 these and other weapons
capable of sending "men ... to perdition by the hundreds" were in
common use.' Forces of Bologna in 1439, using a new handgun, shot
down a number of plate-armoured Venetians, provoking such feelings
among the Venetians as to their opponents' disregard for the game of
war that the Venetians slaughtered all prisoners "who had stooped so
low as to use this crude and cowardly innovation," i.e., gunpowder. "It
would, if unchecked, they said, make fighting a positively DANGER-
OUS profession."'
While the church may have relied on divine punishment, the feu-
dal knights were aware of the "law of chivalry," a customary code of
conduct controlling their affairs and enforced either by arbitrators
especially appointed or, in the case of England and France, by Courts
of Chivalry.' In 1307, special military courts were trying allegations
of breach of parole."' The rules of chivalry only applied among the
knights, but they could be enforced by commanders of any nationality.
They were sufficiently widely known by 1370 that at the siege of
Limoges, three captured French knights appealed to John of Gaunt
and the Earl of Cambridge after the English commander issued orders
that no quarter was to be given: "My Lords we are yours, you have
vanquished us. Act therefore to the law of arms."3 Their lives were
25. Id. §§ 126-130.
26. CONTAMAINE, WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES 71 (Jones trans., 1984).
27. Draper,The Interaction of Christiantity and Chivalry in the Historical Devel-
opment of the Law of War, 5 INTL REV. RED X. 3, 19 (1965).
28. BELLI, DE RE MILrTARi ET BELLI I III, cap. 29, 186 (Carnegie trans., 1936)
(1563).
29. TREECE AND OAKESHOTr, FIGHTING MEN - How MEN HAvE FOUGHT
THROUGH THE AGES 207-8 (1963).
30. See, e,g., KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 27 (1965); see
also CONTAMINE, supra note 25 at 270-7; WARD, "Of the Influence of Chivalry," 2
THE FOUNDATION AND HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN EUROPE ch.XIV (1795);
and Gardot, Le Doit de la Guerre dans l'Oeuvre des Capitaines Francois du XVI
Si~c/e, 72 HAGUE RECEUIL 397 (1948).
31. Keen, supra note 29, at 34.
32. Id. at 1.
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spared and they were treated as prisoners.
As has already been pointed out, by the time of Elizabeth I the
principles of the "law of arms" were so well established that Shake-
speare could refer to them in his Henry V. Moreover, as early as 1391
Merigot Marches was tried at Paris for continuing to commit acts of
war after the entrance of a truce.3 Both Edward III of England and
Charles VII of France issued ordinances for the trial of ecorcheurs
34
accused of conducting warlike acts without royal authority. 5 Perhaps
more important than these instances, however, was the trial at
Breisach in 1474 of Peter of Hagenbach. Before a tribunal made up of
representatives of the Hanseatic cities, Hagenbach was tried for hav-
ing administered occupied territory in a manner contrary to "the laws
of God and of man," and was executed regardless of his plea of obedi-
ence to the orders of his lord. 8
It was not only in international wars between, for example, Eng-
land and France, that attempts were made to regulate the behavior of
the troops. Since, however, the laws of chivalry did not apply to com-
mon soldiers, their conduct could only be defined by way of national
codes which condemned particular activities against the inhabitants of
their own country, giving commanders "rights of justice" as laid down
in such codes. Among the earliest of these was that of Richard II of
England, 1385,' which forbade, among other things, pillage of the
church, victuals, provisions, or forage and provided for parole of prison-
ers regarded as the private property not of their captors but of the
king. This system of national regulation was facilitated by the early
fifteenth century. All men-at-arms had to be included in an official
muster, subject to a disciplinary code, including rules concerning the
taking and distribution of booty, as well as forbidding pillage and de-
struction of private property - particularly goods essential for hus-
bandry. Most of such national codes postulated respect for priests,
women, children, the infirm, and the like.' French knights were ada-
mant in protecting the modesty of women found in surrendered cit-
ies," whether in internal wars or not. By ordinance, Coligny, during
the sixteenth century Wars of Religion in France, made violence
against women punishable by death.' Respect for women was so well
established throughout Europe that, writing in 1612, Gentili could
33. Id. at 97-100; further examples are given at 100, n.1.
34. Literally, "skinners," armed bands of free companies.
35. Id. at 97-100.
36. SCHWARZENBERGER, The Law of Armed Conflict, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 39
(1968).
37. WINTHROP, MILrrARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS app. II (1886).
38. See, e.g., Code of Gustavus Aldolphus of Sweden, 1621, Articles and Military
Lawes to be Observed in the Warres, WINTHROP supra note 37, at app. III, art.97.
39. Gardot, supra note 29, at 452-3.
40. Id. at 469.
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state that "to violate the honour of women will always be held to be
unjust," and then quoted as evidence the view of Alexander: "I am not
in the habit of warring with prisoners and women." 1
By the seventeenth century, England had a full system of Articles
of War, a set of regulations on the behavior of the armed forces which
forbade and rendered liable to trial and punishment, among other
things, the marauding of the countryside, individual acts against the
enemy without authorization from a superior, the private taking or
keeping of booty, or the private detention of an enemy prisoner.'2
Similar codes in Switzerland and Germany,' it has been said, com-
bined with the rules of international law, to form "le meilleur frein
pratique pour imposer aux armies le respect d'un modus legitimus de
mener les guerres.""
Regulations for the conduct of war, in some instances together
with acknowledgment of the right of trial, are not only found in the
customs of the knights or the national military codes. Reference must
be made to views of at least some of the classical writers on interna-
tional law,' for to the extent that they expressed commonly held
views of the time, their writings constitute evidence of customary law.
Gentili, for example, wrote:
[Un war.., victory is sought in no prescribed fashion.... Our
only precaution must be not to allow every kind of cunning device;
for evil is not lawful, but an enemy should be dealt with according
to law.... In dealing with a just and lawful enemy [as distinct
from pirates and brigands] we have the whole fetial law and many
other laws in common.... Necessity does not oblige us to violate
the rights of our adversaries... [but t]he laws of war are not ob-
served toward one who does not observe them.'
Nevertheless, he forbids the killing of those who surrender, for it is
"only when we cannot overcome their resistance and bring them to
terms by less severe means, [that] we are justified in taking away
their lives."' He condemns the denial of quarter, reprisals against
prisoners, and violence against women, children, the aged and the sick,
ecclesiastics and men of letters, husbandman, and generally all un-
41. 2 DE JURE BELLI cap. xxi, at 257, 251 (Carnegie trans., 1933).
42. Laws and Ordinances of Warre, reprinted in 1 CLODE, MILITARY FORCES OF
THE CROWN app. VI (1639).
43. Gardot, supra note 29, at 467-68.
44. de Taube, L'apport de Byzance au developpernent du droit international occi-
dental, 67 HAGUE REcunL. 237 (1939).
45. This is the term usually given to the European writers of the fifteenth to
seventeenth century, especially those published in the series of the Carnegie Founda-
tion known as THE CLAssics OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
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armed persons. Equally to be condemned are assassination, the use of
poison and poisoned weapons, and the poisoning of streams, springs,
and wells.'
Gentili's comments should be compared with those of Grotius,
commonly - but wrongly - described as "the father of international
law," who tends to be somewhat self-contradictory: "[Bly the Law of
Nations any Thing done against an Enemy is lawful; .... It is lawful
for an Enemy to hurt another both in Person and Goods... [a]nd for
both sides without Distinction [including killing women, infants and
even prisoners], but it is restrained more or less in some Places by the
particular Law of each State."' Use of poison is unlawful, including
the poisoning of rivers and springs, though not their pollution. Later,
when discussing Moderation concerning the Right of Killing Men in a
Just War,' he quotes Cicero's view that "there are certain Duties to
be observed even to those who have wronged us,"" so that women,
children, old men, priests, and other religious should be spared. "[T]o
these we may justly add those who apply themselves to the Study of
Sciences and Arts beneficial to mankind," as well as farmers, prison-
ers, and those who surrender.52 Finally, he calls for avoidance of use-
less fighting, as a show of strength rather than a true warlike action is
"wholly repugnant to the Duty of a Christian, and Humanity itself.
Therefore all Magistrates ought strictly to forbid these Things, for they
must render an account for the unnecessary shedding of Blood to him,
whose Viceregents they are. "'
Of particular importance, the man in the field, as a participant in
a public matter, was banned from acting as if the conflict were a pri-
vate affair. For example, he may not keep captured property for him-
self, nor commit warlike acts after a retreat or armistice." Moreover,
[Ilt is not enough that we do nothing against the Rules of rigorous
Justice, properly, so called; we must also take Care that we offend
not against Charity, especially Christian Charity. Now this may
happen sometimes; when, for Instance, it appears that such a plun-
dering doth not so much hurt the State, or the King, or those who
are culpable themselves, but rather the Innocent, whom it may
render so extremely miserable.... But, further, if the taking of
this Booty neither contributes to the finishing of the War, nor con-
siderably weaken the Enemy, the Gain arising to himself only from
the Unhappiness of the Times, would be highly unbecoming an
48. Id. §§ 139, 140, 142, 145-7, 155-7, 280-3, 287, 289.
49. 3 DE JuRE BELUI AC PACIS cap IV, §§. xviii, ix, x, xv, xvi, xix (Carnegie
trans., 654, 648, 649, 651, 657) (1625).
50. Id. at cap. XI.
51. DE OFICIIS, cap. XI, §§ ix-xv (trans., at 630, 720).
52. Id. at lib. III, cap. XI, §§. ix-xv (trans., at 640-6; 736-40).
53. Id. § xix (trans., at 649; 673).
54. Id. at cap. XVIII, § i (trans., at 684-5; 788-9).
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honest Man, much more a Christian.... Yet, if a Soldier, or any
other Person, even in a just War, shall burn the Enemy's House,
lay waste their fields, and commit such other Acts of Hostility,
without any Command, and besides when there is no Necessity, or
just Cause, in the Opinion of the Divines he stands obliged to make
Satisfaction for those Damages. I have with Reason added... if
there be not a just Cause, for if there be, he may perhaps be an-
swerable for it to his own State, whose orders he hath trans-
gressed, but not to his Enemy, to whom he hath done no wrong.'
Writing a century later, and with greater knowledge of actual
state practice, Vattel comments:
Since the object of a just war is to overcome injustice and violence,
and to use force upon who is deaf to the voice of reason, a sovereign
has the right to do to his enemy whatever is necessary to weaken
him and disable him from maintaining his unjust position; and the
sovereign may choose the most efficacious and appropriate means
to accomplish this object, provided those means be not essentially
unlawful, and consequently forbidden by the Law of Nations. A
lawful end confers a right only to those means which are necessary
to attain that end. Whatever is done in excess of such measures is
contrary to the natural law, and must be condemned as evil before
the tribunal of conscience.... [Ailso it is very difficult sometimes
to form a just estimate of what the actual situation demands, and,
moreover, as it is for each Nation to determine what its particular
circumstances warrant it in doing, it becomes absolutely necessary
that Nations should mutually conform to certain rules on this sub-
ject. Thus, when it is clear and well recognized that such a mea-
sure, such an act of hostility, is, in general, necessary for overcom-
ing the resistance of the enemy and attaining the object of a lawful
war, that measure, viewed thus in the abstract, is regarded by the
Law of Nations as lawful and proper in war, although the belliger-
ent who would make use of it without necessity, when less severe
measures would have answered his purpose, would not be guiltless
before God and in his own conscience. This is what constitutes the
difference between what is just, proper, and irreprehensible in war,
and what is merely permissible and may be done by Nations with
impunity.'
It is Vattel who of the classical writers, most directly seeks to
restrain the horrors of war. Necessity, providing the only justification
for war, also prescribes the limits on it. Unnecessary acts of hostility
are unjustifiable violations of natural law. Thus, Vattel advocates the
elaboration of a set of general rules, "independent of circumstances and
of certain and easy application," limiting acts to those necessary to
successful prosecution of war:
55. Id. §§ iv, v (trans., at 686; 790-1).
56. 3 LE DRorr DEs GENs ch. VIII, §§ 138, 137 (Carnegie trans., 180, 179)
(1758); see also, RUDDY, INTERNATIONAL LAws IN THE ENUGHTENMENT 245-56 (1975).
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Thus, it is not, generally speaking, contrary to the laws of war to
plunder and lay waste to a country. But if an enemy of greater
superior forces should treat in this way a town or province which
he might easily have held possession of, as a means of obtaining
just and advantageous terms of peace, he would be universally
accused of waging war in a barbarous and uncontrolled manner.
The deliberate destruction of public monuments, temples, tombs,
statues, pictures, etc., is, therefore, absolutely condemned even by
the voluntary Law of Nations, as being under no circumstances
conducive to the lawful object of war. The pillage and destruction of
towns, the devastation of the open country by fire and sword, are
acts no less to be abhorred and condemned on all occasions when
they are committed without evident necessity or urgent reasons.
But as an attempt might be made to excuse these excesses, as be-
ing a punishment merited by the enemy, let us add that by the
natural and voluntary Law of Nations only the most serious offens-
es against the Law of Nations may be punished in this manner."7
It is interesting to note that while Vattel condemns a variety of
acts as contrary to the law of nations and refers to punishment for
such acts, he does not indicate how such punishment is to be meted
out. However, he does record one instance when even death may be
imposed as a punishment:
[Wlhen the enemy have rendered themselves guilty of some grave
violation of the Law of Nations, and especially when they have vio-
lated the laws of war. Such a refusal to spare their lives is not a
natural consequence of the war, but a punishment for their crime,
punishment which the injured party has a right to inflict. But in
order that the punishment may be just, it must fall upon those who
are guilty. When a sovereign is at war with a savage nation which
observes no rules and never thinks of giving quarter he may punish
the Nation in the person of those whom he captures (for they are
among the guilty), and by such severity endeavor to make them
observe the laws of humanity; but in all cases where severity is not
absolutely necessary mercy should be shown.M
Not until the nineteenth century was a code of field army conduct
promulgated, specifying the nature of offenses and providing for trial
and punishment. Formally this code was directed at conduct during a
non-international conflict; however, its provisions were considered to
be of general application, whatever the form of armed conflict involv-
ing forces of the issuing state, and it rapidly became a model for the
armed forces of a variety of other countries, serving as the inspiration
for a series of international instruments. The Code in question was
prepared by Professor Francis Lieber of Columbia University and was
promulgated as law by President Lincoln in 1863 during the American
57. Id. at ch. VIII, § 156, ch. IX, §§ 172-3 (trans., at 289, 294-5).
58. Id. at §§ 140-1 (trans., at 280) (emphasis added).
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Civil War.' According to the Code:
[Mlilitary necessity does not admit of cruelty - that is, the inflic-
tion of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge.... [Tihe
unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as
much as the exigencies of war will admit .... [Pirotection of the
inoffensive citizen of the hostile country is the rule. The United
States acknowledge and protect, in hostile country occupied by
them, religion and morality; strictly private property; the persons of
the inhabitants, especially those of women: and the sacredness of
domestic relations. Offenses to the contrary shall be rigorously pun-
ished. All wanton violence committed against persons in the invad-
ed country... all robbery... or sacking, even after taking the
place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming or killing of such
inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death.... Crimes
punishable by all penal codes, such as arson, murder, assaults,
highrobbery, theft, burglary, fraud, forgery, and rape, if committed
by an American soldier in a hostile country against its inhabitants,
are not only punishable as at home, but in all cases in which death
is not inflicted, the severer penalty shall be preferred. '
Regulations were laid down regarding the rights of prisoners of war as
well as the rights of protected persons, such as medical and religious
personnel. There was even some recognition of the right to punish
prisoners for what are now generally regarded as war crimes."
The rules proposed by Lieber were so consistent with what was
generally accepted as the code of conduct that similar instruments
were soon issued by Prussia, 1870; The Netherlands, 1871; France
1877; Russia, 1877 and 1904; Servia, 1878; Argentina, 1881; Great
Britain, 1883 and 1904; and Spain, 1893.62 However, there was no
internationally accepted document setting out the rules governing
warfare acceptable to the European states, the United States, or the
newly independent states of Latin America. Nevertheless, to the extent
that they express agreement, the rules to be found in these and later
national codes or in the writings of acknowledged international author-
ities constitute the customary international law of armed conflict. To
the extent that they have not been overruled by treaty or expressly
rejected by a state - especially a significant military power - they
are as obligatory as any other rules of international law.
The nineteenth century saw a few attempts at regulating warlike
59. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,
General Orders No. 100, 24 Apr. (1863); SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 3
(1988); see also, Baxter, The First Modern Codification of the Law of War, 3 INVL
REV. RED X. 171 (1963).
60. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,
arts. 16, 2, 37, 44, 47 (emphasis added).
61. Id. art. 59.
62. HOLLAND, THE LAw OF WAR ON LAND 72-3 (1908).
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activities by way of international treaty," but none of these contained
clauses relating to breaches nor made provision for their punishment.
The first document to move in this direction was the Project of an
International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War,
drawn up at the Brussels Conference called by the Czar in 1874."
Although this Project was never adopted as a binding statement of
law, it served as an inspiration for later developments and as a model
for the Preambular ideals ultimately embodied in binding documents.
From the point of view of law enforcement, it merely declared in Arti-
cles 12 and 13 that belligerents did not possess an unlimited power in
their choice of methods of warfare and especially forbade acts which
had already been condemned in sources such as Vattel and the Lieber
Code. The Brussels Declaration inspired the Institute of International
Law to produce the Oxford Manual on the Laws of War clarifying the
rationale behind the propagation of a code of law for armed conflict. Its
Preface merits reproduction:
War holds a great place in history, and it is not to be supposed that
men will soon give it up - in spite of the protests which it arouses
and the horror which it inspires - because it appears to be the
only possible issue of disputes which threatens the existence of
States, their liberty, their vital interests. But the gradual improve-
ment in customs should be reflected in the method of conducting
war. It is worthy of civilized nations to seek "to restrain the de-
structive force of war, while recognizing its inevitable necessities."
The problem is not easy of solution; however, some points have
already been solved, and very recently the draft Declaration of
Brussels has been a solemn pronouncement of good intentions of
governments in this connection. It may be said that independently
of the international law existing on this subject, there are today
certain principles of justice which guide the public conscience,
which are manifested even by general customs, but which it would
be well to fix and make obligatory.... The Institute does not pro-
pose an international treaty, which it might perhaps be premature
or at least very difficult to obtain; but it believes it is fulfilling a
duty in offering to the governments a Manual suitable as the basis
for national legislation in each State, and in accordance with the
provisions of juridical science and the needs of civilized armies.
Rash and extreme rules will not be found therein. The Institute has
not sought innovations in drawing up the Manual; it has contented
itself with stating clearly and codifying the accepted ideas of our
age so far as this has appeared allowable and practicable. By so
doing, it believes it is rendering a service to military men them-
selves. In fact so long as the demands of opinion remain indeter-
minate, belligerents are exposed to painful uncertainty and to end-
63. See, eg. Declaration of Paris, 1856, re maritime warfare; Geneva Convention,
1864, re wounded in armies in the field, 1864; Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868,
re lightweight explosive bullets, etc.
64. SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 25.
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less accusations. A positive set of rules .. if they are judicious,
serves the interest of belligerents and is far from hindering them,
since by preventing the unchaining of passion and savage instincts-
which battle always awakens, as much as it awakens courage and
manly virtue -it strengthens the discipline which is the strength of
armies; it also ennobles that patriotic mission in the eyes of the
soldiers by keeping them within the limits of respect due to the
rights of humanity. But in order to attain this end, it is not suffi-
cient for sov-ereigns to promulgate new laws. It is essential, too,
that they make these laws known among all people, so that when a
war is declared, the men called upon to take up arms to defend the
causes of the belligerent States, may be thoroughly impregnated
with the special rights and duties attached to the execution of such
a command ....
The Manual spelled out a series of specific rules, some of which
are relevant to the problem of enforcing the law: acts of violence are
limited to the forces of belligerent states, who are bound by the laws of
war. As such, states must refrain from unnecessarily cruel and severe
acts, such as punishment of nonbelligerent populations or vanquished
or disabled belligerents, use of arms to cause "superfuous suffering,"
the advance prohibition of quarter, theft, or mutilatation of the dead
on the field of battle, and bombardment of undefended territory. Occu-
piers were bound to respect laws in force during peacetime. Prisoners
of war were considered as being in the hands of the occupying state
rather than the capturing corps of soldiers and as such had the right
of humane treatment under the laws of the capturing army. Punish-
ment of prisoners was recognized in the case of escape or of offenses
against the laws of war."
From the point of view of the development of the history of at-
tempts to deal with breaches, Part III of the Manual is significant:
Part III Penal Sanction: If any of the foregoing rules be violated,
the offending parties should be punished, after a judicial hearing,
by the belligerent in whose hands they are Therefore: Art. 84. Of-
fenders against the laws of war are liable to the punishment speci-
fied in the penal law. This mode of repression, however, is only
applicable when the person of the offender can be secured. In the
contrary case, the criminal law is powerless ... and, if the injured
party deem the misdeed so serious in character as to make it neces-
sary to recall the enemy to a respect for law, no clearer recourse
than a resort to reprisal remains .... Art. 86. In grave cases in
which reprisals appear to be absolutely necessary, their nature and
scope shall never exceed the measure of the infraction of the law of
war committed by the enemy.
The penal law indicated would be the national law, for no provi-
65. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
66. Id. arts. 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 19, 44, 61-3, 68, 70 (emphasis added).
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sion was made for any trial by any international tribunal - in fact at
that time no such tribunal was even considered as a realistic probabili-
ty, nor was any obligation created for a national force to hand an ac-
cused offender to the enemy alleging an offense so that he could stand
trial before an enemy tribunal.
Although the Oxford Manual has no binding legal force, many of
its principles found their way into national military manuals. The
latest editions of such instruments warrant some mention insofar as
they reflect these principles, regardless of the fact that some of the
matters raised have now been embodied in treaty form. Thus, the
British Manual of Military Law states in its Part III on The Law of
War on Land:
The laws of war are the rules which govern the conduct of war....
They are binding not only upon States as such but also upon their
nationals and, in particular, upon the individual members of the
armed forces.... The present laws of war are the result of a slow
growth. Isolated milder practices became in the course of time us-
ages, which at first were not accompanied by a sense of legal obli-
gation, but which by custom (i.e., constant practice accepted as law)
and by treaties, gradually developed into legal rules.... The laws
of war consist, therefore, partly of customary rules which have
grown up in practice, and partly of written rules, that is to say,
rules which have been expressly agreed upon by governments in
international treaties and conventions .... The development of
the law of war has been determined by three principles: first, the
principle that a belligerent is justified in applying compulsion and
force of any kind, to the extent necessary for the realization of the
purpose of war, that is, the complete submission of the enemy at
the earliest possible moment with the least possible expenditure of
men, resources, and money; secondly, the principle of humanity,
according to which kinds and degrees of violence which are not
necessary for the purpose of war are not permitted to a belligerent;
and, thirdly, the principle of chivalry, which demands a certain
amount of fairness in offence and defence, and a certain mutual re-
spect between the opposing forces."7
The United States Manual on The Law of Land Warfare" is,
however, somewhat more specific in its statement of basic principles:
(a) Prohibitory Effect. The law of war places limits on the
exercise of a belligerent's power ... and requires that belligerents
refrain from employing any kind or degree of violence which is not
actually necessary for military purposes and that they conduct
hostilities with regard to the principles of humanity and chivalry.
The prohibitive effect of the law of war is not minimized by "mili-
tary necessity" which has been defined as that principle which
67. H.M.S.O. 1958, 1-3.
68. Dept of the Army, Field Mannual 27-10 (1956).
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justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which
are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the ene-
my as soon as possible. Military necessity has been generally reject-
ed as a defense for acts forbidden by the customary and convention-
al laws of war inasmuch as the latter have been developed and
framed with consideration for the concept of military necessity.
(b) Binding on States and Individuals. The law of war is bind-
ing not only upon States as such but also upon individuals and, in
particular, the members of their armed forces."
Like the British Manual, this too emphasises that the law is to be
found in both treaties and custom - the "body of unwritten.., law
[which] is firmly established by the custom of nations and well defined
by recognized authorities on international law.""
The German War Book, too, after listing forbidden practices in
warfare, states that "hie who offends against any of these prohibitions
is to be held responsible therefor by the State. If he is captured he is
subject to the penalties of military law."7 '
The references to "humanity" and "chivalry" find their source in
the Preamble to the first international agreement attempting to lay
down laws for the conduct of warfare on land. In 1899, Czar Nicholas
invited the major powers to a conference at The Hague, producing Con-
vention I respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, elabo-
rated further by Convention IV of the Second Hague Conference in
1907." While this instrument deals with land warfare, its principles
are generally accepted as having general application, regardless of the
theatre involved. The Preamble makes clear what the purpose of the
law of war is and emphasizes that its provisions are not exclusive:
Seeing that, while seeking means to preserve peace and prevent
armed conflicts between nations, it is likewise necessary to bear in
mind the case where the appeal to arms has been brought about by
events which their care was unable to avert; Animated by the de-
sire to serve, even in the extreme case, the interests of humanity
and the ever progressive needs of civilization; Thinking it impor-
tant, wit this object, to revise the general laws and customs of war,
either with a view to defining them with greater recision or to con-
fining them within such limits as would mitigate their severity as
far as possible;... these provisions, the wording of which has been
inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, as far as mili-
tary requirements permit, are intended to serve as a general rule of
conduct for the belligerents in their mutual relations and in their
69. Id. 3.
70. Id. I 4(b).
71. 1902 THE GERMAN WAR BOOK 66 (Morgan trans., 1915); DE ZAYAS, THE
WEHRMACHT WAR CRIMES BUREAU, 1939-1945 91 (1989); de Zayas translates this".
If he is taken prisoner, he is subject to punishment by [foreign] court-martial."
72. SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 69.
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relations with the inhabitants [of occupied territory]. It has not,
however, been found possible at present to concert regulations
covering all circumstances which arise in practice; On the other
hand the High Contracting Parties clearly do not intend that un-
foreseen cases should, in the absence of a written undertaking, be
left to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders. Until a
more complete code of the law of war has been issued, the High
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not
included in the Regulations adopted by them [and annexed to the
Convention and generally known as the Hague Regulations], the
inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and
the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from
the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of
humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience ....
This latter portion of the Preamble is known as the "Martens Clause"
after the Russian Foreign Minister credited with elaborating it.
A direct obligation was imposed upon the contracting powers to
"issue instructions to their armed land forces which shall be in con-
formity with the Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war
on land, annexed to the present Convention." " Moreover, and perhaps
more ground-breaking from the standpoint of law, Article 3 provides
that "[a] belligerent party which violates the said Regulations shall, if
the case demands, be liable to pay compensation for all acts committed
by persons forming part of its armed forces." There was no provision
in the Convention or Regulations for personal liability. This merely
confirmed the general principle that a party to a treaty might be
obliged to pay compensation in the event of its breach. Also consistent
with general treaty practice, the Convention included an all-participa-
tion clause whereby the provisions of the Convention and the Regula-
tions would only apply as "between Contracting Powers, and then only
if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention." By the time of
the outbreak of the Second World War, however, it was generally ac-
cepted that the Convention and Regulations had become part of cus-
tomary law and were binding in any international armed conflict re-
gardless of whether all the belligerents were parties thereto or not.76
Despite the absence of any treaty provision for personal liability, a
series of war crimes trials was held after the termination of hostilities.
Moreover, while the text indicates that the offenders would be mem-
73. Id. art. 1.
74. Id
75. Id. art. 2.
76. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 3. "[S]everal of the belligerents in the re-
cent war were not parties to this Convention V4 [Bly 1939 these rules laid down in
the Convention were recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being
declaratory of the laws and customs of war," H.M.S.O., Cmd. 6064 65(1946); 41 AM.
J. INT'L L. 172, 248-9 (1947).
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bers of the enemy forces, it is open to any belligerent to try members of
its own forces charged with offenses against the law of war, but in
such cases the trial would be held in accordance with the terms of the
national criminal or military law. Thus, during the Boer - South
African - war, in two significant instances British courts tried mem-
bers of their own forces for offenses against enemy personnel. Three
members of an Australian unit serving under Kitchener were charged
with the murder of Boer civilians, one of whom was a priest. The ac-
cused pleaded compliance with orders issued after one of their officers
had been perfidiously killed. This defense was rejected and two of the
three charged were executed.7 Better known, since the comments by
Solomon J.P. have proven the basis for the English law on superior
orders, is R. v. Smith."8 Smith, acting on orders from his superior,
had opened fire on interned civilian Boers. The references to superior
orders merit reproduction:
It is monstrous to suppose that a soldier would be protected where
the order was grossly illegal. [But that he] is responsible if he obeys
an order that is not strictly legal is an extreme proposition which
the court cannot accept .... Especially in time of war immediate
obedience... is required .... I think it is a safe rule to lay down
that if a soldier honestly believes that he is doing his duty in obey-
ing the commands of his superior, and if the orders are not so man-
ifestly illegal, that he must or ought to have known that they were
unlawful, the private soldier would be protected by the orders of his
superior."'
Garner' cites a number of cases during World War I in which
French tribunals tried Germans for breaches of the law of war, but he
is primarily concerned with discussing the problem of superior orders.
Each of the cases concerned was decided in accordance with French
and not with international law. Once this defense is raised, the issue
of the liability of the superior issuing the order becomes significant.
Insofar as the superior is also head of state, his traditional immunity
from trial by an alien tribunal is involved. As early as 1815 it was
suggested that Napoleon should be brought to trial for having violated
the 1814 agreement exiling him to Elba. After his escape and return to
France where he again raised an army, he was declared by the Con-
gress of Vienna
77. See WITTEN, SCAPEGOATS OF THE EMPIRE (1907); This is a personal account
written by the third accused. This incident and trial are the subject of the film
BREAKER MoRANT.
78. 17 S.C. 561, 567-8 (Cape of Good Hope).
79. Id. See also Comments of Israeli court in Chief Military Prosecutor v.
Malinki et al. (The Kafr Quassem case) (1958), per Halevy J., c. in A.G. Isreal v.
Eichmann (1961) 36 I.L.R. 5, 256; a full report will be found in 2 PALESTwE
Y.B.INT'L L. 69, 108 (1985).
80. GARNER, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 438-39 (1920).
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to have destroyed the sole legal title upon which his existence de-
pended... placed himself outside the protection of the law, and
manifested to the world that it can neither have peace nor truce
with him... [and placed himself] outside the civil and social re-
lations, [so] that, as Enemy and Pertubator of the World, he has in-
curred liability to public vengeance."
While Bliicher would have had him shot as an "outlaw," Napoleon was
regarded "by the Powers as their Prisoner" and placed in the custody
of the British who exiled him to St. Helena.82
At the end of World War I, the Allied and Associated Powers
sought to use this as a precedent to try the Emperor of Germany. By
Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919:
The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William H of
Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offense
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties. A spe-
cial tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring
him the guarantees essential to the right of defense. It will be com-
posed of five judges, one appointed by each of the following Powers:
namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy
and Japan. In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the high-
est motives of international policy, with a view to vindicating the
solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of
international morality. It will be its duty to fix the punishment
which it considers should be imposed ....
However, the Kaiser had sought asylum in The Netherlands,
which refused to surrender him, and this provision never came to fru-
ition. However, certain of its features require comment. First, the Kai-
ser was not accused of any war crimes of which the Germans might
have been responsible, nor for which evidence might have been avail-
able of his direct responsibility for having ordered their commission.
Instead, he was to be charged with "a supreme offense against interna-
tional morality and the sanctity of treaties," an offense which would be
difficult to define, although today it might be considered a crime
against peace in the sense of the Nuremberg Charter. Further, there
was no suggestion that the tribunal would be bound by any legal prin-
ciples other than that of recognizing his right to a defense. Instead, the
tribunal was to be "guided by the highest motives of international
policy," implying that the whole process was in the nature of a political
rather than a judicial operation.
As to other alleged German war criminals, the Treaty sought their
81. Id.
82. See, U.N. WCC, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION
242 (1948).
83. 112 B.F.S.P. 1; 2 Israel, MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISORY, 1648-
1967 1265 (1967).
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trial in accordance with strict judicial and legal principles:
Article 228. The German Government recognizes the right of the
Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals per-
sons accused of committing acts in violation of the laws and cus-
toms of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be subject to pun-
ishments laid down by law. This provision will apply notwithstand-
ing any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or
in the territory of her Allies. The German Government shall hand
over to the Allied and Associated Powers, or to such one of them as
shall so request, all persons accused of having committed an act in
violation of the laws and customs of war ....
Article 229. Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nation-
als of one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be brought be-
fore the military tribunals of that Power. Persons guilty of criminal
acts against the nationals of more than one of the Allied and As-
sociated Powers will be brought before military tribunals composed
of members of the military tribunals of the Powers concerned. In
every case the accused will be entitled to name his own counsel.8'
The German Government refused to hand over any person so
accused, and instead brought some of them to trial before the
Reichsgericht sitting at Leipzig. However, very few trials were held
and the penalties were often little more than nominal. The
Reichsgericht dealt with such matters as the treatment of prisoners of
war ' and, more importantly, the sinking of hospital ships, ' of which
the most significant was the Llandovery Castle7 which also involved
unlawful attacks upon survivors and stands as a landmark on the law
relating to the defense of superior orders.
When World War I broke out, the Prussian authorities established
a Military Bureau of Investigation of Violations of the Laws of War "to
determine violations of the laws and customs of war which enemy
military and civilian persons have committed against the Prussian
troops, [as well as] to investigate whatever accusations of this nature
are made by the enemy against members of the Prussian Army."'
During the War, Germany did in fact try some Allied personnel for
alleged breaches of the law. The Allied Powers maintained that these
trials were themselves war crimes, although none of the persons in-
volved in the trials or in the subsequent executions were brought be-
fore the Leipzig or any other tribunal. This, despite the fact that the
British authorities had described the trial and execution of Captain
84. Id.
85. E.g., Heynen's Casse 2 Ann.Dig. 431 (1921); the full text of this and similar
cases will be found in H.M.S.O Cmd. 1422.
86. Id. at 429 (The Dover Case); The Llandovery Case at 436.
87. The full text of this judgment is reproduced in Cameron, The Peleus Trial,
app. IX (1948).
88. DE ZAYAS, THE WEHRMACHT WAR CRIMES BUREAU, 1939-1945 5 (1989).
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Fryatt - charged while in command of a merchant ship with unlaw-
fully refusing to surrender to, and trying to ram, a German U-boat -
as an act of "judicial murder... an atrocious crime against the law of
nations and the usages of war .... . Similarly, no action was taken
against those involved in the execution of Nursing Sister Edith Cavell
though this was also condemned as "judicial murder.'
Between the wars various steps were taken to forbid recourse to
war, such as the League Covenant,"' which introduced the possibility
of recourse to sanctions against an aggressor, and the Pact of Paris"2
- or the Briand-Kellogg Pact - by which the parties renounced war
as an instrument of national policy, but no attempt was made to sug-
gest that resort to war would result in criminal responsibility. Like-
wise, neither of the Geneva Conventions drawn up in 1929 relating to
the treatment of the wounded and sick and of prisoners of war made
provision for international penal action against breaches." However,
Article 29 of the Convention on the Wounded stated that: "The Govern-
ments of the High Contracting Parties shall propose to their legisla-
tures should their penal laws be inadequate, the necessary measures
for the suppression in time of war of any act contrary to the provisions
of the present Convention;" Article 30 obligated them to inform the
Swiss government as depository of the measures taken to this end.
There is no similar provision in the Prisoners of War Convention, al-
though the Parties "recognize that a guarantee of the regular appli-
cation of the present Convention will be found in the possibility of
collaboration between the protecting Powers charged with the protec-
tion of the interests of the belligerents" who would be authorized to
visit any places in which prisoners were detained."
The problem of war crimes and their punishment, per se, did not
come up again until World War II. No sooner did war begin than both
the British and the Germans established war crimes bureaus for the
collection of evidence, as did the United States in October 1944."5
However, "it seems that during the war, Germans refrained from try-
ing British and American prisoners for war crimes, and neither Great
Britain nor the United States tried any German prisoners for war
crimes prior to the German unconditional surrender. Evidently, neither
side wanted to give the other a reason to retaliate. However, Germany
89. GARNER, supra, note 80, at 407-13.
90. Id at vol. 2, 97-102, 104-5. She was charged while a sister in a military
hospital with having assisted Allied personnel to escape to their own lines, clearly
an offence going beyond her protected status as a nurse.
91. Treaty of Versailles, ch. I, art. 16.
92. 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57; 4 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION, 2522.
93. SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 325, 339.
94. Art. 86.
95. DE ZAYAS, supra note 83, at 10-12.
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did not hesitate to try prisoners of war of other nationalities," includ-
ing Polish, French, and Russian.9 7
During the war, the United Nations" declared their intention to
bring offenders against the laws and customs of war to trial," includ-
ing those responsible for ordering such atrocities, regardless of their
rank or governmental position. In 1945, they adopted the London
Charter for the establishment of an International Military Tribu-
nal." This was the first attempt since Breisach in 1474 to set up an
international criminal tribunal for any purpose. Composed of judges
from France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, it was granted jurisdiction over crimes against peace, namely:
the planning or waging of aggressive war; war crimes in the tradition-
al sense of that term; and crimes against humanity committed against
any civilian population, including nationals of the offending power,
whether committed before or during the war, so long as such offenses
were "in execution' of or in connection with any crimes within the juris-
diction of the Tribunal." This radically reduced the scope of the con-
cept, even though the Charter provided that crimes against humanity
included "persecution on political or religious grounds.""°' The Char-
ter also made clear that the status of the accused would not grant him
any immunity, even though this might have been his right under ordi-
nary customary law. Finally, since the easiest defense that may be put
forward by one accused of war crimes is compliance with orders, the
Charter specified that this would constitute no defense, although it
might serve to mitigate punishment.
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was responsi-
ble for the trial of the Major German War Criminals - that is to say,
those whose offenses were so extensive that their exact geographical
location could not be specified with any certainty. A similar tribunal
was established for the Far East, while a number of allied countries
held trials of their own, in which some of the accused possessed the
nationality of the trying authority or of its allies. Although these latter
courts were national tribunals, for the main part they did apply the
international rules relating to the conduct of hostilities. It is not neces-
sary for our purpose to examine the variety of trials held or the nature
of the crimes alleged or defenses put forward. It suffices to refer to the
General Assembly's Resolution Affirming the Principles of Internation-
al Law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 2 the
96. Id. at 92.
97. Id. at 92-103.
98. Name of the anti-Axis alliance during WWII.
99. E.g., Moscow Declaration, 1943, UNWCC, supra note 79, at 107.
100. SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 911.
101. See e.g., Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRrr. Y.B.INr'L LAW 178, 205
(1946).
102. 1946, Res. 95 (I); SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 921.
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subsequent statement of Principles of International Law Recognized in
the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and in the Judgment of the
Tribunal adopted by the International Law Commission in 1950."~s
This Statement was to some extent general in character since Principle
I stated that "any person who commits an act which constitutes a
crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to
Punishment." It also made clear that the fact that internal law did not
criminalize a particular act would not excuse liability if that act was
criminal under international law. It confirmed the non-immunity of a
head of state or government and denied the defense of superior orders
"provided a moral choice" was open to the accused. It then guaranteed
all accused the right to a fair trial and reproduced the definition of
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity de-
tailed in the London Charter, although in the latter case the reference
to crimes committed "in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal" was changed to "in execution of
or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime." Fi-
nally, it declared that "complicity in the commission of a crime against
peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity... is a crime under
international law." The Commission did not make any provision in this
instrument for the establishment of an international criminal tribunal,
although it expended a great deal of time and energy seeking to elabo-
rate a code of crimes against peace and security, which did not reach
fruition until 1991,1 followed in 1994 by a Draft Statute for an In-
ternational Criminal Court.1 °5
Apart from these developments arising directly from the
Nuremberg Judgment, the field of treaty law has seen certain advanc-
es relevant to the enforcement of armed conflict law. First, in 1948, the
General Assembly adopted the Genocide Convention"° which has
been ratified or acceded to by the vast majority of states. Article 1
confirms that "genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time
of war, is a crime under international law which [the parties) under-
take to prevent and punish." No attempt is made to place offenders
under the jurisdiction of an international tribunal, although it is recog-
nized that a competent tribunal, might subsequently be established. In
the meantime, "persons charged with genocide... shall be tried by a
competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was
committed."'" Since genocide is directed at the destruction "in whole
or in part, [of] a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such,"
it is not a crime likely to be committed as a matter of private enter-
103. 2 Y.B.I.L.C. 374 (1950); SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 923.
104. 30 I.L.M. 1504.
105. 33 I.L.M. 258.
106. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.NT.S. 27; SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 231.
107. Id. art. 6.
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prise. There may also be some doubt whether a country in which it has
been committed is likely to institute proceedings therefor against its
own military or political leadership. In the conflict in Bosnia during
1993 and 1994, there were constant complaints that the various par-
ties involved were indulging in policies of "ethnic cleansing" - appar-
ently a more acceptable term than genocide - with the intention of
removing whole groups of people from particular districts. However,
the International Court of Justice has held that, though the purpose of
such a policy might be to extinguish the presence of a specific group in
the territory, the Convention does not include as genocide "the disap-
pearance of a State as a subject of international law or a change in its
constitution or its territory.""°
However, since genocide is a crime that can be committed in peace
or war, there is no doubt that if committed in an international armed
conflict, genocide would certainly amount to a war crime and probably
also to a crime against humanity. If committed in a non-international
armed conflict, it would amount to a crime against humanity. True,
the absence of any international war crimes or criminal tribunal ren-
ders it somewhat unlikely that the offender would be tried or punished
by the authority of the state concerned, unless he were a rebel cap-
tured by the government or a government representative captured by
the rebels. On the other hand, if genocide amounts to a war crime,
then, in accordance with the principle of universal jurisdiction over
such offenses, the offender could be tried by any country in which he
might be found. In the case of the former Yugoslavia this problem has
been met by the decision of the Security Council 9 to establish an ad
hoc tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Terri-
tory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991.
More pertinent to the law of armed conflict as such are the 1949
Geneva Conventions"' and the amending Protocols of 1977."'
There are two major innovations in the 1949 Conventions that merit
comment. First, Article 3 is common to all four instruments. For the
first time an international agreement relating to armed conflict law
has attempted to extend its purview to "an armed conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
108. Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia
[Serbia and Montenegro]), 1993 I.C.J. 325, 345.
109. U.N. SCOR, Res. 827 (1993); 32 I.L.M. 1203-the Statute of the Tribunal, as
proposed by the Secretary General, is at 1170.
110. I-Wounded and Sick in the Field; II-Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked at Sea;
III-Prisoners of War;, IV-Civilians; SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 373, 401,
423, 495.
111. I-Protection of Victims in International Armed Conflicts; H-Protection of Vic-
tims in Non-International Armed Conflicts; SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at
621, 689.
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Contracting Parties."" This seeks to limit the scope of the conflict by
protecting those who are civilians or hors de combat by providing for
the collection and care of the wounded and sick and by expressly pro-
viding that:
IT]he following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned
persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostag-
es; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating
and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the car-
rying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized persons.
However, the Conventions do not contain any suggestion that a
breach of these principles by either the government or the revolution-
ary forces would amount to a war crime, as the Article makes it clear
that "the application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the
legal status of the Parties to the conflict." There is, therefore, nothing
to stop the authorities from treating captured rebels as traitors and,
provided that the normal judicial guarantees are applied, it would still
be possible to try such persons before a military tribunal so long as it
has been "regularly constituted." It is difficult to determine how mem-
bers of the government forces in breach of the safeguards laid down in
the Article would be rendered liable to prosecution. This would clearly
depend on the goodwill of the government concerned and the provi-
sions of the national criminal and military law. It is also difficult to
perceive how any international judicial tribunal would find a Party in
breach of Article 3 if the complaint were lodged by another Party not
party to the conflict and which had suffered no direct damage from the
breach in question.
Second, and perhaps far more significant, each of the Conventions
contains provisions with regard to the repression of abuses and infrac-
tions, for observation and enforcement," as well as for the establish-
ment of an inquiry procedure concerning any alleged violation. Each
obligates the Parties:
... to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal
sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any
of the grave breaches committed in the following Article. Each High
Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for per-
sons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed,
such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of
their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers,
112. Id
113. I-Arts. 49-52; II-Arts. 50-53; III-Arts. 129-131; IV-Arts.146-149, and re visits
by the Protecting Power, I, lI-Art. 8; 1I-Arts. 8, 126; IV-Arts. 11, 143.
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and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand
such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party, pro-
vided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie
case. Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary
for the suppression of acts contrary to the provisions of the present
Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following
Article. In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by
safeguards of proper trial and defense, which shall not be less fa-
vorable than those provided by Article 105 and those following in
the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War ....
The grave breaches listed in the Convention remain war crimes
since they are breaches of treaty law relating to the conduct of armed
conflict. However, the fact that a traditional war crime has not been
included in the list does not mean that such offense - for example,
denial of quarter or use of poison - has ceased to be considered a
breach of the law of war. Persons accused thereof may still be tried as
war criminals. As defined in the most comprehensive list, found under
the Civilians Convention, grave breaches:
shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed
against persons or property protected by the present Convention:
willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful con-
finement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to
serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or willfully depriving a pro-
tected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the
present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction
and expropriation of property, not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
It is important to note that both "inhuman treatment" and "great suf-
fering" are likely to be difficult to define: the victim's view will proba-
bly be very different from that of the accused or perhaps even of the
tribunal.
Once again the issue of trial and punishment was left to the na-
tional court, although universal jurisdiction was now recognized to ex-
ist at least among the parties to the Conventions, while it was accept-
ed that for various reasons a holding country might prefer to transfer
the accused for trial elsewhere provided the court seeking to try him
could present a prima facie case. The Conventions are general in char-
acter and apply to all personnel participating in a conflict regardless of
nationality. Thus, it is open to a holding country to try its own nation-
als for breaches of the Conventions, although the general practice
would be to enact legislation giving statutory effect to the Conventions.
This means that in such cases the trial would proceed under national
law and might make no reference whatever to the Geneva Conven-
tions. Until the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda, no attempt was made
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to prosecute any accused for any sort of war crime as defined either in
the Conventions or in customary law. However, in Vietnam, the United
States did try a number of its own personnel for offenses which the lay
person or the media would describe as war crimes although charges
were brought under the Code of Service Discipline."" Similarly, the
charges of murder and torture against Canadian personnel serving as
United Nations peace-keepers in Somalia in 1994 were under the Na-
tional Defence Act and the Criminal Code.'15
It is not unusual for those accused of war crimes to plead compli-
ance with their own national law. To some extent the Convention pro-
vision prevents this by forbidding each party "to absolve itself or any
other High Contracting Party of any liability incurred by itself or by
any other High Contracting Party in respect of breaches referred to1A. "
This indicates that not only is the local law defense excluded, but par-
ties are unable to agree among themselves whether to ignore a breach
or to enter into any agreement excusing breaches committed inter se.
The next major development in treaty law came in 1977 with the
adoption of the Protocols additional to the 1949 Conventions. It is only
Protocol I relating to international armed conflict that contains any
provisions concerning enforcement of the law. Section II of Protocol I,
Articles 85-91, is concerned with Repression of Breaches of the Con-
ventions and of this Protocol.'16 In the first place the Section makes
it clear that it relates not only to grave breaches but to other breaches
as well. It then proceeds to expand the list of grave breaches found in
the Conventions; it specifically states that "without prejudice to the
application of the Conventions and of this Protocol, grave breaches of
these instruments shall be regarded as war crimes.""' This merely
means that while all grave breaches are in fact war crimes, not all war
crimes are grave breaches." The additional breaches mentioned in
the Protocol are, of course, subject to the penal provisions to be found
in the Conventions.
Having spelled out what constitutes grave breaches, the Protocol
indicates the measures necessary to repress them and to suppress all
other breaches of the Conventions and Protocol, thus again confirming
that all breaches are punishable. For the first time since Hague Con-
vention IV provided for the financial liability of a state whose nation-
als were in breach of the Regulations, Article 86 of the Protocol
114. See e.g., U.S. v. Keenan, 39 C.M.R. 108 (1969) ; US. v. Griffin, id. at 586;
U.S. v. Callrey, 46 C.M.R. 1131. 48 (1969/71, 1973); id. at 19; 1 Mil. Law. Reporter
2488; see also, Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650 (1974).
115. The reports in these cases have not yet become available, although one sol-
dier was sentenced to five years for manslaughter and an officer was reprimanded.
116. SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 671-5.
117. Id.
118. See BOTHE, PARTSCH AND SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CON-
F'LcTs 521 (1982).
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strengthens the punitive provisions of the Conventions and emphasizes
the liability of a "superior" for any breach by a subordinate, if the
superior "knew, or had information which should have enabled [him] to
conclude in the circumstances at the time, that [the subordinate] was
committing or was going to commit such a breach and if [the superior]
did not take all feasible measures within [his] power to prevent or
repress the breach."
It is unfortunate that the Canadian courts martial arising from
the activities of peace-keepers in Somalia did not pay sufficient respect
to this provision or realize that its principles were of general applica-
tion with regard to the ordinary service responsibilities of military
superiors, be they senior or non-commissioned officers.
In fact, Article 87 spells out the duty of commanders, obligating
all parties to the Conventions, Protocol, or conflict to
require military commanders to prevent and, where necessary, to
suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches [commit-
ted by anyone under their command] (and i~n order to prevent and
suppress breaches [all parties] shall require that, commensurate
with their level of responsibility, commanders ensure that members
of the armed forces under their command are aware of their obliga-
tions under the Conventions and this Protocol ... [and] any com-
mander who is aware that [any] persons under his control are go-
ing to commit or have committed a breach [shall] initiate such
steps as are necessary to prevent such violations and, where ap-
propriate, initiate disciplinary or penal sanctions against violators
thereof.
The Protocol proceeds to make provision for cooperation in crimi-
nal enforcement among the parties, including extradition where appo-
site. In all cases, however, reserving obligations ensuing from any
other treaty concerning criminal cooperation, "the law of the 1/ Party
requested shall apply in all cases." Finally, from this point of view, the
parties have undertaken to act individually or jointly in the event of
serious violations, in cooperation with the United Nations and in con-
formity with the Charter. This development has acquired practical
significance with the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals for the
prosecution of crimes against international humanitarian law perpe-
trated in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Perhaps surprisingly, in view of the emphasis on the responsibili-
ty of the commander and the earlier provision for personal liability on
the part of the actual offender, no mention exists in the Protocol either
of the defense of superior orders or, despite the right of an accused to a
fair trial, to his right to employ any of the defenses recognized by in-
ternational law, including this defense even if only by way of mitiga-
tion of sentence.
It remains necessary to mention two other developments signifi-
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cant from the point of view of securing observance as distinct from
enforcement of the law of armed conflict.
By Article 90 an International Fact-Finding Commission is ap-
pointed, whose task is to "enquire into any facts alleged to be a grave
breach as defined in the Conventions and this Protocol or other serious
violation [thereof and] to facilitate, through its good offices, the resto-
ration of an attitude of respect for the Conventions and this Protocol."
Most modern armed forces have legal advisers available at least
to the most senior officers. These advisers will probably have access to
military manuals. Until 1977 there was no requirement in internation-
al law for this to be the case. By Article 82 of Protocol I, parties to the
Protocol as well as parties to the conflict "shall ensure that legal advis-
ers are available, when necessary, to advise military commanders at
the appropriate level on the application of the Conventions and this
Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to be given to the armed
forces on this subject." While it does not state the level of command at
which advisers should be available, this provision does mean that in
the event a commander should disregard the advice given him, it will
be exceedingly difficult for him to argue at any subsequent penal or
administrative proceeding that he was unaware of the legal position.
This provision has had its effect in practice: during the Gulf War of
1991, many of the vessels involved in patrolling the seas had such
personnel attached to them; General Powell, US Army Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, in his Report to Congress stated that "[dlecisions were
impacted by legal considerations at every level, the law of war proved
invaluable in the decision-making process.""
With the exception of Article 3 common to the four 1949 Conven-
tions, prior to 1977 no international legal regulation relative to the
conduct of non-international conflicts existed, nor did any legal - as
distinct from moral - process for dealing with atrocities exist. In this
regard, in a recognized state of belligerency the international law of
armed conflict would apply. In 1977, however, acknowledging that
many conflicts previously considered to be non-international were now,
for political reasons, regarded as "just" wars, Protocol I raised to the
level of international armed conflicts with all laws and regulations
relevant thereto, those "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racial
regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination.""9 In
practice, this provision has tended to remain somewhat of a dead let-
ter.
The provisions in the Conventions and Protocol clearly relate to a
conflict in progress or the trial of those accused of offenses and in the
119. App. 0. 1, 31 I.L.M. 615.
120. Art. 1 (4).
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hands of an adverse party or of a state in which they have sought
refuge and asylum. Some countries, including Australia, Canada, and
the United Kingdom, have amended their criminal law to give jurisdic-
tion to their courts over persons found within their territory and ac-
cused of war crimes or crimes against humanity, particularly when
such crimes were alleged to have been committed during WW II. How-
ever, the fate of the trials instituted under such legislation has not
been promising."' In addition, arising from the conflicts in Ethiopia,
Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, and those resulting from a variety of
coups and consequential civil wars, successor governments have begun
to try their defeated opponents for offenses which many might regard
as treasonable or common crimes, including murder and torture, but
which the present authorities tend to condemn as war crimes or crimes
against humanity.
Protocol II1 ' aimed at supplementing common Article 3 and, for
the first time, at introducing by way of treaty some measure of legal
restraint into non-international armed conflicts. However, the Protocol
may be ignored for our purpose since it contains no provisions relating
to offenses, breaches, or punishment. Moreover, the provision relating
to dissemination is much weaker and less significant than that found
in Protocol I. Article 83 of the latter obligates the parties, in time of
peace and of war, to disseminate the Conventions and Protocol as
widely as possible, requiring their study in military instruction cours-
es, while encouraging the civilian population to similar study. Further,
it provides that civilian and military personnel who may be called
upon to administer the Conventions and Protocol in time of conflict
should be fully acquainted with their texts, thus decreasing the likeli-
hood of breaches. Article 19 of Protocol II, on the other hand, merely
provides that its terms should be disseminated as widely as possible,
imposing no obligation of any kind either in regard to the civilian or
military personnel of a party.
Although Protocol II lacks any enforcement or punitive procedure,
to some extent the Security Council of the United Nations has in re-
cent years sought to fill these lacunae. It has done this by way of ex-
tensive interpretation of its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter
relating to action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace, and acts of aggression. In its early years, the Council reserved
its enforcement procedures for conflicts which could be described as
international; as time passed it seemed prepared to act even in in-
stances when such classification could only be termed political rather
than legal. Encouragement to operate in this way was, to some extent,
based on the human rights provisions in the Charter, the Universal
Declaration, and the Covenants on Human Rights. Article 2, para-
121. See, e.g., Canadian Case of R. v. Finta, 112 D.L.R. (4th) 513 (1994).
122. SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 689.
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graph 7, of the Charter precludes the Organization from interfering in
any matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, un-
less there is a need to resort to enforcement measures under Chapter
VII. It could hardly be said that the policy of apartheid pursued by the
former Government of South Africa constituted any threat to the peace
by that government. Nevertheless, from as early as 1961, complaints
against this policy arose in the Council, and in 1977 the Security
Council determined, "having regard to the policies and acts of the
South African Government, that the acquisition by South Africa of
arms and related mathriel constitutes a threat to the maintenance of
international peace and security, [and decided] that all States shall
cease forthwith any provision of arms and related matkriel of all
types."' Some countries enacted legislation making it an offense for
their citizens to breach this embargo, which was later extended to
cover sporting relations and other activities, including the denial of
South Africa's right to exercise its rights as a member of the United
Nations.
It is difficult other than by way of Orwellian diplomatic double-
talk to envisage, how the South African policy of apartheid, or the ex-
ports of defensive arms to the South African Government, would have
threatened any other state. The only manner in which the situation
could be brought within the purview of Chapter VII and out of the do-
mestic jurisdiction reservation was by assuming that continuance of
apartheid, against persons they regarded as ethnically related, would
so enrage the newly-independent African neighbors of the Republic
that one or other of them might be provoked into launching an armed
attack. While, normally, one would expect the attacker to be con-
demned under Chapter VII, by reason of international political correct-
ness it could be argued that the refusal to abandon apartheid itself
constituted a threat to the maintenance of international peace since it
was likely to provoke an armed attack which the majority of the mem-
bers of the United Nations would consider just. Eventually, the Gener-
al Assembly adopted a Convention' condemning apartheid as an in-
ternational crime, although no attempt was ever made to indict any
politician, South African or otherwise. This offense has now been ele-
vated by the International Law Commission to the level of a crime
against international peace and security. 25
In this case one can find by extensive interpretation that the
Council was correct in its assertions. However, in other cases the situ-
ation is more difficult. Traditionally, a civil war or a non-international
123. S.C.Res. 418, U.N. SCOR (1977) reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1548 (emphasis add-
ed).
124. GA Res. 3068 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 75, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974).
125. Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 20,
30 I.L.M. 1584.
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armed conflict has been considered as essentially domestic. In custom-
ary law, intervention by outsiders has been considered improper, al-
though history during the last 150 years or so presents numerous
instances of third states putting forward a variety of excuses to justify
interference. Nevertheless, in none of these cases has there been any
suggestion that the international law of armed conflict was applicable
or that those accused of atrocities during the conflict should be brought
to trial in accordance with international legal rules or procedures. The
only means of punishing such offenses has been by the municipal law
of the state involved or in accordance with the new law established by
successful revolutionaries.
However, world public opinion has become revolted by the atroci-
ties committed during non-international conflicts in such places as
Kampuchea (Cambodia), Somalia, Ethiopia, Haiti, and Bosnia, among
others. Responding to this opinion, the Security Council has been pre-
pared to authorize some measure of interference, usually through the
medium of groups of "peace-keepers" specially contributed by member
states. In two instances, the Security Council has gone so far as to
take positive punitive action against those involved in such outrageous
behavior, hoping that the institution of criminal proceedings, especially
while the conflict is in progress, will inhibit the commission of further
atrocities and vindicate the rule of armed conflict law. To this end, the
Council has not been over-scrupulous in identifying the conflict as
international or non-international. However, by authorizing action
against crimes against international humanitarian law, it avoids this
complex legal issue: it is not difficult to argue that any such crime,
regardless of the applicability of the Geneva law commonly described
as international humanitarian law,' is in itself a crime against hu-
manity, while offenses which amount to war crimes - particularly
those of a serious character - equally fall into such a classification.
From 1991 on, reports surfaced of atrocities and other breaches of
international humanitarian law, including "ethnic cleansing" commit-
ted in the conflicts raging in the former Yugoslavia and particularly in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this territory there was, at least in the early
days, both an international conflict involving Bosnia, Serbia and
Croatia, together with a series of internal conflicts affecting the vari-
ous ethnic groups within Bosnia. More recently this seems to have be-
come exclusively a non-international conflict waged by Croatian and
Bosnian Serbs, together with some dissident Muslims against the Gov-
ernment of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was primarily Muslim in char-
126. See, e.g., PIcTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW 1, (1985): "It is the object of international humanitarian law to regulate
hostilities in order to attentuate their hardships"; see also his LE DRorr
HUMANrrAIRE ET LA PROTECTION DES VICTIMES DE LA GUERRE 15 (1973): "Le droit de
Genbve, ou droit humanitaire proprement dit, tend a sauvegarder les militaires mis
hors de combat, ainsi que lea personnes qui ne participent pas aux hostilith."
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acter. As a result of these reports, the Security Council adopted a se-
ries of resolutions condemning these activities, imposing an arms em-
bargo upon all parties and authorizing the dispatch of "peace-keepers"
whose mission was to be humanitarian in character and would include
the establishment of United Nations safe areas for the protection of
civilians. As a result of continuing reports of breaches of international
humanitarian law, in 1992 the Security Council appointed an Interna-
tional Commission of Experts "to examine and analyze" all information
concerning such incidents, as well as conducting its own investigations,
"with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on
the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia." 7 Finally, acting on the recommendation
of the Secretary General"u that, in the light of continuing reports of
widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law,
the situation in the former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to interna-
tional peace and security, the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter, established an international tribunal for the sole purpose of
prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in that territory."
The Tribunal was given competence to deal with such violations
as might have occurred since the beginning of the conflicts in 1991,
and its jurisdiction extended over "grave breaches of the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949; violations of the laws and customs of war; genocide
and crimes against humanity." The persons amenable to its jurisdic-
tion were those planning, ordering, committing, or aiding and abetting
the planning, preparation, or execution of such crimes, whose personal
liability therefore was reaffirmed, with official status not providing any
immunity. Further, the responsibility of a commander and the non-
applicability of the defense of superior orders were confirmed. It is
clear, therefore, that insofar as jurisdiction and competence are con-
cerned, the Statute reflects the developments since the end of World
War II, based on the provisions in the 1949 Conventions, Protocol I,
and the Nuremberg Principles. However, unlike the Nuremberg Tribu-
nal, this Tribunal does not possess competence to try an accused in
absentia. While the principle non-bis-in-idem is confirmed, the Interna-
tional Tribunal enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with national courts, but
possesses primacy so that it may "formally request national courts to
defer to [its] competence," as it has successfully done with regard to an
accused found in Germany, where he was indicted before a local court.
When similar evidence was made available as to events occurring
during the civil war in Rwanda, the Council decided to establish a
127. U.N. SCOR Res. 780 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1476.
128. 32 I.L.M. 1163.
129. U.N. SCOR Res. 827 (1993), 32 I.LM. 1203.
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separate tribunal for those charged in connection therewith, although
the personnel constituting this latter Tribunal would be drawn from
the members of the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia.
If the various groups and governments involved in the hostilities
in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda would agree to transfer those
accused to stand trial before these Tribunals, their activities might
well rank with those of the Nuremberg Judgment. In fact, their juris-
prudence might even stand higher since they have been established
not by a group of victors consequent upon the defeat of an enemy but
by authority of the United Nations without the groups or states in-
volved having any part in the decision. However, it soon became evi-
dent that, for example, the Serb elements in Bosnia would not be will-
ing to hand over any of their supporters regardless of the evidence
against them, despite reports that some of the groups involved in the
conflict have on occasion brought alleged offenders to trial before their
own tribunals. Similarly, in the case of Rwanda the newly established
government announced its intention to institute its own war crimes
trials even though an International Tribunal for this territory exists. A
similar situation has arisen in Ethiopia, where the successful revolu-
tionary government has instituted against supporters of the over-
thrown revolutionary or legitimate regime a series of trials described
as being for war crimes or crimes against humanity. Such national
processes raise the question whether the trials in issue are directed
more at political vengeance than at the punishment of war crimes or
crimes against humanity, having occurred during a non-international
conflict. At the same time, and more significantly, some European
countries, having found alleged offenders among refugees from Yugo-
slavia, have prosecuted them before their own courts, apparently for
crimes against humanity or for breaches of the Geneva Conventions.
Trials by either the International Tribunals created for Yugoslavia
and Rwanda or by national tribunal appear to ignore a major legal
problem, namely that of classification of the conflict. In accordance
with black letter law, war crimes can only be committed during an
international armed conflict. The tribunal established by the United
Nations for offenses in the former Yugoslavia may well be faced with
offenses committed both during an international and a non-interna-
tional conflict. It is true that the competence of the Tribunal expressly
includes grave breaches of the Conventions - this also embraces Pro-
tocol I, since this is now annexed to the Conventions - as well as
offenses against the laws and customs of war. However, the Statute
does not refer to war crimes per se; as indicated above, the grave
breaches are in fact offenses against international humanitarian law,
while "serious" war crimes would almost certainly amount to crimes
against humanity. It would be wise, therefore, for the Tribunal to
avoid using the term "war crime" except when judging an accused from
the forces of an independent state such as Bosnia, Serbia, or Croatia
fighting against one or other of these entities. When the accused is, for
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example, a Bosnian or Croatian Serb involved in an attempt to over-
throw the government of Bosnia, this term should be scrupulously
avoided. What is true of the International Tribunal is equally true of
national tribunals charging persons with similar offences. As to the
Rwanda tribunal, no basis exists to consider the conflict therein as
anything but a non-international conflict, regardless of the language
used to describe the offenses of any person charged. As regards trials
instituted in Rwanda or Ethiopia by local courts, these do not relate to
war crimes (though they may be crimes against humanity) even if they
are really primarily concerned with wreaking vengeance upon political
opponents.
Despite the legal problems herein outlined, the major significance
of the establishment of the International Tribunals and the institution
of proceedings by "neutral" countries is the development in the name of
humanity extending to non-international armed conflicts the same sort
of preventive protection - for the aim of such trials is to warn poten-
tial offenders and thus hopefully to prevent breaches - which has long
existed with regard to international armed conflicts. Since it is impor-
tant to avoid criticism of such developments on the basis of specious or
even substantial legal arguments, it would be preferable if, in any of
these doubtful conflicts, the procedure is based on the provisions of
international humanitarian law and recognition of the fact that
breaches of this law amount to crimes against humanity. Should the
International Law Commission's proposals for the establishment of a
permanent International Criminal Court come to fruition, many of
these problems will disappear, especially as the listing of crimes in-
cludes grave breaches, crimes against humanity, and serious war
crimes. Moreover, a permanent court will be in existence with a per-
manent panel of judges, with the jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and
Rwanda tribunals to assist it.
To return to Wright - if we are to seek to prevent war (especially
of the non-international kind) in which ideological or ethnic hatreds
are responsible for atrocities usually more grievous than those in an
international conflict, perhaps it is time to find some way of avoiding
debate as to the legality of Council action in dealing with this type of
situation. It might be apt, during the fiftieth anniversary celebrations
of the United Nations, for some middle power to propose in the Gener-
al Assembly some resolution along such lines as the following:
When a state, whether a member of the United Nations or not,
because of internal disturbance or complete breakdown of the ad-
ministration, is no longer able to govern the state by maintaining
peace and good order, with the result that it is unable or unwilling
to protect the basic human rights of identifiable groups among the
population, or itself threatens those rights in a gross and inhumane
manner, the United Nations should then recognize that fact and
assume to itself the power to take over the administration of that
state until such time as a new indigenous administrative authority
1996
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is able to undertake the task of government in a peaceful and hu-
mane fashion. The persons chosen to constitute the interim admin-
istration should be selected from groups trained for this task in a
United Nation institution specially established for this purpose,
and, to the greatest extent possible, should not be drawn from
among nationals of any of the permanent members of the Security
Council. In their training, care should be taken to ensure that they
are made fully aware of the history, customs, culture, ethic, and
prejudices of the inhabitants of the state in question.
Espionage in International Law
LT. COL. GEOFFREY B. DEMAREST*
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of international legal principles regarding peace-
time espionage has lagged behind changes in international intelligence
gathering norms and practices. For example, intelligence activities are
now accepted as a common, even inherent, attribute of the modern
state. Moreover, the success of international peace operations, and the
positive contribution of non-governmental organizations to conflict
resolution often depend upon timely, accurate intelligence. Accordingly,
international law might better reflect an updated appraisal of peace-
time intelligence activities. In an age that calls for increasing public
knowledge of the world's diplomatic, military and criminal condition,
international jurists should reconsider the identity and the fate of
individuals accused of spying. International law regarding peacetime
espionage is virtually unstated, and thus, international law has been
an inappropriate and inadequate reference for either condemnation or
justification of actions involving intelligence gathering.
The fact that the intelligence function is an essential part of any
policy or decision making process is axiomatic. Writers who have fo-
cused on international themes note that for an international organiza-
tion to maintain authority in its decisions and policies, it must have
access to good intelligence.' The intelligence gathering activities of
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1. See, e.g., Myres McDougal, et al., The Intelligence Function and World Public
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international organizations, however, generate ethical and practical
problems similar to those caused by the efforts of nation states. There
is an inevitable tendency to measure the relative moral value of ends
versus means within the context of limited intelligence budgets. Yet
law relevant to the negligent loss, betrayal, theft, or collection of infor-
mation by international and transnational organizations barely exists.
Accordingly, jurists interested in promoting the legal reach of public
international organizations should establish sound legal and ethical
guidance. To this end, the American experience can serve as an exam-
ple, due to the high level of public scrutiny focussed on the American
national intelligence regime.'
In its broadest sense, intelligence is knowledge. The term cannot
be stretched to mean all knowledge, but intelligence is, at least, that
knowledge which relates to a decision-making process.3 Supposedly,
Order, 46 TEMPLE L. Q. 365, 367-70 (1973). "Broadly conceived, intelligence is con-
cerned with knowledge: statements and propositions which have been confirmed by
experience, to which a degree of probability can be assigned." Id. This separates the
intelligence function into three key sequential phases: (1) gathering, (2) processing,
and (3) dissemination. "Each phase is divisible into numerous components. Process-
ing, for example, includes assembling, coding, storing, decoding, retrieving, interpret-
ing and planning." Id. at 368. The United States Central Intelligence Agency de-
scribes the intelligence function as a cycle of five steps: (1) Planning and Direction,
(2) Collection, (3) Processing, (4) Analysis and Production, and (5) Dissemination.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PUBLIC AFFAIRS, FACTBOOK ON INTELLIGENCE 14
(1993).
2. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMEN-
TAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: FOREIGN AND MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE, BOOK I, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-40 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE]. For a comprehensive listing of rele-
vant statutes and executive orders see PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLI-
GENCE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMPILATION OF INTELLIGENCE LAWS
AND RELATED LAWS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS OF INTEREST TO THE NATIONAL INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY (1993); LAWS RELATING TO ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE, ETC. (Gilman
G. Udell ed., 1976). For references across the broad range of intelligence related
topics see NEAL H. PETERSEN, AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE, 1775-1990: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC
GUIDE (1992); BIBLIOGRAPHY OF INTELLIGENCE LITERATURE (Walter Pforzheimer ed.,
1985); PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK & FRANK L. SCHAF, JR., INTELLIGENCE, ESPIONAGE,
COUNTERESPIONAGE, AND COVERT OPERATIONS: A GUIDE TO INFORMATION SOURCES
(1978).
3. In its recruiting literature, the United States Central Intelligence Agency has
defined intelligence as follows:
Intelligence is information-information about adversaries and potential
adversaries that nations gather to formulate their foreign and security
policies.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF PERSONNEL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY 3 (1993).
In international affairs Intelligence is knowledge-fact and estimate ....
The London Economist defined intelligence this way: 'Modern intelligence
has to do with the painstaking collection and analysis of fact, the exer-
cise of judgment, and clear and quick presentation. It is not simply
what serious journalists would always produce if they had time; it is
something more rigorous, continuous, and above all operational . .. that
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intelligence differs from mere information because of its value against
a specific decisional goal.
Intelligence officers describe their effort as a cyclical endeavor
consisting of planning, collection, processing, and dissemination; they
use a cycle metaphor to suggest the continuity of the steps and the
impact of each step on the others. Any part of the cycle could be called
'espionage', and the intelligence analyst, briefer, or collection planner
might each claim membership in the espionage establishment.' At
present, however, this is not the case. Espionage, within its more spe-
cific, limited meaning, is human information collection.' Although the
analyst may produce significant intelligence via creative scientific
method, analysis is not spying. Similarly, intelligence planners may
act as key a motivator of espionage-related activities, determining
information priorities, and managing available methods for obtaining
is to say, related to something that somebody wants to do or may be
forced to do.'
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF PERSONNEL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY 2 (1976). Sherman Kent, a pioneer writer on United States national intelli-
gence, distinguished "strategic" intelligence from "operational," "tactical" or "combat"
intelligence. These latter forms are the primary military types involving activities
such as order-of-battle analysis and tactical surveillance while strategic intelligence,
says Kent, is the "knowledge upon which we base our high-level national policy
towards other states of the world." SHERMAN KENT, STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE FOR
AMERICAN WORLD POLICY 3 (1949). Although Kent's differentiations are valid today,
the various intelligence forms, whether categorized as "strategic," "counter," "tactical,"
"domestic," or otherwise, are strongly interrelated and overlap in history, theory,
operation, and purpose; In a recent analysis of the American government intelligence
industry, Jennifer Sims states that "Intelligence is best defined as information col-
lected, organized, or analyzed on behalf of actors or decision makers." U.S. INTELLI-
GENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AGENDAS FOR REFORM 4 (Roy Godson et al. eds, 1995).
Abram Shulsky calls this definition overly broad and argues that secrecy is the
essential element of intelligence that distinguishes it from other policy-relevant infor-
mation. Id. at 17.
4. See generally WILLIAM V. KENNEDY, INTELLIGENCE WARFARE: TODAY'S AD-
VANCED TECHNOLOGY CONFLICT (1983); DAVID WISE, & THOMAS B. Ross, THE EsPIo-
NAGE ESTABLISHMENT (1967). Many writers use espionage in a relatively inclusive
manner. For instance, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones defined espionage as "the process of
acquiring information in the interest of national security.. . . " RHODRI JEFFREYS-
JONES, AMERICAN ESPIONAGE 4 (1977). However, Jeffreys-Jones concedes, citing
Harry H. Ransom, that the idea of espionage has been loosely expanded in common
misuse to include even covert and paramilitary operations. Id. at 3. According to
traditional definition, "Spies are secret agents of a state sent abroad for the purpose
of obtaining clandestinely information in regard to military or political secrets."
LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 510-11 (2d ed. 1912). For some intelligence
experts, the notion of what constitutes a spy is more limited. "It is well to keep in
mind that not all secret agents are spies. They may on the other hand be spy catch-
ers, or 'plants,' to uncover disaffection or subversion, sometimes in surprisingly high
places. Or they may be saboteurs, or code snatchers, or function in a number of
other ways." ALLISON IND, A SHORT HISTORY OF ESPIONAGE 2 (1963).
5. Espionage and spying are virtually synonymous, and the terms are so consid-
ered throughout this article.
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the information-but they are not spies for so doing. Dissemination of
information and media influencing may be so tied to some espionage
activities that distinguishing between the two may be dysfunctional or
disingenuous. Nevertheless, for the most part, the dissemination step
of the intelligence cycle can also be logically separated from espionage
in its limited sense.
Human Intelligence (HUM-INT) serves as the broadest category
and thus, subsumes many human collection efforts that are not proper-
ly considered espionage. For example, the gleaning of information from
Cuban or Bosnian refugees, newspaper accounts of reporters' inter-
views, or observations by diplomatic personnel may be HUM-INT, but
not espionage. Intelligence collection encompasses more than the prod-
ucts of human agents. For example, intelligence collection equally
includes Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Measurement and Signature
Intelligence (MAZ-INT), Photo or Imagery Intelligence (IM-INT), and a
host of other "-INTs."
Throughout history, the terms "espionage" and "spying" have
carried varying amounts of pejorative baggage.' Therefore, any at-
tempt at a precise definition is difficult. In the first instance, authors
of popular literature apply both terms to devices such as satellites,
aircraft, or almost any object associated with intelligence collection!
Human spies have enjoyed a special place in fictional and nonfictional
6. See JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE (1982); two major works on the
related subject of cryptography are HERBERT 0. YARDLEY, THE AMERICAN BLACK
CHAMBER (1931); DAVID KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS (1967); For information on
IMINT and SIGINT support to international arms control and verification see INTEL-
LIGENCE IN THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS: LESSONS FROM INF (Catherine Kelleher &
Joseph Naftzinger eds., 1990); BHUPENDRA JASANI, SATELLITES FOR ARMS CONTROL
AND CRISIS MONITORING (1986); STAFF OF SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE,
96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PRINCIPAL FINDINGS ON THE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED
STATES TO MONITOR THE SALT II TREATY 1 (Comm. Print 1979); Ted Greenwood,
Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Arms Control (London International Institute for
Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper No. 88, 1972).
7. General Harry Halleck, contemporary of Francis Lieber and acknowledged
scholar of international law during the American Civil War era, quotes Emmerich de
Vattel on the question of whether a government may compel an act of spying:
Spies are generally condemned to capital punishment, and not unjustly,
since we have scarcely any other means of guarding against the mis-
chief they may do us. For this reason, a man of honor, who would not
expose himself to die by the hand of a common executioner, ever de-
clines serving as a spy. He considers it beneath him, as seldom can be
done without some kind of treachery.
HENRY W. HALLEcK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 406 (1861). It is the disguise, or false pre-
tense, which constitutes the perfidy, and forms the essential elements of the crime,
which, by the laws of war, is punishable with an ignominious death. Id at 407.
8. See, e.g., DICK VAN DER AART, AERIAL ESPIONAGE (1986); JOHN M. CARROLL,
SECRETS OF ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE (1966); Morton H. Halperin, NSA Spying-Most
Secret Agents, 173 NEW REPUBLIC 12 (1975); The Beep, Blink and Thrum of Spy
Gadgetry, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 22, 1978, at 55.
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writing, especially in the twentieth century.' Novelists create images
of spies that reflect the ethical paradoxes and curious legal trade offs
that are seemingly an inherent condition of the industry.' On one
hand, secret agents possess a romantic mystique of international in-
trigue, competence, and potency. Their activities, on the other hand, at
times debase human trust. "The gravamen of the offense of a spy is the
treachery of deception practiced, the being in disguise or acting under
false pretense."" At any rate, whether in fiction or reality, the indi-
vidual who spies is not constantly skulking. He or she usually has
another occupation and spies only part-time." As such, a practical
definition of espionage, must revolve more around the act of spying
rather than around the office of the individual.
What attributes are common to spies in the act of spying? English
historian Michael Burn outlined the salient characteristics as follows:
1. He is deliberately involved in the conveying of information about
people or things recently observed.
2. He acquires or sends it secretly.
3. The information he seeks or conveys is for the use of people
hostile to or suspicious of those it is about, and it is usually for and
about people in government positions, or thought to be threatening
to a Government.
4. He is consciously a deceiver."3
Burn's description of a spy serves as a useful starting point for estab-
lishing an international legal definition. Accordingly, espionage can be
defined as the consciously deceitful collection of information, ordered
9. See generally J.J. Macintosh, Ethics and Spy Fiction, in SPY FICTION, SPY
FILMS AND REAL INTELLIGENCE (Wesley K Wark ed., 1991) at 161; G. Rausch & D.
Rausch, Developments in Espionage Fiction, 10 KAN. Q. 71 (1978); J. Barzun, Medita-
tions on the Literature of Spying, 34 AM. SCHOLAR 167 (1965); David H. Hunter, The
Evolution of Literature on United States Intelligence, 5 ARMED FORCES & SOc. 31
(1978).
10. Barzun quips, "The spy story does this for us, then: it permits us not to
choose, we can live high and lie low." Barzun, supra note 9, at 168. "The advantage
of being a spy as of being a soldier is that there is always a larger reason - the
reason of state - for making a little scruple or nastiness shrink into insignificance."
Id. at 169.
11. HARRY HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 406 (4th Eng. ed. 1908); see also
CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 477 (2d ed. 1934); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL
& FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 559 (1961).
12. For a brief description of the use of "cover" by the United States CIA, see
HARRY RoSrrzIKE, THE CIA'S SECRET OPERATIONS 213 (1977). There exist obvious
categories of persons who by the nature of their official employment deserve special
mention, e.g., embassy populations. See Maxwell Cohen, Espionage and Immunity:
Some Recent Problems and Developments, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 404, 408 (1948);
Nathaniel P. Ward, Espionage and the Forfeiture of Diplomatic Immunity, 11 INT'L.
657 (1977).
13. MICHAEL BURN, THE DEBATABLE LAND: A STUDY OF THE MOTIVES OF SPIES
IN Two AGES 2 (1970).
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by a government or organization hostile to or suspicious of those the
information concerns, accomplished by humans unauthorized by the
target to do the collecting.
In line with the above legal definition, activities such as analysis,
planning, or processing should be excluded from any definition of espi-
onage. These activities lack the requisite conscious, deliberate manner.
Burn's definition excludes people who are drawn into spying unknow-
ingly. For example, "a diplomatic courier often carries secret and hos-
tile intelligence. This he knows, but so do the enemy; he is not a spy.
But a man certainly involves himself in espionage who conveys or
collects intelligence while pretending to be doing something else."'
Moreover, an element of hostility towards the interests of the collection
target must also be present;' since the motives of the organization
directing or encouraging collection are implicated by the hostility re-
quirement. Nevertheless, although these motives may be difficult to.
determine and prove, it is a common condition of nations to be suspi-
cious of their neighbors."6
14. Id.
15. Definitions found in national espionage statutes reflect these elements of
personal deceit and harm to a nation. E.g., Article 2 of the Law on Criminal Re-
sponsibility for State Crimes (of the Soviet Union) which provided as follows:
Espionage
The giving away, theft or collection with the intention of conveying to a
foreign Power, a foreign organization, or their agents, of information
constituting a State or military secret, as well as the giving away or
collection on the instructions of foreign intelligence agencies of other
information to be used against the interests of the U.S.S.R., if the espio-
nage is committed by a foreigner or by a stateless person-is punishable
by deprivation of liberty for a period of from seven to fifteen years with
confiscation of property, or by death and confiscation of property.
30 I.L.R. 73 (Powers Case, 1960). Note that this Soviet statute provided a possible
death sentence and reflects the importance of use of the information by an extra-
national organization; United States statutes do not define peacetime espionage or
spying, but the Espionage Act prohibits specific acts. 18 U.S.C. §§ 792-799 (1983).
Section 793 of the Act prohibits gathering, transmitting or losing defense informa-
tion. The section requires intent or reason to believe on the part of the collector
that the information would be used to the injury of the United States. Section 794
of the Espionage Act, dealing with the gathering or delivering of defense information
to aid a foreign government or other organization, provides for a possible death
penalty for violations. 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1983). Section 796 prohibits the use of air-
craft for photographing defense installations. Significantly, the penalty for violation
of the prohibition of photographing defense installations is far less severe - a fine
of not more than $1000 or imprisonment of not more than one year, or both. 18
U.S.C. § 796 (1983). Wartime spying is covered by article 106 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice and is codified in Title 10 U.S. Code. The Codes allow the death
penalty to be imposed. 10 U.S.C. § 906 (1982).
16. Hugo Grotius' enlightening comment is: "And yet, in other things [such as
spying] those who avail themselves of the aid of bad men against an enemy are
thought to sin before God, but not before men; that is, they are thought not to
commit wrong against the law of nations, because in such cases--custom has
brought law beneath its sway; and 'to deceive' as Pliny says, ' in the light of the
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Burn's analysis suggests that collection targets include govern-
ments, or parts thereof, other organizations, or individuals. This rec-
ognition is significant because the intelligence targets of international
organizations may likewise be nation state governments or other orga-
nizations.
Burn also inspects the particular motives for spying by dividing
such activity into the following four categories:
(1) The espionage one government practices against another.
(2) The espionage used to defeat this.
(3) The secret watch a government keeps on its own people.
(4) The secret watch some of its people keep upon the govern-
ment."7
These categories are not as distinct as Burn's analysis suggests; in-
stead, they overlap and interact. Nevertheless, Burn's organization
facilitates the examination of terms closely related to espionage.
Burn's second category, espionage used to defeat the espionage
one government practices against another, is better called counterespi-
onage, a subtype of counterintelligence. 8 Counterespionage, a com-
mon specialty found practiced by intelligence organizations world-
wide," can be active or passive, and designed to prevent, confuse, or
alter hostile intelligence development. Counterespionage is the "spy
versus spy" work of countering clandestine human intelligence collec-
tion, but fits outside the definition of espionage offered earlier. Coun-
terspies are supported by the sense of high purpose spies use to hurdle
municipal legal barriers and garden variety ethical standards. This
Machiavellianism is further fueled by fear, a sense of urgency, and
spreading distrust that often first claims ethics as a victim. Conse-
quently, international legal prescriptions addressing espionage should
similarly consider counterespionage. However, counterespionage is not
the subject of this essay.
practices of the age, is prudence.' HUGO GROTrus, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE
(1625), reprinted in LEON FRIEDMAN, 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
39, 40 (1972) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN].
17. BURN, supra note 13, at 3.
18. "Counterintelligence (CI) is a special form of intelligence activity, separate
and distinct from other disciplines. Its purpose is to discover hostile foreign intelli-
gence operations and destroy their effectiveness." FINAL REPORT TO THE SELECT
COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 163; See generally PETERSEN, supra note 2; George
Kalaris et al., Counterintelligence, in INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 1990'S
128 (Roy Godson ed., 1989); BLACKSTOCK & ScHAF JR., supra note 2, at ch. 15.
19. See ALLISON IND, supra note 4, at 15; see generally RICHARD W. ROWAN, THE
STORY OF SECRET SERVICE (1937). Rowan's classic work was updated by the addition
of 12 chapters (to 94) with the help of Robert Deindorfer in 1967. See also I-
ROWAN & R. DEINDORFER, SECRET SERVICE: THIRTY-THREE CENTURIES OF ESPIONAGE
(1967). See also R. ROWAN, SPY AND COUNTERSPY (1928); BLAcKSTOCK & SCHAF JR.,
supra note 2, at 179; For readable accounts of counterespionage events, see ALLEN
DULLES, GREAT TRUE SPY STORIES chs. 3 & 4 (1968).
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Burn's third category, the secret watch a government keeps on its
own people, addresses domestic surveillance. This issue has been
exhaustively considered in the American context since allegations and
revelations of intelligence abuses during the 1960s and 1970s.' This
form of "spying" infringes on the individual rights of a society's mem-
bers, but depending upon the internal and external threats to a polity,
some domestic surveillance is justified." Although important, the spy-
ing of a government against its members is not examined in the pres-
ent analysis.'
Burn's fourth category is "[tihe secret watch some of a
government's people keep upon the government." At its extreme, this
category of spying evokes a crime closely related to espionage: trea-
son.2 Treason, a statutory crime in most countries, typically involves
the conscious transmittal of information to another country's agents or
spies by a citizen of the target country." The information conveyed
usually must have some importance to national security.25 Spying and
treason have a curious relationship. 'A key activity of traditional es-
pionage is what amounts to the recruitment and development of trai-
tors, and, although a traitor also may be a spy, the traitor aspect will
earn greater disrespect and loathing. The contempt accorded to the
traitor results from the perceived breach of duty to one's country - a
duty the foreign spy owes elsewhere. As can be seen, treason is some-
what different to espionage.
20. See, e.g., the description of operation COINTELPRO in FINAL REPORT OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLI-
GENCE ACTIVITIES, BOOK II: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERI-
CANS, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); FINAL REPORT, BOOK III: SUP-
PLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS
OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); see generally THE IN-
TELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, PUBLIC DOCUMENT SERIES 389 (Tyrus G. Fain ed., 1977);
see also CHARLES D. AMERINGER, U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 332-66 passim (1990).
21. For a generalized debate on control of intelligence activities by the United
States government, see Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Operations, 82 AMER.
SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 21 (1988Xa report by a panel chaired by William G. Miller);
American Bar Association, OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES: AN EVALUATION (1985) (a report by the Working Group on
Intelligence Oversight and Accountability, Task Force on Intelligence and Counterin-
telligence, Daniel B. Silver, Chairman).
22. FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 196.
23. Under the United States Constitution there are two forms of treason: (1)
Levying war against the United States and (2) Adhering to the enemies of the Unit-
ed States, giving them aid and comfort. U.S. CONST. art. III, sec. 3; the essence of
the crime of treason is the "breach of national allegiance." Hayes McKinney, Spies
and Traitors, 12 ILL L. REV. 591, 612 (1918).
24. Supra note 15.
25. Id.
26. For a philosophical and historical analysis of this phenomenon see CHAPMAN
PINCHER, TRAITORS: THE ANATOMY OF TREASON (1987).
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Spies are easily distinguished from traitors - not by personal
characteristics, methods, or motives - but rather by their sponsors
and their personal status or affiliations prior to the act of spying. Sen-
sitive to the negative connotations of the word "spy," professional intel-
ligence services deny using spies in the conduct of human intelligence
collection. Instead, persons involved in field human intelligence gather-
ing are called "agents" or perhaps "case officers."" A case officer
might recruit individuals with access to wanted information or seek to
develop confidences that eventually gain personal access to closely held
information. When a case officer recruits a local citizen, even the local
citizen will not be referred to as a "spy," but rather as an "agent,"
"contact," or "source." Whatever the case officer is called, he or she
may be engaged in espionage. The activities of the recruited national,
however, may constitute both espionage and treason.
Burn's analysis does not include covert action, a controversial
enterprise of intelligence organizations that goes beyond intelligence
collection.' Contemporary discussion of covert action broadened after
public revelations of activities by American intelligence organizations,
27. Historian Michael Burn states,
A convention has developed among historians, according to which
the gentlemen are called 'secret agents' and only the players spies, the
difference depending upon whether or not a Person does it for a liveli-
hood, (Professional spies, however, writing about themselves, speak of
themselves as 'agents'). There seems to be a wish to avoid the stench of
what is still a nasty word.
BURN, supra note 13, at 3.
The Directorate of Operations (DO) - the Clandestine Service - is a very
special part of the CIA. It is made up of men and women who are dedicated to
seeking information vital to the security of our country and people.
This is a secret service with its own specialized way of recruiting, training,
and maintaining networks of human agents-some might call them spies-to collect
information about events and issues that threaten or might be potentially harmful to
our country.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 3, at 9.
28. See generally Richard H. Shultz, Jr. et al., Covert Action, in INTELLIGENCE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 1990S 165 (Roy Godson ed., 1989); BLACKSTOCK & SCHAF
JR., supra note 2, at 189; Loch K Johnson, On Drawing a Bright Line for Covert
Operations, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1992); Lori F. Damrosch, Covert Operations, 83
AM. J. INT'L L. 795 (1989); see also Richard A. Falk, CIA Covert Actions and Inter-
national Law, 12 Soc'Y 39-44 (1975); Barrie Masters, The Ethics of Intelligence Activ-
ities, 24 NATL SECURITY AFFAIRS FORUM 39 (1976); E. Drexel Godfrey Jr., Ethics
and Intelligence, 56 FOR AFF 624-42 (1978); Harry Ransom, The Uses (and Abuses)
of Secret Power, 52 FOR SERV J 15-18, 29-30 (1975); Intelligence Activities: Hearings
Before the Senate Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in 7 Covert Action (1975). The
most extreme hostility to American CIA covert activities is perhaps manifested in
PHILIP AGEE, INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA DIARY (1975). It is complemented by DAVID
A. PHILLIPS, THE NIGHT WATCH (1977). Both books deal with covert CIA activities in
Latin America. Other works critical of United States covert operations include VIC-
TOR MARCHEITI & JOHN MARKS, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE (1974);
JOSEPH B. SMITH, PORTRAIT OF A COLD WARRIOR (1976).
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particularly concerning the Iran-Contra affair of the mid-1980s.'
Critics of covert action argue that such activity constitutes an illegal
interference with the internal affairs of a foreign government, and
thus, a breach of Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter." Pure
covert action has no direct relationship to the intelligence function in
decision making. Nevertheless, while covert action can be academically
distinguished from human intelligence gathering, the two activities
may be blurred in practice. Intelligence organizations conduct covert
activities because of the inherent security of the organization, needed
access to closely held information, and the less fettered command and
control by executive decision makers. Covert action - whether legally
supportable or insupportable when conducted - has a relationship to
international legal proscription and mandates already defined by cus-
tomary international law and the United Nations Charter. Some forms
of covert action might bear similarity to the international legal defini-
tion of espionage; for example, the modus operandi of foreign secret
agents interested in gathering intelligence information can include
positive action. Nevertheless, covert action is not espionage, but some
espionage activities may constitute covert action.
The key phrases of the foregoing paragraphs (covert action, trea-
son, domestic surveillance, and counterespionage) were used to frame
and distinguish espionage. This vocabulary, along with related terms
such as sedition, subversion, and sabotage, faces further problems of
interpretation outside English language usage. Words used to describe
clandestine activities can be tortured in translation due to imperfect
cognates and differing connotative traditions. For instance, sedicidn
may not mean for the Argentine what sedition means for the North
American.
II. INTERNATIONAL ESPIONAGE LAW
International law has long addressed the issue of espionage dur-
ing times of war while peacetime espionage has remained unad-
dressed. Rather, peacetime espionage has always been seen as an issue
of domestic law, even though an international event is obviously in-
volved. Consequently, the existing laws of war are a valid starting
point for international juridical treatment of peacetime intelligence.
Principles regarding spying in the laws of war are unique, clear and
consistent. As such, the laws of war provide a compass for navigating
the ethical dilemmas involving human rights, sovereignty, and global
security that human intelligence collection entails.
29. Id. See also IRAN-CONTRA AFFAm, H.R. REP. No. 100-433, S. REP. No. 100-
216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1988); PETERSEN, supra note 2, at 322.
30. UN CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
VOL. 24:2,3
ESPIONAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The following survey of the laws of war adduces, as historian
Burn deduced, that personal deceit, whether in war or during peace,
remains the essential element of spying. The difficulty of defending
such deceit continues to serve as the justification for allowing the most
severe punishments. Nevertheless, according to the traditional view-
point, human intelligence gathering per se is not an illegal activity.
Hugo Grotius' seventeenth century summation of the international
law relating to spying provides a logical starting point for the interna-
tional legal history of espionage. Grotius states:
[S]pies, whose sending is beyond doubt permitted by the law of
nations - such as the spies whom Moses sent out, or Joshua him-
self - if caught are usually treated most severely. "It is custom-
ary," says Appian, "to kill spies." Sometimes they are treated with
justice by those who clearly have a just case for carrying on war; by
others, however, they are dealt with in accordance with that impu-
nity which the law of war accords. If any are to be found who re-
fuse to make use of the help of spies, when it is offered to them,
their refusal must be attributed to their loftiness of mind and confi-
dence in their power to act openly, not to their view of what is just
or unjust.3
Grotius' comment on espionage, although nearly three hundred
years old, is valid today. Accordingly, the law of nations permits the
sending of spies, but if caught, spies are treated most severely.32 A
fascinating legal paradox is apparent.33 While some commentators
claim the noxious spy commits the most serious crime against a gov-
ernment, there is no consensus that espionage is a crime outside of a
municipal statutory sense.
One of the first modern codifications on the laws of war, the Dec-
laration of Brussels, dedicated several articles to the problems of intel-
ligence and espionagej The Declaration stated that "stratagems (rus-
es de guerre), and the employment of means necessary to procure intel-
ligence respecting the enemy or the country (terrain) subject to the
31. HuGo GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, Book III, ch. IV xviii 655 (F.
Kelsey translation, Oxford, 1925).
32. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 33 (1956); see
Ward, supra note 11; but see, Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S. 31 (1942) (stating that espi-
onage violates international law).
33. See Cohen, supra note 12, at 404; Maximilian Koessler, The International
Law on the Punishment of Belligerent Spies: A Legal Paradox, 1958 CRIM. L. REV.
21.
34. Declaration of Brussels Concerning the Laws and Customs of War [hereinafter
Declaration of Brussels] adopted by the Conference of Brussels, August 27, 1874. The
Declaration can be found in FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 194-203, and in THE LAWS
OF ARMED CONFLICTS 25-34 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 1973). The rules
announced by the Declaration were not adopted by the participating powers. How-
ever, the Declaration of Brussel became a basis for the two Hague Conventions
adopted in 1899 and 1907. Id. at 25.
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provisions of Article XXXVI), are considered lawful means [of war-
fare]."3' Thus, even deceptive means of procuring intelligence were
considered lawful. Nevertheless, the Brussels Declaration restricted
treatment of spies by applying the laws only to war time situations.
"No one shall be considered as a spy but those who, acting secretly or
under false pretenses, collect, or try to collect, information in districts
occupied by the enemy with the intention of communicating it to the
opposing force."3 The central aspects of the Brussels Declaration defi-
nition, false pretenses, collection of information and intention to com-
municate the information to an opposing force, are very similar to
Burn's outline. The Declaration states,
A spy if taken in the act shall be tried and treated according to the
laws in force in the army which captures him'. . . If a spy who
rejoins the army to which he belongs is subsequently captured by
the enemy, he is to be treated as a prisoner of war, and incurs no
responsibility for his previous acts.'
This is a very flexible statute of limitations. If a spy returns to his own
army, he is not liable for his' acts on subsequent capture. Such a provi-
sion would be difficult to understand without first accepting the para-
doxical nature of espionage. The law of war, while preserving the de-
terrence effect of capital punishment, and also easing the individual's
fate, rewards success in spying."9 A spy does not remain at large like
other criminals, because espionage is considered a "noncrime crime."
Once the actor has returned home, the spy is no longer a spy in the
same way that a criminal remains so until capture.'
The Declaration similarly restricted to whom the espionage label
could be applied. Military men (les militaires) who have penetrated
within the zone of operations of the enemy's army, with the intention
of collecting information, are not considered as spies if it has been
possible to recognize their military character. In like manner military
men (and also nonmilitary persons carrying out their mission openly)
charged with the transmission of despatches either to their own army
or to that of the enemy, shall not be considered as spies if captured by
the enemy.
35. Declaration of Brussels, art. 14, FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 197; see also
SCHINDLER & ToMAN, supra note 34, at 29.
36. Declaration of Brussels, art. 19, FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 197; see also
SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 34, at 30.
37. Declaration of Brussels, art. 20, FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 197; see also
SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 34, at 30.
38. Declaration of Brussels, art. 21, FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 198; see also
SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 34, at 30.
39. See McDouGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 11, at 559-60.
40. Supra note 38.
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To this class belong, also, if captured, individuals sent in balloons
to carry despatches, and generally to keep up communications between
the different parts of an army, or of a territory."1
Although located in the laws of war, this provision can equally be
applied to several peacetime situations. Transmitting dispatches is not
a reason for considering a person a spy, nor should he be considered a
spy if the nature of his activities is not hidden.
The Lieber Code, written eleven years prior to the Brussels Decla-
ration as a general order for the Union Army during the American
Civil War, is not a document of international law.' However, the
Code is significant due to its role as a primary model for the later
Hague and Geneva agreements.' The Code, like the Declaration, un-
derlines personal deceit or false pretenses as the essence of espionage,
notes the serious threat espionage poses, and acknowledges the heavy
penalties allowed. The Code permitted "scouts, or single soldiers, if
disguised in the dress of the country or in the uniform of the army
hostile to their own, employed in obtaining information, if found within
or lurking about the lines of the captor ... [to be] treated as spies, and
suffer death."" Deceit in personal dealings was considered especially
dangerous and justifying of exceptional deterrent measures. "While
deception in war is admitted as a just and necessary means of hostili-
ty, and is consistent with honorable warfare, the common law of war
allows even capital punishment for clandestine or treacherous at-
tempts to injure an enemy, because they are so dangerous, and it is
difficult to guard against them."' Personal human deception has been
considered so dangerous as to allow capital punishment. Other provi-
sions highlighting the low regard for personal deceit include one deal-
ing with guides. "Guides, when it is clearly proved that they have
41. Declaration of Brussels, art. 22, FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 198; see also
SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 34, at 30.
42. Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the
Field, prepared by Francis Lieber, promulgated as General Orders No. 100 by Presi-
dent Lincoln, 24 April, 1863, Adjutant Generals' Office, 1863, Washington 1898:
Government Printing Office thereinafter General Orders No. 100]. Can be found in
FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 158; SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 34, at 3. The
Lieber Code is a significant ancestor and reference for the 1977 Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions since it was written in the context of a conflict not of an inter-
national character. On this point see Daniel Smith, New Protections for Victims of
International Armed Conflicts: The Proposed Ratification of Protocol IH by the United
States, 120 MiL. L. REv. 60 (1988).
43. SCHINDLER & TOMAN, Introductory note, supra note 34, at 3.
44. General Orders No. 100, art, 83, FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 173; see also
SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 34, at 14.
45. General Orders No. 100, art. 101, FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 176; see also
SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 34, at 16.
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misled intentionally, may be put to death."' Another provision deals
with abuse of a truce flag:
If it be discovered, and fairly proved, that a flag of truce has been
abused for surreptitiously obtaining military knowledge, the bearer
of the flag thus abusing his sacred character is deemed a spy.
So sacred is the character of a flag of truce, and so necessary
is its sacredness, that while its abuse is an especially heinous of-
fense, great caution is requisite, on the other hand, in convicting
the bearer of a flag of truce as a spy."
The Lieber Code marked the beginning of the modern pattern of
giving the spy considerable leeway after-the-fact, but very little leeway
if caught in the act. "A successful spy or war-traitor, safely returned to
his own army, and afterwards captured as an enemy, is not subject to
punishment for his acts as a spy or war-traitor, but he may be held in
closer custody as a person individually dangerous. "' s
The 1899 Hague Rules differed slightly on the use of intelligence
methods. "Ruses of war and the employment of methods necessary to
obtain information about the enemy and the country, are considered
allowable." 9 The 1907 Hague Rules, defining spies similar to the ear-
lier Brussels document, remain the current law.5° Again, the spy was
not liable for previous acts of espionage once he rejoined the army to
46. General Orders No. 100, art. 97, FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 176; see also
SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 34, at 16.
47. General Orders No. 100, art. 114, FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 179-80; see
also SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 34, at 17-18.
48. General Orders No. 100, art. 104, FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 177; see also
SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 34, at 16.
49. Final Act of the International Peace Conference, signed at the Hague, 29 July
1899. The text can be found in FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 204; see also
SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 34, at 49. The Conference submitted for signature
three conventions and three declarations. The Second Convention, relevant here, was
titled Convention Regarding the Laws and Customs of War on Land. Schindler plac-
es the textual provisions of the 1899 Conference alongside parallel articles of the
1907 Hague agreements. An introductory note to the Second Convention begins on
page 57 and the Convention text begins on page 65. The text of the Second Conven-
tion begins in Friedman at 221.
50. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 24, an-
nexed to the Convention [of 18991 Regarding the Laws and Customs of War on
Land. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 229; see also SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note
34, at 77. The wording of the 1907 Hague rules are essentially equivalent.
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which he belonged."1 A spy was to be taken in the act only, and not
punished without trial."
The Hague Rules of Air Warfare, signed in 1922, further defined
when an individual would be considered a spy."
Any person on board a belligerent or neutral aircraft is to be
deemed a spy only if acting clandestinely or on false pretenses he
obtains or seeks to obtain, while in the air, information within
belligerent jurisdiction or in the zone of operations of a belligerent
with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party." Acts
of espionage committed after leaving the aircraft by members of the
crew of an aircraft or by passengers transported by it are subject to
the provisions of the Land Warfare Regulations."
The Rules do not address aerial observation, but rather address acts of
personal espionage by individuals while aboard an aircraft. Hence the
article addresses a jurisdictional question, not the mission of the air-
craft.
51. Article 29 of the 1907 Hague Convention rules reads,
"A person can only be considered a spy when, acting clandestine
or on false pretenses, he obtains or endeavours to obtain information in
the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communi-
cating it to the hostile party.
Thus, soldiers not wearing a disguise who have penetrated into
the zone of operations of a hostile army, for the purpose of obtaining
information are not considered spies. Similarly, the following are not
considered spies: Soldiers and civilians, carrying out their mission open-
ly, entrusted with the delivery of despatches destined either for their
own army or for the enemy's army. To this class belong likewise per-
sons sent in balloons for the purpose of carrying despatches and, gener-
ally, of maintaining communications between the different parts of an
army or a territory.
SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 34, at 78; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at
319; Article 29, referencing spies, is one of the regulations annexed to the 1907
Convention as done in the 1899 Convention. The two versions differ only slightly.
Many of the states which ratified the 1899 Convention did not ratify the 1907 ver-
sion. They remain bound by the 1899 agreement. As between parties to the 1907
Convention, the 1899 agreement is replaced. Both agreements are considered as
embodying rules of customary international law. As such they are also binding on
states which are not formally parties to them. SCHINDLER & ToMAN, supra note 34,
at 57.
52. Convention Regarding the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907 Hague
Convention), art. 30, FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 319; see also SCHINDLER &
TOMAN, supra note 34, at 79.
53. The Hague Rules of Air Warfare, The Hague, Dec. 1922-Feb. 1923. The text
can be found in FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 437; see also SCHINDLER & TOMAN,
supra note 34, at 139.
54. The Hague Rules of Air Warfare, art. 27, FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 442;
see also SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 34, at 144.
55. The Hague Rules of Air Warfare, art. 28, Id.
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The Geneva Convention of 1949, while doing little to change the
law of war regarding espionage, employed additional procedural safe-
guards.' For example, in the case of protected persons accused of spy-
ing in occupied territory, the Convention allowed the occupying power
to refuse the individual rights of communication otherwise granted
under the Convention.67 Furthermore, the Convention mandates trial
with counsel, an appeal process after penalty is imposed, and a six-
month waiting period before a death penalty can be carried out.' The
six-month suspension of sentence can be reduced in grave emergen-
cies.""
The most recent attempt to advance the rules of warfare produced
the Geneva Protocols of 1977. e' These Protocols were intended to de-
56. Article 5 of Part I (General Provisions) of the Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949 (the 4th Geneva Con-
vention) states,
Where in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is
satisfied that an individual protected person is definitely suspected of or
engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State, such individual
person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges under
the present Convention as would, if exercised in the favour of such indi-
vidual person, be prejudicial to the security of such State.
Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is
detained as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of
activity hostile to the security of the Occupying Power, such person
shall, in those cases where absolute military security so requires, be
regarded as having forfeited rights of communication under the present
Convention.
In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with
humanity, and in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair
and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention. They shall also
be granted the full rights and privileges of a protected person under the
present Convention at the earliest date consistent with the security of
the State or Occupying Power, as the case may be.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 643; see also SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 34, at
425.
57. Convention on Protection of Civilian Persons, art. 5, FRIEDMAN, supra note
16, at 643; see also SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 34, at 425.
58. Convention on Protection of Civilian Persons, art. 75, FRIEDMAN, supra note
16, at 664-65; see also SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 34, at 445.
59. The last paragraph of Article 75 reads,
The six months, period suspension of the death sentence herein pre-
scribed may be reduced in individual cases in circumstances of grave
emergency involving an organized threat to the security of the Occupy-
ing Power or its forces, provided always that the Protecting Power is
notified of such reduction and is given reasonable time and opportunity
to make representations to the competent occupying authorities in re-
spect of such death sentences.
Convention on Protection of Civilian Persons, art. 75, FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at
665; see also SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 34, at 445. Thus, it is apparent that
severe and summary punishment including death for the spy is easily permissible
within the provisions of the Conventions.
60. Protocols Additional of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
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velop and reaffirm the laws of war established at the earlier Hague
and Geneva conferences. The Protocols update earlier agreements to
take advantage of new medical and communication technologies and
attempt more thorough inclusion of non-international conflicts."1 Spe-
cifically, Article 46 of Protocol I reaffirms the definition and treatment
of spies as stated in Article 29 of the 1907 Hague Convention.62 Arti-
cle 46 validates the present day use of the procedure for handling
spies, which has been accepted by international law for more than 100
years.'
A common thread running through both the law of war
codifications and historical writings on international law is the nega-
tive connotation attending the word "spy." The war code's approach
has been to identify persons who were not considered spies while stat-
ing nowhere that spying is a crime of nations. Instead, spying is ac-
cepted as a part of war, but is recognized as being so dangerous that
1949, Protocol I Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL COMMIT-
TEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOcOLs OF 8 JUNE
1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (1977) [hereinafter Protocols
Additional]; Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Changing Rules For Changing Forms of War-
fare, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 204 app. (1978); Official Documents, 72 AM. J.
INT'L L. 457 (1972).
61. See generally, W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Juridicial Sta-
tus of Privileged Combatants Under the Geneva Protocol of 1977 Concerning Inter-
national Conflicts, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 4.
62. See supra note 51.
63. Art. 46, Protocol I of the Convention states:
1. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Conventions or of this
Protocol, any member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who
falls into the power of an adverse Party while engaging in espionage
shall not have the right to the status of prisoner of war and may be
treated as a spy.
2. A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who, on
behalf of that Party and in territory controlled by an adverse Party,
gathers or attempts to gather information shall not be considered as
engaging in espionage if, while so acting, he is in the uniform of his
armed forces.
3. A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who is a
resident of territory occupied by an adverse Party and who, on behalf of
the Party on which he depends, gathers or attempts to gather informa-
tion of military value within that territory shall not be considered as
engaging in espionage unless he does so through an act of false pre-
tense or deliberately in a clandestine manner. Moreover, such a resident
shall not lose his right to the status of prisoner of war and may not be
treated as a spy unless he is captured while engaging in espionage.
4. A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who is not a
resident of territory occupied by an adverse Party and who has engaged
in espionage in that territory shall not lose his right to the status of
prisoner of war and may not be treated as a spy unless he is captured
before he has rejoined the armed forces to which he belongs.
Protocols Additional, art. 46 Protocol I, supra note 59 at 561.
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capital punishment is allowed as a discouragement. The venerable
rules of war do little to reconcile the paradoxical nature of espionage
as a delict. As they are, the Rules may be most useful for development
of international law regarding current peacetime intelligence collection
practices.
Applying the laws of war as a preliminary guide to the legal han-
dling of intelligence activities, it is evident that some means of intelli-
gence gathering are considered to be in consonance with honorable
conduct. The law of war takes the need to gather intelligence for grant-
ed, by recognizing only the deceitful or treacherous nature of spying.
The law admits that harsh deterrence is necessary to defend against
spying, but since little personal deceit is involved in most technical
intelligence gathering, the law of war rejects individual punishment for
engaging in such activities.' Unfortunately, while broad consensus
exists regarding the status of the spy in wartime, less of a consensus
exists as to peacetime espionage. In fact, peacetime espionage is barely
considered at all. Richard Falk observed:
Traditional international law is remarkably oblivious to the peace-
time practice of espionage. Leading treatises overlook espionage
altogether or contain a perfunctory paragraph that defines a spy
and describes his hapless fate upon capture. And yet espionage has
always played a prominent role in international relations.65
Almost all international legal consideration of espionage is made
in reference to wartime, even though the domestic statutes of most
nations include espionage and related crimes such as treason and
sedition. Penalties for peacetime espionage vary, but are universally
severe." Still, espionage itself is rarely outlawed - only espionage
directed against, or dangerous to, that particular state is banned."
Lacking recognition, is peacetime espionage legally wrong under inter-
national law? Professor Manuel Garcia-Mora states, "Though interna-
tional law does not explicitly condemn wartime espionage, peacetime
espionage is regarded as an international delinquency and a violation
of international law."' Likewise, Professor Quincy Wright notes:
In time of peace... espionage and, in fact, any penetration of the
territory of a state by agents of another state in violation of the
local law, is also a violation of the rule of international law impos-
ing a duty upon states to respect the territorial integrity and po-
litical independence of other states."9
64. See supra notes 36, 50, 51, 54.
65. Richard A. Falk, Foreword, ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW V
(Roland Stanger ed., 1962).
66. See, e.g., supra note 15.
67. Id.
68. Manuel R, Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses
Under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. PITT. L. REV. 65, 79-80 (1964).
69. Quincy Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in Internal
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Despite these protests, scholarly treatment of peacetime espionage
has been inconsistent. Some of the most authoritative opinions hold
that ". . . it is not considered wrong morally, politically or legally...
to send spies abroad.0
Since World War II, national leaders and policy makers have
occasionally felt obligated to comment on international events involv-
ing peacetime intelligence activities. These comments reveal a desire
either to invoke or to appear to adhere to an international law that did
not exist. As noted earlier, all forms of collection - including technical
means - are labeled spying in popular and scholarly writing. Mean-
while, intelligence organizations avoid use of the word "spy" in some of
the most appropriate instances (such as with "case officers'). Interna-
tional law, however, simply ignores the question of peacetime spying.
One particular event, the Gary Francis Powers U-2 Incident, high-
lights the problems caused by imprecise definitions. The incident
forced a clearer recognition of the modem status of strategic reconnais-
sance." Given the previous definition of espionage, the following dis-
Affairs, ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (Roland J. Stanger ed.,
1962); See also R. Baxter, So-called 'Unpriuileged Belligerency: Spies, Guerillas, and
Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. YRBK. INT'L. L. 323 (1951). Notably, Mr. Rogovin, Special Coun-
sel to the CIA, testified at a House Committee hearing that "Espionage is nothing
but the violation of someone else's laws." U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities:
Risks and Control of Foreign Intelligence, 1975: Hearings: House Select Committee on
Intelligence, Part 5, Dec. 9, 1975, at 1767.
70. OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at . Curiously, Oppenheim adds that "[a] spy can-
not legally excuse himself by pleading that he only executed the orders of his Gov-
ernment, and the latter will never interfere, since it cannot officially confess to hav-
ing commissioned a spy." Id; For a consideration of several international legal theo-
ries and practices under which the sending or tolerance of intelligence gatherers has
been subsumed, see Michael J. Barrett, Honorable Espionage, J DEF & DIPL, Feb.
1984 at 13-21, 25, 63, Mar. 1984 at 12-17,62, Apr. 1984 at 17-21.
71. That the U-2 incident and the United States response was seminal in the
development of intelligence history is indicated by the following examination of Sec-
retary of State Christian Herter by Senator William Fulbright in 1960:
The Chairman: Mr. Secretary, you are a longtime devotee of in-
ternational relations and thoroughly familiar with precedents in this
field. Is the public assumption of responsibility for espionage by the
head of a state the usual and customary practice among nations?
Secretary Herter. No. The general practice has been, I think, for
a long period of time to deny any responsibility whatever.
The Chairman: Do you know of any precedent in our history or in
the history of any great nation in which the head of state has assumed
personal responsibility for espionage activities?
Secretary Herter: No. I do not know of any firsthand. It may be
that there have been some. On the other hand, I would point out, Mr.
Chairman, that this particular incident was of a very unusual nature.
The Chairman: As a general policy, do you believe it is wise for
the head of state to assume responsibility for espionage activities?
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cussion of the U-2 incident delineates technical intelligence as an ac-
tivity other than espionage in an international legal sense.
In 1955, the CIA completed development on the U-2 photo-recon-
naissance airplane.72 The U-2 was among the first technical systems
designed solely for strategic intelligence missions.7" From 1956 until
1960, U-2 flights regularly crossed Soviet territory, gathering informa-
tion immensely valuable to American military and political planners.
In 1960, the Soviets shot down an American U-2 plane and captured
pilot Gary Powers, who was a contract employee for the CIA. Before
the shootdown, the United States government consistently denied
photo overflights just as governments traditionally disavowed knowl-
edge of action by their espionage agents. Plausible denial was the
universal international posture regarding spies; intelligence overflights
seemed to merit the same response. Even if such overflights were not
formally an illegal practice among nations, they would be seen as un-
friendly acts. United States policy makers, not overly concerned that
the public knew it was spying on the Soviets, knew government admis-
sion of the unfriendly act promised to sour diplomatic rapprochement.
Indeed, the U-2 incident caused the failure of the Eisenhower-Khrush-
chev Paris Summit Conference." Against the common practice of de-
nial, the Americans equally had to consider the fate of an individual
spy as allowed by international law, albeit expressed only in the law of
war. The U-2 was a "spy" plane and by semantic association, the pilot
was a "spy.""6
Secretary Herter: Well, very frankly, I don't think it makes a
great deal of difference from the public point of view. On the other
hand I believe in a case of this kind the telling of the truth was the
better course than getting deeper into fabricating excuses or disavowing
responsibility.
Events Incident to the Summit Conference, 1960: Hearings Before the Senate Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1960) [hereinafter Events Incident
to the Summit Conference].
72. For a brief description of the U-2 and the U-2 program development see RAY
S. CLINE, SECRETS, SPIES AND SCHOLARS: BLUEPRINTS OF THE ESSENTIAL CIA 157
(1976); SANCHE DEGRAMONT, THE SECRET WAR, THE STORY OF INTERNATIONAL EsPiO-
NAGE SINCE WORLD WAR II 246 (1962); and see generally Events Incident to the
Summit Conference, supra note 71; for further references on the U-2 incident, see
PETERSEN, supra note 2, at 245.
73. On the origins of the U-2 program see Richard M. Bissel, Jr., Origins of the
U-2, 36 AIR POWER HIST 16, 21 (1989).
74. For discussion of the political and diplomatic consequences of the U-2
shootdown, see generally MICHAEL BEsCHLOSs, MAY-DAY: EISENHOwER, KHRUSHCHEV,
AND THE U-2 AFFAIR (1986).
75. The American policy of denial was based on several reasons besides inertia
in international practice or underdevelopment of international law.' American intelli-
gence may not have been sure whether or how much the Soviets knew about the U-
2 program. Tight security was expected to prolong the life of a secret program that
the CIA had anticipated would someday be countered. Other strategic gathering
efforts were being mounted, such as drone aircraft flights over China and U-2 flights
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After Powers was shot down, the United States continued for a
time to dissemble. In retrospect, the story of a weather plane hundreds
of miles off course seems ludicrous, but at the time perhaps it was a
game effort. The Soviets caught the United States government in an
embarrassing lie when it became clear that Powers had not been
killed. Rather, Powers had described the purpose of his flight to his
captors, and parts of the plane had been recovered, The United States
then admitted to an act of espionage and tacitly conceded the Soviet
right to hold Powers and punish him as a spy."0 Initial Soviet accusa-
tions of espionage and American responses were tied to an apparently
mutual opinion that such "espionage" violated the laws of peace, or at
least the laws of war. Actually, the laws of peace barely address the
question of espionage, and the laws of war distinguish espionage from
intelligence gathering that does not entail personal deceit."'
Eventually, the United States argued that the U-2 flights were
responsible acts necessary to monitor military developments in the
Soviet Union. The new American stance was apparently intended to
shift international attention away from the American mistake and onto
the issue of Soviet secrecy. Moreover, President Eisenhower finally
decided not to deny his personal knowledge of the U-2 flights. Hind-
sight suggests that the United States could have argued the U-2
flights were legal acts of reconnaissance under international law and
that Powers should have been held to no more personal liability than a
dispatcher of official messages (or a balloonist) under the laws of
war.
78
Today, technological developments have partially obviated the
kinds of issues raised by the Gary Powers incident. Satellites and un-
manned vehicles can accomplish the same reconnaissance mission
without endangering a pilot. However, the introduction of new equip-
ment does not usually end continued use of older systems, and there
are many types of technical collectors besides reconnaissance aircraft.
In 1979, the United States was forced to abandon ground based signals
intercept stations located in Iran.7" The abandonment was based upon
the potential danger to personnel if a station was captured and the
occupants were accused and prosecuted for spying.
over a number of smaller countries. Admission of the Soviet overflights was sure to
prompt questions and accusations from other countries previously unaware of or
indisposed to admit the existence of similar flights over their territories.
76. Events Incident to the Summit Conference, supra note 70.
77. Supra notes 36, 50, 51, 54, 64.
78. Cf, Declaration of Brussels, art. 22, supra note 40; The Hague Rules of Air
Warfare, supra notes 53, 54.
79. See Herbert Scoville, Jr., SALT Verification and Iran: Hearings on Military
Posture Before the House Committee on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at
2720 (1979).
1996
DENY. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
III. TODAY'S COLLECTION ENVIRONMENT
During the Cold War, intelligence collection efforts were paced by
technological advances. Weapons of mass destruction increased fears
about technological surprise, while potential shortages of key raw
materials intensified competition both for resources and
technologies.' These pressures dramatically influenced the interna-
tional intelligence activities of the superpowers and their surrogates.
With the end of the Soviet-American confrontation, a broad concert of
threats to peace and stability has become visible. Some of these threats
include the black market trading of nuclear material, weapons prolifer-
ation (including weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue
states, terrorists and organized criminals), conflict over scarce resourc-
es and environmental values, ethnic and religious conflict, spread of
uncontrollable viruses and other diseases, the transnational linkages of
crime, drug trafficking and terrorism and insurgency, illicit electronic
capital movement, migration and illegal immigration, famine, mob
violence, and spontaneous ungovernability. Given this increasingly
complex and sophisticated threat-based environment, many govern-
ments look to international organizations, richer allies, the press, and
their own agents to supply critical intelligence. As such, it is curious
that the debate regarding spies has been so narrowly focused on the
'nasty side' of the spy's image.
Objectivity leads to the uninspiring conclusion that real spies are
neither Ian Fleming's Bonds nor John LeCarre's seedy, sordid little
men." Double agents, fabricated stories that oust presidents, blown
covers that lead to murder, although sensational news copy, are barely
useful in identifying or categorizing the spy."2 Questioning who spies
really are may prove valueless, because the spying act may be the only
common denominator. Backgrounds, motives, and abilities widely vary;
yet, a review of the American debate reveals a selection of problems
regarding the spy's legal identity. The law of war approach has been to
identify who is not a spy, hence the logical exclusion of pilots and tech-
nical collectors. In the United States, congressional attempts to limit
the use of certain groups of people and professions by national intelli-
gence organizations have focused in great measure on news reporters.
Past debates have oriented around "protecting" news reporters from
80. On the question of superpower competition for raw materials and the nature
of Cold War geopolitical competition see RONNIE D. LIPSCHIIZ, WHEN NATIONS
CLASH: RAW MATERIALs, IDEOLOGY, AND FOREIGN POLICY (1989); COLIN S. GRAY, THE
GEOPOLITICs OF SUPER POWER (1988).
81. See generally IAN FLEMING, ON HER MAJESTY'S SECRET SERVICE (1963); JOHN
LE CARR, THE SPY WHO CAME IN FROM THE COLD (1964).
82. For discussion on the necessity of espionage see Herbert Scoville, Jr., Is Espi-
onage Necessary for Our Security? 54 FOREIGN AFF. 482 (1976); See also Samuel
Halpern, Clandestine Collection, in INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 19W0'S 37
(Roy Godson ed., 1980).
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aspies," but perhaps such debate might have been better oriented
around protecting reporters from being categorized as spies.'
In 1981, American intelligence activities became guided and limit-
ed partly by Executive Order 12,333, which replaced Executive Order
12,036 of 1978." Executive Order 12,333 defined certain terms, creat-
ed the Intelligence Oversight Board, indicated the Board's duties and
responsibilities within the community, and established restrictions on
certain activities. In 1993, Executive Order 12,863 dissolved the Intel-
ligence Oversight Board and transferred its functions to the Presiden-
tial Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, PFIAB.' Restrictions on
American intelligence deal mostly with domestic activities or with the
rights of American citizens at home or abroad. Executive Order 12,333,
for instance, prohibited the use of religious missionary groups and
news media as cover identities for national intelligence agents.
Bills were introduced into both the United States House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate in the early 1980s with the purpose of estab-
lishing a legislative charter for intelligence activities. To date, no char-
ter legislation has been passed." The thrust of the bills was to fur-
ther prevent government intelligence functions from tainting other
information-oriented professions. The outcome of the intelligence legis-
lation debate seems to have favored liberal intelligence collection rules.
On its own, the CIA has exempted humanitarian organizations such as
the Red Cross, CARE, UNICEF, Rockefeller Foundation, Ford Founda-
tion, the Peace Corps, and Fulbright Scholars from being used in clan-
destine activities, including cover.8 7 However, the problem of a clan-
destine identity is central to the successful conduct of espionage. Mul-
tinational corporations, missionary groups, news media and academic
83. Journalists are often accused of spying. See U.S. Journalist Faces Charges Of
Espionage, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 8, 1995, at A25.
84. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981).
85. Exec. Order No. 12,863, 3 C.F.R. 632 (1993).
86. The last serious attempt to provide a legislative charter for intelligence activ-
ities was titled the "National Intelligence Act of 1980." The stated purpose of the
Act was "to authorize the intelligence system of the United States by the establish-
ment of a statutory basis for the national intelligence activities of the United
States," and for other purposes. Hearings were held Feb. 21, 1980. The bill was
amended on May 15, 1980. S. REP. NO. 730, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The
amended version was passed by the Senate on June 3rd, 1980 and sent to the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs (June 26) and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. The Senate sent an amendment (No. 1774, calendar No.
780) to add a new section prohibiting employment of certain persons by an agency
or department and to prohibit a federal employee engaged in intelligence activities
from posing as a member of a United States religious, news media, or academic
organization. Provisions of Senate Bill 2284 are printed in 3 THE AMER INTELL J 14
(1980). The bill was not voted on in the house.
87. See Thomas Everson, Controlling the Spies, 12 CENTER MAGAZINE 60 (1978);
Charles E. Thomann, The National Intelligence Act of 1980, 3 THE AMER INTELL J 8
(1980).
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institutions can provide credible identities. Without access to such
cover it is far more difficult for an intelligence operative to establish a
natural presence in many places. Alternately, organizations whose
primary function is not intelligence may lose access to places, informa-
tion, and trust if they are identified as clandestine intelligence fronts.
Actions should be the basis for defining espionage, not association
with particular groups. Nevertheless, attempts to place legal restric-
tions on espionage activity often target the problem of cover according
to group association. The most developed debate on the subject has
been in reference to the news media." Arguments made about the
relationship between the United States news media and the United
States intelligence community are applicable to other cover situations.
The intelligence-news media relationship is the most universal, com-
plex, and perhaps most important in terms of world public order. After
all, news organizations produce public intelligence; they survive on
timely collection, analysis, and dissemination of information supposed-
ly useful for public decision making, and they are sometimes the pro-
ducers of the only intelligence available. What holds true for the policy
information function of the news media can be applied by extension to
other non-state organizations.
Similarities between the news and intelligence industries are
numerous enough that contact between the two is inevitable. At the
collection level, the conditions of the two efforts may often be extreme-
ly similar. To achieve success, news reporters often depend upon access
to closely held information. This access develops through the establish-
ment of contacts and the encouragement of mutual trusts. Reporters
usually have a good excuse for being where they are, and because of
the threat they pose to the unreceptive political leader, they are rarely
imprisoned or executed. Thus, members of the news media are very
alluring to intelligence officers wishing to tap such freedom of move-
ment. In turn, media personnel often seek inside information, leads,
and analyses that only intelligence officers can provide. On issues of
military affairs and movements, or on major governmental actions
within closed societies, a reporter wanting the best knowledge cannot
ignore the potential help of a state intelligence organization. Therefore,
the relationship between reporters and intelligence personnel also
becomes one of mutual use.89
88. See The CIA and the Media: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Over-
sight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 95th Cong., 1st and 2nd
Sess. (1978); see also Lawrence J. Mitchell II, Espionage: The Symbiotic Relationship
Between the Central Intelligence Agency and the American Press Corps, 11 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. J. 41 (1987).
89. "In my field experience in recent years, I have found it is more the press
that woos the CIA than the CIA that woos the press. It seems almost automatic as
a journalist comes into a small country that he asks to see first the ambassador and
second the station chief." Statement of Dean Brown, The CIA and the Media, supra
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Some members of the American news media have argued for legis-
lation requiring strict limitations on contact between United States
intelligence personnel and news persons. One reason given for such
enforced separation concerns the credibility and access that some for-
eign correspondents feel are damaged by association with American
intelligence, especially the CIA. A second argument holds that if Unit-
ed States intelligence agencies deal in any way with reporters abroad,
then a governmental interference with the free press has occurred."'
The arguments, however, are complexly shaded. Descriptions of how
the news media involves itself with American intelligence agencies
form no clear-cut pattern. Some of the news-intelligence relationships
considered by the congressional debate can be categorized as follows:
1. A news reporter is questioned for information by an intelligence
officer.
2. An intelligence agent asks a news reporter to find out a specific
piece of information made available by his special access, mobility
or contacts.
3. A news reporter contracts to regularly provide information to an
intelligence service.
4. An intelligence agent represents himself as a news reporter with-
out the knowledge or consent of the news service.
5. An intelligence agent represents himself as a news reporter with
the consent of the news service.
6. An intelligence officer asks a news reporter to publish a particu-
lar story in a foreign journal.
7. An intelligence officer asks a news reporter to publish a particu-
lar story in a domestic journal.
8. A news reporter informally bargains with an intelligence officer
over a trade of information.
9. A news reporter volunteers information to an intelligence service
on his own initiative.
10. A news reporter interviews an intelligence officer in developing
a story.
11. A news reporter shows an intelligence officer certain news
items, already published or about to be published which deserve
special attention.
12. An intelligence officer verifies or corrects for a news reporter
some already published news item.
A news reporter's citizenship, staff or freelance working status,
and the national identity of the news organization all further compli-
cate the situational possibilities. There is a distinction, however, if the
intelligence officer is overt (as say, an embassy official), or undercover.
The presence of foreign intelligence personnel in many foreign news
organizations further muddles the issue. It might be possible to prohib-
note 88, at 146.
90. See, e.g., statement of Stuart Loory, Id. at 196.
91. See, e.g., the statement of Morton Halperin, Id. at 188.
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it American intelligence officers from contacting American media per-
sonnel abroad, but such a prohibition would likely diminish the quality
of both the intelligence and the news products. American news report-
ers would still regularly deal with foreign intelligence services unless
the American reporters abstained from dealing with the foreign
press.9"
After the international news media, the next most relevant identi-
ties are the information gatherers of non-governmental, public interna-
tional and private volunteer organizations. Many organizations, such
as Amnesty International, are intelligence collection and reporting
organizations with specific missions. Separating the activities of such
intelligence organizations from state intelligence services would prove
difficult. A particular State service of dubious reputation could be the
intelligence target of a non-governmental organization such as Amnes-
ty International. On the other hand, protection of human rights will be
among the principal collection mandates of some state-sponsored in-
telligence efforts-often making cooperative involvements between
state intelligence services and non-governmental organizations natu-
ral. Designation of groups as off-limits to use by intelligence organiza-
tions is, therefore, impractical and counterproductive to the interna-
tional flow of public intelligence.
Lawmakers probably cannot draft universal, objective, yet useful
legislation regarding ethical relationships between news reporters and
intelligence personnel abroad. This is not to take the cynical view that
ethics do not apply, but rather that ethical behavior depends upon the
character of the individual news reporter or intelligence officer. Educa-
tion and training are equally important. For some antagonists of espio-
nage, situational ethics evoke the type of theoretical moral flexibility
that is responsible for ethical failings, and is, therefore, unacceptable.
Nonetheless, most ethical decisions must be left to the practitioners.
News and intelligence organizations will develop and meet their own
ethical standards in direct relationship to the quality of the
organizations' personnel and their moral indoctrination. 3
92. The Western concept of a free press is of course not universally accepted and
may be endangered by the very fact that there is no separation between some for-
eign press systems and their respective government information and intelligence
systems. See Subcommittee on International Operations of the Senate Foreign Rela.
tiona Committee, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. (1977).
93. "I believe that it should be emphasized over and over again that in this kind
of relationship in the past, as in the future, a great deal of responsibility has to
rest on the journalist himself. Statement of Tad Szulc, The CIA and the Media,
supra note 88, at 103; " . . . my agents and I had a clear understanding that they
did their intelligence work for me, but that the news reports they wrote were a
matter between themselves and their editors and were not given prior clearance or
direction by me." Statement of William Colby, Id. at 4.
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While municipal legislation to restrict intelligence agency func-
tions might help protect the civil liberties of a state's citizens, interna-
tional proscriptions regarding contact with intelligence personnel
would not improve moral conduct and would probably erode the quality
of available intelligence.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In the future, we will see continuing growth in the intelligence
collection function of international organizations, many associated with
the United Nations. These organizations will mount new information
gathering efforts, request nationally derived intelligence information
from member countries, and seek information produced by news orga-
nizations and other private groups. Structured intelligence endeavors
will be increasingly common among international organizations, and a
great part of these intelligence efforts will involve human collection.
What then are the possibilities for the development of internation-
al law on peacetime espionage? Adoption and codification of historical
approaches are most likely. Espionage should be narrowly defined to
exclude acts of technical intelligence gathering. This exclusion would
be in consonance with the laws of war. Others who are clearly intelli-
gence gatherers (e.g., scholars, students, news reporters, or members of
non-governmental organizations) should not be considered spies if col-
lecting within the scope of their express identities.
While clandestine information gathering will continue to be con-
sidered an unfriendly act between nations, such activity does not vio-
late international law. The viability of the worldwide intelligence func-
tion depends upon nationally mounted intelligence efforts and other
human intelligence gathering groups, including, but not limited to, the
international press, information gatherers of public international orga-
nizations, and information gatherers of non-governmental organiza-
tions. Therefore, classification of individuals as spies (for the purpose
of prosecution) should be explicitly constrained by international law,
and the prosecution of individuals as spies during peacetime should be
impaired by international proscriptions. Efforts to isolate groups or
professions from members of intelligence organizations should be re-
jected as impracticable and counterproductive. Preserving the paradox
of espionage, punishment of spies caught in the act should continue to
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be permitted under international law, but the death penalty should not
be admitted for any act of peacetime espionage, even involving clear
deceit."
94. Since the death penalty is now being questioned in all its aspects
as punishment for even the most heinous crimes in domestic law, it is
surprising that it is not questioned in international law when applied to
those who act for patriotic purposes. It is inconsistent with the funda-
mental humanitarian objective of Protocol I to impose no limitations
upon the customary use of the death penalty as a sanction applied to
spies.
Mallison, supra note 61, at 27-28.
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The Plight of the Larger Half: Human
Rights, Gender Violence and the Legal
Status of Refugee and Internally Displaced
Women in Africa
J. OLOKA-ONYANGO*
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
This paper launches a broad inquiry into the nature of the burden
shouldered by the larger half of humanity, setting the framework for a
critique of international and regional law, the two main bodies of juris-
prudence within which the issue is addressed. Specifically, why is
international law in general so oblivious to the overall situation of
women? What are the specific points of law and policy that require
critical analysis? How sensitive are feminist critiques of the interna-
tional arena to the specific condition of the African woman? The second
level of inquiry is concerned with the place of gender in the main refu-
gee instruments. The analysis is explicitly linked to general human
rights law and the operations of the United Nations High Commission-
er for Refugees (UNHCR), the main international agency concerned
with protecting the rights of refugees and the internally displaced.
Additionally, consideration will be given to the African human
rights and refugee instruments and mechanisms and the extent to
which they reflect insensitivity to the plight of refugee and internally
displaced women. Part IV of the paper comprises a specific focus on the
issues of physical protection and gender violence with particular re-
spect to internally displaced women. The paper also explores the role
of the main actors in the field, ranging from the United Nations (UN)
and its varied agencies, to the Organization of African Units (OAU)
and the African Commission on Human & Peoples' Rights (ACHPR),
and to national and extra-governmental actors.
Assessing the results of this inquiry led me to the conclusion that
displaced African women and refugees were experiencing "the plight of
the larger half." A number of basic facts confirm this conclusion. The
global population of women exceeds that of men; more than fifty per-
cent of the world's displaced population live in Africa, and the number
of internally displaced persons surpasses that of refugees. The conclu-
* L.L.B. (Hons) (MUK); L.L.M., S.J.D. (Harv.); Dip. L.P. (LDC). Senior Lectur-
er, Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda and Visiting Professor,
University of Minnesota Law School, Institute of International Studies (1994-95).
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sion follows that women outnumber men in both the internally dis-
placed and refugee populations.' Consequently, whether examined in
their separate spheres as women, as refugees, or as internally dis-
placed, or as a combination thereof, these groups comprise the world's
"larger half." Separately, each group faces insurmountable obstacles,
and concurrent membership in two or more of the group classifications
places a person at an even greater risk of marginalization. African
internally displaced women, therefore, comprise one of the most vul-
nerable groups, which is correspondingly least protected by law.
Constituting a majority has not translated into sociopolitical em-
powerment or economic liberation for internally displaced and refugee
women. On the contrary, the general ostracization of women in the so-
cial, political, and economic arenas has created additional barriers for
those forced to seek refuge or become internally displaced. Further, the
normative and institutional mechanisms to cater to these realities are
either manifestly hostile or woefully inadequate to the specific needs of
women, whether qua women, as refugees, or as internally displaced
persons. This is the case irrespective of the dual aspects of the prob-
lem, viz: the question of legal recognition and status,2 or the specific
acknowledgment of issues particular to the displaced women popula-
tion, paramount amongst which is the question of gender violence.3
Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that both the 1951 Geneva
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees4 and the 1969 OAU Con-
vention on the Specific Aspects of Refugees in Africa' recognize neither
the specifics of gender-based persecution nor the particularities of
women refugees or of womanhood as a whole. This is the case whether
viewed in relation to the conceptualization of the term "refugee" or in
the dominant solutions to the refugee crisis that are usually proffered.
The main international instrument concerned with the status of
women, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimina-
1. The estimation of forcibly displaced persons varies depending on the source.
The number of refugees has been calculated at 20 million and that of internally
displaced persons placed at 24 million. Of these, eighty percent are estimated to be
in African countries. See Preliminary Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/42 (1994); UNHCR, THE ADDIS ABABA DOcU-
MENT ON REFUGEES AND FORCED POPULATION DISPLACEMENTS, 10 (1994). For an
examination of the problem of compiling and analyzing statistics in the refugee are-
na, see UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: THE CHALLENGE OF PRO-
TECTION, 145-147 (1993).
2. See David Neal, Women as a Social group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution
as Grounds for Asylum, 20 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. 'REv. 203 (1988), and Genevieve
Camus-Jacques, Refugee Women: The Forgotten Majority, in REFUGEES AND INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS 141 (Gil Loescher & Laila Monahan eds., 1989).
3. Camus-Jacques, supra note 2.
4. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention).
5. Convention governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problem, Sept. 10,
1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 (entered into form June 20, 1974).
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tion against Women (CEDAW)5 , has existed for a little over a decade
but does not address the issues surrounding refugee or internally dis-
placed women. The African Charter on Human & Peoples' Rights7,
mentions the word "women" once, and even then only in an omnibus
clause dealing with the family and children.8 The Organization of Afri-
can Unity (OAU) is a peculiarly male-dominated organization, and has
only recently established a unit within the Secretariat to deal with
issues related to gender.9 Finally, despite the magnitude of the crisis,
international law has thus far failed to establish an adequate frame-
work within which to tackle the question of the internally displaced or
the very unique circumstances of internally displaced women."0 Con-
sequently, the pervasive phenomena of gender violence,
marginalization, and exploitation that this population experiences
remain in a precarious programmatic and legal position.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PLIGHT OF THE LARGER HALF
A. The Status of Women under International Law
1. International Law Today
International law operates within a framework that is influenced
by socioeconomic, political, and historical factors quite different from
those that operate on domestic law. Indeed, the United Nations, the
main institution created to regulate relations between nations, is only
fifty years old and still developing. In comparative terms, international
law, and particularly international human rights law, is a distinct
discipline in the midst of revolutionary change. Because of this, the
parameters of international law remain largely dictated by the hege-
mony advanced socioeconomic and political powers. Such influence
exists in spite of the evolution of distinct interstate principles on the
6. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wom-
en, Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) 193.
7. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 26, 1981, O.A.U. Doc.
CABILEG/67/3 Rev. 5.
8. See generally Chaloka Beyani, Toward a More Effective Guarantee of Women's
Rights in the African Human Rights System, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATION-
AL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 285 (Rebecca Cook ed., 1994).
9. J. Oloka-Onyango, The Place and Role of the OAU Bureau for Refugees in
the African Refugee Crisis, 6 INT'L J. OP REFUGEE L., 51, 52 (1994).
10. Francis Deng was appointed the UN Secretary-General's Special Representa.
tive on Internally Displaced Persons in 1992. His report comprehensively covers the
various issues in relation to legal status, protection and state sovereignty, inter alia.
While he devotes some attention to the issue of internally displaced women, it is
fairly clear that much more could have been said. See, FRANCIS DENG, INTERNALLY
DISPLACED PERSONS: REPORT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
TO THE 51sT SESSION OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS at 29-33, U.N. Doc.
EICN.4(1995/50 (1995).
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use of force, the exploitation of the resources of the sea, and the protec-
tion of the environment, to mention only a few subjects covered by the
discipline. Some critics, such as those in the Critical Legal Studies
(CLS) Movement, have argued that international law is in fact little
more than a set of manipulable and indeterminate rules in the hands
of adept lawyer-scholars."'
Theoretical contestation aside, the most striking distinction be-
tween international and domestic law lies in the ability of domestic
authorities to set and enforce penalties. The lack of options in the
international arena leaves victims dependent on the willingness of
political powers to act on their behalf. Furthermore, the world is en-
tering a phase in which many of the basic precepts of international law
and practice are under intense pressure and scrutiny. The mecha-
nisms to deal with the situation have proven largely ineffective, as
illustrated by the international response to the crises in Bosnia,
Chechnya and Liberia. In summation, international law and the insti-
tutions established to guide and shepherd its development and opera-
tion are under siege, and there is considerable contestation over what
this portends for the future. 2
The above dilemma reflects the general chaos of the world as we
approach the third millennium. In the Agenda for Peace, United Na-
tions Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali captures the tensions of
the present epoch of world history:
We have entered a time of global transition marked by uniquely
contradictory trends. Regional and continental associations of states
are evolving ways to deepen cooperation and ease some of the con-
tentious characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries. Na-
tional boundaries are blurred by advanced communications and
global commerce, and by the decisions of States to yield some sover-
eign prerogatives to larger, common political associations. At the
same time, however, fierce new assertions of nationalism and sover-
eignty spring up, and the cohesion of States is threatened by brutal
ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife. Social peace is
challenged on the one hand by new assertions of discrimination and
exclusion and, on the other, by acts of terrorism seeking to under-
mine evolution and change through democratic means.'
11. See David Kennedy, A New World Order: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 4
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 329 (1994).
12. Barbara Crossette, New York Times correspondent at the United Nations,
has no doubt about what this embattlement means, particularly in the country in
which the organization is hosted: "At a time when this organization (the UN) creat-
ed almost entirely by the United States should be looking ahead to challenges as
great as or greater than those that greeted its birth in 1945, it is instead fending
off a barrage of incredible grassroots allegations. Out there in America are people
who challenge anyone with international credentials." Barbara Crossette, Sinister?
UN's Simply in the Dark, N.Y. TIMES, at El.
13. BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE 41-42 (1995).
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Despite this doomsday scenario, it relates only half of the story; the
other half, the story of the marginalization of women and the implica-
tions of those .... fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereign-
ty... " is yet to be recounted. 5 International law has been par-
ticularly insensitive to the plight of women and has only recently be-
come aware of the role of women as both subjects and objects of inter-
national law in the United Nations and in international law and rela-
tions as a whole. Intellectuals and activists, too, continue to overlook
the problem. All, however, is not lost. In the wake of the gendered
structures of international law and thier interpretation by scholars, a
formidable critique has evolved which demands that we take a second
look.'
2. The Nature of the Feminist Critique
Prominent in the assault on the male-dominated citadels of inter-
national discourse are scholars such as Rebecca Cook'7 and Hilary
Charlesworth 8 who have attempted to illustrate the manifest biases
in the legal and institutional arrangements established at the interna-
tional level.'9 The latter has made the important point that even the
14. Id., at 42.
15. V. Spike Peterson, Introduction in GENDERED STATES: FEMINIST (RE) VISIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 1 (V. Spike Peterson ed., 1992).
16. Recent analyses in the field have produced several interesting dimensions to
the issue in both international relations and international law. A separate area -
international development - has been the subject of attention from feminist re-
searchers for a considerably longer period of time. For some references on all three,
see Rebecca Cook, Women's International Human Rights: A Bibliography, 24 N.Y.U.
J. INT*L L. & POL. 857 (1992); Marysia Zalewski, Feminism and War: Well, What is
the Feminist Perspective on Bosnia?, 71 IT'L AFF. 340 (1995); Chandra Mohanty,
Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse, in THIRD WORLD
WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM, (C.T. Mohanty, A.- Russo & L. Torres eds.,
1991), and Association of African Women for Research and Development, The Experi-
ence of AAWORD, 1 DEVELOPMENT DIALOGuE 101 (1982).
17. For a recent example of her work, see Rebecca Cook, Women, in 1 UNITED
NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 433 (Oscar Schacter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995).
18. See Hilary Charlesworth, Transforming the United Men's Club: Feminist Fu.
tures for the United Nations, 4 TRANSNAT'L. & CONTEM. PROBS. 421 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter, Charlesworth, United Men's Club]; Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin,
The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 HuM. RTS. Q. 69 (1993), and Hilary Charlesworth et
al, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INTL L. 613 (1991).
19. The feminist literature on international law is fairly substantial. For a good
recent bibliography, see Rebecca Cook & Valerie Oosterveld, A Select Bibliography of
Women's Human Rights, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1429 (1995). Karen Knop states the
agenda of feminist critiques of international legal theory and jurisprudence most suc-
cinctly: "Feminist approaches to international law may be understood as seeking to
personalize and personify its normative constructs. They draw attention to the male
environment in which international legal principles are created and applied: the
predominantly male elites who formulate policy in foreign ministries, debate in inter-
national fora, draft treaties and declarations, sit on international and regional courts,
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compartmentalization, prioritization, and emphasis of the UN's work is
clearly related to the construction of relations between the sexes.
There is, of course, the additional fact that "... . the proportion of
women in the highest echelons of the UN does not grow in a perma-
nent way at all; indeed, it regularly grows backwards."" In this way
the international civil service both replicates and reinforces gender
imbalances at the national level. Such a process clearly presents a seri-
ous problem in terms of both policy and practice.
The above problem creates a dual-faceted dilemma, a veritable
"Catch-22," for any conceptual approach to the struggle for women's
human rights. In the first instance, women are generally marginalized
as a thematic issue within the context of international relations. The
marginalization stems from both the characterization of the issues to
the people who determine which issues become important. It is no
surprise that the people who define and implement policies are over-
whelmingly men. There has never been, for example, a woman Secre-
tary-General. A total of only five women head the UN specialized agen-
cies at the present time, a reflection, once again, of a similar situation
of marginalization within the international framework.
The second dimension to the problem is that even when women's
issues are tackled in the international realm, they are addressed in an
oblique and generally dismissive fashion. Such manner of dealing with
women's issues is due to the paucity of women in those arenas of inter-
national discourse and action where their impact is most essential.
Women's issues are thus generally excluded from the discourse on the
general area of international law and practice. Where there are mecha-
nisms erected to deal with the specific condition of women, their na-
ture, prominence, and impact is not considerable.
Rhetorical pronouncements aside, women remain far down on the
list of priorities of the United Nations. This can be discerned from a
cursory examination of the two main policy documents that have guid-
ed UN operations and philosophy in the 1990s, the Secretary-General's
Agenda for Peace'2 and his Agenda for Development." The latter re-
fers to women in a single paragraph out of 245. Of the ninety-two
recommendations for action, only two specifically refer to women and
even then in the usual rhetorical phraseology that has come to charac-
terize UN inaction on the issue. The injury is compounded by the Sec-
and make up the supervisory bodies for key international human rights treaties.
Seen through women's eyes, the landscape to which international law applies as-
sumes quite different - and disturbing - contours, women standing out from men
in sharp relief." See Karen Knop, Feminism and State Sovereignty in International
Law, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEM. PROBs 293, 294 (1993).
20. Charlesworth, United Men's Club, supra note 18, at 428.
21. Id., at 435.
22. BOUTROS-GHALi, supra note 13.
23. BouTROS Boumos-GHALi, AN AGENDA FOR DEvELOPMENT (1995).
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retary-General's Agenda for Peace, which makes no reference to women
throughout more than one hundred pages of analysis and recommenda-
tions; the argument that women are adequately covered under the
generic term "people" is obviously insufficient! Clearly, if the percep-
tion of global peace excludes half of humanity, then a serious problem
exists in the arena of international decision-making.
In conceptual terms, too, the United Nations has failed to address
the specificities of women's existence and the multifaceted dimensions
of oppression which women face. Charlesworth correctly argues that
[b]y focusing on the public domain of state action, international law
generally has left women's lives outside its purview. This can be
seen in the definition of human rights norms. For example, the
operation of most civil and political rights is confined to the public
arena; thus the prohibition of torture extends only to behaviors in
which the State is directly implicated. So too, the "collective" or
"group" right to development has been confined to operate in the
public sphere of the formal economy and market. International
economic measures exclude women from many aid programs be-
cause either they are not considered to be real workers or because
they are regarded as less productive than men."
This dilemma was also reflected in the main mechanisms and instru-
ments that were created to implement women's human rights.
3. CEDAW and the Instrumentalities of Women's Human Rights
CEDAW was intended to address the differential treatment be-
tween men and women under international law. In many respects
however, CEDAW has turned out to be a Janus-like instrument, mani-
festing both positive and negative elements for the global struggle for
the emancipation of women. CEDAW has done this by simultaneously
promoting action on women's issues at the international level, specifi-
cally in the United Nations, while constraining any serious action on
issues affecting women in other international fora. Many scholars have
pointed out that part of the reason for this is that CEDAW was
couched within a predominantly male-centered axis and employs gen-
der-neutral language. Consequently, the manner in which CEDAW
conceptualizes the problem, proffers solutions, and adopts strategies to
pursue its objectives are constrained in several material particulars by
the male-focus of the instrument.2 From the preamble to the defini-
tion of discrimination, CEDAW adopts a standard that permits govern-
ments to engage in behavior that is patently inimical to the status of
24. Charlesworth, United Men's Club, supra note 18, at 448.
25. See Natalie H. Kaufman & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Critiquing Gender-Neutral
Treaty Language: The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS 114 (J. Peters & A. Wolper
eds., 1995).
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women while not necessarily being illegal within the terms established
by the instrument.8
David Neal points to several additional problems: the instrument
has not been enforced or interpreted in a manner that is consistent
with a rigorous protection of the mandate conferred on the Committee
charged with the implementation of its provisions. Furthermore, the
available remedies are inadequate. But the structural problems are
compounded by the very subject with which the Convention deals,
namely, the issue of women, and the potential threat to established
citadels of male hegemony and domination that this question repre-
sents.' Thus, the CEDAW Committee is starved of resources and has
a limited period of time in which to meet.' It lacks any power to
adopt formal reports or to interpret the substantive provisions of the
instrument in any binding fashion, relying primarily on state self-re-
porting.' A mechanism for the hearing of individual petitions was
only presented to the CEDAW Committee in January 1995 and has yet
to proceed through various steps ending with promulgation by the
United Nations General Assembly.30 Although CEDAW helped to fo-
cus attention on women's issues on the international front, clearly
much remains in the way of achieving the objectives of equality and
non-discrimination with which it is concerned.
The promulgation of the United Nations' Declaration on the Elimi-
nation of Violence Against Women on December 20, 199331 constituted
a significant measure in the struggle to project the issue of gender
violence onto the international arena as a human rights issue. While
the Declaration is a non-binding instrument, its passage illustrates the
level of seriousness with which the question of violence against women
is being considered and signifies the potential to pursue the further
development of the area. Most important is the breach the instrument
marks in the public/private distinction that has prevented serious
action on issues such as marital rape. 2 Unfortunately, while extend-
ing a particular focus to marginalized categories of women, the docu-
ment makes no mention of internally displaced women."
26. Laura Donner, Gender Bias in Drafting International Discrimination Conven-
tions: The 1979 Women's Convention Compared With the 1965 Racial Convention, 24
CAL. W. INT'L. L.J. 241 (1994).
27. Neal, supra note 2, at 28.
28. Donner, supra note 26.
29. Julie A. Minor, An Analysis of Structural Weaknesses in the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 24 GA J. OF INTL &
COMP. L. 137 (1994).
30. See Cees Flinterman, Draft Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 13 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 85
(1995).
31. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, GA Pres. 48/104,
48 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 49) at 217, U.N. Doc. A/48149 (1993).
32. Id., art. 1, 2 and 4.
33. The Preamble to the instrument states, "Concerned that some groups of
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Much less scholarly attention has focused on the operations of the
other instrumentalities created to address the question of women at
the United Nations, such as the Commission of Women and
UNIFEM." The fact is that both are subjected to the same con-
straints as is CEDAW, viz., accorded low priority, under-funded, and
often eclipsed by the programs of other organizations in the general
areas of development (UNDP and IBRD), health (WHO), and children
(UNICEF). The organizations and documents discussed earlier illus-
trate the fact that neither the normative nor the institutional mecha-
nisms erected at the international level are adequate to address the
problem.
Of course, in relation to the position of African women, there is a
need to look both beyond the dominant feminist critiques of interna-
tional law and the instrumentalities designed to deal with the status
of women in international fora. If women in general are marginalized,
how much more so in the case of African and other Third World wom-
en? To conclude, a survey of the condition of women under interna-
tional law would be incomplete without making the necessary distinc-
tion and conducting a separate analysis of the socioeconomic, cultural,
and political conditions under which African women are forced to oper-
ate.
B. The Specifics of the Black Woman's Burden
1. First World versus Third World Feminism
Despite the significant theoretical assault launched by feminist
intellectuals on the domination of the avenues of international dis-
course and practice by men, there still remains a significant loophole
insofar as the incorporation of different Third World voices is con-
cerned, viz: the marginalization of such voices in both international
and feminist theoretical analysis and dialogue. This has significant
implications for the practical realization of international law in Third
World contexts. Many Western feminists, whether debating issues
women, such as women belonging to minority groups, indigenous women, refugee
women, migrant women, women living in rural or remote communities, destitute
women, women in institutions or in detention, female children, women with disabili-
ties, elderly women, and women in situations of armed conflict, are especially vul-
nerable to violence." While internally displaced women could fall into any of these
categories, and in particular the last of them, the category is indeed distinct and
merits special mention and attention. The significant difference between refugee and
internally displaced women is the fact that the latter are facing (within their own
country) conditions that the former have fled. The same country that might be a
relatively amiable host to refugees can be an ogre towards the internally displaced.
The Sudan best exemplifies this paradox.
34. For an examination of the overall situation of women at the United Nations,
see HUI= PIETLA & JEANNE VICKERS, MAKING WOMEN MATTER: THE ROLE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS (1990).
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relating to reproduction, political participation, or the male-imposed
demarcation between the "private" and the "public" sphere, either
carry over the ethnocentric biases of their own sociocultural contexts or
assume a comity of perspectives with African women that is often non-
existent. This viewpoint shapes these First World feminists' perception
of Third World realities as static, primordial and unchanging. In this
way, they share with their male counterparts an ethnocentric bond. At
best, they pay only lip-service respect to voices emanating from differ-
ent geopolitical and social contexts.
As previously noted, the dominant focus of Western feminism is
the androcentric and male-dominated perspectives that have influ-
enced and continue to prevail in international discourse and practice.
This has a dual effect. First, it produces lop-sided and limited analyses
of the myriad factors that contribute to the domination of women. The
reason is that is because these analyses largely omit an extremely
crucial element in the paradigm of international relations, namely, the
influence of racial, socioeconomic, class, and ethnocentric perceptions
and actions, as well as the impact of the global economic order. Com-
bined with androcentricism these factors detrimentally influence the
condition of women in Third World contexts. Second, such analyses
also influence the direction of policy in governments, multilateral agen-
cies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) which considerably
impact upon conditions in non-Western countries. African women are
thus trapped in a double jeopardy, confronted by the debilitating ef-
fects of patriarchy on the domestic front, and a truncated feminism
and white matriarchy at the international level."5 One need only look
at the dominant Women-in-Development (WID) model to appreciate
the point being made.'
In addition, the political economy of North-South relations which
are founded and maintained on an exploitative basis are often dupli-
cated in contexts that are not necessarily dominated by men. This
reinforces the imperialist culture of domination and exploitation.
Adetoun Ilumoka, for example, has pointed out that in the internation-
al arena it is mainly the voices of middle-class Western women which
are heard. Consequently, the attack on white male privilege could '...
become the quest for male and female white privilege in the system, or
simply male and female privilege in the system.""7 The debates on
35. For a recent examination of this issue, see J. Oloka-Onyango & S. Tamale,
The Personal is Political,' or Why Women's Rights are Indeed Human Rights: An
African Perspective on International Feminism, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 691 (1995).
36. Allison Goebel & Marc Epprecht, Women and Employment in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Testing the World Bank and WID Models With a Lesotho Case Study, 38
AFR. STUD. REV. 1, 18-19 (1995).
37. Adetoun ilumoka, African Women's Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 320
(Rebecca Cook ed, 1994).
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reproductive freedom, female genital mutilation, and the place of wom-
en in development are often dominated by Western women in a fashion
that is not necessarily positive for the liberation of their southern
sisteren.3
While we can agree, to cite only one example, that female genital
mutilation is a harmful and disastrous practice, the process of moving
towards its eradication is one that must be examined within the specif-
ics of the sociocultural and political milieu in which the practice is
carried out. As a preliminary matter, feminists within the specific
context of the society in which the practice takes place cannot be over-
looked in Operation Restore Hope ("we-are-here-to-liberate-you") fash-
ion. 9 At times, the maternalism of Western feminism, when trans-
posed to the African context, produces significant tensions and points
of conflict, as has happened in the case of the debate over the popula-
tion "explosion" which is so often presented as a question of reproduc-
tive rights and diminishing resources.' The following question must
be asked, however: Why is the "explosion" always on the non-Western
side of the globe?"
The preceding examples are only a sampling of the various ways
in which aspects of Western feminism, when projected across borders
and oceans, can be detrimental to non-Western women. They are par-
ticularly manifest of the differentials in power and intellectual hege-
mony that exist between the two spheres."2 Despite several critiques
of the one-sidedness of Western feminism, even the most erudite and
38. Jean B. Elshtain, Exporting Feminism, 48 J. INT'L AFF. 541 (1995).
39. MaivAn Clech [Am, Feeling Foreign in Feminism, 19 SIGNS, 865, 871 (1994).
40. The Malthusian population bogey-man has influenced Western scholars from
Robert Kaplan to Paul Kennedy. In an article on European integration and global
migration Guy de Lusignan laments the simultaneous aging of the European popu-
lation, and population pressures and high unemployment in less developed countries.
These, he argues, nourish "hopelessness and despair," stimulating them to "...
lash out desperately and viciously at the symbols of consumer society." Without
batting an eyelid, he asserts,
[als Europe's people age and their fertility rate declines, population
growth, particularly in the southern Mediterranean basin and in sub-
Saharan Africa, may produce a mass migration into western Europe.
Similarly, as insecurity and political instability prevail, minorities in
central Europe will flee west for fear of oppression and wars. This is
not confined to Europe only; similar fears have prompted immigration
movements from Haiti and central America to North America.
Guy de Lusignan, Global Migration and European Integration, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 179, 181 (1994).
41. Furedi argues that the "... discussion of population and immigration is
intimately linked to cultural - and, implicitly, racial - issues." FRANK FUREDI, THE
NEW IDEOLOGY OF IMPERIALISM 116 (1994).
42. See Sondra Hale, A Question of Subjects: The "Female Circumcision" Contro-
versy and the Politics of Knowledge, 22 UFAHAMU 26 (1994).
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sensitive scholars remain oblivious to the reproach of their non-West-
ern colleagues. In the final analysis, what does all this mean?
2. Placing African Feminism Firmly on the International Scene
In the first instance, it is fairly clear that there is a need for Afri-
can feminists to confront the "parallel analysis" in international theo-
retical discourse. This entails a more concise articulation of the de-
mands and concerns of African women that extends beyond the focus
on androcentricism that currently dominates international feminist
discourse in the area. In other words, African women and progressives
in general need to engage Western feminists more critically in the
formulation of international feminist theories.' The reasons for this
necessity are twofold as Nahid Toubia succinctly points out:
Even within the feminist movement, women from Africa or other
"third world" countries must show ourselves to be twice as brilliant
and twice as capable as Western women in order to be allowed
visibility, or the chance to be our own spokeswomen. Whether or
not Western feminists genuinely want women of the "third world"
to assert their voices and agendas in the development of an inter-
national feminist perspective, it is in fact our responsibility and
this generation's historic role."
Second, there is a special need to appreciate the various modes of pen-
etration being adopted by imperialism and how, in the final analysis,
these may serve to hamper the struggles of African women for genuine
liberation. The modes of penetration comprise factors as diverse as
development assistance or "aid" to non-governmental cooperation and
academic and collaborative pursuits in the intellectual arena. Finally,
it is essential for African women's movements to build broad and pro-
gressive coalitions across class and other distinguishing lines of demar-
cation. Such divisions as these have previously crippled the evolution
of an holistic feminism that directly responds to the demands of the
context and is not simply an offshoot of the dominant modes of West-
ern feminism.
Engaging Western feminism in this fashion will, at a minimum,
allow for the airing of alternative and more authentic voices on the
plight of the African woman. The assault on external domination must
nevertheless be accompanied by a thorough examination of the condi-
43. Of course, in order for any real success in the transformation of international
legal theory, there is a need for progressive male scholars to join hands with Third
World feminists in confronting the challenges presented. See, Peter Mutharika, The
Role of International Law in the Twenty-First Century: An African Perspective,
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1706 (1995).
44. Nahid Toubia, Women's Reproductive and Sexual Rights, in GENDER VIO-
LENCE AND WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRIcA 15 (Centre for Women's Global Lead-
ership ed., 1994).
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tions of patriarchy on the domestic front and by a reappraisal of
whether the dominant modes of expression adequately cater to the
interests and demands of women. Nowhere is this need more apparent
than in relation to refugee and internally displaced women in Africa.
III. REFUGEE LAW AND THE SITUATION OF WOMEN IN AFRICA
A. Gender in the International Refugee Instruments
Against the preceding background, we can begin to examine and
understand not only how -law mistreats and marginalizes women but
more specifically the situation of women, particularly refugees and the
internally displaced, in the African context. The main refugee instru-
ments do not refer to women, sex, or gender at all.* In this respect,
the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol are not only gen-
der-insensitive, they are also especially prejudiced against women from
non-Western countries. To appreciate how this is so, it is necessary to
engage in a process of disaggregation of the essential elements of inter-
national refugee law as we know it. This means examining the mean-
ing of the term "refugee" as used in these instruments," the content
of a "well-founded fear of persecution," (the basis on which a grant of
refugee status is made) and of the various elements (race, religion,
political opinion, membership in a social group etc.) on which a claim
for refugee status can be entertained.
1. The 1951 Geneva Convention
As the principal instrument in refugee law, the Geneva Conven-
tion was passed in the aftermath of the second World War, and was
designed to address conditions prevailing at the time, especially the
fallout from the persecutions of the Nazi era. In this respect, the Con-
vention was both constrained to a point of time, as well to a specific
place. While it articulated a legal foundation for the basic protection of
refugees, Goodwin-Gill points to the necessity for it to " ... be comple-
mented and in due course replaced by an instrument appropriate to
45. Article 3 of the 1951 Convention (covering non-discrimination) asserts that
the Convention shall be applied to refugees, "without discrimination as to race, reli-
gion or country of origin." For an analysis of what the impact of this phraseology
actually is, see Sunny Kim, Gender-Related Persecution: A Legal Analysis of Gender
Bias in Asylum Law, 2 Am. U. J. GENDER & L. 107.
46. Article 1, para. 2 refers to a refugee as a person who as a result of events
occurring before January 1, 1951 (the Second World War and its aftermath), " . . .
and owing to well.founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality .... "
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present and future needs." 4' Why is this so? Goodwin-Gill goes further
in offering an explanation,
[flounded upon a laudable, if highly individualistic conception of
persecution, premised upon admission and integration, the
Convention's capacity for narrow or restrictive interpretation in the
highly structured environments of case by case adjudication leaves
thousands 'outside' or 'beyond' protection. They become objects of ad
hoc, discretionary and extra-legal policies that finally benefit no
one. Individuals are commonly denied even basic rights, or any
opportunity to contribute to their own solution. Administrations in
turn, appear incompetent to combine humanitarian policy with
effective management of their borders."8
But there are additional problems with the instrument. The main
principles of refugee law enshrined in the 1951 Convention are based
exclusively on a narrow reading of human rights to cover only civil and
political rights as well as on an artificial and unsustainable demarca-
tion between the public and the private spheres of human existence.
This bias has been carried over into the work of the UNHCR and finds
manifestation in the Handbook on Procedures.9 Yet, the New
Webster's Dictionary defines the term "persecution" as "to cause to
suffer"' - making no distinction between suffering that may arise
from a violation of what are considered to be civil and political rights,
or by a deprivation of economic, social, or cultural rights. When read
together with all the major human rights instruments, from the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights to the Tehran Proclamation, and
from the twin Covenants to the Vienna Declaration, the distinction
that was made in the 1951 instrument (and which continues to hold
true) is patently untenable.5 However, the distinction was not made
47. Guy Goodwin-Gill, Asylum: The Law and Politics of Change, 7 INT'L J. REF-
UGEE L. 1, 8 (1995).
48. Id., at 8.
49. See UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING
TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 14-15 (1992). The Handbook is unequivocal in espous-
ing the position that " . . . various measures not in themselves amounting to perse-
cution . . . " (in a political sense), may amount to a" . .. well-founded fear of per-
secution."
50. NEw WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 748 (1994).
51. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/810 at 71 (1948), is the main international instrument in the arena of human
rights. The Proclamation of Teheran (proclaimed by the International Conference on
Human Rights at Tehran, Iran, May 13, 1968) affirmed the indivisibility of the two
categories of rights in paragraph 13. The twin covenants are the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1967), and the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights Dec. 16, 1966, annex to GA. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No.16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967). The Vienna Declaration and Pro-
gram of Action, adopted June 25, 1993, I.L.M 1661 (1993), reaffirms the indivisibility
and interdependence of both categories of rights in Article 5.
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by accident and conforms to both the sexist and ethnocentric percep-
tions that prevail in the formulation of international human rights
law.
Alexander Aleinikoff criticizes the standard and meaning of "per-
secution" as employed in American asylum law."2 He goes on to
condemn existing adjudicatory practice in the US for over-emphasizing
the need for an applicant to identify the specific cause of persecu-
tion." Furthermore, there are only five grounds on which an asylum
grant is considered under the Convention - a practice which is in fact
derived from the UNHCR's recommendations and procedures govern-
ing the granting of refugee status.5 Aleinikoff proceeds to argue that
it would be more useful to look first to international human rights law
and then to pose the question: is there a deprivation of fundamental
human rights, or the threat of the imposition of serious harm as a
penalty for the exercise of a fundamental human right to the asylum
applicant who has fled her or his country?5
Arboleda and Hoy extend the critique by asserting that the appli-
cation of the Convention definition of refugee as employed in Western
countries, is ". . . fast becoming over-legalistic, mired in judicial ab-
straction, removed from the reality facing refugees, and subject to the
vagaries of national interests.""s Finally, Jacqueline Castel completes
the critique by pointing out that women may often find it more diffi-
cult than men to meet the legal criteria for persecution established for
refugee status in the Convention, primarily because they are excluded
from participating in public life in which such grounds of persecution
arise.57
Despite the strength and veracity of these arguments, none of
these scholars probe deeply enough. The logical conclusion to their
arguments is that the grounds in the Convention for the determination
of refugee status are insufficient and lop-sided. But this is not merely
for the reasons they suggest. It is my contention that we must question
52. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Meaning of 'Persecution' in United States Asylum
Law, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 5, 5 (1991).
53. Aleinikoff points out as follows:- "But while the existence of one of the five
grounds might understandably signal the qualitative aspect of the definition of perse-
cution, it is by no means clear that persecution ought to be so limited; or more
importantly, that an applicant must be able to establish conclusively that one of the
five grounds is at work in order to establish persecution. Persecution may well be
given a free-standing' meaning, that requires judgments about both the degree of
and justification for the harm, but not one that necessarily invokes the five grounds
as the test of the qualitative aspect" Ild., at 13.
54. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 49, at 17-25.
55. Id., at 5.
56. Eduardo Arboleda & Ian Hoy, The Convention Refugee Definition in the West:
Disharmony of Interpretation and Application, 5 INVL J. REFUFEE L. 66, 76 (1993).
57. Jacqueline R. Castel, Rape, Sexual Assault and the Meaning of Persecution, 4
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 39 (1992).
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the overall ideology of those grounds because they are rooted in the
philosophy that accords primacy of place to political and civil rights
over economic, social, and cultural rights." As a consequence, interna-
tional refugee law, as presently conceptualized, can in fact only cater
to a small number of de facto refugees." Once again, this is a bias
that refugee law has inherited from the general corpus of international
law.' According to Charlesworth and Chinkin, the primacy accorded
to civil and political rights in international law " . . . is directed to-
wards protection for men within their public life.""' They go on to
make a point that is crucial for an understanding of the prejudices of
international refugee law alluded to above:
[tihe same importance has not been generally accorded to economic
and social rights which affect life in the private sphere, the world of
women .... This is not to assert that when women are victims of
violations of civil and political rights they are not accorded the
same protection, but that these are not the harms from which wom-
en most need protection. 2
We could confidently state that most women need protection from
harms in the sphere of their economic, social, and cultural rights. This
point assumes a heightened dimension when married to the present
condition of social and economic existence in much of the Third
World.' Under assault from the debilitating effects of structural ad-
justment policies,"' the majority of women refugees in the 1990s in
fact have a "well-founded fear" that their economic, social and cultural
rights will be denied65 in spite of international human rights law that
places such rights on the same level as the civil and political rights
protected by international refugee law.6 Stated differently, in the ab-
58. Of course this does not mean that economic, social and cultural rights are
never taken into consideration. See e.g., Arthur Helton, Refugees: An Agenda for
Reform, in HUMAN RGwrS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NExT CENTURY 49, 50 (L. Henkin
& J.L. Hargrove eds., 1994). It is nevertheless clear that, as in everyday, non-
conflictual and non-refugee situations, such rights are relegated to the back seat. See
J. Oloka-Onyango, Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights in Africa, 27 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1995).
59. Employing different premises Eduardo Arboleda arrives at a similar conclu-
sion. E. Arboleda, The Refugee Definition in Africa and Latin America: The Lessons
of Pragmatism, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 185 (1993).
60. See generally, Andrew Byrnes, Women, Feminism and International Human
Rights Law: Methodological Myopia, Fundamental Flaws or Meaningful Marginal-
ization, 12 Ausm. Y.B. INTL L. 205 (1992).
61. See Charlesworth & Chinkin supra note 18, at 69.
62. Id., at 69.
63. For an enlightened discussion of this and other issues, see Isabelle R. Gun-
ning, Expanding the International Definition of Refugee: A Multicultural View, 13
FODHAM INT'L L.J. 35, 72-85 (1989-90).
64. See Yei Osinbajo & 0. Ajayi, Human Rights and Economic Development in
Developing Countries, 28 INTL LAw. 727, 755 (1994).
65. See Ilumoka, supra note 37.
66. A 1986 Working Group of the United Nations placed stress on the involun-
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sence of a well-founded fear as determined by prevailing standards,
governments can so easily dismiss people (especially women) who are
genuine refugees as "economic migrants." Paradoxically, if we take the
elements in the UNHCR's definition of an economic migrant, namely
that their departure must be "voluntary" and for "exclusively economic
considerations" as a reference point, then it is clear that a person who
flees a country on account of the deprivation of her economic, social
and cultural rights is not an economic migrant. Such a person who has
been "made to suffer" in this way is logically entitled to protection.67
The implications of such a radical reformulation of refugee law
reach farther than the mere inclusion of economic, social, and cultural
rights in the formula for the determination of refugee status. Such a
reformulation is not just the recognition of greater numbers of people
as refugees, given that the Geneva Convention initially catered to
large movements of people, and that present restrictions arise mainly
from the revisionist rendering of the instrument." More importantly,
it is with respect to responsibilities of Western and non-Western gov-
ernments, immigration, and multilateral agencies, first and foremost
both in the formulation of policies, that impact on the observation of
human rights in general. Secondly, it is also pertinnent in provding
support to those refugees who do not necessarily reach their borders.
In this way we mean both the internally displaced and what we can
only refer to as the "internally dispossessed" i.e. those persons (men
and women, but especially the latter) who are effectively denied the
realization of their human rights, particularly in the economic and
social arena. The discussion of refugee law today, even as it expands to
encompass the internally displaced, fails to consider the issue in a
tary character of refugee movements, rather than on the narrow elements in the
1951 Convention, and noted that economic or social factors, " ... sometimes the
legacy of recent history or aggravated by the international economic situation . .. ."
were important factors for consideration in the area. See G.J.L. COLES, THE QUEs-
TION OF A GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES FROM SITUATIONS OF
ARMED CONFLICT AND SERIOUS INTERNAL DISTURBANCE 14-15 (International Institute
of Humanitarian Law No. 9, 1989), quoting Report of the Group of Governmental
Experts on International Cooperation to Avert New Flows of Refugees, UN Doc.
A/41/324 (1986).
67. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 49, para. 64. Of course we need to re-exam-
ine and reconceptualization the notion of "protection" too. As Goodwin-Gill states,
"The essence of protection extends beyond well-founded fear of persecution, beyond
race, religion, nationality, social group membership, or political opinion. For protec-
tion relates to the broad field of individual and community rights, not excluding the
right of communities, bound by ethnicity, culture or language to decide for them-
selves the economic, social, cultural and political framework most conducive to main-
taining their identity" Guy Goodwin-Gill, Editorial, 5 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 1, 6
(1993).
68. Of course certain scholars may challenge even this contention. For an inter-
esting treatment of the fluctuating nature of status determination prior to the pass-
ing of the 1951 Convention, see James Hathaway, The Evolution of Refugee Status in
International Law: 1920-50, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 349 (1984).
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holistic fashion. The failure to understand that persecution in the
1990s can be economic, social, and cultural, and that women and the
peoples of the Third World are particularly vulnerable to this form of
persecution is to give human rights only a one-sided interpretation.
Two levels of reformulation are thus suggested by the preceding
discussion. The first level pertains to the standards and determination
of the elements that must be taken into consideration. At a minimum,
gender must become a sixth category; economic, social, and cultural
rights should be accorded more respect and attention in the analysis of
the refugee problem.69 The second is a point which will be reconsid-
ered after examining the 1967 Protocol and the operation of UNHCR;
it relates to the concept of burden sharing and global redistributive
justice.7"
2. The 1967 Protocol and Beyond
The 1967 Protocol recognized the geographical and time-bounded
bias inherent in the earlier document and left the social group category
intentionally undefined. Ostensibly this ensured the necessary flexibili-
69. Numerous recent articles have considered the issue of gender and refugee
law in some detail. See for example: Todd S. Schenk, A Proposal to Improve the
Treatment of Women in Asylum Law: Adding "Gender" Category to the International
Definition of "Refugee," 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 301 (1994); Priscilla F. War-
ren, Women Are Human: Gender-Based Persecution is a Human Rights Violation
Against Women, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 281 (1994); Andrew M. Duetz, Gender
and International Human Rights, 17 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFF. 33 (1993);
Mattie L. Stevens, Recognizing Gender-Specific Persecution: A Proposal to Add Gen-
der as a Sixth Refugee Category, 3 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POLY 179 (1993); Walter
C. Long, Escape from Wonderland: Implementing Canada's Rational Procedures to
Evaluate Women's Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 179 (1994),
Linda Cipriani, Gender and Persecution: Protecting Women under International Refu-
gee Law, GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 511 (1993), and Emily Love, Equality in Political Asy-
lum Law: For a Legislative Recognition of Gender-Based Persecution, 17 HARV.
WOMEN'S LJ. 133 (1994). Leading the way in following the UNHCR guidelines on
refugee women in the domestic context is Canada. However, as Audrey Macklin
points out, there is a need to guard against the ethnocentricism - implicit in some
of the literature urging the inclusion of gender as a ground for refugee status -
that assumes that women in Western countries are not the victims of the same kind
of persecution that they urge should become a ground for the grant of refugee status
to applicants from elsewhere. She points out that, "Given that every country discrim-
inates against women, how will the line be drawn between "mere" discrimination,
and discrimination so "severe" that it amounts to persecution? One concern is that
the line may be drawn by reference to whatever "we" (the nonrefugee producing
country) do. What "we" do is discrimination. The more the claimant's state looks
different from ours, the more what "they" do begins to look to "us" like persecution.
In other words, the fear is that cultural difference may become the yardstick along
which the shift from discrimination to persecution will be measured." See A.
Macklin, Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 213,
263-274 (1995).
70. Roman Boed, The State of the Right of Asylum in International Law, 5 DUKE
J. CoMi'. & INT*L L. 1 (1994).
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ty to address new situations as they would arise.71 At the same time
however, the Protocol failed to visit the gendered notion of asylum that
had been written into the earlier instrument.72 In the circumstances
the 1967 Protocol is not adequate for two reasons. In the first instance,
the refugee situation has so dramatically changed that there is a need
to address the very premises and underlying notions governing refugee
law and practice, not simply the geographical and time-related aspects
of the issue. Secondly, the fluidity of the international instruments has
allowed for more restrictive interpretations to prevail, and for an inor-
dinate shift of the burden of both hosting and caring for refugees from
North to South.
Such fluidity is fostered in the erection of restrictive immigration
policies in Western Europe and North America that are clearly biased
in application against refugees from non-Western (and specifically non-
white) contexts.73 Several observers have asserted that such practices
constitute a violation of a variety of international human rights in-
struments.7' In the words of Arthur Helton,
[g]overnments, particularly those of Western developed countries,
increasingly treat those once considered to be part of refugee move-
ments as unauthorized migrants. Foreign policy ceases to be a
motivating force to assist and protect refugees. Instead, budgetary
constraints come to the fore. Migration management becomes a
guiding principle, and most asylum seekers are considered econom-
ic migrants from less developed countries."
We must add that racist considerations are also in operation in the
evolution of the new immigration practices and that the restrictive
application of refugee law in this fashion obviously has significant
implications for the status of women. Such implications must be ad-
71. Neal, supra note 2, at 229.
72. Article 1(2) removed the application of the January 1, 1951 date to the defi-
nition of "refugee," and Article 1(3) applied the Protocol without geographical limita-
tion. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, art. 1, 606 U.N.T.S.
267.
73. In concluding their examination of the German legislation in this area, Blay
and Zimmerman state, "However one views the reform of refugee law, it does not
augur well for prospective asylum seekers in Germany. More importantly, the Ger-
man situation appears indicative of emerging trends in refugee law in Western Eu-
rope generally. We may thus be witnessing the beginning of the end of liberal asy-
lum laws in Europe." Sam Blay & Andreas Zimmerman, Recent Changes in German
Refiugee Law: A Critical Assessment, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 361, 368 (1994).
74. Kerry E. McCarron (Note), The Schengen Convention as a Violation of Inter-
national Law and the Need for Centralized Adjudication on the Validity of National
and Multilateral Asylum Policies for Members of the United Nations, 18 B.C. INftL &
COMP. L. REv. 401, 422-426 (1995).
75. Arthur Helton, The United States Government Program of Intercepting and
Forcibly Returning Haitian Boat People to Haiti: Policy Implications and Prospects,
10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. OF HUM. RTs. 325 (1993).
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dressed in a forthright manner. A look at the operations of the
UNHCR will take us some distance in addressing this question.
3. UNHCR: The Theory and the Practice
The history of refugee movements extends to a period well before
the present century and can more accurately be traced to the process
of state formation."' Mechanisms at the international level designed
to cater to the problem are nevertheless a phenomenon of more recent
vintage. The LJNHCR can thus trace its heritage to the creation by the
League of Nations in 1917 of the Office of the High Commissioner for
Russian Refugees." The UNHCR was established on the same day as
the Geneva Convention was opened for accessesion, and since that
time has seen its role expanding into a variety of different humanitari-
an and protection contexts. Many of the new areas undertaken by
UNHCR were not predictable either in terms of character or perma-
nency at the time the office was created. 8 The history of the organi-
zation has been recounted elsewhere; indeed the UNHCR has frequent-
ly come under criticism for a variety of reasons. The question remains
of what has been the UNHCR's role in relation to refugee women and
the internally displaced?
With respect to the issue of women (at least conceptually), the
concerns of the organization have evolved progressively with unfolding
geopolitical realities. The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures79 (first
published in 1979) makes no specific mention of women, and many of
the issues covered clearly manifest a bias towards male refugees, as
demonstrated by the typical "gender-neutrality" of the language em-
ployed as well as in relation to the conceptualization problem.' Part
of this "neutrality" relates to the general problem already examined
viz., the bias inherent in refugee law."' However, in 1985 the Execu-
76. For an interesting analysis of the process by which the phenomena of refuge
and asylum developed in international law, see David Kennedy, International Refugee
Protection, 8 HuM. RTs. Q. 1 (1986).
77. UNHCR was the product of Resolution 319(A) of December 3, 1949 of the
UN General Assembly, and established as a subsidiary organ of the General Assem-
bly on January 1, 1951, initially for a 3 year period. For a more extensive history of
the organization, see Gregory McCue (Note), Environmental Refugees: Applying Inter.
national Environmental Law to Involuntary Migration, 6 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L. REV.
151 (1993).
78. U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FACT StHEET No. 20, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
REFUGEES 5 (1993).
79. See UNHCR, HANDBOOK, supra note 49.
80. Id., at 43-44.
81. Paragraph 182 of the UNHCR Handbook refers to the Final Act of the Con-
ference that adopted the 1951 Convention, and the recommendation that govern.
ments take the necessary measures for the protection of the refugee's family, espe-
cially with a view to " ... [the protection of refugees who are minors, in particular
unaccompanied children and girls . . . ." Id., at 43.
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tive Committee of the UNHCR specifically noted that " .. refugee
women and girls constitute the majority of the world refugee popula-
tion, and that many of them are exposed to special problems in the
international protection field." 2 The same recommendation recognized
.. that States, in the exercise of their sovereignty are free to adopt
the interpretation that women asylum-seekers who face harsh or inhu-
man treatment due to their having transgressed the social mores of
the society in which they live may be considered as a particular social
group ... ."' The main implication of this statement is clear: grant-
ing asylum on the basis of sexual persecution is permissive. Conse-
quently, states are under no affirmative obligation to take gender into
account in the grant of asylum, even if it may be precisely the issue of
one's womanhood that has caused flight in the first instance.8 With
respect to the issue of gender as a basis for status, therefore, the
UNHCR has made only limited advances.
Significantly more progress has been made by the UNHCR in
addressing the conditions that might adversely affect refugee women.
In 1988, the Executive Committee spoke to the need for particular
attention to be paid to the issue of physical safety and the sexual ex-
ploitation of women refugees. It urged government support for the
Special Resettlement Program for women-at-risk, and called for the
recognition of refugee women as a vital economic force.' The Execu-
tive Committee made several recommendations on a number of bu-
reaucratic issues with respect to the promulgation of guidelines which
include liaison with other UN agencies, the design of training modules,
and the solicitation of detailed progress reports on the various aspects
of the issue." At the 40th Session, the Committee made a number of
additional observations, in part commending action already taken by
the High Commissioner while at the same time urging further move-
ment on the issue of refugee women.8
The most important instrument from UNHCR on the issue of
women refugees is the Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Wom-
en' that was issued following the construction of a general frame-
work and that was outlined in the UNHCR Policy on Refugee Women;
these guidelines were adopted by the 41st Session of the Executive
82. UNHCR, CONCLUSIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES:
ADOPTED BY THE ExEcuTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNHCR PROGRAMME 84 (1990).
83. Id.,at 85.
84. Anders B. Johnsson, The International Protection of Women Refugees: A Sum-
mary of Principal Problems and Issues, in WORKING WITH REFUGEE WOMEN: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE 98 (Ninette Kelley ed., 1989).
85. UNHCR, CONCLUSIONS, supra note 82, at 124.
86. Id., at 124-125.
87. Id., at 139-141.
88. UNHCR, Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, UN Doc.
ES/SCP/67 (1991).
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Committee." The Guidelines are situated firmly within the
framework of international human rights law and emphasize the link-
age with domestic legislation on rape, physical attack, and sexual
discrimination.' Note must be taken of the fact that while the
Guidelines provide a fairly comprehensive framework of reference, they
are specifically concerned with the issue of protection. The issue of
refugee status a serious issue within the context of current refugee
trends."'
The Guidelines cover issues relating to assessment and planning,
protection needs and responses, assistance, reporting, and follow-up.
The Guidelines have more recently been augmented by an Executive
Committee Conclusion on Sexual Violence Against Women, which
sought to expand the protection of refugee women against gender vio-
lence." The Committee made its strongest condemnation of persecu-
tion through sexual violence, referring to it as a "gross violation of
human rights." This culminated with the issuance of detailed Guide-
lines on the Prevention of and Response to Sexual Violence Against
Refugees in early 1995, which are likewise addressed to field workers.
Significantly, they also address the effect of sexual violence on status
determination. 3
As a framework, the two sets of Guidelines are fairly comprehen-
sive, thoughtful, and sensitive to the situation of women refugees. The
main problem is, of course, the question of enforcement. Whether in
fact they have been or are in general usage when dealing with female
refugee problems in the African context is a question we turn to after
examining into the overall context of the displacement of women in the
African context.
B. Women and Displacement in the African Context
1. State Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the OAU
Against the backdrop of several decades of colonial domination
and exploitation, the continuing specter of apartheid in the unliberated
Portuguese and other Southern African colonies, and the throes of Cold
War rivalry, the promulgation of a Charter for African unity reflected
the peculiar situation of the time. Consequently, just as the main con-
cerns of the day were maintaining the hard-won liberation and protect-
89. Id., at 7.
90. Id., at 7-9.
91. For an attempt to construct a framework for considering gender in asylum
applications, see Nancy Kelly, Guidelines for Women's Asylum Claims, 6 INTL J.
REFUGEE L. 517 (1994).
92. Lauren Gilbert, Rights, Refugee Women and Reproductive Health, 44 AM. U.
L. REV. 1213, 1225-1227 (1995).
93. Id., at 1228.
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ing the new states, two features came to characterize the creation and
subsequent operation of the OAU: state sovereignty and non-interfer-
ence." The two concepts ensured that human rights never attained
much prominence in the formative years of the organization's exis-
tence. The OAU Charter, the quintessential instrument for the conduct
of relations between African states, ignored the fact that states are
merely a conglomeration of people to whom human rights protection
should extend.
African countries were generally hostile to concerns about human
rights, either dismissing them as imperialist interference in their do-
mestic affairs or using them in the Cold War stand-off between the
superpowers. Not until 1981 did the OAU promulgate an instrument
which addressed the issue of human rights.' With the promulgation
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the OAU added
the progressive notion of "peoples' rights" to the human rights debate.
As Shelley Wright has observed, the introduction of the concept of
peoples' rights into international human rights discourse was a hopeful
sign,
... that shows the possibility of escaping from a narrowly white
male European discourse of rights and creating a new venue for
discussion which attempts to escape from the exploitative and de-
structive underside of traditional human rights talk. By limiting
rights to the terms set by eighteenth and nineteenth century theo-
rists whose major concern was control of property - either through
the accumulated property of capitalism or the egalitarian redistri-
bution or elimination of property proposed by socialism - we re-
main trapped in the discourse of those who define all human rela-
tions through the language of ownership and control, or lack of
control over property. 6
Of course, a more critical reading of the African Charter will illustrate
that the instrument was not wholly committed to a radical
reconceptualization of the notion of human and peoples' rights in the
same fashion as, for example, the Algiers Declaration of 1976.' Nev-
94. Solomon Gomes, Sensitivity to the Principle of Non-interference in the Inter-
nal Affairs of States: A Political Imperative, Paper Presented at the International
Negotiation Network (INN) Consultation, the Carter Center, Emory University, At-
lanta, Georgia, USA, (February 17-19, 1993).
95. Edward Kannyo, The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Genesis
and Political Background,' in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 128
(Claude E. Welch & R. Meltzer eds., 1984).
96. Shelly Wright, Economic Rights and Social Justice: A Feminist Analysis of
Some International Human Rights Conventions, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INTL L., 241, 255-
256 (1992).
97. See Francois Rigaux, The Algiers Declaration on the Rights of Peoples, in UN
LAw/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: Two Topics IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 211-223 (Antonio
Lassese, ed., 1979) and ISSA SHIvJi, THE CONcEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA
(1990).
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ertheless the Charter provides the possibility for the development of an
alternative vision. 8 Unfortunately, this was not the case with the
conceptualization of the status of women adopted by the Charter,
which is predominantly traditional.
The fact that the international community had passed CEDAW a
mere two years earlier is only obliquely apparent from a reading of the
African Charter. Only one out of more than sixty articles makes any
reference to women, and even there only in an omnibus clause that
covers the family and tradition." Through the creation of a Commis-
sion charged with the implementation of the rights in the Charter, one
would have hoped for some attention to the issue of women. A look at
the guidelines for reporting would suggest otherwise.'
The Guidelines too, emphasize the position of women in relation
to the family, i.e., in relation to marriage, motherhood and child-
care.' 1 Two additional pages are devoted to general, broad guidelines
on the elimination of discrimination in terms of Article 18 of
CEDAW.' °2 Finally, the Guidelines do not address the situation of
refugees, despite the fact that Article 12 of the Charter refers to vari-
ous aspects of the right " ... when persecuted to seek and obtain asy-
lum. .. ."' Needless to say, neither the Charter nor the Guidelines
refer specifically to the situation of refugee women, and in the state
reports that have been received to date, the issue of women in general
is given short shrift.""
98. For a serious attempt to develop an alternative vision to the Banjul Charter,
see Makauwa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An
Evaluation of the Language of Duties 35 VA. J. INTL L. 339 (1995).
99. African Charter, art. 18.
100. The Guidelines are interesting because of their progressive and far-reaching
methodology, which stands in contrast to some of the more conservative aspects of
the Charter (such as the provisions on worker's rights, for example). See Oloka-
Onyango, supra note 58.
101. AmcAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN & PEOPLES' RIGHTS, PROMOTION, PROTEC-
TION AND RESTORATION OF HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL
PERIODIC REPORTS 14-15 (1988).
102. Id., at 44-45.
103. See Article 12(3) of the African Charter.
104. For a useful comparison of the situation of women by the OAU and other
regional mechanisms of human rights observance, one could usefully look to the
normative response to the question of children's human rights. The later produced
an African equivalent to the Convention on the Rights of the Child within a year of
the promulgation of the international instrument. Furthermore, in Article 23, the Af-
rican instrument makes specific reference to the situation of refugee children. See
generally, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (Adopted by the
26th Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments of the OAU, July,
1990, Addis Ababa); reproduced in AFR. Y.B. INT'L L., 295 (1994). For a general
discussion of the Charter, see Bankole Thompson, Africa's Charter on Children's
Rights: A Normative Break with Cultural Traditionalism, 41 INT'L & COMP L.Q. 432
(1992).
1996 THE PLIGHT OF THE LARGER HALF 373
The above conceptual difficulties are compounded by the actual
functioning of the Commission. Some of its problems are clearly logisti-
cal, such as the Commission's location in Banjul, the Gambia in West
Africa, whereas the OAU Secretariat is located in Addis Ababa, Ethio-
pia in the east. The Commission is starved for resources and meets
only twice a year. These bi-annual sessions are unspectacular on ac-
count of the rather lackluster fashion in which states parties make
their reports, the failure of governments to send representatives to the
sessions,0 5 and the non-attendance of certain commissioners.'O'
But the logistical factors are compounded by a host of political
realities. First, the manner of appointment of the Commissioners is
severely circumscribed by the fact that it is a function vested in the
Heads of State; this process politicizes the appointments. The
Commission's Secretary is appointed by and accountable to the OAU
Secretary-General. Reports are issued by the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government (AHSG); between sessions of the Commission it
is almost functus officio. The approach adopted towards confidentiality
is reportedly "excessive," with "terribly frustrating" consequences.' 7
Of the eleven Commissioners, the first woman was appointed in 1992,
the second in 1995, largely on account of NGO pressure. Although the
Commission is known to have received petitions concerning violations
relating to women's human rights and to have recently hosted a con-
ference on the situation of displaced women in Africa, it has yet to de-
velop a comprehensive and revolutionary approach to the general issue
of women's human rights'08 or the rights of refugees in general.' 9
105. Claude Welch, Human Rights and African Women: A Comparison of Protec-
tion under Two Major Treaties, 15 HUM. RTs Q. 549, 554 & 561 (1993).
106. See Astrid Danielsen & Gerd Oberleitner, Africa, 13 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 80
(1995).
107. INTERIGHTS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN HUmAN
RIGHTS PROCEDURES: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY WITH REFERENCE TO THE AFRICAN
CHARTER ON HUMAN & PEOPLES' RIGHTS 2 (1993).
108. Of course part of the problem is that Human and Women's Rights groups
have not sought to activate the Commission sufficiently. According to Seble Dawit,
"If we are to get any action, complaints need to be filed with the Commission on
violations of the human rights of women resulting from direct government action or
from its failure to act. We have to be able to show that there is a need to review
and strengthen the protective structure, and one way to do that is to highlight the
failures of the domestic system by using regional protective measures." Seble Davit,
Culture as a Human Rights Concern: Highlights for Action, in GENDER VIOLENCE
AND WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 41 (Centre for Women's Global Leadership,
ed. 1994).
109. On only one occasion has the Commission been seized of an issue relating to
refugees. In a communication presented by a Senegalese human rights group, the
Commission examined the expulsion of some 517 West Africans from Zambia in
February 1992. The Commission ruled that the matter was admissible under the
provisions of the African Charter, but refused to consider the merits of the case. The
closest it came to censuring the Zambian government was to point out that,
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We of course overreach ourselves and need to return to a consider-
ation of the main refugee instrument in African jurisprudence, the
1969 OAU Convention. As we change our focus, it is important to keep
in mind that even with an instrument specifically addressed to the
issue of human and peoples' rights such as the African Charter, the
OAU failed to accord women any fundamental respect for their rights
beyond those associated with motherhood. Moreover the rhetorical
attention paid to the question of refugees in the Charter was not fol-
lowed through in the Guidelines for state reporting. The disjunctive
separation of the refugee question and the issue of human rights is one
that has a long history in post-independence Africa and also found
reflection in the 1969 Convention.
2. The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention: A Critical Analysis
Initially perceived as a temporary problem, the refugee question
eventually grew to dominate the relationship between states on the
African continent.1 Thus, a combination of socioeconomic and politi-
cal realities produced both the flexibilities and the tensions that are
apparent in the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention."' In summary, these
are the political issues surrounding the doctrine of non-intervention,
the proscription on "subversive activities," and the socioeconomic as-
pects related to burden-sharing. Both weigh like an albatross around
the future development of refugee law and protection in Africa and are
particularly deleterious to the status of women refugees. The
flexibilities in the OAU Convention emanate from the definition adopt-
ed of the term "refugee," a term which has been glorified as African
"traditional hospitality.""2 In a comparative sense, this is certainly
true when contrasted with the manifestly racist and restrictive policies
presently in application in a variety of Western countries.1 " Howev-
er, it belies the conceptual and practical realities that exist on the
ground."4 It is also a dangerous characterization in light of what I
... Article 12, paragraph 5 of the African Charter, prohibiting mass
expulsion, is intended to prevent the formal violation of individuals'
rights which occurs when individuals are treated as part of a national,
religious, or ethnic collectivity. The apparent mass character of the ex-
pulsion in question, therefore, could constitute a violation of the African
Charter.
See Recontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l'-omme (RADDHO) v. Zam-
bia, (Communication No.71/92, 16th Session of the Commission).
110. See generally, R.C. Channgani, AFRICAN REFUGEE LAW: PROBLEMS AND PROS-
PECTS (1992).
111. OAU Convention, Supra note 5.
112. See Art Hansen, African Re/ugees: Defining and Defending their Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 139, 153-156 (Cohen, Hyden
and Nagan eds., 1994).
113. Helton, supra note 58, and Arboleda & Hoy, supra note 56.
114. Those realities were recently manifest when the Ivorian government caused
Liberian refugees to flee their camps, in a retaliation attack against Liberian rebel
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have already said about burden-sharing, and the evolution of restric-
tive immigration policies in the West." A critical inspection of the
basic tenets of the OAU Convention reveals that the instrument was
strongly influenced by the perceptions of sovereignty and nationhood
that prevailed at the time on the continent. Unsurprisingly, therefore,
the Convention is not strongly linked to a human rights perception of
the refugee problem.
The instrument made several significant contributions to the
corpus of international refugee law (on burden-sharing, non-rejection
at the border, non-refoulement, voluntary repatriation, and temporary
asylum) and is urged by many scholars, " 8 activists and policy mak-
ers" as a relevant model for other regions. Nevertheless, it mani-
fests a number of problems. These include the fact that it does not
specifically mention the rights of refugees," 8 it is silent on refugee
women, and it erects several barriers in relation to rights of move-
ment, expression, and association. Such restrictions on the rights of
refugees are often not justifiable in terms recognized by international
instruments. "9 Elsewhere I have argued that the 1969 Convention
reserved most sensitivity for "... the maintenance of harmonious
relationships between African states, than it [did for] the rights of
refugees as such. Hence, it could be asserted that the OAU Convention
was protective of refugees qua refugees by default, rather than by
design.""' Moreover, the main institution created to address the situ-
ation of refugees - the Bureau for Refugees - was both conceptually
and in terms of resources, ill-equipped to comprehensively address the
problem.'" Nevertheless, as an institution, the OAU has sought to
address the issue of refugees in a pragmatic fashion, and taking ac-
count of the omnipresence of the doctrines of state sovereignty and
non-interference. This is illustrated by the various declarations, confer-
ences, and initiatives undertaken by the organization in the field of
both conflict resolution, addressing the root causes of conflict and in
responding to the various issues raised by asylum and the refugee question.'=
movements. Howard W. French, At an African Border, Hospitality Comes to Grief,
N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1995, at A4.
115. Chris J. Bakwesegha, Forced Migration in Africa and the OAU Convention,
in AFRICAN REFUGEES: DEVELOPMENT AID AND REPATRIATION 3, 13 (H. Adelman & J.
Sorensen eds., 1994).
116. Arboleda & Hoy, supra note 56.
117. UNHCR, supra note 1, at 6.
118. In this respect, the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention employs a methodology
duplicated in the Banjul Charter, which makes reference to the rights of women and
children a . . . as contained in relevant international instruments . . ." a formula-
tion which can lead to a whittling down of the struggle for rights by such categories
of people. See OAU Convention and African Charter.
119. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AFRICAN EXODUS: REFUGEE CRISIS,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 1969 OAU CONVENTION 91-109, (1995).
120. Oloka-Onyango, supra note 58.
121. Oloka-Onyango, supra note 9.
122. See the Khartoum Declaration on Africa's Refugee Crisis, adopted by the
1996
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Even though limited in scope to the situation of refugees, the 1969
Convention was never designed to address what is arguably an even
larger problem, i.e., the issue of the internally displaced. We must
return first to the international arena to appreciate the nature of the
problem for this category of dispossessed persons before considering its
ramifications within the African context.
IV. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT, PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND GENDER
VIOLENCE
A. The Condition of Internally Displaced Women: Conceptual and
Practical Dimensions
1. The Broad Context
Internal displacement has long been an issue of particular concep-
tual and practical difficulty for the international community. In the
African context, when married to the serious issues of human rights
violations, state sovereignty, and the processes of nation-state transfor-
mation, the issue gains in magnitude.'" Furthermore, there are fun-
damental questions of strategy and approach which will critically in-
fluence the evolution of international standards in the area. Questions
relating to root causes, the ubiquitous phenomenon of state sovereignty
and the problematic notion of humanitarian intervention are neither
the province of unilateral action nor of single-step solutions. In partic-
ular, it is impossible to evade the fact that the illiberal, the discrimina-
tory and the sometimes manifestly fascist governments, which have
been and, in some instances, continue to dominate state power, often
bear prime responsibility for the problems of displacement in Afri-
ca.1" Last, but perhaps most importantly, what is the appropriate
institutional framework for addressing the question: an expansion of
the mandate of the UNHCR, or the creation of a wholly new organiza-
tion? " No UN agency has a protection mandate for this category of
Organization of African Unity Commission of Fifteen on Refugees, September 24,
1990, reproduced in 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 153 (1990). For more background on the
activities of the OAU in this regard, see UNHCR, supra note 1, at 3.
123. See Comes, supra note 94.
124. Ahmednasir M. Abdullahi, The Refugee Crisis in Africa as a Crisis of the
Institution of the State, 6 INTL J. REFUGEE L. 562 (1994).
125. David Petrasek asks similar questions in his treatment of the issue, and in
particular provides several reasons why the present institutional arrangement (the
UNHCR "good offices") or an expansion of it may be inadequate. But he goes further
to question whether the refugee regime and mechanisms are adequate to address the
problem: "It would be anomalous to address the gaps in protection for IDPs and to
ignore the many gaps in international standards affecting refugees and asylum-seek-
ers. Such anomalies arise because the problem has been too narrowly defined. The
problem is not only to find a means of protecting people who are already displaced
inside their own countries, but to tackle the root causes of displacement . .. ." Da-
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persons, although the UNHCR stepped in under the aegis of its "good
offices" mandate; the UNHCR is clearly over-stretched, and may in-
deed be compromised through the performance of this function. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is often granted ac-
cess to the camps of the internally displaced, but at times the condi-
tionality that attaches to such access (such as the prohibition on com-
mentary on the condition of human rights) may render the situation
even worse from a protection perspective."
The words of Francis Deng, the UN Secretary-General's Special
Representative on the Internally Displaced, best capture the various
dimensions of the problem:
The crisis is monumental. Its scope and intensity go beyond the
traditional human rights concerns, although protection remains the
most crucial issue involved. Despite the magnitude of the crisis, the
international community is both legally and organizationally ill-
prepared for an effective response to this global humanitarian and
human rights tragedy. There is therefore an urgent quest for the
development of ways and means to provide international protection
for and assistance to the internally displaced and all those in sim-
ilar circumstances of need."
Deng is the most prominent and prolific of the several scholars who
have recently sought to address the problems posed by the question of
the internally displaced." While a comprehensive solution to the cri-
sis is still some distance in the future, it is hoped that emerging mech-
anisms are an appropriate response to the various complexities of the
crisis. The concerted attention to the question should provide a partic-
ularly unique opportunity to ensure not only a specific gender-sensitiv-
ity in the evolution of normative and institutional mechanisms to ad-
dress the issue, but also that the matter will be conceptualized broadly
to consider the human rights imperatives in which it is located.
Richard Plender urges the adoption of relevant standards in the
area, pointing out the legal and practical problems that are involved.
With respect to the former, Plender specifically states that the man-
date of the UNHCR can be extended with few legal problems, although
the issue of resources and the question of direct intervention with
vid Petrasek, New Standards for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons: A
Proposal for a Comprehensive Approach, 14 REF. STUD. Q., 285, 286 & 288, (1995).
126. See J.B. Kabera & C. Mayanja, Homecoming in the Luwero Triangle, in
WHEN REFUGEES Go HOME 96, 99 (Tim Allen & Hubert Morsink eds., 1994).
127. Francis Deng, Dealing with the Displaced: A Challenge to the International
Community, I GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 45 (1995).
128. Among them are, Petrasek, supra note 125; Richard Plender, The Legal Basis
of International Jurisdiction to Act with Regard to the Internally Displaced, 6 INV'L
J. REFUGEE L. 345 (1994), and especially, Maria Stavropoulou, The Right Not to be
Displaced, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L & PoL. (1994).
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governments are significantly more problematic.'" This applies
whether it is the UNHCR or an entirely new agency which addresses
the problem. 30 For the present, and even in the absence of a more
solid legal framework, UNHCR needs to promulgate specific guidelines
in the area. This must be done in collaboration with the Secretary-
General's Special Representative, who has already attempted to formu-
late some preliminary principles in relation to the definition of inter-
nally displaced persons, the question of their rights, and the obligation
of states.'
The UNHCR has progressed in several material particulars in the
creation of a framework for addressing the issue of the internally dis-
placed.'32 The 45th Session of the Executive Committee drew inspira-
tion from Resolution 48/116 of the General Assembly, which was ac-
knowledged as providing an appropriate framework for the continued
involvement of UNHCR.'33 Note was taken of the fact that involun-
tary displacement had assumed "global dimensions" and that there
was a similarity between the causes of internal displacement and refu-
gee movements.3 4 These similarities, " ... often call for similar
measures with respect to prevention, protection, humanitarian assis-
tance and solutions ... 13"5 The Committee encouraged the develop-
ment of internal criteria and guidelines while emphasizing that " ...
activities on the behalf of internally displaced persons must not under-
mine the institution of asylum, including the right to seek and enjoy in
other countries, asylum from persecution."3 " While the Conclusion
specifically mentions the case of women and children, to date there has
been no articulation by the UNHCR or the Executive Committee of the
situation and rights of internally displaced women.
129. Plender, supra note 128, at 350.
130. Clearly there are problems in having UNHCR execute this mandate and the
discomfit of officers within the organization is understandable. Pierre Bertrand has
pointed out that, "The major effect of using prevention as a new approach has been
to shift the work of UNHCR from the relatively stable conditions in the country of
asylum to the more turbulent and often evolutionary processes in the country of
origin. Thus, we are confronted with the major challenge of developing principles
and strategies to meet the protection and assistance needs of uprooted people in
their own country, notwithstanding the constraint of the principle of State sovereign-
ty, or, as in the case of Somalia, the difficulties encountered when the State's own
structures have virtually collapsed." Pierre Bertrand, An Operational Approach to
International Refugee Protection, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 495, 496 (1993).
131. See Deng, supra note 10.
132. See Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme (45th Ses-
sion), Protection Aspects of UNHCR Activities on Behalf of Internally Displaced
Persons, (Sub-Committee of the Whole on International Protection), 24th Meeting,
August 17, 1994, ECISCP/87.
133. Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme (45th Session),
Internally Displaced Persons, (Executive Committee Conclusion, No. 75 (XLV)-1994).
134. Id., at pars. (d).
135. Id., at para. (b).
136. Id., at paras. (k) and (1).
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2. The Gender Dimensions of Internal Displacement
The fact that women comprise nearly eighty percent of the inter-
nally displaced population points to an obvious gender dimension to
the problem. Forbes Martin illustrates the various legal and practical
problems faced by internally displaced women in a treatment of the
issue predating current attention.""7 Women who are trapped in a sit-
uation of internal displacement ostensibly benefit from special protec-
tion under Article 4 of the Second Additional Protocol of 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions 8 and a series of other international and re-
gional instruments.' 9 The problem is that not all governments have
ratified these instruments, and even then, ratification may not always
provide much of a barrier to human rights abuses. " Given this con-
text, Martin emphasizes the need to pay particular attention to the
situation of women:
In reality, civilians, including women and children, are often the
first victims of conflicts. Fleeing one's home or taking refugee in a
displaced person's camp is not necessarily protection from physical
attacks. Moreover, for internally displaced women, even more so
than refugees, access to assistance, particularly food, shelter and
health care, is often the primary protection problem encountered.
In a number of countries, governments and/or resistance forces
have used food as a weapon, and impeded efforts to provide inter-
national assistance to civilians under their control.1
4
1
The specific case of internally displaced women raises special
problems of a nature directly related to their gender. One way to begin
addressing the situation can be to extend the principles and rules
developed by the UNHCR to develop a body of guidelines for the treat-
ment of internally displaced women. 4 Such rules would follow the
137. SUSAN FORBES MARTIN, REFUGEE WOMEN 28-29 (1992).
138. cf Articles 4,5 and 6.
139. Stavrapoulou, supra note 128, at 723-724.
140. Martin, supra note 137, at 29.
141. Id., at 29.
142. The promulgation of such rules are intimately tied up with the whole issue
of the nature of mechanisms established to monitor internal armed conflict. Clapham
points out that the problem is intrinsically political and not legal, and because of
this, we are left with the conclusion that " . . . international humanitarian law is
theoretical rather than practical and that its application is riddled with pitfalls." He
goes on to state,
even if the one organization entrusted with the guardianship of the
Conventions, the ICRC, is able to seek to enforce the relevant provisions
of humanitarian law, such action is usually limited to private exhorta-
tions and quiet diplomacy, due to the organization's operational depen-
dency on the consent of the parties and its general commitment to con-
fidentiality.
ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 116 (1993). Clapham also
points to the initiative contained in the "Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian
Standards," which attempts to deal with the problems of recognition and status, by
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format of the two sets of UNHCR guidelines but would extend even
further to encompass indirect problems of approach and conceptualiza-
tion." Thus, while the UNHCR guidelines are very specifically con-
cerned with the " . . . special protection needs that reflect their gen-
der... "'" and, thus, in particular addressed to UNHCR protection
officers, the proposed guidelines could address the broader relationship
of governments, multilateral institutions, and NGOs. This implies a
two-pronged strategy: the first prong would address the very specific
day-to-day issues of livelihood, gender violence and protection in the
form of a code of conduct, while the second would address the broader
questions of institutional operations, such as relations with govern-
ments as well as linkages between human rights, development work,
and displacement.145 For example, the role of multilateral institutions
in the creation and fostering of situations of displacement by direct
acts of commission, such as through the construction of large
infrastructural projects, or by acts of omission, which fail to adequately
adopt a broad human rights framework for action in their particular
spheres of operation, e.g. development. However, it is necessary to
consider the issue in a manner which looks beyond the question of
displacement per se; one must consider the overall relationship of the
operations of multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the
IMF, to broad human rights principles.'" Often, the absence of any
serious attention to the human rights context within which develop-
ment assistance is being applied by IGOs may exacerbate, rather than
ameliorate the situation. "" This is clearly the case with one of the
most prominent intergovernmental agency's mandate to cover certain
aspects of the situation of the internally displaced, the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP).
binding "all persons, groups and authorities,' and is to be applicable to "all situa-
tions, including internal violence, disturbances, tensions and public emergency." Id.,
at 117.
143. Inspiration can, for example, be drawn from the attempt by the World
Health Organization to formulate basic principles for action by this organization with
respect to major emergencies. See, Coping with Major Emergencies: WHO Strategy
and Approaches to Humanitarian Action, World Health Organization, U.N. Doc.
WHO/EHA/95.1 (1995).
144. UNHCR, GUIDELINES, supra note 88, para. 3 at 7.
145. Stavrapoulou, supra note 128.
146. For an excellent analysis of the connection between these issues, see James
Paul, The United Nations and the Creation of an International Law of Development,
HARV. INT'L L.J. (1995).
147. For a comprehensive examination of the various dimensions of this issue, see
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, THE RIGHTS WAY TO DEVELOPMENT: A Hu-
MAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO DEvELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, 1995.
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3. Multilateral Action on Internal Displacement: The Case of
UNDP
Following the increasing problems of the internally displaced
worldwide, the Secretary-General designated the United Nations De-
velopment Program (UNDP) as local focal points for the coordination of
relief, although this has obviously not solved the larger problems of
protection and human rights violations. In a recent report on the Horn
of Africa by independent experts commissioned by the UNDP, the
various dimensions of the problem were clearly laid out.'" The report
pointed out that, aside from emphasizing the development of an inter-
agency approach to the problem, there was a need for more dissemina-
tion of information and program support."' However, one must ques-
tion whether the UNDP is the most appropriate agency for this func-
tion, particularly since the organization is yet to develop a human
rights-sensitive dimension to its operations."W An illustration of this
can be found in the case of a country such as the Sudan, which has
both an appalling human rights record and a massive population of
displaced persons."'
And yet, the UNDP included Sudan in its sustainable human
development reports as one of several countries that has adopted an
"exemplary model of development."' No mention is made of the dis-
placement or of the human rights abuses for which the Sudan has long
been notorious."' Thus, the credibility of an organization, such as the
UNDP, can be compromised. In addition, it can be positively inimical
to the resolution of the crisis.' As such, there is still a glaring need
for the UNDP to address the issue in a comprehensive and human
rights-sensitive fashion. 5 Such a comprehensive approach must be-
148. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HORN OF AFRICA PROGRAMME FOR
THE DISPLACED (HOAP): MISSION REPORT (1994).
149. Id. Summary and Conclusions, at paragraph 1.7.
150. Oloka-Onyango, supra note 58, at 26-31.
151. For an analysis of the situation in the Sudan, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
SUDAN: 'THE TEARS OF ORPHANS': No FUTURE WITHOUT HUMAN RIGHTS (1995); FUND
FOR PEACE, ABUSES AGAINST WOMEN IN THE SUDAN (1992); and FRANCIS DENG,
PROTECTING THE DISPOSSESSED: A CHALLENGE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
65-81 (1993).
152. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, THE EXPERIENCE OF SUDAN: PRO-
MOTING COMMUNITY-LED DEVELOPMENT (1994).
153. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAl, supra note 151.
154. Francis Deng diplomatically notes the expression of "skepticism" elicited from
the international community in Khartoum, when he sought their views on attempt-
ing to find a solution to the problem of the internally displaced. DENG, supra note
151, at 79.
155. The Mission Report makes the following conclusion: "Before any operational
programmes for the displaced are undertaken, the countries concerned will need to
commit themselves to a minimum of effective legal safeguards and legal protection
for the displaced including their physical security. This is best articulated in a re-
gional policy framework (agreement, declaration) which could be used as a basis for
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gin with a reemphasis of basic human rights, encompassing civil, polit-
ical, economic and social rights without discrimination, in addition to
the so-called third generation group rights (such as peace and the envi-
ronment), which in the case of the internally displaced, all conceptual-
ly collapse one into the other." Addressing the issue in this fashion
raises obligations not only for the host government, but for a range of
other actors including multilateral organizations, multinational compa-
nies, as well as relief and humanitarian agencies. Particularly acute is
the situation where displacement and marginalization come together to
create an especially difficult situation for internally displaced women.
Thus, they are affected in their freedom of movement, work, livelihood,
health, and education, not to mention vicious physical and verbal
attacks."7 For the purposes of the present discussion, we conclude
with a specific examination of the issue of gender violence and physical
protection as it affects internally displaced women before considering
the place of the various concerned actors.
B. Gender Violence and Physical Protection: Towards a Framework of
Action
1. Concept and Analysis
When examining the issues of gender violence and physical securi-
ty, two factors must be considered. The first is an expansive definition
of the term "violence," which as Nahid Toubia reminds us, must be
viewed not only as a series of commissions, but also omissions, which
amount to a failure to recognize the existence of fundamental human
rights for women."8 The structural, as opposed to physical, violence
can produce several different effects on women and thus on the exer-
cise or realization of their human rights."9 Structural violence, ex-
tending from poor nutrition, inadequate health care (including a lack
of contraceptives, coerced sterilization and forced abortions, to mention
only a few factors) to limited access to education and other resources,
resource mobilization." Mission Report, supra note 148, at 1. Once again the focus is
in the wrong place because it emphasizes "resource mobilization" over the need to
address the root causes of the displacement. Furthermore, calling upon the very
state which violated the rights of the displaced to erect minimum legal standards for
their protection, and to expect enforcement thereof, is akin to placing the monkey in
charge of burning down the forest! In sum, it allows for a deflection of attention
from the fundamental causes of the displacement, to looking primarily at its mani-
festations.
156. Maria Stavropoulou, Indigenous Peoples Displaced from their Environment: Is
there Adequate Protection? 5 COLO J. INTL ENVTL L. & POL. 105 (1994).
157. FUND FOR PEACE, supra note 151, at 2.
158. Toubia, supra note 44, at 16-17.
159. See John Sorenson, Refugees, Relief and Rehabilitation in the Horn of Africa:
The Eritrean Relief Association, in AFRIcAN REFUGEES: DEVELOPMENT AID AND REPA-
TRIATION 79 (H. Adelman & J. Sorensen eds., 1994).
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combine to create a situation of severe discrimination against women
which international law has yet to address in a forthright fashion.
While all of these are problems common to a situation of stability, they
are doubly problematic in conditions of flight and displacement." An
additional major problem is that attention from the United Nations
system to the question of violence has " ... not been reflected in the
development of international law." 6'
The second factor is the significant differentiation among the
women who comprise the displaced population. Jok points out that
care should be taken to consider the specific situation of female chil-
dren, young women, and the elderly.'62 Consequently, despite the
claim among relief and other humanitarian agencies that women as a
group have been accorded special attention, it is a fact that
... rates of maternal mortality, inadequate women's diet during
pregnancy, high energy expenditure associated with physical ac-
tivity in production, violence against women (including forcible
extra-marital sex) high fertility levels which have sparked ever
greater concern among health professionals over the increasing
reproductive health problems and susceptibility of Third World
women to a multitude of reproduction-related health problems have
not been addressed in health relief efforts."'
These factors can be combined with realities that result in a des-
perate situation for displaced and refugee women.'6 These factors
may include a scarcity of resources, the manner of their control and
distribution, the utilization by governments of those resources (food,
health care, etc.)'65 as a political weapon against the displaced popu-
lace (as was the case in the Eritrean and Ethiopian wars, and contin-
ues to be so in the Sudan) and finally, the impact of political violence
on health and physical security. Displaced and refugee women par-
ticipate in a wide variety of activities that make their burden particu-
larly acute and even more susceptible to violence. They care for the
sick and the elderly, they cater to the needs of children and daily
household subsistence, they often bear sole responsibility, due to wid-
owhood or separation from their spouse, for family maintenance; they
160. For a succinct examination, see Immigration & Refugee Board of Canada,
Women in Somalia, 13 REFUGEE STUD. Q. 92 (1994).
161. They go on to point out that, "The doctrine of jus cogens, with its claim to
reflect central, fundamental aspirations of the international community, has not
responded at all to massive evidence of irjustice and aggression against women."
Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 18, at 72.
162. Jok Madut Jok, Health Consequences of War and Health Relief Challenges of
Assessment, 21 UFAHAMU 50 (1993).
163. Id., at 55.
164. Id., at 53.
165. Tina Wallace, Taking the Lion by the Whiskers: Building on the Strengths of
Refugee Women, in CHANGING PERCEPTIONS: WRITINGS ON GENDER AND DEVELOP-
MENT 62 (T. Wallace & C. March eds., 1991).
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forage for and provide food, water, fuel, health care, education, and
cultural cohesion. Given the enormity of responsibilities and the vul-
nerability of their situation, displaced women obviously require height-
ened measures of protection. While protective measures must ensure
that women retain their autonomy and freedom of movement (and not
provide the excuse to instead curtail them), particular care should be
taken to ensure that the principles which are developed respond in an
appropriate manner to the dictates of the specific context, rather than
to simply transfer them from one context to another.
2. Sexual Violence in a Context of Dislocation
With particular reference to the issue of sexual violence, the prob-
lem is especially magnified. Jok again: "Repeated brutally forced sexu-
al contact is a common aspect of the displaced female experience, ei-
ther during the escape, at border crossings or during their life in
camps."' Most reports can only be an underestimation of the magni-
tude of the problem for a variety of reasons; "[s]ome societies continue
to attach a stigma to the woman who has been sexually violated. Many
displaced women who have been raped or violated... are regarded by
their community to have no more value, and they are sometimes isolat-
ed. As traumatic as it sounds, it becomes hard to assess these women's
psychological problems that may result."6 7 Connected to the "public"
dimension of sexual violence is of course the phenomenon of rape.
Catherine MacKinnon correctly asserts that rape (as illustrated by the
conflict in former Yugoslavia) has been deployed as an official policy of
war in a genocidal campaign for political control." 8 It is not simply a
policy of the pleasure of male power unleashed, it is
rape under control. It is also rape unto death, rape as massacre,
rape to kill and to make the victims wish they were dead. It is an
instrument of forced exile, rape to make you leave your home and
never want to go back. It is rape to drive a wedge through the
community, to shatter a society, to destroy a people. It is rape as
genocide."9
While the cases of Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda brought the issue of
rape to the forefront, the use of rape as a tool of war knows a much
longer history and thus connects to the overall context in which such
acts of violence against women are committed.1 The question that
must be asked is: how do myths and beliefs about gender play a role in
the creation, maintenance and ending of wars, and other 'public' acts of
166. Id., at 55.
167. Id., at 56
168. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Women's Human Rights, 17
HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 5 (1994).
169. Id., at 11-12.
170. Zalewski, supra note 16, at 355.
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violence? In other words, what are the gender dimensions to war, and
are we responding appropriately to them?
The answer to this question implies a number of issues for those
concerned with the situation of women in such contexts. This requires
both macro and micro-analyses of the specific situation. Women are not
only reproducers as they are considered to be in the instance of health
targeting; they also produce food and maintain the health of their
families. They are involved in the collection, storage and dissemination
of food and health care. All of this implies a variety of different factors
that need to be taken into consideration which can only be discerned
from a concrete investigation of a number of case-studies. In short,
intellectual or academic discussion cannot take the place of hard em-
pirical analysis.
It is thus imperative to conduct a comprehensive survey of the
various dimensions of the issue, which will involve as a primary ele-
ment in the discussion, internally displaced women, social workers,
and policy makers. From such a discussion will emerge the contours of
appropriate standards and practices to address the question of gender
violence in the context of displacement. Specific socio-cultural factors
need to be taken into account. Furthermore, the political milieu, the
hostility or insensitivity of the government and other involved parties,
is of manifold importance to the design of comprehensive mechanisms
to address the situation. The end result of this process should be a
more complete analysis and appreciation of the issue. Problems such
as domestic violence (including marital rape, battery and the sexual
assault of female children) and violence of a generalized nature must
be addressed by the communities at large. 7' In short, it first and
foremost demands looking to the displaced community itself for an-
swers:
The best protectors of their rights are the people themselves: they
have vested interests in ensuring that their rights are safeguarded
and they are directly on the spot when violations occur. But when
the situation gets out of hand and they need back-up assistance,
this basic initiative is often trampled underfoot by zealous rescuers.
Too often uprooted people have to tolerate help that robs them of
their right to self-direction, afraid to speak out lest they should lose
the material aid on which they depend for survival."
Fundamental to any program of action are the refugees and inter-
nally displaced persons themselves who are, more often than not, for-
gotten. Unless their participation is sought and appreciated, uprooted
171. Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Vio-
lence as Torture, 25 COL. HUM. RTs. L REv. 291 (1994).
172. Shirley DeWolf, Practical Aspects of UNHCR-NGO Partnership, Paper Pre-
sented at the UNHCR/PARINAC Conference, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (March, 1995).
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women will remain at the mercy of a variety of hostile forces both
within and outside of their displaced contexts.
However, action by the people affected by the situation must nev-
ertheless be augmented by adequate responses. It is thus inadequate
to design principles or guidelines for dealing with the issue of violence
against such communities, unless there are also existing mechanisms
which can respond in an expeditious and adequate fashion to the prob-
lem. Gilbert suggests that the UNHCR establish a mechanism akin to
that of the World Bank's recently-created Inspection Panel173 in order
to receive and adjudicate complaints by refugees.'74 While such an
idea is indeed welcome, given the nature of the harm involved as well
as the conditions in which refugees and internally displaced persons
are living, it may be more appropriate to think in terms of a mecha-
nism that can respond expeditiously and effectively, and one which is
based at the site of displacement, rather than one which is headquar-
tered in Geneva, in the same way that the World Bank Inspection
Panel is housed at the Bank's headquarters in Washington, DC.
Regarding the issue of physical security, a comprehensive scheme
of principles that extends beyond those in place for refugee camps is
overdue.' Of particular necessity is the need to consider the fact
that internal displacement imports security problems of a different
nature from the refugee context.'76 It is in this regard that the con-
cept of "safe havens" has evolved, albeit few examples that have thus
far taken place: the Kurds in Iraq, and Bosnian Muslims shielded from
Serbian and Croatian attack.'77 There are several problems associat-
ed with the concept of "safe havens," most fundamentally the degree of
safety they can actually provide. As Christopher Tiso points out, the
creation of safe havens is dependent upon the Security Council's autho-
rization under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, or the con-
sent of the crisis country, in deference to the notion of state sovereign-
ty.' Securing such areas from attack is especially problematic if
there are on-going military hostilities. The long-run effects of a United
Nations-created zone of "tranquility" are innumerable.
173. For a good discussion of this new Bank institution, see Daniel Bradlow, In-
ternational Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank In-
spection Panel, 34 VA. J INT'L L. 553 (1994).
174. Gilbert, supra note 92, at 1245-1246.
175. Elly-Elikunda Mtango, Military and Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps, in
REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 87 (Gil Loescher & Laila Monahan eds.,
1989).
176. See generally M. Othman-Chande, International Law and Armed Attacks in
Refugee Camps, 60 NORDIC J. INT'L LAW, 153 (1991).
177. See Christopher Tiso, Safe Haven Refugee Programs: A Method of Combatting
International Refugee Crises, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 575 (1994).
178. Id., at 576.
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These conditions underline the urgency of developing principles
appropriate to the situation of internal displacement. While this may
not entail the promulgation of an international legal instrument, clear-
ly the need for developing such principles in a comprehensive fashion
cannot be overemphasized. 79 Mtango points to the inadequacies of
the UNHCR Executive Committee's Conclusion on Military and Armed
Attacks on Refugee Camps and Settlements and makes the point that
there is a need to review the assumption that makes refugee camps
and settlements exclusively humanitarian and civilian."m He argues
that the language used in the Conclusion, " . .. falls short of the abso-
lute prohibition of attacks on refugee camps and settlements . . . ." and
urges the adoption of a declaration on the issue by the General Assem-
bly.' Of course the issue of physical protection in relation to dis-
placed camps and settlements is yet to be addressed comprehensively
and involves significantly more complex issues, as we have already
pointed out.
C. The Place and Role of Institutional Actors
1. Who is to Act, and How?
All of the above factors raise particular issues for a variety of
actors directly and indirectly concerned with the issue. In short, the
questions relating to refugee and internally displaced women are glob-
al human issues and must necessarily be addressed in a comprehen-
sive fashion, taking full account of the various dimensions of the prob-
lem. This implies examining not only the root causes of displacement
but also the creation of adequate and effective measures to address the
phenomenon. It means asking hard questions and challenging tradi-
tional methodologies for dealing with the causes and results of human
conflicts. For example, UN troops and monitors of conflict situations
have on occasion (as in Mozambique) turned out to be more of a threat
to the population they are supposed to protect than a positive force in
179. Petrasek returns to the issue of complexity and contradiction involved in
devising comprehensive rules for the internally displaced:
It would be easier to isolate issues relating to protection (i.e. after dis-
placement) from issues of prevention (tackling root causes) and solution
(right to return), both in terms of simplifying the drafting process and
of ending up with clear legal principles. The more comprehensive the
standards the more complex the drafting process will be, and it could
well take years before there is sufficient consensus to achieve a resolu-
tion in the General Assembly. On the other hand, to focus on just one
aspect of a complex problem (e.g. asylum) risks repeating the mistakes
of the past which have left us with a refugee protection treaty that is
silent on so many pressing issues.
Petrasek, supra note 125, at 289.
180. Mtango, supra note 175, at 121.
181. Id.
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protection of it. As one critic has asked: "who is going to watch the
men who are watching the men who are supposedly watching out for
us?"
8 2
At the macro-level of analysis, one must examine the nature of
political and economic relations specific to the particular entity being
examined and within the context of global relations as a whole. First
and foremost is of course the legal regime; how sensitive is this to the
violations committed against women, and what are human rights and
women's rights NGOs doing about it? How many of them are address-
ing the specific problems of displacement, whether of refugees or of the
internally displaced?
Secondly, what are the mechanisms erected to expose the shady
connections of business and commerce with dictatorial governments,
and with particular respect to the arena of conflict, trade, and the
exchange of arms. Thus, while the UNHCR was deploying troops with-
in the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire for the protection of refugees,
very little action was taken against the process of rearmament under-
way within those very same camps. Human Rights Watch's aptly enti-
tled report, Arming with Impunity, details the terror which the ex-
army and militia of the former Rwandan government is already wreak-
ing amongst the refugees." How much more so if they begin a sus-
tained attempt to recapture power? What implications does this have
for those in the camps and for those in Rwanda?"' Is the internation-
al community not staring another catastrophe in the face?' What
does the OAU think of its member governments colluding with people
whose motives are not only malevolent, but also clearly genocidal? 8'
182. MacKinnon, supra note 168, at 13.
183. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 7. No. 4, RWANDA/ZAIRE: REARMING WITH IMPU-
NITY: INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE PERPETRATORS OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE
14-15 (1995). See also Stephen D. Goose and Frank Smyth, Arming Genocide in
Rwanda, 73 FOR. AFF. 86 (1994).
184. For a study that explicitly states that the results will be disastrous, see
AFRICAN RIGHTS, DISCUSSION PAPER No. 5, HUMANITARIANISM UNBOUND? CURRENT
DILEMMAS FACING MULTI-MANDATE RELIEF OPERATIONS IN POLITICAL EMERGENCIES
33-36 (1994). African Rights states that the focus on "humanitarianism" in the after-
math of the defeat of the government army (i.e. the immediate needs of the emer-
gency), meant that the issue of genocide was relegated to the background; massive
material assistance went to the killers; the killers had an unrestricted outlet for
propaganda, and political structures have been recreated that are inimical to the
long-run resolution of the crisis in that country. Id., at 35.
185. We must also take note of the fact that several months before the Rwandan
genocide, human rights organizations had been warning about the influx of arms
into the country. The world simply turned a blind eye. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(ARMS PROJECT) VOL 6. No. 1, THE ARMS TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN
THE RWANDAN WAR (January 1994).
186. In this respect the second recommendation of Human Rights Watch on the
possible effect of the traffic of arms to Rwanda, is a chilling reminder that we ig-
nore the present situation at our peril, "The Arms Project calls for all countries
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Implicated in the general crisis of humanitarianism is of course
the phenomenon of relief assistance which, according to Alex de Waal,
has " ... been used to sustain armies, maintain garrison towns, keep
open supply routes, and allow generals to don the humanitarian man-
tle."' 7 Evidently there is much in the way of waste and lack of ac-
countability for which these agencies are responsible, all the while
maintaining a veneer of assistance, as
[hiundreds of millions of dollars have been spent.., on a 'human-
itarian' operation that is in fact feeding soldiers more than it is
feeding their victims. The SPLA's quartermaster is the World Food
Programme, USAID and an array of NGOs. Government garrisons
live on international food aid. But noone knows the true figures for
the impact of the programmes, or the rates of diversion, because no
proper studies have been done. Meanwhile, the war is in a stale-
mate."
Reconsidering the macro-level of protection includes an examina-
tion of the overall human rights framework, the specific conditions
within refugee and displacement-producing countries, and the estab-
lishment of appropriate mechanisms of conflict resolution.'89 Given
these questions, which obviously extend beyond the scope of this paper,
the following account gives a summary of the various actors and of the
individual and/or collective actions that should be adopted in pursuit of
a resolution to the crisis.
2. Developing a Program of Action
Fundamental to addressing the issue of displacement as it affects
women is the normative reformulation of the principal human rights
and refugee instruments. This necessarily entails a comprehensive and
far-reaching review of both the structural elements we have referred to
as well as the normative and institutional factors that combine to
underlie the domination and marginalization of women by internation-
al law. Such a program would entail an examination and revamping of
the major international institutions, beginning with the United Na-
which choose to sell arms or provide military assistance in the future to legally and
explicitly condition such transfers upon the human rights performance of the recipi-
ent. The Arms Project believes that weapons of increased lethality and technological
sophistication should not be introduced into Rwanda given the existing evidence of
the parties' willingness to abuse human rights." Id., at 37.
187. Alex de Waal, African Encounters, 6 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 14, 17 (1994).
188. Id.
189. The OAU has devoted significant attention to the establishment of such
mechanisms following the upsurge of internal conflicts in the 1990s. See ORGANizA-
TION OF AFRICAN UNITY, RESOLVING CONFLICTS IN AFRICA: IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS,
(1993). For a general, more objective comment, see Sam G. Amoo, Role of the OAU:
Past, Present and Future, in MAKING WAR AND WAGING PEACE: FOREIGN INTERVEN-
TION IN AFRICA, 239 (David Smock ed., 1993). See also DENT OCAYA-LAIDI, AFRICA'S
INTERNAL CONFLICTS: THE SEARCH FOR RESPONSE (1992).
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tions, but extending to cover agencies as diverse as the World Bank,
UNICEF, UNDP, and WHO. Contemporaneous to this exercise must be
a consideration of the extent to which these bodies have incorporated
women into their structures of operation at executive and operational
levels.
The second level of attention must be the achievement of an over-
all balance in gender and nationality since Third World peoples com-
prise the greater percentage of the global population and because the
majority of conflict situations and displaced populations are in these
areas. Women with a sensitivity to the cultural, political and socioeco-
nomic realities of those contexts should begin to be more actively re-
cruited into such agencies.
One of the continuing problems is that United Nations institu-
tions that are mandated to cover women's issues, such as CEDAW, the
Commission on the Status of Women and UNIFEM, lack both a promi-
nent profile and adequate resources to pursue the tasks for which they
were created. At the same time, in order to avoid the "ghettoization" of
women's issues, other UN agencies should, within their own work,
devote more attention to the gender dimensions of their activities, e.g.
trade (UNCTAD and the UTO), industry (UNIDO), and intellectual
property (WIPO).
Within the regional context, there is a specific role for the OAU,
particularly since its function as a body for the liberation of African
states from the yoke of colonialism was terminated with South African
independence. However, the organization clearly needs to be more
aggressive in order to achieve compliance of member states and to
effectively resolve some of the long-running and festering disputes on
the continent. In this respect, the OAU itself needs to devise a code of
conduct for its leadership and to devise methodologies that do not
simply allow governments to commit egregious violations against their
citizenries. It should apply sanctions such as those used to coerce dues
payments against human rights violators; it should also apply sanc-
tions against dictators who have remained in office for an inordinate
length of time without seeking a popular mandate, as well as to those
who come to power by force and proceed to abuse it.
Central to the operation of the continental human rights and
refugee regime is the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights (ACHPR). The Commission must conduct a comprehensive re-
view of their guidelines on state reporting to comprehensively cover
the issue of women's rights, the rights of refugees and the internally
displaced, and in particular to ensure that states parties take their
obligations under the Charter seriously.'O Furthermore, the organi-
190. The problem of the lack of seriousness of states parties towards the report-
ing requirement under the African Charter is a point taken up with brisk, but inci-
VOL. 24:2,3
THE PLIGHT OF THE LARGER HALF
zation must devise a mechanism for expeditious intervention and pub-
lic commentary on issues of particularly egregious human rights viola-
tions and must consider the issues of autonomy of action (from the
OAU Secretariat) and operation (from the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government). In tandem with such reorientation, the Bureau for
Refugees must be revitalized, first with increased funding for its opera-
tion, and secondly with a reversion to and reinvigorated execution of
its original mandate of advocacy and protection. This would involve,
inter alia, encouraging more accession to and ratification of the 1969
Refugee Convention by states parties, and ensuring that domestic
regimes governing refugees and immigration are in conformity with
the regional instrument.
The institutions of the international community, including the
UNDP, World Bank and the IMF, need to develop appropriate mecha-
nisms for addressing human rights (civil and political and economic,
social and cultural) in a holistic and comprehensive fashion. They must
recognize and acknowledge past and present contributions of their
organizations to the situations of human rights violations and socioeco-
nomic collapse; amends can be made through the assumption of a
larger proportion of the burden of hosting refugees and catering to the
internally displaced in a comprehensive fashion, and reviewing the
structure and content of continuing operations. Zolberg et al. state:
Given the inescapable reality that the majority of the developing
countries' refugees will remain in the South, the richer states must,
at a minimum, accept a greater financial obligation to assist the
countries of first asylum in the South, the richer states must, at a
minimum, accept a greater financial obligation to assist the coun-
tries of first asylum in the South. The division of labor has a his-
torical precedent: After World War II, a war-devastated Western
Europe demanded that the resource-rich North America absorb
most of the financial outlays for refugee relief, as Western Europe
provided the asylum. Four decades later, Europe, North America,
Japan and a handful of others constitute the resource-rich North
and must pay accordingly, not only on ethical grounds, but also to
reduce social conflict in recipient countries that could compound the
refugee problem. The concept of sustainable refugee policy intro-
duced in the discussion of refugee-warrior communities is relevant
also in this respect: Refugee policy must be held up against the
sive criticism by Tigere, who asserts that the impression created by the first
Zimbabwean report to the Commission is of " . . . a state steeped in hypocrisy and
unconcerned about human rights, even though one would like to believe that the
"chimurenga" (revolutionary war of liberation) was predicated on the aspirations of
the people of Zimbabwe to assert their human rights and fundamental freedoms."
We may add that Zimbabwe's attitude to reportage fits the general mold. See P.
Tigere, State Reporting to the African Commission: The Case of Zimbabwe, 38 J.
AFn. L 64, 66 (1994).
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negative yardstick that at least it should not contribute to greater
refugee flows in the future. 9 '
Despite these sentiments being in the right place, they are based
on false premises. Instead, a rearticulation of the notion of burden-
sharing that takes into consideration both the contribution of those
members of the international community who are better-endowed, and
the historical legacies of the colonial experience as well as the inade-
quacies of the measures taken in order to address the situation of
underdevelopment is required. 92 When reformulated in this fashion,
what emerges is not an obligation based on moral imperative, as
Zolberg and company suggest, but rather legal consequences on which
legitimate claims can be based, and assessments of binding "contractu-
al obligation" made. 3
National domestic structures, such as immigration, police, armed
forces, the judiciary, and other administrative services are of critical
importance to ameliorating the plight of refugee and internally dis-
placed women. Initially, there will be an overall need for training in
the general field of human rights and specifically in catering to refugee
and internally displaced populations, and the recognition of the human
rights dimensions of the issue. National agencies need to develop sys-
tems of reportage and exchange of information on the situation of the
above categories of people. The preeminent need will be for the cre-
ation of democratic structures of local and national governance, as well
as of suitable mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts within and
between communities.
Relevant laws and institutions need to be reformed in order to
bring them into conformity with international and regional standards
in women's rights, refugee and general human rights law. Indigenous
Nongovernmental Organizations (particularly human rights and
Women's Rights Groups) need to consciously incorporate action on
refugees and the internally displaced in their operations and evolve
gender-sensitive methods of operation. Furthermore, there is a gaping
need for the commencement of programs of promotion, litigation and
support for the rights of refugee and internally displaced women. On
the other hand, international NGOs, which by contrast are more inti-
mately involved in the issue, must review their relationships with local
NGOs, and also their operations in relation to humanitarian and hu-
191. See A. ZOLBERG & A. SUHKRE, ESCAPE FROM VIOLENCE: CONFLICT AND THE
REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 282 (1989).
192. Such admission can be found in reports such as the World Bank's, SUB-SA-
HARAN AFRICA: FROM SUSTAINABLE CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH (1989), and
forms the basis for what Rolf Knieper argues is the necessity to move away from
the notion of "development assistance," and to begin to consider such transfers as
part of "an integrated policy in an integrated world." ROLF KNIEPER, THE CONCEPT
OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND DEVELOPMENT LAW 27 (1992).
193. Id., at 10-12.
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man rights emergencies, and erect mechanisms to more effectively
coordinate operations in the field of traditional development work with
activities in the promotion of human rights.
Finally, it is necessary to conclude with some specific recommen-
dations:
1. At an international level:
- The legal instruments currently in place which address the
related issues of women, refugees and the internally displaced
must be urgently reviewed and a process of promulgation of more
where they are non-existent. These would necessarily include:
- The prommelgation of a Convention on the Internally Displaced
(with a Codicil/Code of Conduct specifically addressing the various
facets of the situation of internally displaced women).
- A Second Protocol to the 1951 Geneva Convention addressing
issues, such as gender-bias; restrictive application of the asylum
grant; relationship to international human rights standards (in-
cluding specifically economic and social human rights and so-
called "third Generation" human rights).
2. Regional mechanisms and institutions:
- Promulgate a Protocol to the Banjul Charter on the Rights and
Status of Refugee and Internally Displaced Women, the Elderly,
disabled and children.
- A Second Protocol to the Banjul Charter comprehensively cov-
ering the general human rights of Women (incorporating CEDAW,
ICCPR, ICESCR, etc.).
V. TOWARDS RECONSTRUCTION
This study has focused on today's "wretched of the earth," African
refugee and internally displaced women. Through the employment of a
broad lens it has attempted to illuminate the sexual, geopolitical, ra-
cial, and socioeconomic factors that combine to create and exacerbate
this condition. While appreciating the fact that the concrete conditions
of displacement require that we develop effective normative and insti-
tutional mechanisms to address the specific situation relating to dis-
placement, we should never lose sight of the broader picture. In short,
so long as the "apartheid of gender" continues to determine the charac-
ter of the international legal regime, and such manifest discrimination
is combined with the exclusion of whole populations on account of their
racial and socioeconomic attributes, we shall make little headway in
addressing the question.'
194. The phrase "apartheid of gender is taken from a statement made by Ms.
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At the same time, while maintaining a focus on the global and
national dimensions of the problem of refugee and internally displaced
women, we should bear in mind that these seemingly international
problems are merely the domestic script writ large. Such a reality, the
fact that the issue of women's human rights have for so long been
relegated to the private, ostensibly "familiar," sphere of domestic res-
olution, should force us to devote our efforts to the quest for a compre-
hensive transformation of the plight of humanity's larger half. In es-
sence this means seriously taking women's rights as human rights and
pursuing them as such.
The preceding analysis illustrates that piecemeal assaults will
change little. Nothing short of a comprehensive reconstruction of the
basic premises of international, regional and domestic human rights
law, will alter the status of women. Unfortunately, this is doubly true
for the condition of women who are refugees or internally displaced.
Karin Poo, Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF, to a preparatory meeting for the
Beijing Women's conference. See Karin Sham Poo, The 'Apartheid of Gender' Must
End, Statement at the ECE High-Level Regional Preparatory Meeting for the 4th
World Conference on Women, Vienna, Austria, October 17, 1994. See also REBECCA
COOK, THE ELIMINATION OF SEXUAL APARTHEID: PROSPECTS FOR THE FOURTH WORLD
CONFERENCE ON WOMEN (ASIL Issue Papers on World Conferences No.5, 1995).
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An Ethics of Human Rights: Two
Interrelated Misunderstandings
DR. DANIEL WARNER*
Within the subject of an ethics of human rights are subsumed
some of the most controversial debates in current philosophical and
political discourse. It is helpful to begin by analyzing the debates on
the underlying questions, before examining the overall subject of an
ethics of human rights. The debates surrounding an ethics of human
rights are similar, and a proper understanding of the parts leads to a
clarification of the whole.
I. WHAT ETHICS?
The first part of the equation is ethics. Recent political discourse
in the West shows great sensitivity to ethical issues. Whether the
discussion revolves around humanitarian intervention for the Kurds,
ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, relief efforts in Somalia,
responsibility for the spread of contaminated blood in France, or the
amount and type of aid to the former Soviet Union, ethical language
has been and continues to be used by political figures.' This height-
ened sensitivity to ethical issues is a welcome change from the power
politics that dominated discussions during the post-World War II peri-
od. Ethical issues, which had been considered secondary because of the
imperatives of Realpolitik, have come to the fore. Nevertheless, the
mere use of ethical language does not necessarily mean there is clarity
of ethical thought.
A. The First Level of Confusion: The Subject of Ethical Discourse
The confusion surrounding ethical discussions has two levels. The
first level concerns the subject of the ethical discourse. Normal ethical
discourse concerns people. Any debate surrounding questions such as
* Dr. Daniel Warner is the author of "An Ethic of Respon-
sibility in International Relations" and has written extensively on
refugees and normative issues. He is the Deputy to the Director for
External Relations and Special Programs of the Graduate Institute
of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. This paper was
presented at the International Conference on Social Philosophy at
Moscow University, February 2-5, 1993.
1. See Leslie Gelb, Iran-Contra: Crimes Not Patriotism, INTERNATIONAL HERALD
TRIBUNE, Dec. 28, 1992, at 8; Garry Wills, Bush Granting Pardons is Simply
Unpardonable, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Dec. 28, 1992, at 8.
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"the good life" or "justice" ultimately reverts back to people. Specifical-
ly, in normal ethical discourse discussions focus on people within a
certain geopolitical space. Political theory has fixed borders, whether
within a community or a state. The limits of the community are not
considered ethical problems. These border problems are reserved for
metaethical discussions, that are usually deemed irrelevant to norma-
tive considerations.' In normative discourse, it is the problems involv-
ing the relations between a fixed group of people that draw our atten-
tion.
Traditional language concerning people has developed in interest-
ing ways. Discussions about the limits of the community and the peo-
ple involved are increasing. Even prior to the break-ups of the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia, theorists were broaching the frontiers of tra-
ditional normative political theory. Whereas John Rawls' Theory of
Justice3 and Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars4 focused within
the state, others expanded normative arguments beyond the state.'
While cosmopolitan arguments have not been widely accepted, recent
political events have strengthened the belief that traditional normative
political theory that is limited within fixed borders is outmoded. Tradi-
tional normative political theory is seen as insufficient to the realities
of an interdependent world. The first problem involved in ethical dis-
course, therefore, involves the parameters of the subjects involved and
their geopolitical delimitation. Therefore, discussions about collectives
are increasing.'
Notions of group rights and collective goods transpose normal
ethical language to more than one person. Whereas the above discus-
sion points to the expanding geography of the people involved in ethi-
cal discourse, the focus here is on the expanding numbers of the sub-
jects involved in an expanding space. Movements away from limited
borders also involves movements away from individual subjects, al-
though the two are not directly related.'
2. See, e.g. TRADITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS, (Terry Nardin and David
Mapel eds., 1992) (discussions of certain ethical traditions without any focus on the
subject of the traditions of the geopolitical delimitations of those subjects).
3. JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
4. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (1977).
5. See CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979);
STANLEY HOFFMAN, DUTIES BEYOND BORDERS (1981); ANDREW LIKLATER, MEN AND
CITIZENS IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1982).
6. See Vernon Van Dyke, The Individual, the State and Ethnic Communities in
Political Theory, 29 WORLD POL 343 (1977).
7. It should be noted, however, that these discussions of collectivities often treat
the group as an individual through the use of methodological individualism. In
discussions about more than one person, the language of the individual continues to
be used. Language hampers the ability to understand the complexity of group
dynamics. It seems impossible to look inside the group, and at the relationship
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Recent debate about the subject of ethics has pushed beyond the
individual and collectivities to discussions of kinds of subjects. While
there has been geographic and numerical expansion in the subjects of
ethical discourse, a fundamental change in the very nature of the geo-
graphic-numerical subject discussed has evolved. This appears most
clearly in discussions of state morality, where the state is merely a
juristic entity. Thus, debates surround the tension between state mo-
rality and individual morality where the categories of the two are
completely different.' This same juristic debate also arises when we
look at the ethical behavior of organizations' and businesses.'"
Discussions of the morality of international organizations and corpora-
tions are similar to discussions of state morality in that they turn
around the elusive question of the subject. Whereas the objects and
consequences of certain actions can be measured, identifying the sub-
jects of the action is difficult. For example, there may be acts with no
doers, such as the organization of a company considered responsible for
an airline crash."
This non-human aspect of the subject of ethical debate includes
the international system. The subject level can be elevated from the
individual, state, or a specific organization to the entire international
system. Thus, from Kenneth Waltz's description of the three levels of
actors in the cause of war-man, state, and the international system-one
can take each of the subjects and analyze it in terms of ethical dis-
course and ethical agency. 2 For each of the subjects, the problem in
the West is the lack of an ethical vocabulary to deal with non-person
actors. In situations dealing with actors beyond limited borders,
between the group and the outside at the same time. It is difficult to discuss the
collectivities' rights in language other than individual rights. For a helpful discussion
of methodological individualism, see Steven Lukes, Methodological Individualism Recon.
sidered, BRIT. J. OF SOC. 119 (1968). See generally Vernon Van Dyke, Collective Entities
and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal Thought, 44 J. POLITICS 21 (1982); Vernon Van
Dyke, Justice as Fairness: For Groups?, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 607 (1975).
8. See, e.g. JOHN DUNN, INTERPRETING POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY ch. 8 (1990) (dis-
tinguishing between theoretical reason at the state level and practical reason at the
level).
9. See generally Klaus-Gerd Geisen, International Organization and Ethics: Cogni-
tive Interests and the case for Pragmatic Constructivism (Paper Presentation, The
Inaugural Pan-European Conference in International Studies, Heidelberg, Germany
,Sept. 16-20, 1992).
10. John C. Coffee Jr., No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 7 MICH. L. REv. 386 (1981).
11. See David Luban et al., Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90
MICH. L. REV. 2371-372 (1992) (discussion of the 1979 crash of an Air New Zealand
jet where the blame was placed on the organization and not individuals); See also
PETER FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE REsPONSIBILITY 145-54 (1984); Paul
Thompson, Why Do We Need A Theory of Corporate Responsibility?, in SHAME,
RESPONSBILITY AND THE CORPORATION 115-35 (Hugh Cutler ed., 1986).
12. KENNETH WALTz, MAN, THE STATE AND WAR (1959).
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collectivities, and non-persons, the ethical vocabulary in the West lacks
precision.
The level-of-analysis debate is a fundamental problem in theoreti-
cal discussions in international relations. 3 This debate can be trans-
posed to the level of modern ethical discourse. Not only is there not a
consensus on what is the subject of international relations, but even if
a consensus existed, the situation arises wherein there is no ethical
language to deal with the subject chosen. The choice of the subject
itself may be an ethical decision, and discussions about the subject of
ethical discourse are metaethical debates. In sum, the metaethical
debate surrounding the subject of ethical discourse, focused within the
substantive debate surrounding non-individual or non-human subjects,
raises perplexing questions.
B. The Second Level of Confusion: Two Concepts of Morality
The second level of confusion surrounding ethical discussions
concerns the ethical perspective from which one discusses the subject
once the subject has been decided. Thus, related to the ethical ques-
tions involving the choice of subject is the parallel question of the
choice of ethical positions. The ethical position from which one ob-
serves the defined subject or the actions of that subject must be clari-
fied. On what basis are there judgments? Who is to decide? While
these problems are similar to those elucidated in the previous discus-
sion of the subject of ethical discourse, they are not exactly the same.
In the Western tradition, ethical positions are divided between the
absolute and the situational." The absolute position involves a hier-
archical given. The rules and principles from which behavior can be
judged are usually otherworldly, as is the ultimate judgment. Situa-
tional ethics are horizontal and emerge from and interact with a given
culture or society. A similar distinction between the vertical aspect of
absolute ethics and the horizontal aspect of situational ethics can be
found in the distinction in the sources of international law between
formal treaty law and custom. Formal treaty law becomes a given,
while customary law emerges from practice. This distinction represents
two concepts of morality. 5
13. J.D. Singer, The Level.of-Analysis Problem in International Relations, 14 WORLD
POL. 77 (1967).
14. See Neil Cooper, Two Concepts of Morality, in THE DEFINITION OF MORALITY
72 (G. Wallace & A. Walker eds., 1970).
15. See HENRY SIDGWicK, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RIGHT AND WRONG 17
(1919).
There are two distinct ways of treating ethical questions . .. We may
begin by establishing fundamental principals of abstract or ideal morality,
and then proceed to work out deductively the particular rules of duty or
practical conceptions of human good or well-being through the adoption of
which these principals may be as far as possible realized under the actual
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The first concept, what might be called ideal morality or just mo-
rality, focuses on the relation between something otherworldly and an
individual. The rules by which persons are judged are given, and the
judgment concerning the individual's response to those rules is beyond
the individual or society. Social morality or ethics, on the other hand,
concerns norms that emerge from interactions between people and the
rules that emerge from those interactions. While the judgment in ideal
morality is otherworldly, ethical judgment comes from the same inter-
actions from which the norms emerged. Absolute ethics, ideal morality,
or morality all focus on vertical relationships between rules and indi-
viduals. Situational ethics, social morality, or ethics all focus on hori-
zontal relationships between social norms and people.
These two fundamental positions are traceable within different
Western ethical and religious traditions. And, it is interesting to note
the importance of these traditions. when related to certain political
cultures and systems.16 Amid all the current debates surrounding the
spread of democracy and free-market economics, insufficient attention
is given to the underlying philosophical assumptions behind specific
political and economic systems; little attention is given to the devel-
opment of what is called the "civic culture."7 Interest in the civic
culture heightened during the 1960's with development programs in
Africa. Most of the programs were failures and their failures were
improperly analyzed. Today is a renewed burst of enthusiasm involv-
ing Eastern Europe, but the problem of creating civic culture from the
experiences of the 1960's in the developing world has not been trans-
formed. The relationship between different ethical and religious tradi-
tions and the socio-economic systems that have emerged out of those
traditions is not seen. Democracy and free market economics are not
mere political and economic tools to implant on a neutral body politic.
Political and economic systems are directly related to larger ethical
and cultural phenomenon. The ethical position one chooses, as well as
the ethical subject one is focusing on, have direct bearings on political
and economic decisions.
While this previous discussion may seem a digression from the
subject of an ethics of human rights, it is a necessary prelude. Beneath
the interest in human rights throughout the world is a major misun-
conditions of human life. Or, we may contemplate morality as a social
fact-'positive morality' as it has been called-i.e. the body of opinions and
sentiments as to right and wrong, good and evil, which find prevalent in
the society of which we are members.
See also LYNNE RIENNER, AN ETHIC OF RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
.2-3, 23 (1991).
16. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC & THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1977).
17. GABRiAL ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE Civc CULTURE: PoLrrmcAL ATrITUDES
AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY (1965).
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derstanding concerning the nature of human rights. Paralleling the
recent heightened interest in ethics without clarifying the subject and
ethical position involved in discussing ethics, there has is also height-
ened interest in human rights without clarifying the human rights
involved. The fundamental misunderstanding concerning the nature of
human rights is related to the ambiguity within one's understanding of
ethics. If the hypothesis is correct, the debates surrounding what is
ethics and human rights are related. In sum, an ethics of human
rights contains two interrelated misunderstandings.
II. WHAT HUMAN RIGHTS?
Debates on human rights have often focused on the split between
civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. These
debates have been "noisy"8 and revelatory of deep philosophical and
cultural biases. As has been noted, "the term 'human rights' is now
used in non-Western cultures, and increasingly in the West, with con-
tent that is not identical with that of Western liberal rights." 9 The
division between these two sets of rights is represented within the
International Bill of Human Rights. In following this premise, I will
briefly examine the division within the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights before describing the historical division between the two
covenants on human rights. Having shown this division, I will discuss
the relationship between the two sets of rights. In conclusion, we will
examine the relationship between the two sets of rights in terms of our
initial discussion of ethics, to show how the two sets of debates are
interrelated.
A. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights' was adopted by
the General Assembly on 10 December 1948. The Declaration consists
of a preamble and 30 articles. The articles are based on two major
premises.2 Article 3 states the first major premise: "Everyone has the
right to life, liberty and the security of person."22 This statement de-
fines the basis of the individual rights which have been enveloped
within civil and political rights. Article 3 introduces articles 4 to 21,
18. STANLEY HOFFMAN, DUTIES BEYOND BORDERS 100 (1981) (Hoffman refers to
this debate as "the cause of a great battle").
19. Virginia A. Leary, Postliberal Strands in Western Human Rights Theory:
Personalist-Communitarian Perspectives, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 105 (Abdullah Ahmed An Na'im ed., 1992).
20. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
21. J. Morsink, The Philosophy of the Universal Declaration, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 309,
331-332 (1984) (suggesting that Articles 1 and 22 are "lead" articles for a different
type of list of rights).
22. G.A. Res. 217A (i11), supra note 20, art.3.
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which set out the civil and political rights contained within the Decla-
ration. Among these rights are: freedom from slavery or servitude;
freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment; the right to recognition as a person before the law; the
right to equal protection before the law; the right to effective legal
remedy; freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; the right to
a fair trial and public hearing by an impartial and independent tribu-
nal; the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty; freedom
from interference with privacy, home or correspondence; freedom of
movement and residence; the right of asylum; the right to nationality;
the right to marry and to have a family; the right to own property;
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of opinion and
expression; the right to peaceful assembly and association; the right to
take part in the government of one's country; and, to have equal access
to public service in one's country.
Article 22 states the second major premise of the Universal Decla-
ration:
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security
and is entitled to realization, through national effort and interna-
tional co-operation and in accordance with the organization and
resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his per-
sonality. 3
Articles 23 through 27 set out the other economic, social and cultural
rights contained in the Declaration. Among these rights are: the right
to work and to equal pay for equal work; the right to just and favor-
able remuneration; the right to form and join trade unions; the right to
rest and leisure, including reasonable limitations on working hours
and holidays with pay; the right to a standard of living adequate for
health and well-being; motherhood and childhood are entitled to spe-
cial care and assistance; the right to education; the right to participate
in the cultural life of the community.
Within the Universal Declaration are two major premises and two
sets of rights. The separation between the two groups of rights is ac-
centuated by the introduction to Article 22 which begins "Everyone, as
a member of society.. . "' Why is this parenthetical phrase -neces-
sary? If one re-reads the first group of articles, it is obvious that the
rights describe are actualized within society. The civil and political
rights described can only be actualized within a society where there is
a legal system. In spite of this obvious statement, the introduction to
Article 22 is an important reminder how civil and political rights are
often distinguished from economic, social and cultural rights. The par-
enthetical introduction to Article 22 infers a distinction between non-
23. GA. Res. 217A (III), supra note 20, art.22.
24. Id.
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social and social rights. As Craig Scott has noted, "[tihe political rights
in Articles 1 to 21 and the economic rights in Articles 22 to 27 are said
to be based on two different philosophical anthropologies: humans as
rational or natural agents, and humans as social beings."25
B. The International Covenants on Human Rights
The history of the International Covenants on Human Rights is
highly informative of the debate surrounding the two sets of rights and
their separation.26 This history reinforces the division between the
two premises in the Declaration and the inclusion of the parenthetical
aside in Article 22. In 1948, the General Assembly requested the Hu-
man Rights Commission to prepare a draft covenant on human rights.
One covenant was envisioned. In 1949, the Commission examined the
text of the draft and in 1950 revised the first 18 articles.
As part of the revision of the Draft International Covenant on
Human Rights, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 421 (V) in
December 1950.2 Section E of the Resolution said:
Whereas the Covenant should be drawn up in the spirit and
based on the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,
Whereas the Universal Declaration regards man as a person to
whom civic and political freedoms as well as economic, social and
cultural rights indubitably belong,
Whereas the enjoyment of civic and political freedoms and of
economic, social and cultural rights are interconnected and interde-
pendent,
Whereas, when deprived of economic, social and cultural
rights, man does not represent the human person whom the Uni-
versal Declaration regards as the ideal of the free man,
7. (a) Decides to include in the Covenant on Human Rights
economic, social and cultural rights and an explicit recognition of
25. Craig Scott, The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: To-
wards a Partial Fusion of the International Couenants on Human Rights, 27 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 769, 804-805 (1989).
26. See generally Memorandum by the Secretary-General on the Draft International
Covenant on Human Rights and Measures of Implementation (Historical Analysis of
the Question), 6th Seas., U.N. Doc. A/C.31559 (Nov.5, 1951) and Draft International
Covenant on Human Rights, 10th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/2929 (1955). At about the same
time that this debate was going on, a group in France drafted a declaration of rights
which tried to correct what was believed to be the individualism of the 1789 French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. The revised French Declaration of
Rights was adopted in 1946 and incorporated a recognition of economic and social
rights. For a fascinating account of this Declaration, see LEARY, supra note 19, at 116-
124. The International Covenants on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 Annex, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Seas., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, reprinted in 99 U.N.T.S. 171, 6
I.L.M. 368 (1967).
27. G.A. Res. 421, U.N. GAOR, 5th Seas.
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equality of men and women in related rights, as set forth in the
Charter of the United Nations;
(b) Calls upon the Economic and Social Council to request the
Commission on Human Rights, in accordance with the spirit of the
Universal Declaration, to include in the draft Covenant a clear
expression of economic, social and cultural rights in a manner
which relates them to the civic and political freedoms proclaimed
by the draft Covenant;
(c) Calls upon the Economic and Social Council to request the
Commission on Human Rights to take steps as are necessary to ob-
tain the co-operation of other organs of the United Nations and of
the specialized agencies in the consideration of such rights;
(d) Requests the Economic and Social Council to consider, at
its twelfth session, the methods by which the specialized agencies
might co-operate with the Commission on Human Rights with re-
gard to economic, social and cultural rights;
Why were economic, social and cultural rights not included in the
original draft? Why is there this inclusion after the drafting of the first
18 articles? As in the Universal Declaration, economic, social and cul-
tural rights came after civic and political rights.
The debate that surrounded the inclusion of economic, social and
cultural rights in the one covenant was highly contentious. Even after
the General Assembly had resolved to have one covenant and had
called upon the Economic and Social Council to request the Commis-
sion on Human Rights to include economic, social and cultural rights
in the one covenant, the debate surrounding the number of covenants
and the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights continued.
Resolution 384 (XIII) of the Economic and Social Council' adopted on
29 August 1951 includes the Report of the Commission on Human
Rights (seventh session). Section C of Resolution 384 (XIII) said:
Having noted General Assembly resolution 421 (V) calling
upon the Council to request the Commission on Human Rights to
include in the draft Covenant on Human Rights a clear expression
of economic, social and cultural rights in a manner which related
them to the civic and political freedoms proclaimed by the previous
draft of the Covenant,
Noting that the revised draft Covenant, prepared by the Com-
mission on Human Rights at its seventh session in response to this
request, contains provisions relating, inter alia, to such rights,
Considering that these provisions provide for two different
methods of implementation, without indicating which method or
methods are to apply:
(a) To political and civic rights
(b) To economic, social and cultural rights,
Conscious of the difficulties which may flow from embodying
in one covenant two different kinds of rights and obligations,
28. E.S.C. Res. 384, U.N. ESCOR.
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Aware of the importance of formulating, in the spirit of the
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and General
Assembly resolution 421 (V), economic, social and cultural rights in
the manner most likely to assure their effective manipulation,
Invites the General Assembly to reconsider its decision in
resolution 421 E (V) to include in one covenant articles on econom-
ic, social and cultural rights, together with articles on civic and
political rights.
The Third Committee devoted almost two months to the question
whether one or two covenants on Human Rights should be drafted by
the Commission on Human Rights. The debate is fascinating reading;
a reminder of the political and ideological differences that separated
countries at that time, but also a reminder that the schism between
the two sets of rights was very profound. Many of the arguments
turned on the problem of implementation, as Mrs. Roosevelt aptly
states:
(considering] the longer period of time which it will take and the
long-range planning which will be necessary to achieve the objec-
tives of the economic and social provisions of the covenant ... [T]he
draft covenant on Human Rights submitted to us by the Commis-
sion on Human Rights recognizes that the enactment of legislation
is generally sufficient to put into effect civil and political rights,
while legislation is not sufficient for the attainment of economic
and social rights. A much broader programme of action is neces-
sary.'
But, the arguments reflected more deep-seated differences than merely
implementation.
Through Resolution 384 (XIII)' , the Economic and Social Council
was asking the General Assembly to reverse its decision on one cove-
nant, a covenant that included economic, social and cultural rights in
the same document with civic and political rights. Whereas the Gener-
29. U.N. GAOR, 6th Seas., 374th plen. mtg. at 83-84, U.N. DOC. (Feb, 4, 1952)
(statement of Mrs. Roosevelt). The same type of argument was made by the United
States many years later:
We are, therefore, ready to subscribe enthusiastically to the proposition
that respect for civil and political rights, for free speech, and free election,
goes hand in hand with economic progress. We would not shy away from
going further in this discussion, but ask whether that should be done
under the rubric of human rights.
U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 48th Seas. (statement of Richard Schifter, U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs). See also Morris B.
Abram, Human Rights and the United Nations: Past as Prologue, 4 HARV. HUM. RTs.
J. 69 (1991). But see CYRUS R. VANCE, BUREAU OF. PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPIr OF
STATE, PR 194, HuMAN RIGHTS POLICY 1 (Apr. 30, 1977). But cf WARREN CHRISTO-
PHER, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP~T OF STATE, PR 374, HUMAN RIGHTS:
PRINCIPLE AND REALISM 1 (Aug. 9, 1977) (position was re-affirmed).
30. E.S.C. Res. 384, supra note 28.
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al Assembly had given specific orders for one covenant in Resolution
421 (') 3 1 at the Fifth Session in 1951-explicitly placing economic, so-
cial and cultural rights together with civic and political rights-the
General Assembly reversed itself in Resolution 543 (VI)"2 at the Sixth
Session in 1952. Resolution 543 (VI) on the Preparation of two Draft
International Covenants on Human Rights said:
Whereas the Economic and Social Council, by resolution 303 I
(XI) of 9 August 1950, requested the General Assembly to make a
policy decision concerning the inclusion of economic, social and
cultural rights in the Covenant on Human Rights,
Whereas the General Assembly affirmed, in its resolution 421
E (V) of 4 December 1950, that "the enjoyment of civic and political
freedoms and of economic, social and cultural rights are intercon-
nected and interdependent" and that "when deprived of economic,
social and cultural rights, man does not represent the human per-
son whom the Universal Declaration regards as the ideal of the free
man",
Whereas the General Assembly, after a thorough and all-round
discussion, confirmed in the aforementioned resolution the principle
that economic, social and cultural rights should be included in the
Covenant on Human Rights,
Whereas the General Assembly, at the request of the Economic
and Social Council in resolution 384 (XIII) of 29 August 1951, re-
considered this matter at its sixth session,
The General Assembly
1. Requests the Economic and Social Council to ask the Com-
mission on Human Rights to draft two Covenants on Human
Rights, to be submitted simultaneously for the consideration of the
general Assembly at its seventh session, one to contain civil and
political rights and the other to contain economic, social and cultur-
al rights, in order that the General Assembly may approve the two
Covenants simultaneously and open at the same time for signature,
the two Covenants to contain, in order to emphasize the unity of
the aim in view and to ensure respect for and observance of human
rights, as many similar provisions as possible, particularly in so far
as the reports to be submitted by States on the implementation of
those rights are concerned."
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' was
adopted by Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered
into force on 23 March 1976. The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights', also adopted and opened for signature,
31. G.A. Res. 421, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess.
32. GA Res. 543, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess.
33. Id.
34. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 Annex,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Seas., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
35. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200 Annex, U.N. GAOR, 21st Seas., Supp. No. 16, (1966), reprinted in 993 U.N.T.S.
3.
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ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI)
of 16 December 1966, entered into force on 3 January 1976. Although
various General Assembly resolutions have reaffirmed that civic and
political and economic, social and cultural rights are "interconnected
and interdependent,"' and although the two covenants were adopted
by the same Resolution, there are two separate covenants 7 and there
is no denying that " [tihis division has influenced international activi-
ties in the field of human rights."'
The two premises within the Universal Declaration and the divi-
sion of the Covenant into two covenants reflect ideological and philo-
sophical differences. The "Western doctrine" has assumed that "al-
though it is not really possible to rank human rights in order of
preference, civil and political rights appear to be of primary impor-
tance."39 Economic, social and cultural rights have been defended by
socialist States and the developing world.' Without entering into the
ideological struggle, I will now examine the relationship between the
two sets of rights.
36. See Conference Resolution XVII, The International Conference on Human Rights
in Teheran (1968), endorsed in G.A. Res. 2442, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess.; G.A. Res.
32/130, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 150, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (Dec. 16,
1977); G.A. Res. 40/114, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., (establishment of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights); G.A- Res. 41/117, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., (20th
Anniversary of the Covenants); Declaration on the Right to Development, GA Res.
41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess.
37. For a detailed analysis of the reasons for separate instruments, see Scott,
supra note 25, at 791-799.
38. Preliminary Report of The New International Economic Order and the
Promotion of Human Rights: Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
ORGAN?, SESSION?, MEETINGIITEM at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/19, (June 28,
1989)(Mr. Danilo Tork, Special Rapporteur); Final Report of The New International
Economic Order and the Promotion of Human Rights: Realization of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, MEETING/ITEM at 3, U.N. Doc. ECN.4/Sub.2/1992/16 (1992). Louis
Henkin analyzed the division as follows:
Western States fought for, and obtained, a division into two cove-
nants .... The two Covenants recognize the difference in the character
of rights in various subtle ways. For example, the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights is drafted in terms of the individual's rights .... The
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, on the other hand,
speaks only to States, not to the individual .... There was wide
agreement and clear recognition that the means required to induce
compliance with social-economic undertakings were different from those
required for civil-political rights.
Louis Henkin, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 10 (Louis Henkin
ed., 1981).
39. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 297 (1986).
40. Id. at 301, 307-08.
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C. The Relationship Between Civic and Political Rights and Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights4
The relationship between the two sets of rights has been set out
in various ways. In almost all cases, one finds variations on similar
themes that have become part of accepted thought over the years."2
Historically, it is noted, the first phase of human rights focused on
civil and political rights and traditional Western sources. While these
rights have generally been associated with the eighteenth century and
the French and American Revolutions, they can be traced back to the
Magna Carta of 1215 and the thoughts of traditional Western
philosophers.' The second phase of human rights resulted from the
ideas of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the
Mexican and Russian Revolutions. Ideas of economic and social justice
which grew out of the Industrial Revolution, produced economic, social
and cultural rights which were carried on by newly independent States
in their drive for development. In this sense, economic, social and cul-
tural rights were "second generation rights". As Adam Seligman notes:
"The addition of social rights to the civil and political rights of citizens
manifests not only a greater extension and universalization of citizen-
ship but also a mediation of that extreme individualism that had char-
acterized nineteenth-century liberal-individualist political theory.""
A simple list of the relationship between economic, social and
cultural rights and civil and political rights might look like this. 5
Economic, Social and Civil and





5. Unmanageably Complex vs.Manageable
41. Our discussion will focus mainly on economic and social rights. For a good
discussion of cultural rights that criticizes the liberal individualist perspective, see
Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, 20 POL. THEORY 105 (1992).
42. Philip Alston helpfully lays out these 'received" wisdoms and discusses them
in Prevention Versus Cure as a Human Rights Strategy, in DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 49-54 (Pergamon Press 1981) (Conference Report April
27-May 1, 1981, International Commission of Jurists).
43. Robert H. Kapp, Some Preliminary Views on the Relationship between Civil
and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of Devel-
opment and on the Right to Development 3, (1978) (Mimeo, The International Com-
mission of Jurists, Geneva).
44. ADAM SELIGMAN, THE IDEA OF CIVIL SocIETY (1992).
45. See Scott, supra note 25, at 833.
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6. Ideologically Divisive/ vs.Non-Ideological/
Political Non-Political
7. Non-Justiciable vs.Justiciable
8. Aspirations or Goals vs."Real" or "Legal" Rights
Attempts at resolving the division between the rights have been
done by several authors, among them Craig Scott,' Philip Alston,47
Asbjorn Eide," Henry Shue,49 and Danilo Tuirk. 0 These efforts have
focused on showing that even negative rights - which are supposed to
entail only government abstention - require positive action. Further,
that notions of personhood, basic rights, minimum sufficiency, mini-
mum core content and dignity require that economic, social and cultur-
al rights be considered along with civil and political rights. All of these
authors argue against a hierarchy of rights and against the second-
class status of economic, social and cultural rights - a second-class
status that can be observed through the enormous disparity between
the UN committees mandated to supervise the rights.5 ' Since econom-
ic, social and cultural rights have been under constant attack in the
West, and especially in the United States, these authors have tried to
salvage these rights. According to Danilo TUrk, "the era of the
hierarchization of human rights is more or less over and that a unified
approach is to be sought in the interpretation of the relationship be-
tween the two major sets of human rights."52 Rather than repeat the
work of these authors, I conclude this paper with an investigation that
leads back to the original discussion of the complexity of under-
standing ethics. I have shown certain differences within understanding
ethics and human rights. Thus, I conclude by examining how these dif-
ferences are interrelated.
III. INTERRELATED MISUNDERSTANDINGS
The major argument followed in this examination is one proposed
by Joseph Raz.' Raz' basic point is that "morality is not right-
46. Id.
47. Alston, supra note 42, at 49-54.
48. AsBJoRN EIDE, RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD AS A HUMAN RIGHT 10-16 (Centre
For Human Rights Study Series 1, 1989).
49. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY (1980).
50. See Tdrk, supra note 38.
51. See Philip Alston, Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 332 (1987). For
an interesting discussion of the legal differences, see Marc Bossuyt, La Distinction
Juridique Entre Les Droits Civils et Politiques et Les Droits Economiques, Sociaux et
Culturels, 8 REVUE DES DROrrs DE L'HOMME 783 (1975).
52. TaLrk, supra note 38, AT 9.
53. JOSEPH RAz, Rights-Based Moralities, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 182 (Jeremy
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based."" He sets this out by endorsing the principle that "the expla-
nation and justification of the goodness or badness of anything derives
ultimately from its contribution, actual or possible, to human life and
its quality."" Thus, Raz' "humanism" is not in and of itself a moral
theory. Rather, it is a basis on which to judge moral theories.
Raz' humanistic argument leads away from right-based moralities
that focus on a morality of rights and duties. In describing the impov-
erishment of rights-based moralities, he notes that they: (1) do not give
reasons for actions which do not amount to duties; (2) do not account
for the nature of acts which are praiseworthy and yet their omission is
not morally wrong (supererogation); and, (3) do not allow moral value
to virtue and the pursuit of excellence.
What are the implications of Raz' argument concerning the impov-
erishment of right-based moralities? Raz argues that right-based mo-
ralities are usually individualistic, and that "individualistic moralities
are humanistic moralities which hold that collective goods have instru-
mental value only." ' Raz posits that humanism is compatible with
holding collective goods to be intrinsically valuable, and not instrumen-
tally valuable. He uses this example of art, "A life with art is a good in
itself, the existence of works of art is a constituent good and the quali-
ty of life with art which explains its value is the ultimate good. All
three are intrinsic goods."57 Raz uses this argument to show that
right-based theories which insist upon duties are limited. He says that
"if... others' duty to me is confined to not violating my integrity as a
person and providing me with basic needs, then I have no right to
collective goods as my interest in them is not among my basic needs
for survival. Generally, since the maintenance of a collective good af-
fects the life and imposes constraints on the activities of the bulk of
the population it is difficult to imagine a successful argument imposing
a duty to provide a collective good which is based on the interest of one
individual."" The example of art is used to show that not only life
and its quality are intrinsically valuable. Raz' major point is that
right-based theories "tend to be individualistic and to deny the intrin-
sic value of collective goods."5"
Raz's argument, to this point, is very similar to the initial distinc-
tion made between ideal morality and social morality. Ideal morality is
individualistic in that the rights deriving from ideal morality come
down to the individual. That is why in the discussion of ideal morality,
Waldron ed., 1984).
54. Id. at 182.
55. Id. at 183.
56. Id. at 186.
57. Id. at 189.
58. Id. at 190.
59. Id. at 189.
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the fact was stressed that collective rights are often seen as individual
rights through methodological individualism. Civil and political rights
in their negative aspect of non-interference can be seen to be deriva-
tive of ideal morality. The individual is given certain rights-by his
Creator, according to the preamble of the United States Declaration of
Independence'-and those rights cannot be interfered with. In this
sense, just as ideal morality is hierarchical and vertical, so are civil
and political rights. The separate individual who is protected by civil
and political rights is part of a historical/religious understanding of the
separation of the public and the private. As Adam Seligman has noted:
(T]he differentiation of civic selfhood from communal or collective
attributes was a process that, in Western Europe, took place over
hundreds of years. It owed much to the religious doctrines of sec-
tarian or ascetic Puritanism, from which the notions of the individ-
ual as possessing metaphysical and moral value emerged. That
selfhood, which, as both Marcell Mauss and Max Weber realized,
was validated in the Declaration des Droits de l'homme et du
citoyen- stemmed, ultimately, from a religious paradigm whose
roots were firmly tied to Reformation religion."
6 '
One cannot separate civil and political rights from the reli-
gious/historical underpinnings from which they emerged.
But what of economic, social and cultural rights, and social moral-
ity? Raz' argument is based on his understanding of personal autono-
my. He does not begin from a social understanding of the individual,
but seeks to reinterpret how people generally view personal autonomy
in a social context. First, Raz distinguishes between the autonomous
person's life as what it is, but also by "what it might have been and by
the way it became what it is."82 Autonomy, for Raz, is based on the
notion of achievement through choices. Second, for Raz a person is
autonomous:
if the conditions of autonomous life obtain. Those are partly to do
with the state of the individual concerned (that he is of sound
mind, capable of rational thought and action, etc.) and partly to do
with the circumstances of his life (especially that he has a sufficient
number of significant options available to him at different stages of
his life).'
Thus, in both his description of cognizant individual choices and in his
notion of sufficient number of significant choices available to the cogni-
zant individual, Raz has moved away from justifying rights merely to
protect autonomy. For Raz, "the ideal of personal autonomy (whose
realization is clearly a matter of degree) requires not merely the pres-
60. United States Declaration of Independence
61. Seligrnan, supra note 44, at 6.
62. RAZ, supra note 53, at 191.
63. Id.
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ence of options but of acceptable ones.' Certain social conditions
must exist for there to be personal autonomy.
A person whose every major decision was coerced, extracted from
him by threats to his life or that of his children, has not led an
autonomous life. Similar considerations apply to a person who has
spent his whole life fighting starvation and disease, and has no
opportunity to accomplish anything other than to stay alive ....
Now whereas this last statement sounds very much like the argu-
ments for economic, social and cultural rights being put on the same
footing as civil and political rights based on personhood and dignity,
remember that Raz is developing his argument in contradiction to
right-based theories. Raz is arguing that there are certain collective
goods that go beyond rights and duties that are intrinsically valuable.
He is pointing to the fact that if autonomy is an ultimate value, which
is argued by those who insist on only civic and political rights, then
autonomy "affects wide-ranging aspects of social practices and insti-
tutions .... Almost all major social decisions and many of the consider-
ations both for and against each one of them bear on the possibility of
personal autonomy, either instrumentally or inherently."6 He is say-
ing that there are values at the foundations of morality apart from
rights.
Raz suggests that although governments do have duties, these
duties do not derive from the rights of individual human beings. One
of the difficulties with right-based theories is that they often link
rights with duties, but one cannot locate whose duty corresponds to
certain peoples' rights. For example, when Shue says that "basic
rights . . . are everyone's minimum reasonable demands upon the rest
of humanity," 7 he footnotes this by adding, "[i]t is controversial
whether rights are claims only upon members of one's own society or
upon other persons generally.""5 By arguing for certain intrinsic col-
lective goods which form the foundation of moral values, Raz is sug-
gesting that "governments have duties which do not derive from the
rights of individual human beings.""9
Without going into concrete examples of the kinds of intrinsic
duties that government's have that do not refer back to individuals, it
is important to note Raz' conclusion where he makes a distinction in
defining narrow morality. This point is crucial because it refers to the
discussion of the difference between ideal and social morality, and the
two sets of rights. I quote Raz at length on this:
64. Id. at 192.
65. Id.
66. Id at 194-95.
67. SHUE, supra note 49, at 19.
68. Id. at 178.
69. RAZ, supra note 53, at 195.
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Morality in the narrow sense is meant to include only all those
principles which restrict the individual's pursuit of his personal
goals and his advancement of his self-interest. It is not 'the art of
life', i.e. the precepts instructing people how to live and what
makes for a successful, meaningful, and worthwhile life. It is clear
that right-based moralities can only be moralities in the narrow
sense. An individual's rights do not provide him with reasons for
action (though if he can expect his rights to be respected they in-
form him of some of his opportunities). It is impossible to assume
that an individual can conduct his whole life on the basis of the
sole motivation of respecting other people's rights. Nor is there any
reason to commend such a mode of existence. It would be a life of
total servitude to others. On the other hand, morality in the narrow
sense may be right-based. Rights do exactly what narrow morality
is supposed to do. They set limits to the individual's pursuit of his
own goals and interests. On the plausible assumption that the only
valid grounds on which the free pursuit by people of their own lives
can be restricted are the needs, interests, and preferences of other
people it becomes plausible to regard (narrow) morality as right-
based.
[T]he objection is to the notion that.., one can divide one's princi-
ples of action into those concerned with one's own personal goals
and those concerned with others, in such a way that the principles
are independent of each other. The mistake is to think that one can
identify, say, the rights of others, while being completely ignorant
of what values make a life meaningful and satisfying and what per-
sonal goals one has in life. Conversely, it is also a mistake to think
that one can understand the values which can give meaning to life
and have personal goals and ideals while remaining ignorant of
one's duties to others . . .
Raz is trying to break away from the distinction between a narrow
sense of morality focusing on the individual's pursuit of his own's in-
terests and a larger sense of morality involving others. His argument
against right-based theories is that they accentuate this individualistic
aspect of moral individualism. The very language of rights in the legal
sense is inherently individualistic.7 Raz' examination of intrinsic col-
lective goods puts in the forefront those values which cannot be isolat-
ed in terms of an individual's rights and duties. As he notes, "The
confrontational view of morality which pitches a person's own interests
and goals as not only occasionally in conflict with his obligations to
others but as deriving from independent and fundamentally different
sources is essentially an individualistic conception.""2
70. Id. at 198-99.
71. See Robin West, Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1990)
(impassioned argument against "liberal legalism's court-centered and rights-centered
strategy for the protection of individual liberty").
72. RAZ, supra note 53, at 200.
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How then does the concept of ethics of human rights concern two
interrelated misunderstandings? On the most superficial level, there is
the objection that both ethics and human rights contain dichotomies
that are much too narrow. By imagining an ideal morality separated
from social interaction, one winds up with such absurd questions as:
Did Robinson Crusoe have rights before the arrival of Friday? By
imagining civil and political rights separated from economic, social and
cultural rights, one imagines such absurd situations as a society of free
speech and free elections where there would be no concern for econom-
ic, social and cultural rights, or vice versa. The recent demise of Com-
munism should put to rest once and for all the famous Omelette thesis
attributed to Lenin: "You can't make omelettes without breaking
eggs."73 This thesis has been favored by those who argued that one
set of rights had to be sacrificed for the other.7' Secondly, and in a
deeper sense, Raz' point is that the way to overcome the dichotomy
between ideal and social morality is not necessarily through right-
based theories. Ideal and social morality may be the foundations for
certain values which may be expressed through certain human rights,
but they cannot be limited to only human rights.
Thus, ethics and human rights are both misunderstood in an
interrelated fashion when they are interpreted in the narrow sense. A
wider understanding of ethics allows one to see the role of human
rights in a broader context. The difficulty with human rights discus-
sions, even those that accentuate the correlation between duties and
rights, is their attempt to narrow the focus of the discussion away from
this larger picture to a legalistic conception of rights without a moral
foundation. The privileging of rights discussion might work against
itself by ignoring the basis on which the rights were based. Morality in
the largest sense is not right-based, although human rights are based
on morality."5 Raz has persuasively shown that human rights are a
73. For a fascinating discussion of the omelette thesis, see Paul Sieghart, Economic
Development, Human Rights and the Omelette Thesis, 1 DEV. POLY REv. 95 (1983)
(Sieghart, using very primitive indicators, tried to show that there is a correlation
between economic development with the protection and enjoyment of human rights).
For a recent attempt to use indicators to measure compliance with the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, see Thomas Jabine and Denis
Johnston, Socio-economic indicators and Human Rights (January .1993) (Background
Paper, American Association for the Advancement of Science) (Presented at the
Seminar on Appropriate Indicators to Measure Achievements in the Progressive
Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Geneva).
74. See, e.g., Rhoda Howard, The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take
Priority Over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 HuM.
RTS. Q. 467 (1983).
75. Dorothy V. Jones makes this historical point in her discussion of the evolution
of international ethics during the 20th century:
What is frequently overlooked in discussions .. .is that the various civil,
political, social, economic, and cultural rights for human beings articulated
by the states, especially since 1945, were not set down upon a blank
1996 413
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
subset of morality. It is important to understand that both sets of
rights examined in this paper are included in the subset, as well as the
fact that there are areas outside of the subset that belong to the larger
whole - what Raz refers to as intrinsic collective goods. This examina-
tion of the interrelated misunderstandings of an ethics of human
rights shows that narrow understandings of ethics can include certain
aspects of human rights, but that a complete understanding of human
rights can only be encompassed within a larger understanding of eth-
ics.
As H.L.A. Hart points out:
The essential connection between the notion of right and the justi-
fied limitation of one's person freedom by another may be thrown
into relief if we consider codes of behavior which do not purport to
confer rights but only to prescribe what should be done .... ITihe
Decalogue is perhaps the most important example... it would be
a surprising interpretation of (the Ten Commandments) that treat-
ed them as conferring rights. In such an interpretation, obedience
to the Ten Commandments would have to be conceived as due to or
owed to individuals, not merely God, and disobedience not merely
as a wrong to (as well as harm to) individuals. The Commandments
would cease to read like penal statutes designed only to rule out
certain types of behavior and would have to be thought of as rules
placed at the disposal of individuals and regulating the extent to
which they may demand certain behavior from others.'
The claims of rights exist within a larger framework that might
include such notions as "Rules are to respected". There are overriding
ethical principles within which we can discuss specific sorts of rights.
Friedrich Kratochwil talks of "constitutive principles.., establishing
the practice in which the assertion of specific 'rights' figures promi-
nently."" It is in this sense, he argues, that arguments for certain
human rights, such as welfare rights, are based on what is right.
There is an obvious distinction between 'what is right' and 'having a
right,' but one cannot imagine having a right that is not based on
'what is right.'
In order to discuss an ethics of human rights, therefore, focus
should be placed on the ethical position that determines the specificity
of the human rights under consideration. This discussion showed that
page. They were inserted into a thickly textured mesh of already existing
states rights and duties .....
DOROTHY V. JONES, ETHICS AND SECURIrY IN THE WORLD OF THE WARLORD STATES 155
(1991).
76. H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights, 64 PHIL. REv. 175, 182 (1955).
77. FRIEDRICH R. KRATOCHWJL, RuLEs, NoRMs AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS
OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC AF-
FAIRS 168 (1989).
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a narrow conception of morality will lead to a narrow definition of
rights. A different conception of ethics based on social morality will
lead us away from the dichotomy between civil and political rights,
and economic, social and cultural rights. Ethics and human rights are
often misunderstood in a related fashion; a proper understanding of
ethics allows us to clarify the relationship between ethics and human
rights and to conceive of a cogent ethics of human rights.

Russian Dumping in the Sea of Japan
STEVEN D. LAVINE* **
I. PROBLEM
Governments worldwide manufacture significant amounts of ra-
dioactive waste.' The storage and disposal of such waste is a serious
problem, however, and many governments have chosen to dump their
nuclear wastes into the oceans rather than to build treatment and
storage facilities. Since 1946, when the United States began dumping,
at least one nuclear nation has been dumping radioactive wastes into
the sea at any given time Although there is some support for the
belief put forth by several nuclear nations - that the dumping of low-
level radioactive waste into the oceans is both the safest and the most
economic method of disposal' - few governments are willing to admit
that they would even consider this option today due to the negative
public perception of ocean dumping.4 As a result, public rhetoric
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1. Britain alone is expected to produce 1,750,000 cubic meters of low and inter-
mediate level radioactive waste by the year 2030, not including waste arising from
military use. Candy Gourlay, Environment: "Big Four" Nuclear Powers to Oppose
Sea-Dumping Ban, INTER PRESS SVC., Nov. 9, 1992 (available in) LEXIS, Nexis li-
brary, INPRES file..
2. David G. Spak, The Need for a Ban on All Radioactive Waste Disposal in the
Ocean, 7 J. INVL L. & BUS. 803, 817 (1986). The Russian Federation released a
white paper in 1993 detailing the extensive dumping by Russia of nuclear material
into the oceans through 1992. See Leyla Boulton, Russia in Crisis: Navy Admits
Dumping Nuclear Reactors at Sea, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at 2; Russia
Admits It Dumped Waste From Nuclear Reactors at Sea for 30 Years, BNA INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENT DALY, Apr. 6, 1993 (available in) LEXIS, Nexis library,
BNAIED file.
3. U.K. Agriculture Minister Gillian Shephard recently argued before Parliament
that scientific studies showed controlled sea dumping of certain radioactive wastes
caused no environmental harm and was, in fact, the "best practicable" environmental
option. Pearl Marshall, U.K., China agree to Abide by London Convention Sea Dump
Ban, NUCLEONICS WEEK, Feb. 24, 1994, at 14.
4. The U.K. chose to go along with the London Convention's ban on dumping
low-level radioactive waste because "the weight of international opinion on this mat-
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against nuclear dumping has reached new heights, while international
elites have, concurrently, done all that they can to keep dumping op-
tions open for the future.
The Russian Federation's dumping of 237,000 gallons (900 tons) of
low-level nuclear waste into the Sea of Japan in October 1993 seems to
have changed this. It has long been an open secret that Russian ocean
dumping has been commonplace for the past thirty years,5 but
Greenpeace's efforts to publicize the recent Russian dumping into
prime Japanese fishing grounds exposed Russia to worldwide criticism
and prompted a change in official Japanese and U.S. positions on the
dumping of low-level nuclear waste." This change of position, in turn,
led to the passage of a resolution against nuclear dumping at the Lon-
don Convention in November 1993, making the dumping of low-level
nuclear waste a violation of the Convention for any countries which
failed to file a timely objection.7
Although the official position of parties to the London Convention
has changed dramatically since the Russian dumping, the actual de-
sires and intentions of most parties have not changed. Regardless of
national rhetoric, there continues to be no strong control intention to
ban the dumping of low-level nuclear waste among parties to the Lon-
don Convention. Today's expectations of effective elites towards nucle-
ar dumping are virtually indistinguishable from those which* existed
before the Russian dumping operation. Nuclear nations including the
United Kingdom, France, and Japan continue to wish that they could
dump low-level waste at sea and are largely stopped from doing so
only by the pressure of public opinion. Russia has been prevented from
dumping only by an infusion of Japanese funds and not by any strong
ter means that such dumping is not, in any event, a practical proposition." Id. The
National Union of Seafarers, a British Trade Union, refused to follow government
orders to dump the waste. See Robert C. Cowen, U.S. Ocean Dumping of Low-Level
A-Waste Not Likely, Despite Report, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 25, 1984, at
5.; Stephanie Cooke, London Convention Votes to Continue Ban on Radwaste Dump-
ing at Sea, NUCLEONICS WEEK, Oct. 3, 1985, at 7.
5. "The fact that the USSR actively littered the waters of the world's oceans
with its radioactive wastes over a period of several decades was no secret to any-
one .... The situation sometimes took an absurd turn. For example, in 1989, when
instances of the burial of radioactive wastes in Northern and Far Eastern seas had
long been an open secret . .. Soviet experts declared: 'The USSR has not dumped,
is not dumping and does not plan to dump any radioactive wastes into the sea.'"
Andrei Baiduzhy, Safety: Another Ecological Secret is Revealed - The Continued
Operation of the Russian Atomic Fleet is Unsafe, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, Apr. 3, 1993
reprinted in Is Russia Still Dumping Nuclear Wastes at Sea?, XLV CURRENT DIGEST
OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS 14, at 21, May 5, 1993.
6. See David E. Pitt, U.S. to Press for Ban on Nuclear Dumping at Sea, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1993, at A5.
7. Russia is the only country which filed such an objection. See Nuclear Waste:
Russia Alone in Dumping Radioactive Waste in the Sea, EUROPE ENERGY, March 4,
1994, (available in) LEXIS, Nexis library, EUREN file.
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threat of sanctions on the part of the international community. Al-
though the idea of a 'ban' on the dumping of low-level radioactive
wastes makes for good rhetoric, a lack of enforcement provisions to
punish violators,8 in conjunction with the fact that the London Con-
vention requires no true alteration in behavior on the part of any
country but Russia (which has not agreed to abide by the ban), both
indicate that the ban possesses little substance and that the ban will
not constrain the behavior of effective elites if public opinion against
the dumping of low-level radioactive waste softens in the future.
II. FACTS
In mid-October of 1993, Boris Yeltsin took a long-postponed trip to
Tokyo intending to promote goodwill between the Russian Federation
and Japan. In Tokyo, Yeltsin responded to Japanese concerns about
nuclear dumping at sea by signing a joint declaration with Japan's
Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa stating that "[tihe ocean dumping
of radioactive wastes raises .a grave concern on a global scale, particu-
larly due to its effects on the environment of the neighboring coun-
tries."9 He agreed with Hosokawa that radioactive waste dumping is
"an urgent issue" and promised to conduct a joint survey with Japan of
nearby waters "as soon as possible, if not [by] October." 0
Just as Yeltsin was signing this declaration, the Russian Navy
tanker TNT-27 loaded 900 tons of radioactive waste, consisting mostly
of low-radiation cleansing fluid and coolant used for servicing nuclear-
powered submarines," and headed for a site 341 miles west of
Japan's island of Hokkaido and 120 miles southeast of Vladivostok,"
intending to dump the material into the Sea of Japan.' Unbeknownst
to Russia, the Greenpeace monitoring vessel Pegasus was waiting for
them." Greenpeace had predicted that Russia would soon dump in
that area after reading a Russian government report stating that Rus-
sia would continue marine disposal of nuclear wastes until 1997. In
anticipation of the Russian dumping, the Greenpeace ship left north-
8. See Spak, supra note 2, at 820 on the London Convention's general lack of
enforceability.
9. Joint Russian-Japanese Declaration of October 12 quoted in Officials and
Environmentalists Criticize Radioactive Waste Dumping, UNITED PRESS INTERNATION-
AL, Oct. 18, 1993, (available in) LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file.
10. Naoaki Usui, Russian Radwaste Dumping in Sea of Japan Mars Bilateral
Entante, NucLEoNIcs WEEK, Oct. 21, 1993, at 4.
11. Teresa Watanabe and Richard Boudreaux, Russian Nuclear Waste Sparks
Feud: Japan is Angry after Moscow Dumps Toxic Liquid in Nearby Waters, Los AN-
GELES TIMES, Oct. 19, 1993, at A7.
12. Officials and Environmentalists Criticize Radioactive Waste Dumping, UNITED
PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 18, 1993, (available in) LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file.
13. David E. Sanger, Nuclear Material Dumped Off Japan, NEW YORK TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1993, at Al.
14. Usui, supra note 10.
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ern Japan on October 7 and waited for the Russian vessel to appear; it
finally did on October 16.'
Greenpeace followed TNT-27 until the ship began piping waste
into the Sea of Japan at 8:00 A.M. Japanese time on the morning of
October 17. The dumping continued for over twelve hours and was
filmed by Greenpeace which monitored the dumping from a position
about fifteen meters away. When the activists tried to approach the
tanker on October 18 in order to more closely monitor the level of radi-
ation, they were forced away with blasts from high-powered water
hoses. Nevertheless, Greenpeace was able to monitor background ra-
dioactivity "10 to 70 times higher than natural background" radiation
near the site of the dumping.'"
News of the dumping led to public anger in Japan and extreme
annoyance with Greenpeace in Russia. Japanese television networks
began tracking the ship as soon as word of the dumping became public;
soon, the networks were broadcasting pictures of the TNT-27 dumping
liquid waste into the sea." Fishermen near Hakodate, Hokkaido, a
major maritime center near the site of the dumping which supplies
much of Japan's squid, expressed fear about seafood contamination
and a resulting potential consumer boycott."5 Angry Japanese citizens
began to protest outside of the Russian embassy.'9 On October 19, the
day after Moscow acknowledged the dumping, Japan lodged a formal
protest with Russia demanding that all such dumping be permanently
stopped."0
"The Japanese people were shocked and outraged by this action
and particularly so because it took place only days after President
Yeltsin's visit," commented a senior Japanese Foreign Ministry offi-
cial,2' concluding that "[t]his incident really added to [the] distrust"
between Japan and Russia long fostered by the Cold War." The Japa-
nese public seemed to agree. The Mainichi Shimbun, a major Japanese
daily newspaper, wrote that the dumping exposed Moscow's "clear lack
15. Emiko Terazono, Making A Splash in Japan - Support for Greenpeace is
Growing, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 24, 1993, at 17.
16. Usui, supra note 10.
17. Sanger, supra note 13.
18. Id The Japanese are particularly sensitive to water purity, and in this case
the dumping of nuclear waste in one of the country's main fishing areas revived
memories of the Minamata poisoning case, which began in the late 1950s. In that
case Chisso, a chemicals manufacturer, disposed of mercury refuse in the bay of
Minamata on the island of Kyushu, contaminating fish and poisoning much of the
local population. Terazono, supra note 15.
19. Watanabe and Boudreaux, supra note 11.
20. Usui, supra note 10.
21. Quoted in Tim Johnson, Russian Nuclear Dumping Deepens Japanese Mis.
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of environmental awareness;" the Asahi Shimbun called the dumping
"a poorly timed act of bad faith."' "No sooner had an agreement been
reached between the Japanese and Russian leaders to set up a work-
ing committee to study the problem than the Russians kicked dirt in
our faces."2'
Russian officials seemed genuinely surprised by the intensity of
Japan's reaction. It had been well known, after all, that the Russians
were dumping radioactive waste at sea, especially after the release of a
Russian "white paper" early in 1993 detailing the dumping abuses of
the former Soviet state and noting that the Russian Federation intend-
ed to continue the Soviet tradition of dumping radioactive waste.25
The Russians had told Japan that they wanted Japanese help in creat-
ing a $100-million fund for the processing and storage of Russian ra-
dioactive waste as early as May, 1993,26 and had been absolutely
clear that dumping would have to continue until Russia could afford to
build processing and storage facilities.2" The dumping issue had,
therefore, been a major point of contention during President Yeltsin's
visit to Japan. Although Hosokawa had asked Yeltsin to refrain from
dumping, Yeltsin had been unwilling to agree to do so.'
The Russians therefore, assumed that Japan was prepared for and
expected Russian dumping of liquid radioactive wastes at some point.
Moscow had specifically warned Tokyo that dumping would continue
until at least 1997," had notified the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) of the dumping in advance" (although Russia failed to
warn either the International Maritime Organization or the London
Convention),31 and had made no attempt to keep the dumping opera-
tion secret. The New York Times noted:
[t]he Russian dumping action on Sunday was carried out with a
brazenness that made it seem almost routine. By sending the load
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Guy Chazan, Russia Reveals Details of Nuclear Dumping, UPI, April 2,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis world library, UPI file. See also Russia Admits It
Dumped Waste from Nuclear Reactors at Sea for 30 Years, BNA INTERNATIONAL EN-
VIRONMENT DAILY, April 6, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis world library, Allnws
rile.
26. Naoaki Usui, Russia Won't Stop Sea Dumping but Supplies Details to Tokyo,
NUCLEONICS WEEK, May 20, 1993, at 17.
27. Baiduzhy, supra note 5, at 22.
28. Usui, supra note 10. "I asked him to stop, but there was no agreement to
stop," said Hosokawa. Wantanabe and Boudreaux, supra note 11.
29. Id. See also Baiduzhy, supra note 27.
30. Russia Poised to Dump Nuclear Waste Again Wednesday, JAPAN ECONOMIC
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis world library, Allnws file.
31. Vanora Bennett, Ignoring Protests, Russia Plans More Nuclear Dumping,
REUTER EUROPEAN BUSINESS REPORT, Oct. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis world
library, AlInws file.
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into the Sea of Japan the Russian navy must have known it would
be spotted. Its cargo was clearly marked with nuclear symbols, and
it began dumping the radioactive waste water from a pipe in broad
daylight.n
The Russians saw the dumping as a necessary evil. Russia gener-
ates an estimated 5,000 tons of low-level liquid radioactive waste each
year simply as a byproduct of dismantling its antiquated submarine
fleet and significantly more as a result of its many other nuclear oper-
ations.' Adequate storage processing facilities to deal effectively with
this waste simply do not exist in the Russian Far East;34building
costs would be prohibitive. Until Russia could find money to build
storage and treatment facilities - a low priority at the moment, given
the unhealthy state of the Russian economy - the Russians intended
to store the waste in offshore tankers and dump it as necessary.
By October, 1993, the need to dump had become urgent. Both
TNT-27 and the tanker TNT-5, which were being used to store low-
level radioactive waste, were completely full." Furthermore, both
tankers were in extremely dilapidated condition. TNT-5, which had
been decommissioned in 1992, was "practically falling apart"" and
was in such bad condition that it could not even be towed without
posing the risk of an accident.3 7 One of the old vessels storing liquid
radioactive waste at Vladivostok was reported to have a hole in it "that
might pose a threat in bad weather."38 Due to the extraordinarily poor
condition of the Russian storage facilities, the Russian Ministry of
Environmental Protection approved the dumping operation as "the
lesser of two evils"39 for fear that one of the vessels would otherwise
32. Sanger, supra note 13.
33. Japan to Study Emergency Provisions to Help Russia with Nuclear Waste
Storage, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 21, 1993 excerpted in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Dec. 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis world library, Allnws file.
34. As of late 1993 there was not a single processing plant for liquid radioactive
waste in the Russian Far East. Press Conference by RF Environment Minister Viktor
Danilov-Danilyan and Federal Employment Service Chief Fyodor Prokopov on the
Results of RF Government Meeting, OFFICIAL KREMLIN INTERNATIONAL NEWS
BROADCAST, Oct. 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis world library, Allnws file,
[hereinafter October Press Conference].
35. Both tankers were "filled to the brim" with liquid radioactive waste. Inspec-
torate Chairman Yuri Vishnevsky quoted in Tatiana Smolyakova, Well, It Is Really
Very Harmless Waste, ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA excerpted in RUSSIAN PRESS DIGEST, Oct.
20, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis world library, Allnws file.
36. V. Ignatenko and V. Maslakov, The Problem of Radioactive Waste in Mari-
time Kray is not Going to be Solved on a Populist Wave, KRASNOYE ZNAMYA, Apr.
16, 1994, excerpted in Dumping Into Sea Seen as Only Option for Radioactive Waste
in Far East, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Apr. 29, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Nexis world library, Alinws file.
37. October Press Conference, supra note 34.
38. Japan to Study Emergency Provisions to Help Russia with Nuclear Waste
Storage, supra note 33.
39. Smolyakova, supra note 35.
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release its waste into the harbor, where it would be concentrated and
pose a real danger to Russian citizens.'
Because Russian officials took the dumping operation for granted
as routine, expected, and necessary, they were perplexed by the strong
Japanese reaction and ann9yed with Greenpeace for turning what they
saw as a fairly harmless operation into an international incident." In
the days following the dumping, Russian officials defended their ac-
tions to the press. "I understand the concern of our Japanese neigh-
bors[;] however, international agreements do not ban the dumping of
low toxic waste in the sea," argued Valery Damilyan, head of the Rus-
sian fleet's chemical operations. [In addition,] [wle have no facilities to
process the waste .. ."' Russia maintained the official position that
it had the right to continue dumping and announced that an additional
800 cubic metres of radioactive liquid waste would be dumped into the
Sea of Japan between October 20 and November 15, 1993.' 3
The Japanese were concerned enough by the possibility of a sec-
ond dumping that they took strong steps to prevent its occurrence, cir-
cumventing normal diplomatic channels and holding out the prospect
of significant financial incentive for the Russians not to dump. The Los
Angeles Times reported:
[aifter twice calling in the Russian ambassador and getting no
satisfaction, Japanese Foreign Minister Tsutomo Hata took the
unusual step Wednesday of telephoning his Russian counterpart,
Andrei V. Kozyrev, to press for a commitment to stop the dumping.
According to an account of their 20-minute conversation in the
Russian newspaper Izvestia, Hata indicated that Japan is willing to
40. "[I]t is simply absolutely real that there could be an accident at that tanker
CTNT-5] because its hull is practically fully worn out. In that case all the liquefied
radioactive waste inside it would be in the sea, inside a harbor, not on the high
seas where the depth is great, but in the harbor .... The dumping was neces-
sary ... to prevent a far more serious accident involving TNT-5 in the harbor."
October Press Conference, supra note 34.
41. Russian Federation Environmental Minister Viktor Danilov-Danilyan ex-
pressed his annoyance at Greenpeace in a press conference soon after the dumping:
"I have some complaints about Greenpeace .... Firstly, Greenpeace is . . . trying
to annoy as many people as they can. [I]t sets sail or goes on foot without any
permission . . . in order to provoke a clash with the law enforcement agencies. I
don't understand why they are doing it .... [IUn the final analysis it produces no
result. All this has a negative effect on the validity of those proposals which it puts
forward." Press Conference by Viktor Danilov-Danilyan and Yuri Yarov, Candidates
for the State Duma from the Political Bloc Vybor Rossii (Russia's Choice) on Russian
Federation Environmental Problems, OFFICIAL KREMLIN INTERNATIONAL NEWS BROAD-
CAST, Nov. 22, 1993 [hereinafter November Press Conference], available in LEXIS,
Nexis world library, Allnws file.
42. Russia Poised to Dump Nuclear Waste Again Wednesday, supra note 30.
43. 1d; Hugo Gurdon, Russia Defies Protests to Dump Atom Waste at Sea, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Oct. 19, 1993, at 16, available in LEXIS, Nexis world library, Alnws
file.
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help solve Moscow's waste disposal problem and Kozyrev agreed to
relay Japan's concerns to Yeltsin."
Although he indicated that Japan might be willing to help Russia
financially, Hata also made clear that a second dumping would be tak-
en very seriously by Tokyo. Hata demanded that Russia cancel its
plans to dump the second load of waste," warning that "[ilf Russia
goes ahead with its reported plan of another dumping ... the founda-
tion of a new Japan-Russia relationship built by President Yeltsin's
visit will crumble."" American officials also called publicly for a halt
to the dumping, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher made it
clear that he would press Japan's case if the matter was not soon re-
solved. 7
On October 20, the day after the conversation between Hata and
Kozyrev, the Russians modified their position. Russian Federation
Environment Minister Viktor Danilov-Danilyan announced at a press
conference that Prime Minister Chernomyrdin had called off the sec-
ond dumping operation for the moment so there would be no more
threat of dumping "in the immediate future."' Other spokesmen indi-
cated, however, that the decision not to go ahead with the dumping
was only "a temporary measure" and that dumping would "likely be re-
sumed within a year." 9 Clearly connected to all Russian discussion of
future dumping was the question of whether, and how much, financial
assistance would be forthcoming from foreign countries for the building
of processing and storage facilities for Russian nuclear waste in the
Far East. Danilov-Danilyan coupled his announcement of the suspen-
sion of nuclear dumping with an appeal for foreign financial help to
speed construction of a nuclear waste processing plant and said that, if
building such a plant would take more than eighteen months, the
Russian navy might be forced to resume sea dumping.' He also an-
44. Richard Boudreaux, Russia Calls Off Nuclear Dumping In Sea, LOS ANGELES
TIMES, October 22, 1993, at A6.
45. Gillian Tett and William Dawkins, Russia Bows to Japan Pressure on Dump-
ing, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 22, 1993, at 4.
46. Satoshi Isaka, Government Changes Tack on Dumping; Russian Action Leads
Tokyo to Urge Ban on Sea-Dumping, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Oct. 25, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis world library, Allnws file.
47. Boudreaux, supra, note 44.
48. October Press Conference, supra note 34.
49. Russia Abandons Second Operation to Dump Nuclear Waste, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Oct. 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis world library, Allnws file.
50. Craig R. Whitney, Russia Halts Nuclear Waste Dumping In Sea, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1993, at A9. See also, Danilov-Danilyan said:
"We hope for assistance from other countries in the implementation of this
project. The statement made by the Japanese Foreign Ministry recently about the
dumping promises such cooperation and such technical and financial assistance to
Russia. I am convinced that other countries will also take part in resolving this
problem ... . I hope that the Russian government will find a solution . . . It will
depend on the speed of construction of facilities for processing liquid radioactive
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nounced the departure of Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov to
Tokyo "to discuss the question of the participation of the Japanese side
in the construction of a plant to process liquid radioactive waste in the
Far East.".
In Japan, Minister Mikhailov engaged in negotiations to divert a
$100 million fund, previously pledged by Japan for the purpose of
helping Russia dismantle its nuclear weapons, to finance a new agen-
da. The Russians wanted a portion of the fund to be immediately dis-
bursed and used to build processing and storage facilities for radioac-
tive waste.5" Japan's hesitation was largely a result of its concern
that the funds might be used to bolster Russian military forces instead
of helping to reduce excess nuclear waste produced by dismantling
those forces."
Although the financial issues were not resolved during his visit,
Minister Mikhailov apologized to the Japanese in Tokyo and promised
that the Russian Federation would never again dump in the Sea of
Japan." He refused to promise that Russian dumping of nuclear
waste would stop entirely, however, and speculation remained that
Russia would simply begin dumping future waste into the Pacific or
Arctic Ocean instead.55
Shortly after Mikhailov's visit to Tokyo on November 1, 1993, the
Japanese reversed a long standing policy designed to keep open the
possibility for future dumping by announcing that Japan would now
support an international ban on the dumping of radioactive waste at
sea.' Two days later, America followed suit.5
waste in the Far East and in northern Russia whether or not waste will be
dumped into the sea in the future. If these facilities are built quickly, it will
probably allow to prevent [sic] the dumping of waste. If it takes, for instance, a
year and a half to build such facilities, Russia will be compelled to dump more
waste into the sea." October Press Conference, supra note 34.
51. October Press Conference, supra note 34.
52. See Usui, supra note 10; David Ljunggren, Russia Suspends Nuclear Dump-
ing Off Japan, REUTER WORLD SERVICE, Oct. 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis li-
brary, REUWLD file; Tett and Dawkins, supra note 45.
53. Marjorie Sun, Japan to Help Russia With Nuclear Waste Problem, NATIONAL
PUBlIC RADIO, Oct. 28, 1993, transcript #1284-5, available in LEXIS, News library,
Script file.
54. Naoaki Usui, Mikhailov, In Tokyo, Pledges No More Waste Dumping In Ja-
pan Sea, NUCLEONICS WEEK, Oct. 28, 1993, at 10; Russia Not To Dump Again In
Japan Sea, REUTER WORLD SERVICE, Oct. 26, 1993, (available in) LEXIS, Nexis
library REUWLD rile.
55. Sun, supra note 53.
56. Edo Rules Out Sea Dumping Option for Radioactive Waste, KYODO NEWS
SERVICE, Nov. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis world library, Alinws file.
57. Statement by White House Press Secretary On Radioactive Waste, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, News library, Arcnws file; See also
Pitt, supra note 6, at 45.
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III. CONFLICTING CONCEPTIONS OF LAWFULNESS
The facts of this incident have never been disputed by the parties
involved. Legal claims relating to the Russian dumping operation have,
however, come into conflict. Russia claims that its dumping operation
was legal and in accordance with the terms of the London Convention.
Japan and the United States have never pressed the Russians strongly
on this point, in part because neither the United States nor Japan had
advocated the passage of strong laws against the dumping of low-level
nuclear waste before this incident occurred and were, therefore, in no
position to criticize Russia as a 'lawbreaker' without appearing hypo-
critical.' Greenpeace, in contrast, has long stood for the proposition
that the dumping of any nuclear waste at sea is illegal - a claim
which Russia strongly disputes - and has forcefully argued that
Russia's dumping was a violation of the London Convention.
In considering the legality of Russia's actions, two separate issues
must be considered: 1) the legality of the dumping itself and 2) the
question of whether Russia followed proper procedures prior to dump-
ing. These issues must be considered separately below.
A. Legality of the Dumping
Beginning in the early 1980s, Greenpeace began a concerted high-
profile campaign against the dumping of low and intermediate level
radioactive waste at sea59 which helped lead to the passage of a "vol-
untary" moratorium against the dumping of such waste at the Seventh
Consultative Meeting of the London Dumping Convention.' The mor-
atorium, in place since 1983, was explicitly enacted both because of "a
growing body of public opinion with regard to the dumping of radioac-
tive substances" and a lack of "current knowledge" as to the effects of
such dumping. The moratorium called for the suspension of all dump-
ing of radioactive materials at sea pending the presentation of a final
report detailing the environmental effects of such dumping. '
58. See Greenpeace Charges G.7 With "Hypocrisy" Over Stand on Nuclear Waste
Dumping at Sea, BNA INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT DAILY, June 23, 1993 (noting
that Japan helped lead opposition to a permanent ban on radioactive waste dumping
at sea, and that Japanese concern over Soviet dumping was hypocritical due to its
stark contrast with Japan's intention to dump its own nuclear waste into the Pacif-
ic).
59. Nicholas Schoon, UK Holds Out On Dumping: Britain Facing Isolation As
Negotiators Move Towards International Deal, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 12,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis world library, Allnws file.
60. Id; Daniel Suman, Regulation of Ocean Dumping by the European Economic
Community, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 559, 597 (1991).
61. See Resolution LDC.14(7), Disposal of Radioactive Wastes and Other Radioac-
tive Matter at Sea (LDC 7/12, annex 3), reprinted in International Maritime Organi-
zation, THE LONDON DUMPING CONVENTION: THE FIRST DECADE AND BEYOND 207
(1991).
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That report, issued in 1985, proved inconclusive, and the London
Dumping Convention passed a second resolution to indefinitely contin-
ue the voluntary moratorium until "an informed judgment" about the
safety of nuclear dumping could be made and further studies could be
completed.62 However, it was signed by neither Japan nor Russia,'
and its voluntary nature was emphasized in statements made by both
the U.S. and the U.K on the final day of the convention." The 1985
moratorium was scheduled to officially expire at the Sixteenth meeting
of the London Convention, beginning November 8, 1993, when the
results of new studies would be presented."5
Although the ban was generally accepted and observed by member
countries, it was always clear that the moratorium was not legally
binding." Furthermore, as the Russian White Paper of 1993 estab-
lished, Russia blatantly disregarded the ban since its inception, pre-
tending to observe it while in fact secretly dumping massive amounts
of nuclear wastes into the oceans."
Nevertheless, Greenpeace's first allegations against Russia fo-
cused largely upon the breach of these voluntary moratoria. Joshua
Handler, a Greenpeace activist and research coordinator, argued that
the voluntary ban was as binding under international law as was the
treaty itself." During Minister Viktor Danilov-Danilyan's press con-
ference of October 21, 1993, Handler and Danilov-Danilyan testily
disputed the point:
Handler: We express indignation with the Russian government's
illegal actions.
Danilov-Danilyan: Which law has been broken? Can you tell me?
Handler: Obligations under international treaties.
Danilov-Danilyan: Can you show them to me?
Handler: The London Convention to which you are a signatory.
Danilov-Danilyan: The London Convention contains nothing about
low-activity liquid radioactive waste. You should not invent any-
thing for the London Convention, saying that it allegedly contains
things it does not contain. It has nothing of the kind.
62. Stephanie Cooke, London Convention Votes to Continue Ban on Radwaste
Dumping at Sea, NUCLEONICS WEEK, Oct. 3, 1985, at 7. See Resolution LDC.21(9),
Dumping of Radioactive Wastes at Sea (LDC 9/12, annex 4), reprinted in Interna-
tional Maritime Organization, supra note 61 at 208.
63. Tett and Dawkins, supra note 45.
64. Cooke, supra note 62.
65. Greenpeace Says U.S. Opposition to Sea Dumping of Radioactive Waste is
Victory for Environment, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 3, 1993.
66. Ban Widened, Though Four Key Nations Vote "No", NuCLEAR NEWS, Dec.
1990, at 78.
67. See Chazan, supra note 25. See also note 5, supra.
68. Boudreaux, supra, note 44.
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Moderator: (cutting in) Let us not continue this dispute. We are
pressed for time, sorry."
In both this press conference and a second on November 22, 1993,
Danilov-Danilyan continued to maintain that Russia's actions had not
violated the terms of the London Convention. As he argued in the
November conference:
Russia could have broken its commitments only if it had been a
participant to a voluntary moratorium on dumping. And Russia
never joined it... "
B. Violation of Proper Procedure
1. Failure to Notify the IMO
Russia notified the IAEA of its intent to dump 1,700 tons of low-
level nuclear waste into the Sea of Japan on October 9th, over a week
before the dumping took place."' This seems to have been the result of
some confusion. Russian officials seem to have believed that they pos-
sessed an obligation to notify the IAEA prior to dumping. As Minister
Danilov-Danilyan explained: "Russia was supposed to ... inform the
IAEA... under Article 7 of the London Convention on Dumping...
We have done that."
72
In fact, it is Article 6 - not Article 7 - of the London Dumping
Convention which obligates contracting parties to notify the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization - not the IAEA - of their dumping
operations.73 Notification of the IAEA instead of the IMO is a clear
violation of the London Convention.
This mistake, whether made honestly or not, may help to explain
why the Russian dumping took Japan, and the world, by surprise. The
IAEA failed to act upon the Russian letter, or even notify others of its
existence, until after the dumping had taken place.7' Greenpeace
69. October Press Conference, supra note 34.
70. November Press Conference, supra note 41.
71. Sanger, supra note 13.
72. November Press Conference, supra note 41.
73. Article VI(4) of the Convention states that "Each Contracting Party, directly
or through a Secretariat . .. shall report to the Organization . . . the information
specified . . . " The London Dumping Convention, reprinted in International Mari-
time Organization, supra note 61 at 11. The Organization was defined at the first
meeting of Contracting Parties in London from 17 to 19 December 1975 as the In-
ter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), whose name was
changed on 21 May 1982 to the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Id. at
56i 115.
74. Gamini Seneviratne, IAEA Accused of Supporting Russian Radwaste Dump-
ing, NUCLEONICS WEEK, Nov. 11, 1993, at 14. These accusations were contained in a
31-paragraph statement addressed to the 16th meeting of contracting parties to the
London Convention.
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strongly lamented both the Russian mistake and the IAEA's failure to
correct it. In November, Greenpeace accused the "IAEA of dereliction of
duty, incompetence, and even 'support' of" the dumping due to its fail-
ure to notify the IMO or other contracting parties as soon as they
learned of the Russians' intent to dump."h
In an attempt to defend itself, the IAEA issued an aide-memoire
to "clarify and correct certain misunderstandings" as to its role under
the Convention. Representatives of the IAEA argued that they had
done nothing wrong since Russia "should have told the IMO, not us...
[and] we have no obligation to circulate the information."" Privately,
however, senior IAEA officials admitted that a 19 day response time to
the Russian letter was too long. "[W]e drew up the rules for the Con-
vention (in IAEA Safety Series No. 78, 1986) and we should have told
them, pronto, that they were not playing by them." "
2. Issuance of a Special Permit
Whenever a contracting party to the London Convention dumps
waste or other matter at sea, it is required first to obtain a permit for
the dumping.7" Article VI of the convention provides that each con-
tracting party must designate an appropriate authority for the grant-
ing of such permits.79
There seems to be some confusion within Russia as to which orga-
nization is the proper authority to notify in the event of a planned
dumping. This may be because until recently the official Soviet posi-
tion on nuclear dumping was as follows: "The USSR has not dumped,
is not dumping and does not plan to dump any radioactive wastes into
the sea."8" In the past, Russian dumping plans have been drawn up
by the government but not officially endorsed due to Russia's public
acceptance of the London Convention."'
It is not surprising that the Russian Federal Nuclear and Radia-
tion Safety Inspectorate argued that the Russian dumping into the Sea
of Japan had been illegal because the wrong Russian agency had given
permission for the dumping. Shortly after the dumping, Inspectorate
Chairman Yuri Vishnevsky told Rossiiskaya Gazeta that all "opera-
tions of this kind" must be coordinated with the Inspectorate. In this
case, however, the Inspectorate was never notified. Instead, the Rus-




78. International Maritime Organization, supra note 61, at 76.
79. Id at 10, 76.
80. Baiduzhy, supra note 5, at 21.
81. Smolyakova, supra note 35.
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permission from the Ministry of Environmental Protection. 2
Vishnevsky therefore, argued that the dumping had been illegal and
that the Ministry of Environmental Protection had taken "a great
responsibility" upon itself for allowing the dumping to take place.'
3. Improper Packaging
Even without regard to the voluntary moratorium on dumping
low-level radioactive wastes at sea, such wastes are included in Annex
II (the "grey list") of the London Convention, and may, therefore, be
dumped at sea only under certain conditions. One requirement pro-
scribes that substances listed in Annex II must be dumped using "spe-
cial care."S4
It has become clear from recent discussions among contracting
parties to the London Convention that such care may imply the use of
certain dumping procedures and techniques which can mitigate the
potentially harmful effects of Annex II substances. 5 One such proce-
dure is packaging the waste. Therefore, as IAEA Director General
Hans Blix wrote in a letter to Russian Minister Danilov-Danilyan,
although the dumping of "packaged" liquid radioactive waste is not
prohibited, the dumping of "unpackaged" liquid radioactive waste is
not allowed. 8
The Russian waste was not "packaged" in any way, but was sim-
ply poured out beneath the TNT-27's propeller so as to be mixed more
quickly with seawater. 7 The manner of the Russian dumping was,
therefore, in violation of the London Convention.
C. Conclusions
Russia and Greenpeace proffer conflicting claims as to the legality
of the Russian dumping operation. Russia has argued for its legality,
while Greenpeace claims that the dumping was an unjustified and
illegal act. Greenpeace is undoubtedly correct in its assertion that the
operation was not "legal" under the London Convention. However, all
aspects of the convention which were clearly violated, including
Russia's failure to notify the IMO of its intention to dump, its possible
failure to ask the correct agency to issue a special permit, and its fail-
ure to properly package the waste, are procedural in nature; the errors
made may be easily corrected for in future decisions to dump low-level
radioactive waste. More important is the question of whether Russia
82. Id.
83. id.
84. International Maritime Organization, supra note 61, at 71.
85. Id.
86. Seneviratne, supra note 74.
87. Smolyakova, supra note 35.
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may legally dump such waste when proper procedure has been ob-
served. As regards this question, Russia seems justified in its assertion
that the dumping, per se, did not contravene its obligations under the
London Convention.
IV. PREVIOUSLY EXISTING NORMS REGARDING THE DUMPING OF LOW-
LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
Whatever the "legality" or "illegality" of Russia's dumping, it is
telling that no international body ever formally determined whether
Russia had violated the terms of the London Convention; no sanctions
- or even threats of sanctions - were ever brought. This may, in
part, be due to the "toothlessness" of the London Convention. The Con-
vention is notorious for its lack of provision for enforcement. As one
commentator notes:
Perhaps the major reason that ... the LDC... (has] not been
effective is that [it] lack[s] enforcement provisions to punish viola-
tors. There is little recourse for contracting parties ... to stop a
nation or its industry from violating the treaties. The only viable
options are direct appeals on a nation-to-nation or nation-to-indus-
try basis .... [Tihese appeals are not always successful."
Indeed, Russia had earlier flouted the terms of the London Con-
vention and gotten away with it. In May 1992, well over a year before
the dumping in the Sea of Japan, Soviet dumping in clear violation of
the London Convention was disclosed to the world. The New York
Times wrote:
The 1972 London Convention on ocean dumping outlawed the [re-
cently disclosed Russian dumping practices] . . but [Russian]
officials said there was no remedy other than international
pressure to disclose and perhaps clean up the worst sites ....
This lack of enforcement is characteristic of both the London Con-
vention and the norms guiding the international elites who established
it, many of whom wish to keep ocean dumping available as a possible
future option. History demonstrates that when dumping has been
stopped in the past, this result has not usually been as a result of an
international agreement." Further, those treaties which have been
88. Spak, supra note 2, at 820.
89. Patrick E. Tyler, Soviets' Secret Nuclear Dumping Causes Worry for Arctic
Waters, N.Y. TIMEs, May 4, 1992, at Al.
90. Spak, supra note 2 at 819. The United States, for instance, suspended dump-
ing in 1970 in large part in reaction the Council on Environmental Quality report
on ocean dumping, which noted that radioactive waste dumping at sea was not as
economical as other methods of disposal. And the Netherlands stopped dumping
radioactive waste at sea solely in response to public opinion. One Dutch government
official noted: "[this ministry is convinced that ocean dumping is a safe disposal for
wastes. But it is clear that our society does not want ocean dumping." Il at 819-20.
1996
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY
agreed upon have sometimes been violated by international elites with-
out a second thought.
A. Brief History of Dumping
Since 1946, when the United States began dumping radioactive
wastes off the northeastern Atlantic coastline and in the Gulf of Mex-
ico, at least one nation has been disposing of its radioactive wastes at
sea at any given time.91 Many nations viewed ocean dumping as both
a politically and economically viable option for the disposal of wastes.
When the London Dumping Convention, as it was then known, was
signed in 1972, a majority of scientists still believed that the oceans
had an "assimilative capacity" to receive virtually limitless amounts of
wastes without causing significant damage to marine ecosystems.
92
Given these attitudes towards dumping on the part of international
elites and scientists, it is not surprising that the London Dumping
Convention was labeled a "dumpers club" by its critics who argued
that it existed to block dumping regulation rather than strengthen en-
vironmentally protective measures.93 Some critics claim that this
"dumpers club" image resulted in a lack of interest in attending or
joining the Convention by countries not directly concerned with ocean
dumping techniques.'
Most nations with nuclear power stations and nuclear weapons
continued to look to the oceans as a prime disposal site for nuclear
wastes until the 1980s."5 Until then, the "dumping of low and inter-
mediate-grade radioactive waste at sea was quite routine by states
with nuclear power industries and/or nuclear weapons;"9' even land-
locked Switzerland hired ships to haul nuclear waste into the North-
east Atlantic.97 It was not until Greenpeace's campaign began to raise
public awareness in the early 1980s and until the London Dumping
Convention imposed its 1983 "voluntary" moratorium in response, that
many countries began to change their dumping practices. Since then,
large-scale dumping has ceased among most Contracting Parties to the
Convention.' Nevertheless, it was not until 1992, at the 15th Consul-
tative Meeting of the London Dumping Convention, that the Contract-
ing Parties voted to drop "Dumping" from the Convention's name in
91. Id. at 817.
92. Greenpeace, Comments On Amendments to the Convention and its Annexes,
Nov. 8, 1993. (submitted by Greenpeace International to the 16th Consultative Meet-
ing of the London Convention) (hereinafter Greenpeace Comments) (on file with au-
thor).
93. Gourlay, supra note 1.
94. Greenpeace Comments supra note 92.
95. Schoon, supra note 59.
96. Editorial: Nuclear Waste, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993, at 13.
97. Schoon, supra note 59.
98. Editorial: Nuclear Waste, supra note 96.
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order to make it clear that "dumping" is not a preferred option for
waste management."
Neither the Convention's name nor its edicts have always proven
sufficient to alter the behavior of effective international elites, howev-
er. The permissive attitude towards dumping in which the Convention
was founded remains present in the actions and attitudes of several
nuclear powers who are Contracting Parties.
1. Russia
"[Niot a single reasonable individual will say that the dumping of
liquid radioactive waste into the sea, into the ocean, is a norm," ex-
plained Minister Danilov-Danilyan shortly after the Russian dump-
ing. ' Nevertheless, dumping radioactive waste into the ocean has
long been Russia's standard operating procedure. The fact that the
USSR dumped a significant amount of radioactive waste over the past
few decades has been common knowledge for years. But due to the ex-
traordinary secrecy surrounding Soviet dumping operations and the
refusal of the Soviets to admit to dumping anything at all, the precise
extent of Russian dumping has long been impossible to ascertain.'
The international community's patience with this state of affairs
ran out in 1991 when Greenpeace released a report and rough map of
radioactive burials in the Northern seas based on its own information,
thereby shocking the world public and causing an international furor.
A consultative conference of the London Convention's contracting par-
ties demanded that the USSR provide information on all instances of
dumping of radioactive wastes.0 2 In 1992, the USSR dissolved and
London Convention signatories repeated their demand, this time in the
form of a thinly veiled ultimatum. In October 1992 Boris Yeltsin estab-
lished a government commission headed by Aleksei Yablokov whose
report became the basis of the "White Paper" released on April 2, 1993,
which detailed Soviet dumping over the years."°
The White Paper noted that the USSR started dumping in 1959
when 600 cubic meters of liquid radioactive wastes were poured from a
Soviet atomic submarine into the White Sea. From then on, the USSR
continued dumping substantial amounts of radioactive wastes into the
oceans every year. After the London Convention came into force in
1972, the USSR, while both limiting and denying the extent of its
99. Greenpeace Comments supra note 92.
100. October Press Conference, supra note 34.
101. Baiduzhy, supra note 5, at 21.
102. Id.
103. Id See also supra notes 25 and 67.
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dumping, deliberately continued to violate nearly all of the
Convention's provisions.'"
Nezavisimaya Gazeta noted in 1993 that "the 'organized' burial of
radioactive wastes [by the Russian Federation] ... is continuing right
up to the present.""8 In 1992 alone seven instances of dumping were
recorded, the most significant of which was the sinking of a tanker
containing solid radioactive wastes somewhere in the Sea of Japan."
It should, therefore, be clear that when Minister Danilov-Danilyan
claims that dumping is not a Russian norm, he is speaking about Rus-
sian ideals and not about Russian practice. As TASS recently reported,
"dumping is a commonplace event" in Russia."7
2. The United Kingdom
Of those nations which, unlike the USSR, have historically report-
ed their dumping of low-level radioactive waste to the London Con-
vention as required, the United Kingdom has always been a particular-
ly heavy dumper. A 1985 report noted that Britain's waste constituted
ninety percent of all disposals then allowed."8 It should, therefore,
come as no surprise that Britain has historically fought against any
restrictions on the dumping of waste, and has frequently ignored, or
has tried to ignore, the London Dumping Convention's regulations.
Britain continued to dump low-level radioactive waste into the
Northern Atlantic after the adoption of the London Dumping Conven-
tion, and the British government would not conduct the obligatory
impact studies or grant the necessary permits which the Convention
required.'" British dumping failed to stop in 1982 after the Europe-
an Parliament adopted a resolution urging the cessation of radioactive
waste dumping in the northeastern Atlantic; nor did it stop after the
London Dumping Convention imposed its two-year moratorium on the
dumping of radioactive waste at sea in 1983. "0
When the British finally did stop dumping in 1985, they did not
do so because of the moratorium. Britain had decided to ignore the
resolution against dumping passed by the London Convention, but the
British seamen's union - the National Union of Seafarers - forced
compliance by refusing to handle Britain's radioactive waste."'
104. Baiduzhy, supra note 5, at 21.
105. Id., at 22.
106. Id., at 22.
107. Second Dumping to Take Place before November, TASS, Oct. 20, 1993.
108. Michael Wise, Nuclear-Dumping, REUTERS, Sept. 20, 1985.
109. Spak, supra note 2, at 819.
110. Id. See also notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
111. Wise, supra note 108; Cowen, supra note 4.
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Perhaps because of an upcoming need to decommission and dis-
pose of old nuclear submarines and power stations within the next two
decades, both Britain and France have fought hard to retain the legal
right to dump in recent years."2 In September 1992, at the Conven-
tion on Marine Pollution in Paris, both countries lobbied to ensure that
a moratorium on dumping radioactive waste into the northeast Atlan-
tic would last for only 15 years;"3 Both nations have fought to pre-
vent the London Convention from extending their 10 year moratorium
on dumping into a permanent one. The Intergovernmental Panel of
Experts on Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea, an expert panel estab-
lished by the London Convention in 1985 to study and advise on this
matter, found itself unable to reach consensus after eight years of
study due largely to British and French efforts to keep ocean dumping
available as a future option."'
3. Japan
Between 1955 and 1969, Japan dumped 1,650 drums of low-level
radioactive waste into the Pacific ocean." 5 The Japanese government
stopped dumping radioactive waste at sea in 1969 but has seriously
considered resuming the practice as recently as 1993. Japan has re-
mained reluctant to eliminate the option of nuclear dumping altogeth-
er due to possible implications for future nuclear energy use."6
In 1980, Japan sent four officials to a South Pacific Islands sum-
mit meeting on Guam in an attempt to persuade participants of the
safety of Japan's plan to dump low-level radioactive waste into the
waters near the Pacific Islands."7 The Japanese government intend-
ed to dump 10,000 drums of cemented radioactive waste into the South
Pacific beginning in 1981 and to begin "full-scale dumping" in
1982. "8 The plan met strong opposition from South Pacific countries,
which adopted a resolution demanding Japan's "unconditional" can-
cellation of its dumping plans; ultimately Japanese dumping was put
off due to international pressure." 9
112. Amanda Brown, Britain to Fight Nuclear Sea Dumping Ban, PRESS ASSOCIA-
TION NEwsFILE, Nov. 30, 1992.
113. Id.; Bronwen Maddox, UK Fights Ban on Dumping, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 9,
1992.
114. International Panel Fails to Reach Agreement on Ocean Dumping, BNA IN-
TERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT DAILY, July 19, 1993.
115. Terazono, supra note 15.
116. Japan Not to Dump Radioactive Waste Into Sea, JAPAN ECONOMIC
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 2, 1993.
117. Japan Set to Dissuade S. Pacific Leaders From Opposing Radioactive Waste
Dumping, JLII PRESS TICKER SERVICE, Aug. 6, 1980.
118. Id.
119. Japan Decided to Join NEA's Surveillance System for Radioactive Waste, JiJI
PRESS TICKER SERVICE, July 17, 1981; Pacific Is. Leaders Call for Japan's Cancella-
tion of Radioactive Waste Dumping, JIuI PRESS TICKER SERVICE, Sept. 3, 1981. See
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During the mid-1980's, shortly after the passage of the London
Dumping Convention's moratorium on nuclear dumping, the Japanese
government once again attempted to clear the way for dumping opera-
tions in the South Pacific. In 1984, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro
Nakasone held talks with the leaders of Australia, New Zealand, Fiji,
and Papua New Guinea and "shelved" dumping plans due to these
countries' opposition."2 In 1985, Nakasone told leaders of the same
nations that he would "freeze the plan until [he] obtain[ed] their un-
derstanding."12" ' The Japanese hoped that they would soon be able to
dump in the Pacific region"2 but pacified Pacific Island nations by
assuming that Japan would not "force the region to undertake the job
of nuclear waste disposal."'23 Nevertheless, Japan had again made
plans to dump in the region, and was stopped only after a group of
northern Mariana Islanders visited Japan with petitions supporting
their cause.'24
The persistent Japanese desire to resume dumping is clearly in
contradiction with their strong condemnation of Russian dumping over
the years. In July 1993, shortly before the Russian dumping in the Sea
of Japan, a Greenpeace representative noted that Japan was "'anxious'
to dump radioactive waste in the Pacific" and that "Japanese represen-
tatives at the London Convention actively were promoting the resump-
tion of dumping."' 2' This desire to dump was clearly in sharp con-
trast with contemporaneous Japanese condemnations of Russian
dumping as "immoral" and as "a crime against mankind."2 '
Although it abides by the terms of the London Convention, Japan
continues to dump significant amounts of low-level radioactive waste
at sea. Japan's forty-six nuclear power plants release 1,020 billion tons
of radioactive coolant into the sea each year. 2 Although the water is
sufficiently dilute to fall within acceptable international standards,"
also Cowen, supra note 4, noting that "Japan last year dropped plans to deposit 92
million liters (22 million gallons) of low-level waste in the Pacific Ocean, bowing to
opposition from inhabitants of the Mariana Islands."
120. Nakasone Prudent About Nuclear Waste Dumping in Pacific, JAPAN ECONOM-
IC NEWSWIRE, Dec. 28, 1984.
121. Nakasone to Stress Need for Pacific Cooperation During Oceanian Tour, JulI
PRESS TICKER SERVICE, Jan. 7, 1985.
122. Japan to Shelve Idea of Ocean Dumping of Nuclear Waste, JAPAN ECONOMIC
NEWSWIRE, Jan. 7, 1985.
123. Id.
124. Islanders Appeal Against Radioactive Waste.Dumping Plan, JAPAN ECONOMIC
NEWSWIRE, March 1, 1986.
125. International Panel Fails to Reach Agreement on Ocean Dumping, supra note
114.
126. Id. See also Greenpeace Charges G-7 With 'Hypocrisy" Over Stand on Nuclear
Waste Dumping at Sea, supra note 58.
127. Terazono, supra note 15:
128. Before being released into the sea, waste water from Japanese nuclear power
plants is diluted to bring its radiation level down to a level lower than 1140 of that
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and although Japan releases the coolant into its own internal waters
and not into the high seas, the sheer volume of fluid released results
in an estimated 100 curies of radioactive tritium entering the oceans
each year."9 With this record, it should come as no surprise that the
International Herald Tribune reported shortly after the Russian dump-
ing:
Japan is in no position to indulge in righteous indignation. The
chief of the Science and Technology Agency, Satsuki Eda, has admitted
that Tokyo Electric Power Co. dumps 10 times more radioactive waste
each year into the Sea of Japan than the amount that the Russians got
rid of after Mr. Yeltsin's visit."
V. OUTCOME AND INTERNATIONAL APPRAISAL
Non-nuclear countries have been fighting to extend the London
Convention's "temporary" dumping moratorium into a permanent ban
since long before the Russian dumping of October 1993. A Danish
proposal to make the ban permanent was defeated in 1992 by a group
of nuclear states including the United States, Britain, Japan, and
France, "' all of which have historically been opposed to a ban, 2
though it was understood at the time that the possibility of a ban
would be raised again after the completion of an environmental impact
report due in 1993.'
The Russian dumping of October 1993, just weeks before the six-
teenth meeting of the London Convention, brought out the long-sim-
mering controversy more quickly than anticipated. Public awareness of
the dumping caused both Japan and the United States to reverse their
long-held positions against a permanent ban in moves which each
country presented as a major shift in policy.3 "
Neither of these shifts in policy were as bold as they appeared,
however, as they required neither the United States nor Japan to
change its behavior in any way. Shortly after the Japanese announce-
ment, a Russian spokesman noted:
set by international standards. Nevertheless, critics have noted that Japanese waste
water contains tritium, a radioactive substance which can be particularly harmful to
humans if it enters the food chain. Suvendrini Kakuchi, Japan-Environment: Greens
Welcome Shift in Nuclear Policy, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 12, 1993.
129. Kazuki Yoshikawa, End to Sea-Dumping Seen as Hollow Victory: London
Pledge Leaves Russian Issue Still Unresolved, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Dec. 27, 1993, at 24.
130. Mark J. Valencia, Make the Sea of Japan a Model of Environmental Partner-
ship, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Dec. 31, 1993.
131. Brown, supra note 112.
132. See, Statement by White House Press Secretary on Radioactive Waste, supra
note 57.
133. Parties to LDC Treaty Draw Closer to Permanent Ban on Sea Disposals, BNA
INTERNATIONAL EVNiRONMENTAL DAILY, Nov. 20, 1992.
134. See supra notes 56 and 57.
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As to the statement made by Japan... [ilf it comprises refraining
from dumping radioactive waste from... Japanese power stations,
in that case it is naturally a new and major initiative. But if it is a
matter of just not dumping in the seas of those waste [sic] which
are formed as the result of the operation of nuclear reactors on
ships, well, Japan is actually observing this moratorium .... In
that case there is nothing new in it."'
As the Japanese initiative did not cover water used to cool nuclear
power plants, it did not require any change in Japanese behavior. As it
turns out, even the Japanese commitment not to dump was not as firm
as it first seemed. A December, 1993, article reveals that Japan's deci-
sion to cease dumping low-level radioactive waste at sea was made
only "on condition that the policy could be altered if the situation dras-
tically changes in the future.""' One high-ranking Japanese official
wondered whether "Japan, by yielding to pressure, gave the impression
it had changed its atomic energy policy."'37
Similarly, although a Clinton administration official argued that
the United States' decision to press for a permanent moratorium on
nuclear dumping was "a pretty significant departure from the
past,""' the move did not require America to alter its behavior in the
slightest. Granted, the United States Navy has long opposed the idea
of a comprehensive ban and the Defense Department pressed the
Clinton Administration hard for a flexible moratorium with provisions
allowing parties to withdraw at any time,'39 but both the Defense De-
partment and the Navy eventually gave in as the debate was largely
moot in practical terms. The United States has not disposed of low-lev-
el waste in the oceans since 1970, after publication of a report which
noted that dumping of radioactive waste at sea was not as economical
as other forms of radioactive waste disposal."0 By 1972, the Ocean
Dumping Act had been passed, prohibiting the dumping of radioactive
waste at sea without a joint resolution from Congress."" Since then,
Congress has never given permission for the dumping of radioactive
waste."" Therefore, as Representative Torkildsen argued on the floor
of the House in support of a permanent ban on the dumping of low-
135. Press Briefing by Russian Federation Foreign Ministry, OFFICIAL KREMLIN
INT'L NEWS BROADCAST, Nov. 2, 1993.
136. Yoshikawa, supra note 129.
137. Id.
138. Pitt, supra note 6.
139. Id.
140. Spak, supra note 2, at 819.
141. See Administration to Call for Global Ban on Dumping of Low-Level Waste
in Oceans, BNA NAT'L ENVT DAILY, Nov. 4, 1993.
142. 140 CONG. REC. H3807 (Daily ed. May 23, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Torkildsen).
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level radioactive waste: [a permanent ban] will not change the way
that the United States does business." 143
A. The Sixteenth Meeting of the London Convention
Although neither the United States nor the Japanese had to take
more than a purely symbolic step in promising not to dump, their shift
in position had a significant effect upon the London Convention. It
clearly signaled that the balance of power had shifted in favor of a
permanent ban, and isolated the United Kingdom and France as the
two major Western powers still in opposition.'"
When the convention met, the United Kingdom and France
pushed for the passage of an alternative amendment which would have
extended the ban on dumping by fifteen years instead of imposing a
permanent ban. "5 By such a compromise, the UK and France would
have given up nothing. As noted earlier, both had already committed
to a fifteen year moratorium at the regional Convention for the Protec-
tion of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic.'" The
proposed compromise would simply have brought their obligations
under the London Convention in line with already established commit-
ments. The passage of this alternative amendment was rejected by
Contracting Parties to the Convention.
The Russian Federation proposed an amendment which would
have made the permanent ban on dumping radioactive wastes at sea
applicable to Russia only after December 31, 1995. Russia argued that
due to a shortage of storage and disposal facilities for radioactive
waste, it would simply be unable to stop dumping before that date, and
could not abide by the terms of any ban which called for a cessation of
Russian dumping any sooner."7 Nevertheless, the Russian amend-
ment was also rejected."
143. Id.
144. See generally, Statement by White House Press Secretary on Radioactive
Waste, supra note 57.
145. Report of the Sixteenth Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties to the
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other
Matter, 4.36-37, Dec. 15, 1993 [hereinafter Convention Report]; World Wide Ban On
Waste Dumping At Sea 'Major Leap Forward' Says Greenpeace, Greenpeace Press
Release, Nov. 12, 1993 [hereinafter Greenpeace Press Release].
146. See note 113, supra, and accompanying text. See also Environment Minister
Announces Ban on Sea Disposal of Radioactive Waste, BNA INT'L ENVT DAILY, Jan.
5, 1994. (noting that "the (proposed] compromise was in line with a 15-year morato-
rium agreed to under the September 1992 Convention .... [which] allows countries
to continue dumping radioactive waste after the moratorium expires provided that no
safer disposal options can be found.")
147. Convention Report, supra note 145 at 4.47.
148. Convention Report, supra note 145 at 4.39; Greenpeace Press Release supra
note 145.
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Ultimately, the permanent ban won the necessary two-thirds vote
needed, and was passed by the Convention. Thirtyseven countries
voted in favor of the ban, none opposed it, and Belgium, China, France,
the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation abstained."9 It was
agreed that the ban would be reviewed by the Convention in 25 years
in light of new scientific evidence."
After passage of the ban, countries were given 100 days within
which they could submit a "declaration of non-acceptance" to the Con-
vention. "' Submission of such a declaration would exempt any ob-
jecting country from being legally bound by the ban, allowing them to
effectively "opt out" of the anti-dumping requirement.52
After the vote, several delegations urged the Russian Federation
to accept the ban and stop dumping radioactive waste at sea. A few
offered assistance to the Russian delegation in helping them to over-
come their financial difficulties.' The Japanese delegation, in partic-
ular, expressed interest in helping Russia to stop dumping, and after
stressing that the Russian Federation was primarily responsible for
the management and disposal of its own radioactive waste, expressed
its readiness to "explore the possibilities of extending support to the
efforts of the Russian Federation with a view to resolving remaining
difficulties that it may encounter with the issue of radioactive waste
disposal.""
The American delegation was less sensitive to Russian needs.
United States Representative David A. Colson rejected the Russian
position that Russia would have to resume dumping at sea without
immediate financial assistance from other nations, arguing:
Those that would use nuclear power - be it for civilian or military
purposes -. . . must understand that it is their responsibility to
deal adequately and safely with waste and other materials associat-
ed with this use. It is a cost of doing business, and if you cannot
bear the cost, you should not be in the business. We cannot accept
that it is for others to bear the cost, either in terms of risks and
costs of environmental degradation or in terms of the financial
costs associated with storage ... We recognize that Russia has
severe economic difficulties, but the Russian navy maintains and
operates its nuclear fleet at substantial cost - and there is money
to do this. The Russian Government chooses to spend enormous
sums of money on new nuclear vessels - and there is money to do
this. To then say there is no money for adequate storage and pro-
149. Convention Report, supra note 145 at 4.41; London Convention Votes Perma.
nent Ban on Ocean Dumping of Radioactive, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 12, 1993.
150. AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, supra note 149.
151. BNA NAT'L ENVT DAILY, supra note 141.
152. Id.
153. Convention Report, supra note 145 at 5.24.
154. Id. at 5.25.
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cessing facilities - this cannot be so .... You will not convince me
- and you will not convince the American people - that if the
Russian Government so chose, it could not reallocate its priorities
and immediately build and quickly have in place adequate storage
and processing facilities. It is a simple issue of... priorities.i"
B. General Acceptance of the Permanent Moratorium
It was generally expected that both Britain and France would file
declarations of non-acceptance within 100 days of the Convention in
order to exempt themselves from the ban against dumping." To the
surprise of most observers, both countries failed to file declarations,
choosing to accept the ban instead.
France was the first to announce a formal acceptance of the ban.
In what Greenpeace France called "a 180 degree turn in the
government's original position," French Environment Minister Michel
Barnier announced on December 20, 1993 the French decision to ac-
cept the total ban on dumping of radioactive waste required by the
London Convention. 5 On the same day officials from the Ministry of
the Environment released a statement saying that French willingness
to adhere to the ban "conforms with the will of Prime Minister
Balladur to conduct an energetic policy respectful of the environ-
ment."
I 5s
The French decision was surprising, in part, because it was made
much earlier than necessary - well before the end of the 100 day
waiting period. But in another respect it was less surprising. The
French had not dumped - or tried to - in years, and France had
sufficient land-disposal options available for waste disposal.' 9 At the
London Convention the French, while fighting the proposed ban, never-
theless, stated that their objection was "opposition in principle - and I
emphasize that this is in principle.. . " to the idea of ruling out a
potential waste disposal option without sound scientific evidence." °
The British, unlike the French, did wait until the very last mo-
ment to accept the ban; and British opposition was clearly more than
just "opposition in principle." The difference between the British and
French positions may have been due to the differing needs of the two
155. David A. Colson, Russia's Radioactive Waste Disposal: A Matter of Grave
Concern, Address to the Parties to the London Convention (Nov. 10, 1993), in DEP'T
ST. DISPATCH, Nov. 22, 1993, at 807. See also Convention Report, supra note 145 at
5.30-32; David E. Pitt, Nations Back Ban on Atomic Dumping, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
1993, Sec. 1, at 7.155.
156. Schoon, supra note 59.
157. Ban on Dumping of Radioactive Waste at Sea to be Instituted, France An-
nounces, BNA INTL ENv'T DAILY, Dec. 28, 1993.
158. Id.
159. id
160. Convention Report, supra note 145, at 4.46.
1996
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POLOY
countries in the coming years. In England, large steam generators
from the first-generation Magnox nuclear reactors are due to be taken
out of service over the course of the next fifteen years, and as most are
on coastal sites, it would be significantly less expensive to load them
on barges and tow them into the ocean for dumping than it would be
to cut them up for disposal on land."'1 Britain also wants to retain
the option of dumping 17 decommissioned nuclear submarines which
are all expected to be out of service by the end of the century.'
Whether for these or other reasons, the British have tried to make
a strong scientific case in favor of dumping low-level radioactive waste
at sea. British officials have argued that studies indicate that ocean
dumping may be the best practicable environmental option for some
categories of low and intermediate level radioactive wastes. Agriculture
Minister Gillian Shephard released a statement to Parliament in Feb-
ruary 1994 noting that "scientific evidence shows that dumping at sea,
carried out under controlled conditions, causes no harm to the marine
environment and poses no threat to human health, ""3 and British of-
ficials at the London Convention argued that "[i]t would be irresponsi-
ble to foreclose that option [of dumping] now when alternatives could
be more damaging.""'
At the Convention, the British argued that, compared to the nine
billion tons of uranium already present in the world's oceans, any
radioactive material that man might dump would be insignificant in
comparison. 6 ' In addition, they claimed that burying wastes at sea
would be safer than land-based disposal because it would remove the
wastes from people to a place where their radioactivity would seep out
slowly enough to cause no harm.'" Both of these arguments were re-
jected by the Convention.
The British formally accepted the ban just days before the amend-
ments were due to take effect on February 21, and made clear that
they were doing so for political, not scientific, reasons.'6 7 On Febru-
ary 17, Minister Shephard released a statement which said that al-
161. Tom Wilkie, Sea Dumping of Radioactive Waste Banned; Britain Abstains in
Vote by 42 Nations, THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 18, 1994, Home News Page, at 7.
162. Nicholas Schoon, UK Bows to Ban on Dumping N-Waste at Sea, THE INDE-
PENDENT, Feb. 18, 1994, Pol. Pol'y Page, at 6.
163. Britain Goes Along with Nuclear Ocean Waste Ban, REUTERS WORLD SER-
VICE, Feb. 18, 1994.
164. Wilkie, supra note 161.
165. Dumping Policy Is All At Sea, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 15, 1993 Comment
Page, at 15. Others argue against this view, noting that the British argument ig-
nores the central question of what effect additional man-made (as opposed to natu-
rally occurring) materials might have on the ocean environment. See Spak, supra
note 2, at 805.
166. THE INDEPENDENT, supra note 165.
167. Marshall, supra note 3.
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though controlled ocean dumping of radioactive wastes was both safe
and practical, "the U.K. recognizes that the weight of international
opinion on this matter means that such dumping is not, in any event,
a practical proposition. We have, therefore, decided to accept the
ban."' " This was a wise political move for Britain. One newspaper
noted that, since both England and France are bound not to dump for
fifteen years anyhow, and as the London Convention's "permanent"
ban will be reviewed and possibly reconsidered in 25 years, "withdraw-
ing from the London Dumping Convention's radioactive-waste agree-
ment would bring international unpopularity for no immediate
" 169gain.
Along with Britain and France, Belgium and China also agreed to
accept the ban. 70 Only Russia officially registered its declaration of
non-acceptance with the International Maritime Organization before
the end of the 100 day deadline,' arguing that it would need to con-
tinue dumping radioactive wastes at sea until at least 1996."7
C. Ongoing Russian Japanese Negotiations
Although the Russian Federation did not then, and has not yet,
accepted the London Convention's ban on dumping, neither has Russia
dumped nuclear waste at sea since the October 1993 incident in the
Sea of Japan. This can be attributed to financial negotiations between
Russia and Japan which have been ongoing since before the Russian
dumping.
As noted, infra, Russia has been trying to convince the Japanese
to create a fund for the processing and storage of radioactive wastes
since at least May 1993,' and did not carry out a planned second
dumping in the Sea of Japan due, at least in part, to Japanese prom-
ises of financial aid."' Russian press releases and conferences follow-
ing the dumping explicitly linked the cessation of future dumping to
foreign financial assistance, and threatened that without such assis-
tance Russia would resume dumping."' Russia continued to press for
foreign aid during the London Convention of 1993, indicating once
168. REUTERS WORLD SERvIcE, supra note 163.
169. Wilkie, supra note 161.
170. China, Britain, Belgium Accept Nuclear Waste Dumping Ban, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 1994, Foreign Desk, at 11; Marshall, supra note 3.
171. Russia Opts Out of Int7 Ban on Nuclear Waste Sea Dumping, JAPAN ECON.
NEwswtRE, Feb. 21, 1994.
172. Bronwen Maddox and Tony Walker, UK and China Join Ban on Dumping
Nuclear Waste at Sea, FINANCIAL TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1994, at 1.
173. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 43 and 44.
175. See supra notes 48-53.
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again that without immediate foreign assistance they might be forced
to dump again."'
Although the Japanese have continued to hold out the promise of
financial assistance to Russia since the Convention, negotiations be-
tween Japan and Russia have gone absolutely nowhere. A complicated
dance has been under way between the Federal Russian Government,
the local government of Primorsky Territory in the Russian Far East,
and Japan. The same steps have been taken time and again with su-
preme incompetence and minor variation: Russia threatens to dump
into the Sea of Japan, a financial arrangement is struck, Russia holds
off from dumping, and the deal falls through. The pattern continues to
this day.
During the Russo-Japanese talks of December 1993, just following
the Convention, the Chief Radiologist of the Russian Navy expressed
his belief that the Navy would request permission from the govern-
ment to dump radioactive waste into the Sea of Japan within a few
weeks."' Immediately thereafter Japan announced that it would
study the possibility of providing Russia with a used chemical tank-
er178 sufficient to hold enough radioactive waste to halt Russian
dumping for two years.'79 The study commenced, and Japan soon of-
fered Russia a 6,800 ton Panamanian-registered chemical tanker; but
in mid-January Russia rejected the offer,' 0 claiming that the tanker
would not be able to withstand the severe cold of the Russian Far
East, and that the deck was not thick enough to protect the crew from
radiation poisoning.'
Moscow instead suggested an alternative plan to build land-based
disposal facilities in Vladivostok, and asked Japan for financial assis-
tance.' 2 By early February the Japanese government announced that
it had "substantially decided" to give Russia millions of dollars to pay
for building the storage and disposal facilities,'" and TASS reported
that the Russian Finance Ministry would decide by mid-February
whether to allocate the funds needed to build the treatment plants.'8
176. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
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Russia decided to allocate the money, but it never became available
because Parliament did not approve the Federal budget."' 5
Unsurprisingly, by February's end Russian authorities were again
arguing that "if facilities for recycling liquid radioactive waste is [sic]
not built... within the next two months, Russia will possibly have to
dump this waste in the Sea of Japan again in order to avert an ecologi-
cal disaster." "' On March 14, Valery Damilyan, the chief of the
Pacific Fleet's chemical service, told TASS that Russia might dump in
the Sea of Japan in May "unless foreign countries, including Japan,
provide financial help with building facilities to use and store liquid
radioactive waste."'87
Just a few days later, on March 18, 1994, Russian Deputy Foreign
Minister Aleksandr Panov denied the statements offered by the Pacific
Fleet. Panov told the press that "Iblecause the construction of facilities
to store liquid nuclear waste will be completed by the end of April with
Japan's assistance, there will be no need for the moment to resume
dumping." 8
But Panov's claims were powerfully countered by a statement
issued on March 24 by the Administration of Primorsky Territory in
the Russian Far East. The Administration said that the Russian ban
on dumping nuclear waste into the Sea of Japan had aggravated the
ecological situation in the territory, and complained that the Federal
government had done nothing to speed the promised Japanese grant
despite repeated local pleas.'89 The local government threatened to
dump liquid radioactive waste into the Sea of Japan within one week
without an immediate infusion of cash from Moscow for waste storage
and utilization. "Moscow's continued inaction forces the local authori-
ties to act independently and allow a waste discharge from the TNT-5
tanker, which is overfilled with waste and needs emergency re-
pairs." 'g°
The urgent need to dump felt by residents of Primorsky Territory
was understandable: their economy would be strongly affected by an
inability to dispose of Russian waste. A local article from Krasnoye
Znamya, in Vladivostok, explains:
Plants, TASS, Feb. 3, 1994.
185. Veronika Romanenkova, Russia to Treat Radioactive Waste with Japan's
Help, TASS, June 20, 1994. See also Russian Pacific Fleet Wants Japanese Aid to
Deal with Nuclear Waste, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, March 17, 1994.
186. Veronika Romanenkova, Russian Government Faces Two Options on Waste
Disposal, TASS, Feb. 24, 1994.
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One would think that we still have... six months to... create[]
new capacities for utilization or storage of LRW'. . . . We do not
have this margin, because 170 tonnes of LRW is clearly not enough
to fulfil the current year's state programme for ship repair and
utilization. Not only will an important state defence order not be
fulfilled, but also a great number of Bolshoy Kamen residents will
be left without work .... [W]e have a dilemma: either bring the
plants to a standstill and limit the activities of the Russian navy, or
violate the Government ban and carry out unauthorized dumping of
LRW in the Sea of Japan .... The former option is simply impos-
sible. This leaves the latter - dumping into the sea.'
Japanese papers blamed the Russian Federal Government for the
confusion, noting that "Russia has failed to respond to Japan's pro-
posal to help it build the storage facility.""" But before long, after
still more meetings between Russian and Japanese officials, a new
Russo-Japanese agreement was announced. In early June, Japan and
Russia announced plans to build a disposal plant for liquid nuclear
waste near Vladivostok, to be funded by a 70 million dollar Japanese
grant."3 The plant was to be completed by the end of 1994, although
sources warned that the project might be held up by "apparent differ-
ences between Moscow and Vladivostok authorities about the nature of
the plant."'" Local authorities in Vladivostok agreed not to pour any
liquid radioactive waste into the Sea of Japan before the end of the
year.
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By late June the details had been hammered out, and Japan had
signed an agreement committing itself to provide funds for a floating
treatment installation for low and intermediate level radioactive waste
in the Russian Far East.' It was agreed that the contractors would
be decided upon through an international tender.'97 The only poten-
tial trouble spot related to the "apparent differences between Moscow
and Vladivostok" mentioned earlier. One newspaper noted that "the
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195. Russian-Japanese Commission Considers options for Recycling Nuclear Waste,
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signing of an agreement on the construction has been delayed because
of Russian domestic reasons. ... 19
In October bids were solicited to build the project by a Japanese-
Russian joint committee. 99 The committee called for the picking of a
successful bidder towards the end of the year,' and met again in To-
kyo in January 1995 to "button down" the deal.2°' At that meeting,
an unidentified British consulting firm presented an evaluation of the
different tender offers. But before a bidder could be chosen, "sudden
and additional demands" from Russia brought the meeting to an
abrupt close. A senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official said: "they
suddenly added fresh demands, and the meeting had to be broken off.
We seem to have to start from scratch again. They are simply inconsis-
tent."
20 2
A better explanation may be that of another unidentified British
consulting firm: "The Russians may have found a contender not of
their liking in a better position."' The government refused to identi-
fy the bidders"'
By February 1995, virtually nothing constructive had been done to
improve the situation in Vladivostok since the Russian dumping inci-
dent. As TASS reported:
[The 1993 dumping] was prompted by an emergency: the tankers
used for storage of liquid waste were full and threatened with a
disaster. As of today, the situation has not changed radically, ex-
cept that a Russian-made pilot plant has been put into operation,
which is currently processes [sic] 0.5 liters of liquid radioactive




Purification of 0.5 liters of radioactive waste per hour was not
sufficient to meet Russian needs, and talks between Russia and
Japan began again in March 1995.' The talks, held in Moscow,
began with an examination of applications from seven international
consortiums offering to build processing installations in the Russian
Far East. Great care was taken to preserve the anonymity of the
198. JLn PRESS TICKER SERVICE, supra note 196.
199. Japan, Russia Solicit Bids for Nuclear Disposal Barge, JAPAN ECONOMIC
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 14, 1994.
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bidders; all companies submitting applications were code-named so
that they might be considered anonymously.2 '
As of this writing, no bidder has yet been chosen. Russian sources
indicated in July 1995 that "delays in executing the tender are con-
nected with the different approaches to this problem on the part of the
local authorities and the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry. So it looks
as if the utilization facility will not be built so soon."" 8 In particular,
Russian nuclear specialists local to the Russian Far East have com-
mented that "Russian factories and plants must participate in the con-
struction work of the radioactive waste utilization unit... [and] Rus-
sian research institutes could contribute greatly to the design... "209
Because nothing has been done to solve the problem, Russian
authorities have stated as recently as July 1995 that authorities in the
Russian Far East may soon decide to once again dump liquid radioac-
tive waste into the Sea of Japan. As was the case in October 1993, the
tankers in the harbor are "filled to the brim" and remain unable to
adequately and safely store the waste they are holding.210
VI. AUTHOR'S APPRAISAL AND ANALYSIS
From a distance, the Russian Federation's dumping of low-level
nuclear waste into the Sea of Japan in October 1993 appears to have
changed international law by leading to significant changes in the
London Convention and a "permanent ban" on the dumping of low-
level waste at sea. In reality, little has changed. It was easy for the
United States and Japan to take a stand against dumping, since nei-
ther country was forced to change their behavior in any way. But nei-
ther country has shown a willingness to take any steps which are more
than purely symbolic: Japan continues to pour ten times more radio-
activity than the Russians dumped into its own internal waters each
year, and anti-dumping legislation introduced into the United States
Congress in November 1993 has yet to be passed. "
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Other nuclear nations, such as the UK, France, and Belgium,
have accepted the ban with extreme reluctance. Britain made it abso-
lutely clear that it stopped dumping only because international opinion
has made dumping impractical for the moment. Britain has disregard-
ed the London Convention's anti-dumping law in the past, and with a
pressing need to dump reactors and submarines becoming more urgent
every day, may choose to disregard it again in the future when obliga-
tions under other treaties have ended. As for Russia, the true "target"
of the ban, it has refused to sign and has been prevented from dump-
ing only by the promise of Japanese funds. At this date, those funds
have not been used to build storage or processing facilities, and the
Russian situation remains as urgent as it was in 1993, with Russia
threatening to dump nuclear wastes into the Sea of Japan again at
any moment.
The fact that the Convention carries no threat of sanctions, and
that dumping has occurred in the past with blatant disregard for the
Convention's dictates, indicates that there is not sufficient control
intention behind the ban to maintain it in the face of significant oppo-
sition. Countries have paid lip-service to the problem of nuclear dump-
ing since the Russian incident, expecting the Japanese - who would
be most effected by another Russian dumping operation - to shoulder
the costs of preventing the Russians from dumping. Should Japanese
money fail to prevent additional dumping in the future, however, it
seems unlikely that other countries will feel strongly enough about
this issue to bring anything stronger than rhetoric into play - espe-
cially if stronger measures would come at any cost to themselves.
It may be worthwhile to consider the questions which this analy-
sis raises. When some poor nation chooses, at some point in the future,
to dump its low-level radioactive waste into the oceans, how will inter-
national elites respond? Not all neighboring countries will be as
wealthy, or as subject to manipulation, as the Japanese, and it seems
likely that mere invocation of the London Convention will prove insuf-
ficient to prevent future dumping. It also seems unlikely that wealthy
elites will wish to subsidize poorer countries in order to keep them
from dumping in some remote corner of the world.
This analysis seems particularly resonant given that studies con-
ducted immediately after the dumping," six-months afterwards,21"
and over a year and a half afterwards,"' all concluded that the Rus-
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sian dumping had not measurably raised radiation levels in the Sea of
Japan. If small amounts of dumping have such minimal effects, how
likely is it that wealthy elites who privately wish to reopen the possi-
bility of ocean dumping will act forcefully to prevent such dumping in
the future?
If, as this author does, we conclude that the current state of af-
fairs is insufficient to prevent future dumping from occurring, we must
then begin to think seriously about how and whether to prevent such
dumping from taking place. If poor countries find that dumping low-
level nuclear waste into the oceans is the only disposal option they can
afford and begin dumping, how will wealthier nations respond? This is
the question we must consider.
There are many ways in which nations may choose to reasonably
allocate access to the oceans. Wealthier countries may decide to sub-
sidize poorer ones to a certain extent in order to prevent some dump-
ing, or nations may come up with some other system to ensure that
only limited dumping takes place. But until such a system has been
arrived at and agreed to, the question of how to dispose of low-level
nuclear waste remains to be decided. Declaring the problem solved by
invoking the words of the London Convention simply will not suffice.
DAILY NEWS, July 27, 1995.
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Leonard v.B. Sutton Colloquium
Keynote Address
United Nations Peacekeeping: The Years
Past, The Years Ahead*
JOE BYRNES SILLS**
As we enter the United Nations' (U.N.) fiftieth year, it is appropri-
ate to begin by looking back to San Francisco in 1945. The organiza-
tion created there, the United Nations, adopted and continued Frank-
lin Roosevelt's name for the alliance against fascism. It was estab-
lished to ensure that the horrors of the war just past would not be in-
flicted on future generations. The basic assumption on which the U.N.
was created was that the alliance which won the war would remain
together to preserve the peace. But reality quickly set in. The Cold
War began and, as Winston Churchill so eloquently stated, an Iron
Curtain fell across Europe.
As a result, in the political sphere, the U.N. was largely
marginalized. The veto, and the threat of the veto, immobilized the
Security Council. The military staff committee, the Charter mechanism
for continuing collective security, was dormant.
The focus shifted to the General Assembly. The temporary ab-
sence of the Soviet Union, in protest, from the Security Council had
allowed the U.N. to act in Korea. But it was obvious that this curious
* This keynote address was presented at the Sutton International Law Collo-
quium at the University of Denver College of Law in March, 1995.
** Mr. Sills is Director of the United Nations Information Centre in
Washington, D.C., a post he assumed on January 1, 1996. Prior to that, he was the
Spokesman for United Nations Secretary-General Boutrous Boutros-Ghali for over
three years. He had earlier served for six years as Associate Spokesman for Secre-
tary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. Mr. Sills joined the United Nations in July of
1981 following eight years as Vice President of the United Nations Association of
the USA. Mr. Sills is a graduate of Vanderbilt University where he received a B.A.
degree, magna cum laude, in English literature, and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa.
He received his M.A. degree in Arab Area Studies from the American University of
Beirut, in Lebanon, where he was a Rotary Foundation fellow.
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error in judgment was unlikely to be repeated. In 1950, therefore, the
General Assembly, under United States leadership, adopted the "Unit-
ing for Peace" resolution. Under the Charter, the Assembly is prohibit-
ed from dealing with an item if the Security Council is considering it.
However, since the Charter assigns primary responsibility for the
maintenance of peace and security to the Council, it was reasoned that
secondary responsibility had to reside somewhere. Where else but in
the Assembly? The resolution, therefore, empowered the Assembly to
deal with threats to the peace if the Council was unable to do so. Thus,
in 1956, following the Suez Crisis, the Uniting for Peace resolution was
utilized to create the first UN peacekeeping force.
The concept of peacekeeping does not exist in the U.N. Charter. It
was born of necessity as a holding action until peaceful settlement of
armed conflict could be reached through negotiations. Falling between
Chapter 6, which contains provisions for peaceful settlement of dis-
putes, and Chapter 7, which sets out procedures for enforcement action
to deal with "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression,"' peacekeeping is often referred to as "Chapter 6 112" of
the U.N. Charter.
For over forty of peacekeeping's forty-seven years, the ground
rules have been defined very clearly. Peacekeeping meant the use of
multilateral military personnel, provided voluntarily by member
states, under international command, functioning with the consent of
the host government and other parties involved, and whose goal is to
help control and resolve conflicts between hostile states. Peacekeepers
traditionally are either unarmed or lightly armed. They are authorized
to use weapons only in self-defense, must remain impartial among the
parties, and must not interfere in the internal affairs of the host coun-
try.
Over the last five years, however, none of these guidelines has
been left untouched. The need for consent of the parties has sometimes
been overridden by humanitarian imperatives. Volatile situations in
the field have made it necessary to expand the definitions of both self-
defense and the justified use of force. Even the range and nature of
international command is now being hotly debated - at least in Wash-
ington. Mandates have far exceeded the traditional supervision of
truces and separation of antagonists. They now comprise duties as
diverse as monitoring free and fair elections, guaranteeing the delivery
of humanitarian aid in war zones, overseeing land reforms and human
rights, reintegrating armed combatants into productive civilian roles,
intervening in situations of civil war, establishing safe and secure
environments, and remaining in towns and villages under attack to
prevent loss of life.
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
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With this expansion of duties, demand has grown. In 1988, there
were five U.N. peacekeeping operations. In 1992, there were eleven. At
present, there are sixteen. Over the same period, the number of mili-
tary personnel involved in peacekeeping has gone from 9,600 to close
to 70,000. The largest operation is the U.N. protection force in the
former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), with a size of about 40,000 and an
annual budget of $1.6 billion. The smallest is the U.N. observer mis-
sion in Tajikistan (UNMOT). It is made up of 17 military observers
and costs $1 million annually. Overall, peacekeeping operations cost
$3.5 billion in 1994. In 1995, the figure will be lower, about $3.1 bil-
lion, largely due to the closing down of UNOSOM in Somalia. Over
half a million people have served in these operations since 1948. Some
1,300 of these individuals have given their lives in the cause of peace.
The first two peacekeeping operations - the U.N. Truce Supervi-
sion Organization (UNTSO), based in Jerusalem, established in 1948,
and the U.N. Military Observer Group In India and Pakistan
(UNMOGIP), established in 1945 - were observer missions with only
military officers participating. As I mentioned earlier, it was the third
operation, the UN emergency force established in the Sinai in the
wake of the Suez Crisis, which involved troops for the first time. Since
then, peacekeeping operations have utilized either peacekeeping forces
or observer missions.
In 1989, the U.N. Transition Assistance Group in Namibia
(UNTAG) was the first peacekeeping operation which was given multi-
ple assignments beyond the "traditional" duties. Its main task was to
create the conditions for free and fair elections. For this purpose,
UNTAG monitored the electoral process, which was carried out by
South Africa. It also monitored the rapid reduction, cantonment, and
eventual withdrawal of the South African military presence from
Namibia. Refugees were returned and resettled. An independent jurist
was appointed to advise on disputes that might arise in connection
with the release of political prisoners and detainees. Following the
constituent assembly elections, UNTAG also assisted in the drafting of
the new constitution.
Since Namibia, several large-scale and complex operations have
been undertaken, including the U.N. Transition Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC), the U.N. Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia
(UNPROFOR), and the U.N. operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).
UNTAC was given the ambitious task of supervising a number of
state functions, such as defense, police, foreign affairs and information,
in addition to all other military and civilian tasks. The disarmament of
the parties to the conflict up to an agreed level was not fully attained
due to the resistance of the Khmer Rouge, even though it had agreed
to it in the Paris Accords. Nevertheless, the UNTAC-supervised elec-
tions were successfully carried out and an internationally recognized
1996
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
government was formed. Cambodia, therefore, can be characterized
fairly as a qualified success.
UNPROFOR was established in the process of the break-up of
Yugoslavia. Its initial mandate in Croatia was fairly straightforward:
to maintain a cease-fire, facilitate the withdrawal of the Yugoslav
army, demilitarize the U.N. protected areas, and create conditions for
an overall political settlement. Subsequently, however, not only was its
mandate in Croatia expanded, but it was also extended to Bosnia and
Herzegovina when fighting broke out there. UNPROFOR's initial func-
tion in Bosnia was to supervise the re-opening of the Sarajevo airport
and withdrawal of heavy weapons as well as to provide the necessary
protection for humanitarian assistance activities. But its mandate was
also expanded later to include border control, protecting the "safe ar-
eas," supervising the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the exclusion
zones, and assisting in the implementation of the cease-fire and cessa-
tion of hostilities agreements.
The preventive deployment of U.N. peacekeepers was also under-
taken in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This was the first
such deployment in the history of the U.N. This operation was placed
under UNPROFOR as well.
The mixture of U.N. peacekeeping and such elements of enforce-
ment as the "No-Fly" zone, air strikes, economic sanctions, and the
arms embargo undertaken by NATO, by the western European Union,
and through national means in the same theater of operations, has
made UNPROFOR a very complex and difficult operation. Now,
UNPROFOR faces the challenge of being split into three separate but
still inter-linked operations.
Even though the difficult and not so successful aspects of
UNPROFOR tend to be the focus of media attention, UNPROFOR has
a number of solid accomplishments. It has succeeded in containing the
conflict within the borders of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina,
thus preventing its spread into the wider Balkan area and beyond.
(You may recall that World War I began in Sarajevo.) The U.N. opera-
tion has also provided millions of people with humanitarian assistance
and protection wherever possible.
Peacekeeping missions in general, and UNPROFOR in particular,
are often judged against an idealized solution of the problem. Failure
against this standard is inevitable. It is also artificial. The success of a
peacekeeping mission might better be gauged not by how it would have
played out ideally, but rather by the mandates it has been given and
the way that the situation on the ground would most probably have
developed without it. In an ideal world, the troubled peace of the last
few months in and around Sarajevo would not be interrupted. Realisti-
cally, without the U.N., it would not have occurred at all. In an ideal
world, Srebenica would never have been attacked. Realistically, with-
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out the courage of General Morillon, and those with him, it would have
faced utter devastation. Ideally, the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims would
all have resolved their differences by now. Realistically, the small
areas of peace which have taken form would never have done so with-
out the aid and support which the international community brought to
bear.
The U.N. operation in Somalia became a qualitatively different
operation: the first case of peace enforcement by the U.N. itself. Initial-
ly, the task of the U.N. was to monitor the cease-fire agreement among
the warring factions and to facilitate humanitarian activities. Howev-
er, the U.N. efforts were obstructed and U.N. peacekeepers were un-
able even to establish an effective base of operations. A serious famine
developed. The multinational force (UNITAF), led by the United States
and endorsed by the Security Council, intervened in Somalia on hu-
manitarian grounds. The cooperation of the warring factions was ob-
tained for this operation. The problem arose when the multinational
force was taken over by the second U.N. operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM II). UNOSOM II was given the task of disarming the fac-
tions even, if necessary, by the use of force. No central government
existed, and the security situation was tenuous at best. There was
certainly sufficient ground for giving the U.N. enforcement power.
However, one of the main factions, led by General Aideed, resisted
being disarmed. This resistance eventually led to armed clashes be-
tween the U.N. and the Aideed faction. A serious complicating factor
was the dual operational structure. The United States maintained the
Rapid Reaction Force under its own command. It was this American
force that went into the Aideed-controlled part of Mogadishu and was
ambushed. The American casualties and the television images of the
body of an American soldier being dragged through the streets changed
the picture in Somalia. Once strong American support was lost,
UNOSOM had to be scaled back. The Security Council effectively re-
moved its enforcement function and UNOSOM became a regular
peacekeeping operation. But there was no peace to keep.
In Somalia, the failure of the factions to achieve national reconcil-
iation - a failure widely blamed on the United Nations - led, earlier
this month, to the closing down of the operation in Somalia. UNOSOM
is commonly portrayed as a failure. This is not totally fair. One of the
initial and main motives of the operation in Somalia was to facilitate
humanitarian assistance to those Somalis who had been severely suf-
fering from the effects of long drought, the collapse of the State and
the resultant Civil War. Today, no Somalis are dying from famine.
Schools have reopened in most of the country. In many parts of Soma-
lia outside of Mogadishu, the local government structure and the judi-
cial system the U.N. helped to establish are functioning.
Several major lessons can be learned from Somalia.First, the U.N.
can only support, encourage, and facilitate political reconciliation. It
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cannot force such reconciliation if the parties to the conflict are unwill-
ing to reach an agreement. Second, abandoning the U.N.'s traditional
neutrality and even attacking militarily one of the parties destroys the
U.N.'s credibility and value as a peacekeeping force. Third, a failure to
have unity of command is a recipe for disaster.
Even though the shadows of Somalia and former Yugoslavia tend
to obscure the achievements of the U.N., it must be noted that the
number of successful peacekeeping operations is significant.
I have already mentioned Namibia and Cambodia. The operation
in Mozambique has just concluded. Small, flexible, and excellently led,
it guided Mozambique from civil war to cessation of hostilities to free
and fair elections. The operation has given that country a real opportu-
nity for peace and development. The mission in El Salvador ends a
month from now. The civil war of many years is over. Elections have
been held. Even though some difficult problems, such as land reform,
remain to be fully resolved, that country is well on the way to peace.
Our new operation in Guatemala is underway. Today, in Mexico
City, with strong assistance and guidance from U.N. mediators, the
government and the Revolutionary Unity of Guatemala (URNG) are
scheduled to initial an accord on the rights of indigenous people in
Guatemala.
Before I attempt to bring these points together and look at
peacekeeping's future - at the response to the challenge of the 21st
century - I need to talk a bit about the financing of peacekeeping.
Most operations are financed from a peacekeeping budget, with
member States assessed a set percentage. Under the U.N. Charter,
this is a mandatory, not voluntary, payment. The current formula,
devised in 1973, varies slightly from the regular U.N. formula in that
it requires the five permanent members of the Security Council to pay
a larger percentage than their regular budget share: together, 54%, of
which the U.S. share is just over 30%, compared to the U.S. share of
the regular budget of 25%. The assessment percentages are primarily
based on ability to pay.
As I stated earlier, total peacekeeping costs for 1995 are expected
to be around $3.1 billion, making the U.S. share about $1 billion. How-
ever, Congress has passed a law stating that, beginning in October of
this year - the first month of the new U.S. fiscal year - the U.S. will
pay only 25% of U.N. peacekeeping. This is the same percentage as it
pays of the regular budget.
Intense negotiations are underway among member States to agree
on a new formula which would, among other changes, reduce the U.S.
assessment, but probably not to 25%. To be sure, the U.N. cannot force
any member State to write a check. But our position is, and must be,
that a decision by any member State to change its rate of assessment
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unilaterally is inconsistent with its obligation under the Charter. Ab-
sent any agreed-upon revision of the scale of assessments, we would
treat any shortfall as an arrearage in payments.
Given the present mood in Congress, I'm not sure it makes any
difference to note that all spending of the U.N. system for a year,
$10.5 billion, is $1.90 per human being, and per capita expenditures on
the military and weapons are $150 per person per year. The annual
U.S. bill for U.N. peacekeeping - $1 billion - is almost exactly what
one week of the Vietnam war cost (in 1968 U.S. dollars). And so on.
It is also relevant to note, as the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.,
Madeleine Albright has on numerous occasions, that multilateral oper-
ations allow sharing of personnel, costs, and other burdens rather than
requiring a single State, or group of States, to bear them without as-
sistance.
In sum, what have we learned from 47 years of peacekeeping?
And what does the future hold? First, we can clearly and without res-
ervation affirm the value of U.N. peacekeeping in maintaining the
peace and facilitating negotiations in appropriate situations. To reduce
or even destroy this capability of the international community would
not only be a blow to multilateralism but an affront to common sense.
Second, in several cases we have seen, graphically and tragically,
how dangerous it is to depart from the basic ground rules of peace-
keeping discussed earlier. Perhaps our biggest challenge is to figure
out how we can substantially reinstate those ground rules while still
maintaining the flexibility to meet the new demands, also mentioned
earlier, being placed on peacekeeping. Let us have no illusion that if
we fail to respond multilaterally to these challenges, they can either be
solved by bilateral action, or somehow go away.
Third, we are seeing the increasing and inevitable cohabitation of
peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief. These activities are
conducted both by U.N. and governmental bodies but, increasingly,
also by private, voluntary organizations. This working relationship
must be examined further and improved significantly. It is increasing-
ly clear that it cannot function well if the peacekeepers take sides in
the conflict.
Fourth, we have learned - and the Security Council, led by the
United States, has become demanding in this regard - that proposed
peacekeeping operations must be more carefully evaluated. They must
also have their goals better defined, costs taken more into account, and
termination dates be set. The current consideration by-the Council of
the deployment of the U.N. Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) III
demonstrates this well. Until a set of conditions is met, the deploy-
ment of military contingents will not take place. These conditions in-
clude a cease-fire, disengagement of forces, and freedom of movement
and operations of the initial stages of UNAVEM.
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Such caution is to be applauded. Tragically, it comes in Angola
only after another lesson: peacekeeping "on the cheap," with inade-
quate resources and personnel, simply will not do the job. Several
years ago, an agreement was reached in Angola, and elections were
held. But the two sides were not disarmed. The U.N. presence was
woefully inadequate to deal with the situation. When the two sides
refused to accept the results of the election, war began again. More
people have been killed in Angola in the last two years than in all the
regions combined where the United Nations maintains peacekeeping
operations.
Fifth, we have repeatedly seen the need to speed up the creation
of peacekeeping missions and their deployment. A small, standing U.N.
force, quickly available to the Secretary-General following Security
Council authorization, is, I think, desirable. But it is simply not in the
cards. Major member States have made it clear they will not support
it. What we can do today is to continue our efforts to create trained
units in member States which would be ready for quick assignment
and to strengthen our support and delivery capabilities.
Finally, and most importantly, we have learned that there are
certain things the U.N. realistically cannot, and perhaps should not, be
doing. Here I am speaking of peace enforcement.
It is inevitable that the Security Council will increasingly man-
date regional arrangements and multinational forces to carry out such
operations. This formula, first used in Korea in 1950, was the basis of
Desert Storm. In Desert Storm, the Council authorized member States
to use all necessary means to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The
operation was conducted not in the name of the U.N. but with a man-
date from the U.N. Security Council. This certainly represents a dan-
ger for the U.N.'s credibility and image. The Secretary-General has
called it a "fall back" position and has stated: "We can do nothing
else."
A variation of this is playing out today in Haiti where a multina-
tional force, again led by the U.S. and endorsed by the Council under
the "all necessary means" formula, and, significantly, operating under
Chapter VII of the Charter, is turning over command to a U.N. force
which will operate under Chapter VI. I think we will see more such
two-phase operations in the future.
Before I close, I want to make some comments on U.S.-U.N. rela-
tions. As an international civil servant, I do so cautiously. But I feel
there are some things that need to be said.
The U.N. has certainly had its ups and downs regarding public
support in the U.S., and also regarding the attitude at both ends of
Pennsylvania Avenue. I remember thinking, during the early years of
President Reagan's first term, when the Heritage Foundation burst
onto the scene with the U.N. as one of its main targets, that if we can
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survive this, we can survive anything. (I had not been around some 30
years earlier when McCarren and McCarthy savaged many Americans
in the Secretariat with unproven and unprovable charges that they
were Communists or Communist sympathizers.) But rarely has the
U.N. met with the degree of hostility, even contempt, it now evokes
from some in Washington and from the American right.
I have thought much about why this is the case. It certainly isn't
good politics. Opinion polls consistently show a high and relatively
steady level of popular support for the U.N. Of all the items in the
Contract with America, polls showed the U.N.-related pledge to have
the least support. In part, I think it is based on an image of the U.N.
that is 20 years out of date, a caricature of Communists and third-
world deadbeats using the U.N. forum to criticize the U.S. for imperial-
ism and neo-colonialism simultaneously with outstretched hands and
pleas that the U.S. come to their rescue. There seems to be an un-
awareness, perhaps intentional, that most General Assembly resolu-
tions are now passed by consensus or without a vote; that the budget
is now approved by consensus, and has been at zero-growth in real
terms for several years; and that the use of the veto has virtually dis-
appeared from the Security Council and been replaced by agreement
among the five permanent members. Indeed, the most common com-
plaint I hear in U.N. corridors today is that the organization is totally
dominated by the U.S.
I think Max Frankel came pretty close to an answer to this hostil-
ity in a recent article in The New York Times. He observes that the
right-wing is not isolationist at all. Instead, "they perceive profit not in
ignoring the world but in trashing it .... With Communism in ruins,
they are desperate to find a new foreign enemy that might justify their
nativism. And so to replace the Kremlin they have chosen the United
Nations."2 The Blue Peril has replaced the Red Peril. Richard Dowden,
Diplomatic Editor of The Independent, observed perceptively that "the
important debate is not between isolationists and globalists but be-
tween multilateralists who see the U.S. as a global leader, moving and
working with Allies, and the unilateralists urging it to do whatever it
wants, when it wants, how it wants, with no justification other than
American self-interest. The U.N. appears a large obstacle to the
unilateralist vision. 3
At best, this is unfortunate. At worst, tragic. I hope all of you will
not only reject these allegations of incompatibility of national goals
with United Nations ideals and activities, but will work actively to
2. Max Frankel, Word & Image; Beyond the Shroud, N.Y. TIMES, March 19,
1995, sec. 6, at 30.
3. Richard Dowden, UN Dances to Washington's Tune, THE INDEPENDENT,
March 9, 1995, at 14.
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reinforce the fact that true multilateral cooperation is in everybody's
best interest.
Leonard v.B. Sutton Award Paper
Military Intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina:
Will World Politics Prevail Over the Rule of
International Law?*
MICHAEL P. RoCH**
"International law is that thing which the evil ignore and the righ-
teous refuse to enforce." - Leon Uris
I. INTRODUCTION
Sarajevo, only three years ago a bustling Central European city, is
today a mixture of rubble, bodies, and bullets. The Serbs have mur-
dered more than several hundred thousand Bosnian Muslims' and
have systematically raped countless Muslim women' in their effort to
maintain the utopia of a "Greater Serbia" to encompass much of
Yugoslavia's territory.3 Nearly one half of Bosnia-Hercegovina's pre-
war population of 4.4 million has become refugees4 to avoid the count-
This article received the United of Denver College of Law's Leonard v.B.
Sutton Award for the best paper in international law in 1995. The award includes a
scholarship to attend one summer at The Hague Academy of International Law. The
author would like to thank Chief Justice Sutton for his generous support.
Events prior to January 15, 1995 form the historical basis of this article.
* J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 1996; Master of Accountancy,
University of Denver School of Accountancy, 1991. Prior to attending law school, the
author was a management consultant in the former Yugoslavia.
1. Fred McCloskey, The U.S. is Appeasing Fascism and Genocide, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, December 31, 1992, at 19.
2. See Laurel Fletcher et al., Human Rights Violations Against Women, 15
WHrITIER L. REv. 319, 352-355 (1994); see also John Webb, Genocide Treaty - Eth-
nic Cleansing - Substantive and Procedural Hurdles in the Application of the Geno-
cide Convention to Alleged Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, 23 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 377, 380 (1993); Chuck Sudetic, Jet Attacks Bosnian Town; 10 Deaths Re-
ported, N. Y. TIMES, November 10, 1994, at A8.
3. See infra notes 51 and 64 and accompanying text.
4. Roger Cohen, Balkan Moral Order Upset As Victim Becomes Victor, N. Y.
TIMES, November 6, 1994, sec. 4, at 1 [hereinafter Balkan Moral Order]; David Bind-
er, Pariah as Patriot; Ratko Mladic, N. Y. TIMES, September 4, 1994, sec. 6, at 26;
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less violations against human rights.5 Thousands are still to die in the
most inhumane of ways. All this under the watchful eyes of United
Nations (U.N.) observatory troops who are powerless to intervene.
Although the international community promised during the
conflict's early stages to quickly end this war, little has been accom-
plished to make good on that promise. This crisis stretches the limits
of the United Nations and of peace negotiations on a daily basis. Yet
the political will of key nations to put a quick end to the war using the
only medium that will accomplish peace, United Nations military in-
tervention, is missing.
This article analyzes the possibilities of and strongly advocates
military intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina under the United Nations
charter. It provides first a historical introduction to the ex-Yugoslav
region, focusing on Bosnia-Hercegovina and on Serbia, and to the
events of the conflict through the end of 1994.6 Second, it provides a
brief introduction to the intervention concept.7 Third, it applies the
possibilities of legal military intervention under the United Nations
Charter to the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. s The last section evaluates
the peace making efforts to date and makes final observations.9
Larry Pressler, Justice Must Be Demanded for 'Ethnic Cleansing' Crimes, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 29, 1992, at 19; Anna-Patricia Kahn, Wo sind die bosnischen
Kinder? (Where are the Bosnian children?), Focus, May 16, 1994, at 108.
5. See generally Human Rights Watch, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA: A HELSINKI
WATCH REPORT, (1993). In two volumes, this work represents a compilation of such
violations across all areas and enclaves in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Alleged offenses in-
clude rape, mutilation, summary executions, and castration. The atrocities are de-
scribed in varying levels of detail.
For example, in one, now well-publicized 1992 account, an officer in charge of
the Omarksa facility named Dusko Tadic ordered one young boy held prisoner to
bite off the penis of another inmate. Id. at 187. After Tadic's capture in Germany
early 1994, a former inmate at the same camp reported that "[e]very day, after
Dusko Tadic was finished in the interrogation room, we had to wash blood from the
floor . . . In a garage he himself cut off men's genitals. He was a butcher." Stephen
Kinzer, Germans Arrest Serb as Balkan War Criminal, N. Y. TIMES, February 14,
1994, at A6. The same inmate reported that Tadic laughed as he watched his vic-
tims bleed. Id.
Another, undocumented report includes the case of a refugee who reported to
her treating doctor in Germany that Serbs raped her nine-year-old niece in the
woman's house in Bosnia; after they had satisfied themselves, the same perpetrators
allegedly gouged out her husband's eyes before quartering him and burning him in
the fireplace. Interview with Dr. med. Peter Blosch, Ottobeuren, Germany (April
1993).
6. See infra part II.
7. See infra part III.
8. See infra part IV.
9. See infra part V.
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II. YUGOSLAV HISTORY: WAR AND OPPRESSION FOLLOWED BY LIBERAL
SOCIALIST RULE
Many of the factors which caused this war are imbedded in the
Yugoslavs' complex history. Since a thorough discussion of that history
is not possible here, the following pages are limited to the relevant
historical events which led up to the situation as it existed at the be-
ginning of 1994 and are confined to the Bosnia-Hercegovinan and Serb
regions.
Before the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia"0 (Yugoslavia), which immediately preceded and partially
caused the Bosnian war, Slovenians, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins,
Bosnians, Macedonians, and Albanians lived peacefully in Yugoslavia;
each enjoyed its own culture and history until the signing of the Decla-
ration of Corfu in 1917 which formed the foundation for the Yugoslav
state. As a whole, all Yugoslav nations combined to approximately 24
million people in an area of 256,000 km2."
A. Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia: From the beginnings to World
War II
From its beginnings, all of Yugoslavia suffered from constant
foreign rule, most commonly exercised by the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire and the Ottoman Empire. 2 As is common among colonizing pow-
ers, each ruler attempted to impose his own culture on his new acqui-
sition. Ethnic strife and revolt were common, resulting in migration
and in the development of a strong need for independence by even the
smallest of identifiable groups.
1. Bosnia-Hercegovina
The region of Bosnia-Hercegovina was settled by Croats and Serbs
by the seventh century. Signs of Bosnian autonomy were evidenced by
the rising of Bogolinism, a Catholic-Orthodox sect, around the twelfth
century; by the fourteenth century, Bosnia had become an important
state. Bosnian adversaries within the state founded a rival state,
namely Hercegovina, in the late fourteenth century. Both Bosnia and
Hercegovina were conquered by the Turks around 1483; the Turks
10. "Yugoslav" literally translated means "South-Slav," a seemingly appropriate
name for the ethnicity of the peoples comprising this state. Bruce McFarlane, YUGO-
SLAVIA: POLITICS, ECONOMICs AND SOCIETY 4 (1988).
11. YUGOSLAVIA A COUNTRY STUDY 301 (Glenn E. Curtis, ed., 1990) [hereinafter
COUNTRY STUDY]. For a comparison, consider the size of the U.S. state of Wyoming
of about 253,390 km2 with a population of about 500,000.
12. James B. Steinberg, International Involvement in Internal Conflicts, in EN-
FORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 30 (Lori
Fisler Damrosch, ed., 1993).
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added Islam to the already historically divided region of the Eastern
and Western Roman Empires of Diocletian and Theodosius which
formed the dividing line between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. 3 The
Bogolian nobility converted to Islam in order to retain family land; the
lower classes became serfs to the Bogolians and Ottomans. In the next
four hundred years, Bosnia-Hercegovina became virtual chattel in the
territorial games of Austrian, Russian, and Turkish nobility. In 1850,
Turkey centralized the rule of Bosnia-Hercegovina in Sarajevo to settle
ongoing unrest. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Hercegovina shortly
after the 1878 signing of the Treaty of Berlin. In an attempt to in-
crease the Catholic population, Austria-Hungary colonized the region
with Catholic Slavs and Germans; these families again essentially
reduced both Bosnia-Hercegovinans and Serbs to serfs."
By 1878, the Hungarian crown ruled over much of Bosnia-
Hercegovina, a rule that was very much resented by all of its three
main ethnic groups. The Muslims wanted to remain with the Turks,
the Croats feared "Hungarianization" of their culture, and the Serbs,
still condemned to serfdom, screamed for recognition and alliance with
Serbia in the south.
15
2. Serbia
The Serbs lived under Byzantine dominion until the middle of the
twelfth century, after which time Serbia enjoyed a fair amount of au-
tonomy under the Byzantines. The Turks conquered the Serbs in 1459
and ruled Serbia until Austria took dominion of Serbian regions south
of the Sava river in 1718. In the remaining areas, Turkish rule re-
mained until the Serbs, in alliance with Russia, Romania, and Bulgar-
ia, ousted the Turks in 1877. Austria-Hungary annexed Serbia only
three years later, defeating the Serbian dream of an independent state.
By that time, Serbs lived as minorities in many parts of Yugoslavia, a
fact which remains true today. 8
3. Formation of the Yugoslav state
During World War I, the area of Yugoslavia again became the
playing-ground of the major European powers. In the secret 1915 Trea-
ty of London, the Entente (consisting of France, Britain, and Russia)
promised Istria, much of Dalmatia, and Slovenia to Italy. The time had
come for an independent Yugoslav state, a thought which had been
considered at times after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, but one which
could not be realized due to constant foreign occupation. Finally, the
13. Vojislav Stanovcic, History and Status of Ethnic Conflicts Yugoslavia, in
YuGOSLAvIA: A FRACTURED FEDERALISM 24 (Dennison Rusinow, ed., 1988).
14. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 11, at 22-24.
15. Id. at 25.
16. Id. at 16-22.
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Declaration of Corfu, uniting Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia, was signed
in July, 1917, in an attempt to neutralize the effects of the Treaty of
London. By the end of World War I, the international community rec-
ognized the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians (SKS). 7
The Declaration of Corfu promised equal recognition of the Cyril-
lic and Latin alphabets"8 and recognition of all three nationalities,
including democratic representation. Notwithstanding these provisions,
Croats and Serbs soon clashed about the issue whether governmental
rule should take federal or centralized forms; Serbia argued strongly
for the latter.' The conflict between Croatia and Serbia was fueled by
the Usta~e, a Croat nationalist group.' Ethnic hatred and civil strife,
also due" to the number of non-slavic minorities which the SKS inherit-
ed, divided the young nation. Lack of experienced leadership led to the
violent suppression of Albanian and Macedonian minorities after nu-
merous uprisings. The Serbs' self-declared king unsuccessfully tried to
impose unity upon ethnic groups, but by 1931 allowed limited democ-
racy to calm the spirits.2
World War II ensued, and after several small attempts to ally,
leaders of the SKS' quasi-democratic cabinet and SKS' economy be-
came more and more closely knit with Germany. The fascist salute and
green shirts became the policy of one cabinet member's group. The an-
nexation of Austria strengthened Germany's grip on the SKS. In des-
perate search for an ally, the SKS finally recognized the Soviet Union
in 1940, a move which proved to be too little, too late. On March 25,
1941, the SKS was forced into signing the Tripartite Pact with Germa-
ny which assured non-aggression from the Axis powers; on April 6,
1941, the first bomb fell on Belgrade, and eleven days later the SKS
surrendered to German rule.2"
Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria dismembered the Yugo-
slav kingdom during the War, and all imposed cultural terror. Germa-
ny created a puppet state, the Independent State of Croatia, which
roughly encompassed Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Having refused
to fuel the Axis war machine, two million Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies
were eliminated by means of religious conversion, deportation, and
17. Id. at 27.
18. Serb uses the Cyrillic alphabet. Croatian and Slovenian, although Slavic lan-
guages, use the Latin alphabet, a phenomenon due to Western occupants and the
Catholic religion which became predominant in both Croatia and Slovenia; Serbs are
largely Orthodox. The Latin alphabet was imposed on Bosnia-Hercegovina prior to
the conversion to Islam.
19. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 11, at 29.
20. Steinberg, supra note 12, at 31.
21. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 11, at 34.
22. I& at 36-37.
DENY. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
violence. Albanians and Hungarians, two abused minorities under the
SKS, also took turns massacring Jews and Serbs.'
From the Yugoslav resistance movement arose the Socialist ideal-
ist Jozip Broz Tito. Tito arranged in 1944 for the Soviet Union to enter
Yugoslav territory. This move meant the end of the War, and the coun-
cil supporting Tito's resistance endeavors formed the post-World War
II basis for Yugoslavia's government. World War II left 1.7 million
people or eleven per cent of the pre-war population dead, second in
death rate only to Poland.' Tito and his cabinet instituted
communist rule, and, after mock elections, dissolved the SKS and es-
tablished the "Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia" on Novem-
ber 29, 1945; that name was changed in 1963 to "Socialist Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia."' The new government adopted a Soviet-style
constitution which established a strong central government under the
Serbian Belgrade and divided regions of the nation, more or less along
ethnic lines, into states."
B. From World War II to 1990: Events leading to war
1. Ethnicity and self-government
Yugoslavia's diversity problems were three-fold; Catholicism and
Orthodoxy divided the country into East and West, and the disparity of
economic growth and level of development split the country into North
and South. Join non-Slav minority nations in majority enclaves
(such as Albanians and Hungarians) with Slavic tribal minorities, each
with their own history of ethnic hatred, foreign rule, and injustice, and
diversity becomes a three-dimensional phenomenon which is very diffi-
cult to manage. Even the United States of America arguably faces
diversity today on only one level, namely ancestral national origin.
In order to overcome the distrust among the various ethnic groups
after World War II, Tito placed much propaganda effort in unity and
equality of the new state.' While this effort was necessary and
helped to promote the self-management concept, bureaucracy on all
governmental levels later hindered the inherent autonomy in such a
concept."
Tito's government also attempted some reforms in the early 1960s.
These reforms were designed to please the Croats who were quite up-
23. Id. at 36-37.
24. Id. at 42.
25. Mark Thompson, A PAPER HOUSE: THE ENDING OF YUGOSLAvIA 1 (1992).
26. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 11, at 43.
27. Stanovcic, supra note 13, at 25.
28. Id.
29. 1d at 36.
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set about earlier unity policies; these policies, for instance, outlawed
Croatian as a language and adopted "Serbo-Croatian" as the official
language of Croatia and Serbia. Severe bureaucratic "adjustments"
attempted to shift economic planning from Belgrade to the individual
states in response to economic difficulties," allowing limited self-gov-
ernment in the regions,3 ' in an effort to diffuse debates of national
self-rule versus federalism, debates which remained from the SKS 2
and which would continue until the disintegration of the Yugoslav
state in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
More important than resulting in a stimulated economy, the "Re-
form Crisis" allowed significant political change which continually
forced Tito to give in to Croatia's demand for essentially a confederacy,
which was a political structure for which Croatia had always pressed,
especially since the end of World War II. By the early 1970s at the
latest, Croatia's nationalism had spread to the other republics as
well.33 The Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Albanians in
Kosovo especially followed the Croatian model of demanding self-rule.
Ethnic divisions aside, the federal government largely neglected
its citizens, especially with respect to individual rights.3 4 For in-
stance, Serbs frequently arrested liberals and state nationalists by
1971 as tensions began to worsen. A new and complex constitution was
written and passed in 1974 aimed at controlling the increasingly diffi-
cult situation; the new constitution provided for a complex system of
checks and balances for all types of groups present in Yugoslavia,35 a
possible beginning of the end.
2. Economics and Tito's death
The end of the state came one step closer after Tito's death in
1980, an event which again threatened political disharmony.36 Vari-
ous groups at that point in time often proposed drastic political re-
forms, many of which were anti-Serb.3 7 A true leadership crisis devel-
oped in 1988, when Slovenia and Croatia boldly began to push for a
market-economy in an attempt to solve the economic crisis and to re-
pay $21 billion in hard-currency debt.' By then, debates about the
distribution of the national budget, allocation of transportation re-
30. Pedro Ramet, NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1963-1983, at
87 (1984) [hereinafter NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM].
31. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 11, at 43.
32. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
33. See NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM, supra note 30, at 122-125.
34. Stanovcic, supra note 13, at 36.
35. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 11, at 54.
36. Id. at 56.
37. Id. at 182.
38. Stanovcic, supra note 13, at 2.
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sources, et cetera, were flaming. 9 The true reason behind this push,
however, was simple: Slovenia was the most productive of the re-
gions," its eight per cent population producing up to twenty per cent
of the nation's GNP, with Croatia not too far behind."' In this time of
economic disparity, Slovenia and Croatia both longed back to the be-
ginning 1970s, years that showed relatively high economic growth, an
improving living standard, increasing ties to the west, and general
commercial optimism."
3. Foreign policy
In matters of foreign policy, the alliance with the Soviet Union
had severe ups and downs, especially later in light of the Soviet
Union's invasions into Hungary in 1956 and into Czechoslovakia in
1968. It appeared that Yugoslavia soon went its own way, always cau-
tiously eyeing its dominant ally, eventually allowing unrestricted trav-
el and free flow of intellectual materials.
The fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s allowed the Yugo-
slavian states to make decisions with less fear of reprisal from Mos-
cow. The Yugoslav states saw the Soviet Union's disbandonment as
their opportunity for independence.
C. The beginnings of war
Disintegration began with the December 23, 1990, vote of
Slovenians for independence;' Slovenia's discontent with the federal
state was largely due to the fact that the "federation virtually ceased
to function as a unified state."" After a brief period of war and nego-
tiations aided by the European Union" and the Conference of Securi-
ty of Co-operation in Europe (CSCE),5 Slovenia achieved peace
around July 5, 1991."
39. See NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM, supra note 30, at 195-202.
40. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 11, at 206.
41. See NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM, supra note 30, at 197.
42. Stanovcic, supra note 13, at 2.
43. Croatia followed suit May 19, 1991.
44. Lenard J. Cohen, Regime Transition in a Disintegrating Yugoslavia: The
Law-of-Rule vs. The Rule-of-Law, THE CARL BECK PAPERS IN RUSSIAN AND EAST
EUROPEAN STUDIES, No. 908, at 31 (1992).
45. The European Community changed its name to the European Union on Jan-
uary 1, 1993. The term European Union is used throughout this article for consis-
tency purposes.
46. The CSCE has no enforcement powers and it bases its philosophy of resolv-
ing disputes largely on consensus-building. See Miriam Sapiro, Dispute Resolution:
General Methods and CSCE Mechanisms, ASIL NEWSLETTER, September 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, Lawrev library, Allrev file.
47. Marc Weller, Current Development: The International Response to the Disso-
lution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AJ.I.L. 569, 573 (1992).
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The root of this and the Croatian conflict was largely grounded in
the fact that the Serb leadership did not desire a loose federation and
in the failure of negotiations to that effect." Serb actions were doubt-
lessly encouraged by initial responses of the European Union and of
the CSCE and subsequent responses of the United States, all of which
favored territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at that early time in the
conflict.49
However, despite European Union observers, fighting broke out
again, this time in Serbian majority enclaves in Croatia between eth-
nic Serbs and Croats. The Croatian Serbs were supported increasingly
by Yugoslav National Army (JNA) forces;' these actions were justi-
fied by the Yugoslav federal government to protect the Serbs in an
independent Croatian state."' The United Nations Security Council
remained silent, and even during its first meeting on September 25,
1991, it did nothing but express "deep concern" over the death and
destruction and called for a military arms embargo against Yugoslavia
as a whole.52 Cyrus R. Vance was appointed shortly thereafter as the
Secretary-General's personal envoy to Yugoslavia."
Bosnia-Hercegovina followed Slovenia and Croatia on October 15,
1991, in its declaration for independence; this vote was supported by
virtually all Muslims but was boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs.5" On
February 24, 1992, a make-shift Bosnia-Hercegovinan government
asked the JNA to leave Bosnia-Hercegovina's territory.' Around
March 9, 1992, initial United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)
troops entered Yugoslavia; 6 by that time, however, a massive amount
48. Id. at 569.
49. Id. at 570. Whenever parts of nations desire to secede, it appears that the
West favors territorial integrity and tolerance of minorities instead of secession by
the minority. See Barbara Crossette, What is a Nation?, N. Y. TIMES, December 26,
1994, sec. 1, at 10.
50. See, e.g., Binder, supra note 4 (discussing the Yugoslav army's transfer of
experienced officers to lead Bosnian Serb forces). See also Barbara Crossette, U.N.
Eases Curbs on Yugoslavia After Serbian Peace Concessions,.N. Y. TIMES, September
24, 1994, at 1. (reporting Yugoslavia shipping military items across the Drina River
into Bosnian Serb territory).
51. Id. See also Weller, supra note 47 at 574. Recent evidence suggests that the
Serbs prepared for war against Croatia as early as 1986. Philip J. Cohen, Ending
the War and Securing Peace in Former Yugoslavia, 6 PACE INTL L. REV. 19, 27
(1994) [hereinafter Ending the War].
52. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 3009th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/23067 (1991).
53. Amy Lou King, Bosnia-Hercegovina - Vance.Owen Agenda for a Peaceful
Settlement: Did the U.N. Do too Little, too Late, to Support this Endeavor? 23 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 347, 352 (1993).
54. Webb, supra note 2, at 377-378.
55. Weller, supra note 47, at 597.
56. Id. at 585.
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of military armor already had been transferred from federal Serb
troops to the local Serb fighters.57
After Bosnia fulfilled certain conditions to protect minority groups
by placing the respective clauses in its provisory constitution," the
European Union finally recognized Bosnia-Hercegovinan independence
on April 6, 1992,"9 despite Bosnian Serb opposition and fierce fight-
ing.'M Despite the fact that one month earlier 40 of 102 United Na-
tions Military Observers were placed in Bosnia-Hercegovina (the re-
mainder was stationed throughout Yugoslavia),"' war between
Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims broke out April 7, 1992, as
Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, declared independence
from the new state6 2 with full support from Slobodan Milosevic, Presi-
dent of the Yugoslav Serbs, 3 the ultimate objective being joinder of
the Bosnian and Yugoslav Serbs."
The Serbian Yugoslav government, together with Montenegro,
formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, essentially becoming the de
facto successor of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on April
27, 1992."5 This new state "was no longer open to the former central
authorities, now totally dominated by Serbia, to claim a right to exer-
cise authority within non-Serbian parts of the former [Yugoslavia]."'
Fighting soon became intense and wide-spread; Bosnian Serb
militia were supported, both directly through manpower and indirectly
through weaponry, by JNA forces."' Alija Izetbegovic, president of
Bosnia-Hercegovina, soon appealed to the European Union, CSCE, and
United Nations" to stop the slaughter committed by the much stron-
ger Serb forces. Inaction by those three bodies marks the stalemate
which is still in effect today: the international bodies would try to
negotiate peace with Serbian forces and would order Serb withdrawal
from the region; the Yugoslav Serbs would insist that they were not
interfering with the hostilities; the Bosnian and Yugoslav Serbs would
57. See id. at 586.
58. A Statement of Principles for New Constitutional Arrangements for Bosnia
and Hercegovina to that effect was passed March 18, 1992. Id. at 597.
59. Id. at 593; Webb, supra note 2, at 378.
60. Weller, supra note 47, at 597.
61. Id. at 586.
62. Id. at 593; Webb, supra note 2, at 386.
63. Judy Dempsey, Bosnians Seek U.N. Force to Stop Spread of War, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1991, at 2.
64. Danilo Ttark, Remarks Concerning the Breakup of the Former Yugoslavia, 3
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PRORS. 50, 52 (1993); Ending the War, supra note 51, at
32; Steinberg, supra note 12, at 47.
65. See Dept. of State Dispatch, Chronology: Developments Related to the Crisis
in Bosnia, March 10-August 28, 1992.
66. Weller, supra note 47, at 596.
67. Id. at 597.
68. Id.
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insist that, although Bosnia-Hercegovina is a recognized nation, the
conflict was internal"' and would maintain that intervention in inter-
nal affairs of a state is illegal under the United Nations charter." In
the meantime, reports of systematic efforts by the Bosnian Serbs to
"ethnically cleanse" Bosnia had been confirmed;7' at latest by Septem-
ber, 1991, the European Union, CSCE, and the United Nations had
full knowledge of the various atrocities ongoing in Bosnia-
Hercegovina."
The United Nations Secretary-General informed the Security
Council on April 29, 1992, that a feasibility study of deploying United
Nations peacekeeping forces would be conducted." The Security
Council rejected Bosnia-Hercegovina's request for 15,000 peace en-
forcement troops and instead demanded the usual cease-fire, and, for
the first time, demanded free passage of humanitarian aid efforts un-
der Chapter VI. 7"
Later, the United Nations Security Council adopted sanctions."
These, however, came much too late, and proved ineffective due to
many logistics problems in border enforcement76 and willful disregard
for the embargo.77
The first reports of regional organizations' involvement other than
the European Union and CSCE appeared August 7, 1992, when the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) first began pressuring
the United Nations for action." However, extended OIC actions could
fuel Serbian propaganda that long claimed that the Bosnian Muslims
desired to turn Bosnia-Hercegovina into an Islamic fundamentalist
69. See id. at 597-603.
70. See infra note 105 and the accompanying text.
71. The Serb leadership would later point to the cruelty committed against the
Serbs in Yugoslavia's early history by the Muslim and Croatian forces. Unter den
russischen Fliugel gedrdngt (Forced under the Russian wing), DER SPIEGEL, March 3,
1994, at 144-145 (in an interview with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic).
72. See King, supra note 53, at 351.
73. Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Res-
olution 749 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/23900 (1992).
74. Weller, supra note 47, at 602; see also infra notes 120 and 130 for the perti-
nent sections of Chapter VII.
75. S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/res/757 (1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1453 (1992).
76. United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Honorable Edward M.
Kennedy, U.S. Senate, Serbia-Montenegro: Implementation of U.N. Economic Sanctions
6 (April 1993) [hereinafter GAO Report to Senator Kennedy].
77. Ending the War, supra note 51, at 31. Greece is accused of deliberately vio-
lating the embargo as part of an arrangement with Yugoslavia to divide Macedonian
territory and return part of it to Greece. Greece has long placed claims on Macedo-
nia and refers to it as "the stolen jewels of Greece." ld.
78. Judy Dempsey, Islamic Nations Press U.N. on Force, FIN. TIMES, August 7,
1992, at 2.
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state;" to date, none of OIC's actions have materialized. Throughout
the remainder of 1992, indecision by the United Nations, the United
States, and the European Union was blatantly apparent,8w interrupt-
ed by a well-meant, but initially irrelevant, United Nations Security
Council resolution dated August 13, 1992, that authorized use of force
as a last measure to ensure relief convoys reach their destinations."1
By the end of 1992 and throughout 1994, the frustration of the United
Nations personnel stationed in Bosnia-Hercegovina as to their inability
to accomplish even the smallest of missions due to lack of authoriza-
tion by the United Nations was blatantly obvious.82
In the meanwhile, the Yugoslav Serbs engaged in a terror cam-
paign of political intolerance within their own territory, one of the
worst seen in Europe after German national-socialism, in order to
silence the intellectual and urban minority against the war in Bosnia-
Hercegovina.' Shortly thereafter, in the beginning of March, Vance
and Lord Owen brought their first plan carving up Bosnia-Hercegovina
into small enclaves.' It would soon become clear that the Bosnian
Muslims would not agree to any such plan unless much of their territo-
ry was restored and they were given sea access through either Croatia
or Serbia. Bosnia's position in this respect has not significantly
changed through 1994.
The remainder of 1993 and all of 1994 continued to witness inac-
tion and ineffective action,85 until the United Nations called on NATO
in early 1994 to commence air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions
with the sole purpose of enforcing the earlier resolution ordering the
Serbs to allow relief convoys to pass through to Muslim enclaves and
refugee gathering points.8 This operation took place as all European
79. Id.
80. Roger Matthews and Nancy Dunne, U.N. May Back Force in Bosnia: Western
Governments Strive to Resolve Differences of Scale of Military Involvement, FIN.
TIMEs, Aug. 10, 1993, at 1.
81. Michael Littlejohn et al., U.N. Agrees Force as Last Resort in Bosnia Aid Ef-
fort, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1992, at 1.
82. See David White, U.N. Fears It Can Only 'Ease the Passage of History': How
Restricted Resources and Powers May Prevent U.N. Troops from Fulfilling their al-
ready Limited Tasks. FIN. TIMES, December 5, 1992, at 2. See also Frances Williams,
et al., U.N. Tells Bosnian Factions to Allow Full Scale Relief, FIN. TIMES, February
18, 1993, at 22. Examples include convoys being turned back by Bosnian Serbs,
either through military force or by ordering women and children to crowd access
roads to needy Muslim enclaves. Id.
83. Dusko Doder, Yugoslavia: Nazi-style - Campaign of Terror, THE AGE (Mel-
bourne), February 15, 1993 (Reuter Textline).
84. David Gardner, Serbs to Face U.N. Pressure on Peace Plan, FIN. TIMES,
March 9, 1993, at 2.
85. See, e.g., Chuck Sudetic, Conflict in the Balkans: The Overview, N. Y. TIMES,
April 18, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Conflict in the Balkans).
86. See, e.g., Unter den russischen Flugel gedrdngt, supra note 71. Serb leader
Radovan Karadzic decried the attack as "clearly anti-Serb," possibly preventing peace
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nations, including Russia, held their breath in fear of an escalation of
a "full-scale war in Europe." 7 Indeed, the fear of war is so great that
some Europeans believe that Bosnia-Hercegovina should all but capitu-
late.
In addition, prosecution of war crimes and the possibility of grant-
ing amnesty to war criminals have become bargaining chips during
peace negotiations as an incentive for the various factions to continue
to participate in those talks.8 9 Indeed, the Bosnia-Hercegovinan crisis
may become one of the most outrageous examples of plea-bargaining in
the history of transnational law.' The price for such bargaining will
be permanent insecurity in the Balkans.9
At the end of 1994, the Serbs held approximately seventy percent
of Bosnian territory.9 2 Casualties have been high, snipers continue to
kill civilians, among them many women and children," and camp
leaders continue to torture their inmates, 4 all under the watchful
eyes of United Nations peacekeepers and the United Nations itself,95
based on diplomacy. Id.
87. Elaine Sciolino, Contain Your Joy: Russia's Back on World Stage, N. Y.
TIMES, February 20, 1994, at A20 (citing a letter of Russia's President Boris
Yeltsin's to U.S. President Clinton),
88. Balkan Moral Order, supra note 4. "We disapprove of the offensives now
under way by the Sarajevo government and Bosnian troops even though the respon-
sibility for the war lies with the Serbs." Id. (quoting Alain Juppe, France's Foreign
Minister).
89. Sadruddin Aga Khan, War Crimes Without Punishment, N. Y. Times, at A23.
90. See Balkan Moral Order, supra note 4. As one commentator has written:
"The current practice of forcing the victims of Serbian aggression to negotiate with
their tormentors, while keeping the victims weak through an arms embargo, is mor-
ally reprehensible and politically unwise, and serves only to reward Serbia's aggres-
sion by legitimizing ill-gotten war gains." Ending the War, supra note 51, at 24
(1994).
91. This is because "[p]eace without justice cannot endure." Benjamin B. Ferencz
(a prosecutor at the Nilrnberg trials), Editorial, N. Y. TIMES, July 17, 1994, sec. 4,
at 16. However, it may be idealistic to expect many war criminals to be tried, given
the history of other, smaller conflicts since World War II and the subsequent
Nalrnberg trials. See Marc D. Charney, Conversations / Telford Taylor; The Laws of
War Are Many, but Self.Interest Is the Only Enforcer, N. Y. TIMES, December 25,
1994, sec. 4, at 7. Since World War II, the responsible nation itself, not some in-
ternational body, has tried individual offenders. See, e.g., United States v. Calley, 22
C.M.A. 534 (1973).
92. Roger Cohen, Washington Might Recognize a Bosnian Serb State, N. Y.
TIMES, at 10.
93. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
94. There have been recent discussions as to why camp leaders deem it neces-
sary to engage in torture and rape, or, more broadly, why those in a superior posi-
tion to others feel the need to abuse those inferior. For an excellent psychological
and sociological discussion of this human phenomenon, see Wo lernt man das denn?
(Where does one learn something like this?), DER SPIEGEL, January 17, 1994, at 70-
91.
95. See, e.g., 'Akashi paktiert mit den Serben" ("Akashi cooperates with the
Serbs"), FOCUS, May 21, 1994, at 218.
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helpless to stop the continuing breaches of local, periodically arranged
cease-fires." Little has been resolved as several additional peace pro-
posals have been rejected either because Bosnia stood to lose too much
or because Serbia had to give up too much conquered territory. 7
So much for the drab history of the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina
through the end of 1994. The remainder of this article discusses the
legal alternatives of military intervention in order to achieve peace as
soon as possible under these burdening circumstances.
III. HISTORY, POLICY, AND CONDITIONS: MILITARY INTERVENTION IN
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
Since the writings of St. Augustine, people have distinguished
"just wars," i.e. permissible wars, from unjust or impermissible ones;
however, due to its inherent subjectivity, this line of distinction soon
showed to be unworkable.98 Between St. Augustine and World War I,
war was considered a mere fact of life; collective military intervention
into smaller states was primarily a tool employed by the larger em-
pires to keep the established power distributed among the larger
states. 9 For instance, the Holy Alliance of Austria, Russia, and Prus-
sia used collective intervention to maintain absolute monarchy as sta-
tus quo within a great part of Europe,0 0 thereby reserving "the right
to use force unilaterally to protect and vindicate legal
entitlements."'0 '
After World War I, the League of Nations required that states
settle their disputes without war. Intervention was only permitted as a
last measure after the League's efforts to remedy a given situation
proved ineffective." 2 This vague set of standards, coupled with the
lack of enforcement power of the League of Nations,0 3 among other
factors, allowed Germany to create world war in order to achieve na-
tional objectives.0 "
96. Among numerous reports of Serb factions breaking the countless cease fire
agreements, see, e.g., Allied in Failure, TIME, December 12, 1994, at 28-32; Paul
Quinn-Judge, Serbs Tighten Grip in Spasm of Violence, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17
1993, at 2.
97. See Conflict in the Balkans, supra note 85, at Al; Bruce W. Nelan, Return to
Sender, TIME, August 1, 1994, at 38. For a discussion on the dissection of Bosnia-
Hercegovina, see, e.g., Christian J. Garris, Bosnia and the Limitations of Internation-
al Law, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1039, 1052-1055 (1994).
98. John Norton Moore, Legal Standards for Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 13
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 191, 192 (1983).
99. Drs. F. X. DeLima, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 17 (1971).
100. Id.
101. W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International
Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 279 (1985).
102. DeLima, supra note 99, at 30-32.
103. Id. at 162.
104. Moore, supra note 98, at 193.
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In order to assure that the Second World War remained the last
such war, the charter of the United Nations (the Charter) was adopted
as the first instrument to prohibit all uses of unilateral force," 5
"thereby surpassing the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact's prohibition of go-
ing to war as a political means."' °' However, the writers of the Char-
ter clearly intended to prohibit war across international boundaries,
not "insurgency, terrorism, mixed civil-international conflict, conflicts
within nations divided by a cold war, wars of unification, wars of suc-
cession, wars to create states where none previously existed, and com-
petitions among various groups indigenous to the sovereign.""'
Defining the crisis in Bosnia-Hercegovina as one of international
dimensions by no means makes passing resolutions in favor of the
forcible creation of peace simple. For instance, due to the desire to
maintain status quo, supporting a government in power has tradition-
ally been considered legal and supporting anti-government factions has
been considered illegal. '08 However, since such policy would in es-
sence render moot the competing principle of self-determination of
peoples, scholars developed the standard of neutral non-intervention.
Under this rule, neither faction is to be aided in an internal con-
flict; ° this rule became written in the Charter as well, ° and this
provision may now be seen as the primary cause of frustration of peace
efforts in ex-Yugoslavia. It is this frustration, especially in light of the
gross violations of human rights in ex-Yugoslavia, that some of these
standards may need to be re-worked.'1 The current rules are abso-
105. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, which reads:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. Id.
For an excellent interpretation of Article 2(4), see Oscar Schachter, International
Law: The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1624 (1984).
106. Jost Delbrtkck, A More Effective International Law or a New 'World Law"? -
Some Aspects of the Development of International Law in a Changing International
System, 68 IND. L.J. 705, 707-708 (1993) [hereinafter Development of International
Law]; see generally, General Treaty for Renunciation of War as a Instrument of
National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, T.S. No. 796, 94 I.N.T.S. 57.
107. Moore, supra note 98, at 194. For a discussion of the role of the United
Nations in civil wars, see Oscar Schachter, The United Nations and Internal Conflict,
in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 403 (John Morton Moore, ed., 1974).
108. Moore, supra note 98, at 195.
109. Id.
110. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7, which states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII. Id.
111. See generally, Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, International Law Governing Aid to
Opposition Groups in Civil War: Resurrecting the Standards of Belligerency, 63
WAsH. L. REV. 43 (1988).
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lutely inadequate to deal with conflicts of the type at hand here, espe-
cially because leaders in Yugoslavia, as did leaders in Iraq during the
1990 conflict,1 2 for instance, believe they may safely disregard inter-
national law, thereby destroying the ultimate goal of the Charter.
These considerations aside, it appears that the Bosnia-
Hercegovinan war is the type of international conflict which the draft-
ers of the Charter intended to confront and prevent. First, Bosnia-
Hercegovina is a nation recognized by the United Nations."' As such,
its borders must be protected from invading forces. Second, the new
Yugoslavia, a nation itself, is aiding the Bosnian Serbs by providing
personnel, arms, and other materials in operations which cross the
Yugoslav-Bosnian border;" this aid amounts to an invading force
and must be prevented.
Even if one rejects these arguments and defines the Bosnian crisis
as an internal one,"' this conflict still has severe international di-
mensions which justify United Nations action. This is because this war
is fueled by racial hatred, and because civilians suffer tremendously in
large numbers through human rights abuses committed on behalf of at
least one faction. In addition, the types of aid provided by the Yugoslav
Serbs will again become an issue. "6
112. Paul W. Kahn, Lessons for International Law from the Gulf War, 45 STAN L.
REV. 425, 428 (1993).
113. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Recognition appears to be the
most significant in determining the fine line between civil conflict and international
war. See Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of Interna-
tional Law, 88 A.J.I.L. 78, 81 (1994).
114. See supra note 67 and infra notes 131 through 133 and accompanying text.
115. Such position is, indeed, sustainable. Consider, for instance, the fact that
small, extremist Bosnian Muslim factions, opposed to Izetbegovic's form of govern-
ment, are fighting next to Bosnian Serb soldiers. See, e.g. Renate Flottau, "Dies hier
ist kein Rambo-Film' (-Mhis is not a Rambo movie"), DER SPIEGEL, July 4, 1994, at
118; Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia,
and Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 519 at note 294; Chuck Sudetic, U.N.'s Forces Put
on Alert As Serbs Advance in Bosnia, N. Y. TIMES, November 21, 1994, at A6.
116. One author used similar standards in his analysis as to when a civil conflict
becomes an international concern. Schachter, The United Nations and Internal Con-
flicts, supra note 107, at 410-415. See also Louis B. Sohn, Civil Wars for States and
the United Nations, in LAw AND CML WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 583 (John
Norton Moore, ed., 1974). Sohn's proposed guidelines for non-intervention in civil
wars are as follows:
The following acts in support of a foreign government or an insurgent group shall be
considered as military intervention for the purpose of these guidelines:
a.Arms sales or grants;
b.Making available military training at home or abroad;
c.Making available military advisers . . . ;
g.Participation in military operations by combat units, whether composed of "volun-
teers" or regular military personnel. Id.
See supra note 67 and accompanying text in support of Serbian forces providing
such assistance.
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For the purposes of the following discussion, it is assumed that
the war in Bosnia is, indeed, one of the types of international conflicts
addressed by the Charter.
IV. INTERVENTION IN THE YUGOSLAV WAR UNDER THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER
If peace is indeed the ultimate value to be achieved under the
Charter, "7 under what circumstances, then, is intervention allowed
to attain peace? As discussed, the Charter prohibits any use of
force," 8 with the possible exceptions of armed force as an enforce-
ment measure as authorized by the Security Council, collective and
unilateral intervention for purposes under self-defense, introduction of
United Nations peacekeeping forces in the territory in question, and
intervention to counteract violations of human rights."9 These excep-
tions are considered in turn.
A. Armed force as an enforcement measure taken by the United
Nations Security Council under Article 42
The Charter allows use of force to be employed by the Security
Council essentially if prior sanctions have shown ineffective and if
international peace is endangered. 2 '
First, prior sanctions must have been demonstrated to be ineffec-
tive. In the case of Yugoslavia, it appears that the sanctions which
have been issued to date, namely trade and weapons embargoes, have,
indeed, failed. This is due on the one hand to the inability of Serbia's
neighbors to enforce the embargo because of the complete lack of en-
forcement logistics.' 2' On the other hand, the embargoes have seen
little enforcement due to the lack of the Orthodox world's desire to
enforce the embargo because of Greece's fear of Macedonian expansion-
ism'2 2 and due to the dependency of Yugoslavia's neighbors on their
117. Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 38-39 (Louis Henkin et. al., eds., 1989).
118. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
119. See generally Oscar Schachter, Authorized Use of Force by the United Nations
and Regional Organizations, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER
65 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer, eds., 1991).
120. U.N. CHARTER art. 42, which states:
"Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations." Id.
121. See GAO Report to Senator Kennedy, supra note 76.
122. Weller, supra note 44, at 588.
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Serbian export market."z These factors have not improved to date;
they in fact help deepen the crisis.'
Second, the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina must present a threat
to international peace. It appears that Article 42 does not view vio-
lations of human rights committed within a country to be within its
scope.' However, in a resolution passed at the beginning of the war,
the Security Council did consider the events in ex-Yugoslavia as a
threat to international peace and security when it first implemented
the embargo.' 6
The limitation of the exception to the threat of international peace
is essential because if human rights violations of any kind were
grounds for intervention under Article 42, the principle of state sover-
eignty would be significantly restricted' 7 . It appears that the ab-
sence of such limitation would make the entire exception unworkable
because, for instance, some countries' laws' roots in religion directly
violate some standards of human rights." Critics of that limitation
raise examples such as the intervention against Iraq, in which threats
to international peace and security "are more likely to be acknowl-
edged when the target country is geo-politically significant. Displaced
persons from these countries or oil-rich states may gain attention,
while those from poorer nations languish because their loss is not
perceived as a threat to international peace.""a Given this analysis,
123. See GAO Report to Senator Kennedy, supra note 76.
124. While the Bosnian Serb faction is supplied with arms from its Yugoslav
neighbor, Bosnian Muslims have no access to such arms as they are land locked. In
recent months, the United Nations Assembly expressed a desire to lift the arms
embargo. Barbara Crossette, U.N. Assembly Approves Call for End to Bosnian Arms
Embargo, N. Y. TIMES, November 4, 1994, at A6. Lifting the arms embargo would
do nothing to ease the pain of the Bosnia-Hercegovinan population, but it might at
least in some way level the rules of war, which so far has been a deck of cards
militarily stacked in favor of the Serbs.
125. Jost Delbrack, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Au-
thority of the United Nations, 67 INDIANA L.J. 887, 888 (1992) [hereinafter Fresh
Look].
126. See S.C. Rec. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/713
(1991).
Some writers contend that no threat of international peace exists since the
fighting remains limited to the borders of former Yugoslavia. See, e.g., Mary Ellen
O'Connell, Continuing Limits on U.N. Intervention in Civil War, 67 IND. L. J. 903,
910 (1992). Such articles continue to ignore the fact that Bosnia-Hercegovina has
been recognized as a nation, whereas the new, "rump" Yugoslavia, consisting of Ser-
bia and Montenegro, remains to be admitted to the United Nations. See supra note
65 and accompanying text.
127. Fresh Look, supra note 125, at 890.
128. For example, some Arabic countries inflict crippling corporal punishment for
certain crimes committed by their subjects.
129. Nancy D. Arnison, International Law and Non-Intervention: When Do Human-
itarian Concerns Supersede Sovereignty? 17 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 199, available
on WESTLAW, Jir database (1993).
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it clearly appears that the Security Council may give orders to any of
its surrogates to militarily intervene in the Yugoslavian war to create
peace, not to merely enforce humanitarian aid.
B. Collective and individual self-defense under Article 51
Article 51, in its ambiguous language, allows both individual and
collective self-defense in cases of armed attack;"s much of the debate
around Article 51 lingers around the definition of aggression. 3' How-
ever, since Bosnia-Hercegovina has been recognized as a state in April
of 1992, it appears that the direct and indirect aid delivered by the
Yugoslav Serbs to the Bosnian Serbs despite the Security Council's
embargo presents an act of aggression under customary international
law as defined by the Definition of Aggression'32 and interpreted by
the International Court of Justice."'
Once it can be acknowledged that an act of aggression has taken
place by the Yugoslav Serbs against the Bosnia-Hercegovinan govern-
ment through its support of the Bosnian Serbs, the road to collective
self defense appears to have been paved. The hesitation of the United
Nations to militarily intervene, then, may be the result not of inability
to do so, but based on the continuing hope for a peaceful resolution of
the conflict. However, in this case, threats of use of force by the United
States" and by the United Nations appear to continue to be a politi-
130. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51, which reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or col-
lective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Na-
tions, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security. Id.
131. See generally Eugene V. Rostow, Armed Force, Peaceful Settlement, and the
United Nations Charter: Are there Alternatives to "A New International Anarchy"? 77
AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 31 (1983).
132. See Definition of Aggression (1974), G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc A/9631 (1974); Article 3 states:
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shaH, subject to and in
accordance with the provisions of Article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such grav-
ity as to amount to [an attack as defined in omitted paragraphs], or its substantial
involvement therein. Id.
133. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 146 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27). In this case, the
Unites States militarily supported rebel forces in that country against the de jure
government.
134. Juliet O'Neil and Julian Beltrame, Europe, U.S. Back Use of Air Strikes to
End Siege, THE OTrAwA CrrlzEN, Feb. 8, 1994, at A6.
479
DENY. J. INTYL L. & POL'Y
cal means to achieve a settlement without United Nations military
intervention, a plan of action which has shown largely unsuccessful so
far. 
135
One arguable limitation to self-defense is the customary interna-
tional law concept of proportionality, which requires that the actions of
the defending state may not exceed those of the attacker. 31 Most re-
ports indicate that while the Serb attackers continue to revert to geno-
cide as a medium of war, the Bosnian Muslims generally, but by no
means always, remain within the realms of international laws of war-
fare. Although proportionality is otherwise a difficult concept to apply
in belligerent situations, 7 the balance dictated by the proportionali-
ty principle appears to have been in favor of the Muslim side, a result
favoring collective intervention on behalf of the United Nations.
C. United Nations peacekeeping forces authorized by the Security
Council or General Assembly and employed in agreement with the
states concerned
The role and size of United Nations peacekeeping forces in
Bosnia-Hercegovina has increased extensively in recent years in the
area of refugee management, humanitarian aid, and election monitor-
ing."'38 Bosnia's President, after Bosnia was recognized as a state, re-
quested such peacekeeping forces, and, after initial hesitation, they
were properly employed.'39
The question is whether the United Nations troops have been, or
ever will be successful. Countless violations of cease-fires followed by
equally fruitless attempts to prevent the fighting between the factions
demonstrate that the peacekeeping forces have failed in their objective
to "help create the conditions of peace and security required for negoti-
ation of an overall political settlement among the contending par-
ties." "' This is not due to their lack of competency, but rather to the
strict limitations the Security Council has placed on their activities. To
date, they have not been successful in the peacemaking process, but
have been marginally successful in assuring that aid is delivered to the
needy refugees. Many more troops are likely to be needed if their goal
is to enforce peace agreements militarily, a reality which is partially
due to the fact that the infrastructure of the territory in Bosnia-
135. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
136. See Schachter, supra note 105, at 1637.
137. See Kahn, supra note 112, at 435.
138. Bartram S. Brown, International Law: The Protection of Human Rights in
Disintegrating States: A New Challenge, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 203, 218 (1992).
139. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
140. Brown, supra note 138, at 219.
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Hercegovina can only with difficulty support ground troops and artil-
lery.
141
One writer lists the following factors to help determine whether
peacekeeping efforts will be successful; these are a strong international
consensus, a workable mandate, and a force with an effective integrat-
ed command.4 4 Although the current mandate is less than workable,
the international consensus is not yet as present as one may wish.
Integration of command does not appear to pose a problem as such
integration has not posed significant problems in prior instances, such
as during the war against Iraq, in which a resolution to the conflict
was relatively quickly achieved. The instant problem faced by the
United Nations forces is their lack of authority to take more aggressive
military measures; this causes the troops either to keep potential refu-
gees in their home villages where their lives are in danger or to move
them to safer areas, which would essentially aid the ethnic cleansing
process."3 Authorized use of more aggressive force by the Security
Council would not only eliminate the latter concern, but would also
allow for more aggressive protection of the villagers.
D. Collateral intervention as a measure responding to violations of
human rights'"
The violations are well-known, and their results are document-
ed."5 There have been "numerous reports of 'ethnic cleansing', in-
cluding civilian killings, mutilation, torture, starvation, operation of
detention centers, executions, mass graves, systematic rape, and mass
terrorization of Croats and Muslims."" These acts are illegal under
141. See COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 11, at 236.
142. Nikolai B. Krylov, International Peacekeeping and Enforcement After the Cold
War, in LAw AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 97 (Lri Fisler
Damrosch & David J. Scheffer, eds., 1991).
143. Pierre Bertrand, An Operational Approach to International Refugee Protection,
26 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 495, 500 (1993).
144. Louis Henkin et. al., 2 RIGHT V. MIGHT. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE 50 (1991). For a full discussion of human rights and their relation to
international law, see Myres S. McDougal et al., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OP AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (1980).
145. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
146. Webb, supra note 2, at 380.
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the Genocide Convention of 1948," 7 and constitute violations of the
most basic human rights.
In certain circumstances, violation of Article 2(4) is justified if
human rights are at stake. '" Instances of intervention to prevent
violations of human rights are plentiful;149 the difficulty lies in strik-
ing a balance between Article 2(7) of the Charter and the need to pro-
tect individuals from the atrocities committed by its own government
or a third party." In Bosnia-Hercegovina, numerous violations of
human rights have taken place on both sides,'51 and the Internation-
al Court of Justice has issued the appropriate opinion."2 It would ap-
pear that even Articles 1(3) and 55(c)" taken alone would outweigh
147. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
of December 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
Article II states:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole, or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such:
a)Killing members of the group;
b)Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c)Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
physical destruction in whole or in part;
d)Imposing measures intended to prevent bilrths within the group;
e)Forcibly transferring children of the group to another grbup. Id.
For an excellent analysis of the Genocide Treaty, see Matthew Lippman, The 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Forty-Five
Years Later, 8 TEMP. INVL & COMP. L. J. 1 (1994).
148. See Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, Forcible Self-help by States to Protect Human
Rights: Recent Views from United Nations, Humanitarian Intervention and the United
Nations 201 app. (Richard B. Lillich, ed., 1973). This premise is heavily contradicted
by others because, among other reasons, there is no "black letter rule" permitting it.
See Roger S. Clark, Humanitarian Intervention: Help to your Friends and State Prac-
tice, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 211 (1983). These positions have been essentially
eliminated by recent decisions of the Security Council in its request of NATO to en-
force humanitarian aid mandates.
149. For pre-Bosnia analyses of the validity of humanitarian intervention, see
Schachter, International Law: The Right of States to Use Armed Force, supra note
105, at 1629 (discussing the validity of India's intervention in East Pakistan to pro-
tect Bengalis during Pakistan's 1971 civil war); see also Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian
Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217-228 (John Norton
Moore, ed., 1974).
150. See Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and
Haiti - Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International
Law - Part 1, 20 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305 (1992).
151. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 121.
152. See Case Concerning Application of the Convention of the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Hercegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro)), reprinted in 87 A.J.I.L. 505 (1993).
153. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3, which states:
To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an econom-
ic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion; .... Id. (Emphasis supplied.)
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the issue of sovereignty with respect to Yugoslavia, as any actions
contrary to Article 1(3) by any state would undermine the very purpose
of the United Nations and would violate article 2(4) itself."s
One writer offers five criteria under which humanitarian military
intervention should be permitted.'55 These criteria include the se-
verity of human rights violations, the nature of the intervention, the
purpose of the intervention, the extent and collectivity of the action,
and the balance of alternatives and outcomes." To briefly apply
these criteria, not many crimes are more severe than those of genocide.
Intervention would last as long as necessary, at the minimum, to stop
the violence, at the maximum, to forcibly return Yugoslav forces to
their own borders after a lasting peace accord has been agreed upon
and has been implemented by the factions. The purpose of such inter-
vention would clearly be in furtherance of a humanitarian concern;
under the United Nations umbrella, such action would be of collective
instead of unilateral nature. Although the question of balancing alter-
natives and outcomes is a difficult one to resolve until the conflict is
essentially over and one has the advantage of hindsight, it appears
apparent that, at this late date, any positive intervention will begin to
help save lives and will ease the exodus refugee burden on Bosnia-
Hercegovina and the influx refugee burden on neighboring coun-
tries."'57 At the minimum, the past three years of impotence on behalf
of the United Nations would finally come to a close, and, at the maxi-
mum, such intervention would serve as an important precedent to
future conflicts and as a deterrent to future violators of human rights.
The human rights violations in Bosnia-Hercegovina to date alone must
more than justify intervention by any state or by the United Nations
with the objective to restore a normal life in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
This article focused on the United Nations' possibilities for mili-
tary intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina in order to achieve peace.
Based upon the above discussion of the four different standards under
which the United Nations may intervene in the Yugoslav war, it ap-
Art. 55, para. c states:
[The United Nations shall promote] universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, lan-
guage, or religion. Id.
154. Jordan J. Praust, Conflicting Norms of Intervention: More Variables For the
'Equation, 13 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 305, 306 (1983). See Fernando R. Tres6n,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 130-137 (1988)
for a full discussion of this conflict.
155. Nanda, supra note 150, at 330.
156. Id.
157. Steinberg, supra note 12, at 50. The latter has been a hot issue for debate
in Croatia, Slovenia, and many Western European nations.
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pears that the United Nations, if it so desires, has the legal authority
to do so. Why, then, does the United Nations not follow its own exam-
ple set during the Iraq conflict and achieve peace in this manner?
Why, instead, does the United Nations continue to negotiate with the
Serb factions, who have shown on many occasions that their interest is
not in peace but in expansionism utilizing tools of genocide and ethnic
cleansing?
The answer can only be found, unfortunately, in politics itself."'
The United States, often the first to loudly condemn such incidents,
does not have, so it appears, any economic or national interests in
Bosnia, and is, therefore, reluctant to proceed with military interven-
tion, "'59 or to use its powerful role to persuade the United Nations to
militarily solve the crisis."'° Some even say that the United States
Department of State deliberately downplays Bosnian genocide accounts
in order to avoid public opinion outbursts for United States action.'
European nations, on the other hand, view Bosnia-Hercegovina as
a hot iron not to be touched,"2 remembering the sore experience of
World War I after the events in Sarajevo. In addition, Europeans do
not particularly like the idea of another neighboring Muslim state;"
as a result, the European Union excuses its inaction by claiming that
its hands are tied without clear United Nations authority to act.'
In addition to regional excuses for inaction, it appears that the
United Nations and the Security Council do not wish to engage in
conduct which is unpopular with Western governments." 5 As one
158. See, e.g., United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Honorable
Robert S. Dole, U.S. Senate, Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of Operations in
Bosnia 4 (April 1994) (summarizing the evaluation of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees about this GAO report) [hereinafter GAO Report to Senator
Dole].
159. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
160. Prior examples of the United States' using this influence are plentiful; one
needs to point merely to the Iraq and Somalia conflicts. See, e.g., Samuel M.
Makinda, SEEKING PEACE FROM CHAOS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA 59-
82 (1993).
161. Aide says U.S. Ignores Genocide, N. Y. TIMES, February 4, 1994, at 4 (citing
Richard Johnson, former head of U.S. Department of State's Yugoslavia desk).
162. See Sciolino, supra note 87.
163. See Balkan Moral Order, supra note 4. "Britain and France, concerned about
the emergence of a Muslim state in Europe, are now eager to forget the brutality of
the Serbs." Id.
164. See Brian Hall, Blue Helmets, Empty Guns, N. Y. TIMES, January 2, 1994, at
20. This proposition appears to hold, at least on its face, true, since the 1958 Treaty
of Rome does not address the deployment of military forces into non-member na-
tions.
165. The tragedy caused by this inaction is amplified by the fact that, according
to some, the Security Council is finally working as intended by the drafters of the
Charter. Prior to the end of the Cold War, any one of the five permanent members
of the Council would frequently use its veto power to avoid Council action. Recently,
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commentator has phrased the problem: "None of this should come as a
great surprise because we are speaking about concerns based on hu-
man rights, not the rights of governments, and the United Nations is
an organizaticn of governments, not human beings."" In fairness it
must be acknowledged that the United Nations helped relieve the
suffering in Bosnia-Hercegovina to some extent. Through the help of
the United Nations, less numbers starved, the Sarajevo airport was
kept operational throughout much of this crisis, and airlifts and con-
voys reduced the overall suffering through their providing of medical
and other assistance.1
67
However, the United Nations did not stop human rights abuses
and the killing of civilians."~ While Bosnian leaders long ago invited
a strong United Nations presence, 69 the United Nations still appears
to follow the wishes of Western nations. 7 This policy has the effect
of rendering the United Nations an instrument of the United States
Department of State. Ironically, this is the precise effect which the
United Nations has tried hard to avoid in the past,' as such an ef-
fect would undermine the quintessential existence of any transnational
body.
However, imagine that Serbia successfully realizes its goal of a
"Greater Serbia." Such a vision, if achieved, may be sustainable
1 72
the Security Council members have overcome this stalemate and cooperate with each
other. See, e.g., The Stanley Foundation, CHANGING CONCEPTS OF SOVEREIGNTY: CAN
THE UNITED NATIONS KEEP PACE 25-26 (1992).
166. Douglass Cassel, Jr., Tenth Annual International Law Symposium 1993 -
Select Panel Discussions: Bosnia, War Crimes, and Humanitarian Intervention, 15
WHITTIER L. REV. 445 (1994).
167. GAO Report to Senator Dole, supra note 158, at 25.
168. See id.
169. Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick and Morton I. Abramowitz, Lift the Embargo, N. Y.
TIMES, April 20, 1994, at A19. Obviously, notwithstanding international law issues,
one of the factors which contributes to successful peacekeeping operations is the
desire by the affected population to have a U.N. presence. See, e.g. Barbara
Crossette, U.N. Falters in Post-Cold-War Peacekeeping, but Sees Role as Essential, N.
Y. TIMES, December 5, 1994, at A6 [hereinafter U.N. Falters).
170. The reason for this lies in the fact that the United Nations and the Security
Council are political bodies, considering media coverage, public opinion, and budget-
ary issues first; the rule of law appears to be a secondary consideration. See, e.g.,
The Stanley Foundation, THE U.N. ROLE IN INTERVENTION: WHERE Do WE Go FROM
HERE? 20-21 (1993).
171. Barbara Crossette, U.N. Leader to Call for Changes in Peacekeeping, N. Y.
TIMES, January 3, 1995, at A3 (in an interview with Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
Secretary General to the United Nations) [hereinafter U.N. Leader to Call for
Changes].
172. Sabrina Petra Ramet, BALKAN BABEL: POLITICS, CULTURE, AND RELIGION IN
YUGOSLAVIA 180 (1992) (quoting Milos Vasic, editor of VREME, a Belgrade opposition
paper). A "Greater Serbia" is not achievable through peaceful means due to the
cultural, religious, and political diversity. Of course, if the Serbs succeed in their
ethnic cleansing campaign, minority opposition of the Serb intellectual community
will be small.
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but would also lead to a less secure Europe. The new Yugoslavia, led
by Serbia and Montenegro, is presently in charge of the armaments of
what was once the fifth largest army in the world. To allow the exis-
tence of a "Greater Serbia" as the successor to the new Yugoslavia
could eventually lead to insecurity not only in Central Europe, but in
Western Europe as well. Until the United States policy makers under-
stand this danger, the United States will not originate a sincere push
for peace.
Tragically, without a firm push by both the European Union and
the United States, military intervention under the supervision of the
United Nations in order to achieve peace is not likely to take place.
Past accounts of this cruel war'73 as of yet have not moved global
powers to intervene.
Two recommendations follow from these conclusions. First, the
United Nations must learn to cope with its new role in the post-Cold
War era. If United Nations members must pass amendments to the
Charter in order to strengthen the enforcement capabilities of the
Securities Council,' so be it. If the establishment of a quick re-
sponse securities force is required to quickly quell regional dis-
putes, 75 so be it. Hardly any measure, if achieved through democrat-
ic process by legal means, is too authoritarian or coercive if the objec-
tive is the keeping of world peace and the prevention of gross human
rights violations. This is because one of the United Nation's main goals
is the maintenance of international security, a goal which the United
Nations has not been able to achieve in the Bosnian crisis and a goal
which the United Nations will never achieve, unless it is willing to
implement drastic measures to calm the conflict under discussion and
to prevent future wars. 71 In the long term, the costs of achieving and
maintaining peace will be outweighed by their benefits, as only then
will the United Nations have the time to devote itself to other impor-
tant human issues, such as the environment, underdevelopment, and
overpopulation.
77
Second, the West must follow its own tough words, condemna-
tions, and threats with actions. 78 Such actions would save lives and
accomplish peace. The West promised the Bosnians peace at the begin-
ning of the war; delivery of this promise is long overdue.
173. See, e.g., Zlatko Dizdarevic, SARAJEVO: A WAR JOURNAL (1993); Slavenka
Drakulic, THE BALKAN ExPREss: FRAGMENTS FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF WAR (1993).
174. Ferencz supra note 91.
175. U.N. Falters, supra note 169.
176. See Ferencz, supra note 91.
177. U.N. Leader to Call for Changes, supra note 171.
178. Robert Marquand and Faye Bowers, Slovenian Premier Urges West: Stay
Tough on Serbs, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Apr. 8, 1994, 6 (quoting Janez Drnovsek,
Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia).
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[Editors' Note: The state of affairs for the purposes of this article is
February 1995. During the late summer of 1995, NATO selectively
bombed Bosnian Serb targets in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Bosnian
Serbs continued to violate established "safe areas" and after yet another
shelling in the center of Sarajevo taking many innocent lives. In addi-
tion, the 1995 Dayton Agreement permitted U.N. peacekeeping forces to
carry out various objectives within the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
These recent events do not alter the analysis as presented in this article.
The United Nations, here with the help of NATO, and international
leadership will only consider military intervention, whether legal or
illegal under international law, if the political climate supports such
action. It is respectfully submitted that only the consistent application
and enforcement of international law, not swings of political winds or




Lobue v. Christopher: A Demonstration of the
Failures of U.S. Extradition Law?
W. QUINN BEARDSLEE
I. INTRODUCTION
The current U.S. extradition statute' is 147 years old in its pres-
ent form.' When reviewing the aged statute, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia did not uphold the US extradi-
tion statute.3 While that judgment was vacated recently at the appeals
level', Lobue demonstrates how this area of the law has become more
important, the focus of more interest and in need of reform. To be
constitutionally correct, an effort must be made to rewrite the current
statute and place the statutorily grantedpowers granted with an ad-
ministrative agency controlled by the executive branch. While the
reasoning in this case has not been consistently upheld, it reveals to
the legal community in this country and in others that US extradition
law is outdated, unclear and in need of many revisions. This case note
first summarizes the holding and reasoning of the court in Lobue.
Other recent cases criticize the reasoning of the Lobue court, therefore
this case note examines the reasoning of these attacks. Then it discuss-
es how, under close analysis, these criticisms also show the need for a
change in the current law. Finally, this article concludes with a recom-
mendation for revisions needed to improve the law.
The language and structure of the actual statute is relatively
unclear and archaic. However, normal extradition procedure is de-
scribed in the next few sentences. 18 U.S.C. §3184 (1996), "Fugitives
from foreign country to United States" specifies that whenever an
extradition treaty exists between the US and a foreign government,
1. Fugitives from foreign country to United States, 18 U.S.C. §3184 (1996).
2. The statute first became effective in 1848 through the Act of Aug. 12, 1848,
ch. 167, 9 Stat. 302.
3. Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F.Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1995).
4. Lobue v. Christopher, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 9933.
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any judge5 can issue a warrant for arrest of the criminally charged
person and that the person may be brought before a judge to hear the
evidence of criminality. If the judge believes the evidence sufficient to
sustain the criminal charge under the provisions of the treaty with the
foreign country, the judge will certify this criminality along with a
record of the hearing to the Secretary of State. In finding that an indi-
vidual is extraditable, the court must justify its conclusion by finding
that the offense charged is covered by the extradition treaty with that
country, that the alleged behavior is criminal in the U.S. and the re-
questing country, and that probable cause exists to support the guilt of
the extradite. The Secretary of State then reviews this record and
issues a warrant for the commitment of the individual to the "proper
jail"6 and kept there until surrendered to the foreign country. This
procedure was the focus of the plaintiffs attack in the Lobue case, as
described in the next section.
II. LOBUE V. CHRISTOPHER
Reportedly, the accused in this case were two off duty Chicago
police officers who went to Winnipeg to help a man bring his disabled
wife to Chicago for the purpose of medical tests related to a lawsuit
regarding her injuries. The woman's parents reported her as kid-
napped after she taken from her home and the officers were stopped at
the U.S.-Canada border with the quadriplegic woman and her hus-
band. The woman was returned to her home and the Canadian author-
ities filed kidnapping charges against the two police officers three
months later.7
Pursuant to the extradition treaty, the Canadian government
requested the surrender of the plaintiffs. The magistrate issued an
order and certification for the extradition of the plaintiffs. Following
normal procedure under the current US statute, the Secretary of State
then authorized the surrender of plaintiffs, which was not executed,
however, until this court ruled on the parties' cross-motions for sum-
mary judgement and the plaintiffs class-certification motion.
The court analyzed the current extradition statute and raised the
question of "[w]hether a statute may confer upon the Secretary of
State the authority to review the legal determinations of federal extra-
dition judges."' The court stated its holding and concluded that the
Constitution forbids the Secretary of State from exercising this review
5. The statute states "any justice or judge of the United States, or any mag-
istrate authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or any judges of a court
of record of general jurisdiction of any State, .. . " 18 U.S.C. §3184 (1996).
6. Id.
7. Michael Briggs, Cops Face Canadian Kidnap Charges; City Officers Say Fa-
vor Turns Into Nightmare, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Aug. 14, 1995, at 1.
8. Lobue, Supra note 3 at 68.
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of extraditability. The court continued its analysis of the statute to
find that the discretion allowed to the Secretary of State in determin-
ing extradition suitability is vague and ambiguous. The court then
examined and rejected the government's argument, finding that the
judicial decision is an advisory opinion.9
The court further stated that the executive branch review of an
extradition judge's legal determinations is unconstitutional."0 It sup-
ported this holding by finding that the extradition judge's decisions are
neither binding nor final. This is because under current law, there is
no limit to the number of times an individual may be the object of ex-
tradition proceedings and the Secretary of State has wide discretion in
rejecting the court's decision. This ties into the idea that the extra-
dition judge's decisions are subject to executive review. This finding
also supports the court's conclusion." The court added the fact that
similar statutes have not survived the separation of powers analysis
this statute should be considered under. 2 Also, the court stated that
the foreign policy concerns of the country do not legitimize the other-
wise unconstitutional commingling of powers and that the procedure
under the extradition statute is not comparable to preliminary judicial
rulings in criminal cases for separation of powers purposes. 3
The court in Lobue also found a great lack of accountability both
to the accused individual and to the public. This is because it is not
immediately apparent which branch has made the extradition deci-
sion. 4 The decision making is shielded through obscurity. The Secre-
tary of State may not allow extradition, regardless of the court's con-
clusions. Consequently, the accused and the public do not know to
which branch to attribute the decision. This process lacks further cred-
ibility because the arguments raised at the proceedings are often not
within the Secretary's expertise. It is often unclear who made the ac-
tual extradition determination and the Secretary is appointed to his
position and therefore not subject to any public scrutiny that would
result from a popular election.
Finally, the court concluded that the statute is unconstitutional. It
noted that the statute has not been challenged on the separation of
powers basis before and, although the statute has remained unchanged
for 150 years, the court reasoned that it could not compound errors by
allowing this process to continue and found the statute unconstitution-
al.15
9. Id. at 70.
10. Id. at 71.
11. Id. at 72.
12. Id. at 72-73.
13. Id. at 73-75.
14. Id at 76.
15. Id at 78.
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IIl. CRITICISM BY OTHER COURTS
There is much criticism of the Lobue court's reasoning. In the
Matter of the Extradition of Gregory J. Sutton'6 considered the Lobue
case. The court decided that the extradition proceeding is similar to
the issuance of a search warrant or a preliminary examination, where
the judiciary and the executive work together, with each step in either
procedure a separate exercise of that branch's governmental responsi-
bility. 7 The court cited Cherry v. Warden Metropolitan Correctional
Center,'8 to support the finding that the courts really are not making
a final determination that extradition should or should not be carried
out. The court concluded this is actually a foreign policy issue which
needs to be controlled by the executive branch.
The extradition statute was also addressed in the case In the
Matter of the Extradition of Raymond C. Lin.9 The Lin court found
that the Lobue holding was not binding upon them.20 First, the court
reasoned that the injunction in Lobue only affects the Secretary of
State's surrendering of an extraditable detainee and teh injunction did
not control judicial extradition proceedings. Secondly, the court agreed
with the search warrant reasoning used in Sutton.2 As a result, the
court believed that the two branches may execute similar roles without
violating the separation of powers doctrine. After considering what it
sees as the Madisonian intent regarding the separation of powers doc-
trine,22 the court concludes by stating, "The extradition process is a
flexible employment of the individual expertise inherent in each
branch, providing a workable and constitutional solution to a complex
problem."'
In the Matter of the Extradition of Ferdinand Gino Lang' is one
of many cases concluding that the US extradition statute is Constitu-
tional. That court did not attack the reasoning of the Lobue court, but
found that the plaintiff in Lobue lacked standing." The court stated
that the
"review by the Secretary of State works only to the benefit of extra-
dites, never to their harm.26 It serves as a second chance for them
to be determined not extraditable. In other words, any potential
16. 905 F. Supp. 631 (E.D. Mo. 1995)
17. Id. at 637.
18. 1995 WL 598986 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
19. 915 F.Supp 206 (D.C. Guam).
20. Id. at 211.
21. Id.
22. Id, at 213.
23. Id. at 215.
24. 905 F. Supp. 1385 (C.D.Cal. 1995).
25. Id. at 1391.
26. Id at 1392.
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unconstitutionality in the statutory scheme occurs after the extra-
dite has been determined to be legally extraditable. The extradites
therefore suffer no injury or harm from the unconstitutionality of
the statute."'
The court also found that there was no advisory opinion,28 that
there was subject matter jurisdiction, and that because the extradition
ruling was not a final judgement, there was no need for appellate
review."'
Following the Lobue arguments, the plaintiff in Lang attacked the
lack of accountability in the extradition system and the overall consti-
tutionality of the statute. The court found no defects with 18 U.S.C.
§3184, so there was no injury to the plaintiff and he had no stand-
ing."' The court went on to state that there is no imminent harm to
the plaintiff, no causation because there is no harm and therefore no
remedy present for the plaintiff.31 This trail of logic leads one in a
circular route and therefore lacks credibility. The court in Lang states
that any relief given to the plaintiff in this case is only temporary.
This is because the government is not prevented from trying to extra-
dite the plaintiff again. Repeated extradition attempts are allowed
because this is not considered a criminal procedure and is therefore
not subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause nor the Double Jeopardy
Clause.32
Another court held that the extradition statute was not unconsti-
tutional in the case it was considering. The court in Manrique Carreno
v. Johnson" found that the ruling in Lobue held no precedent and
that there was no authority which required it to interpret the statute
as being unconstitutional. It also found no facially unconstitutional
provisions with the statute.34 The court added that there was no evi-
dence of the Secretary of State conducting an unconstitutional review
in this case. The court went on to state that it would not consider
whether the practice of such a review was constitutional or not. The
opinion ended, however, on a note which could support some of the
arguments raised in Lobue. It stated, "[Tihe Court need not reach the
government's arguments analogizing the extradition process to presi-
dential pardons and to probable cause determinations in connection
with search and seizure warrants. The Court notes, however, that such
comparisons appear inapposite to the extradition process." It seems as
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1393.
29. Id. at 1394-1395.
30. Id. at 1395.
31. Id at 1401.
32. Id. at 1400.
33. 899 F.Supp. 624 (S.D.Fla. 1995).
34. Id at 632.
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though this court found the search warrant reasoning as inapplicable
to these cases.
Most recently, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York approved the extradition of an individual to Israel and flatly
rejected the Lobue reasoning. In re Extradition of Abu Marzook.35 This
court stated that the Executive Branch's power under the statute to
reject an extradition court's decision on extraditability is not a viola-
tion of the separation of powers. This reasoning is justified by finding
that the final responsibility for extradition is an executive power that
merely uses the Judicial Branch for a function it is well suited to per-
form.
IV. DEFECTS IN THE ARGUMENTS IN THESE CASES
Many of the courts criticizing Lobue use the extradite's lack of
standing argument to support their decision to ignore the apparent
violation of the separation of powers. This reasoning demonstrates a
serious flaw in current extradition law. If there is no standing for an
extradite because there is no possible injury to them in only being
extradited for a criminal trial, then why is an Article III court review-
ing the case at all? The law of sufficient standing requires that if a
party in a suit lacks the necessary standing, the case must be dis-
missed. In reviewing extradition proceedings, the court should then not
make any decisions on these cases because, as an Article III court,
they are violating their own precedent. This is because the court is
ruling on a case where supposedly one party has no standing to be in
court because there is no injury. This demonstrates how, if there is no
injury to the extradite, these cases should not be absorbing the time
and energy of the Article III courts.
Many of the courts in the above referenced cases state that the
intrusion on the judiciary's power is justified by the need for the execu-
tive to command foreign affairs. This is a basic power of the executive,
granted to it by Article I of the Constitution. In a sense then, the judi-
ciary is the branch infringing upon this clearly executive power. To
allow the executive to have the control it needs to efficiently fulfill its
obligation to this area of government, no other branch should interfere
with its operations in foreign policy. The executive branch could then
have complete control of this process, as the Constitution states.
Another criticism of these decisions is that the courts are actually
making a final determination as to extraditability. In Lobue, the court
supports its decision by looking at the fact that the Secretary of State
has only revoked the determination of extraditability by a court twice
in the past fifty years. One must then consider if the process really
should involve two branches, when one branch obviously places great
e
35. DC SNY, No. 95 Cr. Mis. 1, 5/7/96, 59 Crim. L. 1234.
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deference on the decisions of another. It seems as though the statute
has left itself open for attack on this front without ever utilizing the
dual branch process successfully to support itself.
However, one court believes that extradition is primarily a func-
tion of the executive branch." To agree with this court's belief, the
statute needs to be revised so that the executive extradition power is
complete and not mixed with another branch. There seems to be some
confusion by both branches as to who is actually making the decision
in these cases. Under the current procedure, it seems as though the
courts are subject to the executive, while the executive fails to use its
power in the process. As a result, each branch beleives that the other
branch is, in effect, making the determination and the extradition of
an individual is not being considered to its full extent by any one
branch.
Finally, these cases simply- reject, with little support, the Lobue
reasoning concerning many of the areas explicitly advanced in that
case. The courts should recognize the arguments brought up in Lobue
and offer strong counterarguments. Instead, these courts often simply
reject the points raised with no explanation. Examples are Lang with
its unexplained dismissal of the advisory opinion argument, 7 and Lin
with the separation of powers arguments brought up by Lobue.
These courts do not recognize the legitimacy of some of the Lobue ar-
guments and reject them without directly addressing the central is-
sues.
V. OTHER CRITICISMS OF THE STATUTE
Currently, the Secretary of State is not forced to provide any ex-
planation with its determination of extradition. This provides little
guidance for practitioners and extradites. While the Administrative
Procedure Act does not require an agency to state its reasoning with
specificity, an extradition hearing following the APA requirements
would provide more guidance than that currently required by 18
U.S.C. §3184. A statement of reasoning, a developed record and a dis-
tinct formal or informal decision making process would be more likely
in following administrative procedure. This argument supports the
conclusion that an administrative agency would best fulfill the needs of
extradition in today's international setting.
18 U.S.C. §3184 is, in simple terms, old. It was originally formed
in 1848."' In light of the many changes over the past 148 years it is
logical to assume that the statute requires some revision.
36. Sutton, supra note 16 at 635.
37. Lang, supra note 24 at 1392, 1395 and 1397, respectively.
38. IAn, supra note 19 at 211.212.
39. See supra note 2.
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It is also important to note that the extradition procedure is one
that cannot respond to the political process. Anyone who believes he or
she was the victiim of an ineffective extradition proceeding will al-
ready be outside the US and under the control of the courts of another
state. Any revisions to the statute as it stands and as the courts have
interpreted it must come from the legislature. This political failure is a
serious flaw and perhaps one of the reasons that US extradition has
not been reformed in recent years. Without political representation in
the US, extradites are then unable to exert any influence on reforming
the current extradition law. As a result, the statute cannot respond to
any negative criticism citizens or extradites may have for it.
Finally, one might also look at current US extradition law as
adopting the legal standards of other states and perhaps committing
the same human rights violations present in such other states. Other
states do not have the same due process and evidentiary standards for
criminal convictions that the US requires. Many states allow a crimi-
nal conviction based on less evidence than needed here. Since the ac-
cused will normally be subject to a criminal trial in another state
should he or she be found extraditable, the US standards and process-
es should be made to be reliable and constitutional in order to protect
the rights of those being extradited. Finding an accused person extra-
ditable in the US may mean there is enough evidence, however lacking
by US standards, for a criminal conviction in the other state because
another state may have minimal requirements for a criminal convic-
tion. This is a danger to an extradites' human rights. As a result, this
process should receive more attention and should be reformed to make
it less ambiguous.
VI. CONCLUSION
The original judgment in the original Lobue case was found to be
lacking in jurisdiction. This occurred when the case was appealed from
the district court to the circuit court.' Because the plaintiffs are in
the constructive custody of the U.S. Marshal for the Northern District
of Illinois, the circuit court reasoned that they can challenge the stat-
ute through a petition for habeas corpus in that jurisdiction. Without
commenting on the constitutionality of the statute, the circuit court
concluded that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
hear the case. The circuit court then vacated the district court judg-
ment."' Therefore, the original Lobue judgment does not stand and
provides no precedent. The circuit court chose not to address the sub-
stantive issues raised Lobue at the district level and dismissed the
arguments due to inadequate jurisdiction. Due to its dismissal of the
case without addressing its merits, the lack of reasoning makes it
40. 1996 U.s. App. LEXIS 9933 (CAD.C. 1996).
41. Id. at 8.
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seem as though the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was
reluctant to take responsibility for either affirming or denying the
validity of the current US extradition statute and passed this difficult
task to a different district.
In light of the criticisms of the current US extradition statute, one
can conclude that a more appropriate forum is required. Not all gov-
ernment decisions can be made with complete separation of the
branches. Administrative agencies often fulfill the need for a commin-
gling of powers. Such agencies institutions are allowed to exist in the
name of practicality and efficiency. The blending of powers in extradi-
tion proceedings lends support to the idea that an administrative set-
ting is perhaps the most qualified for this role. In sum, because such a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine is allowed to exist within
the administrative agencies, it would then follow that proceedings
which apparently violate the separation of powers doctrine be made in
a setting experienced with this style of decision making. This view
does not advocate that poorly written statutes should be followed be-
cause of practicality and tradition, but instead argues that the entire
statute and process should be revised.
The plaintiffs in Lobue have already filed a petition for habeas
corpus in Illinois. That court will have to hear these similar arguments
and decide on that petition. Until the Illinois court decides to either
recognize the need for extradition law reform or continue to support
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(1995); ($95.00); ISBN 0-941320-59-6; 458 pp. (hardcover).
A few friends, and many books,
both true,
Both wise, and both delightful too!
Abraham Cowley, "The Wish"
It is delightful to witness the meteoric growth of international
environmental law in this decade, 'and especially to welcome a new
treatise in the field from an esteemed colleague which is both true and
wise. Professor Ved P. Nanda's International Environmental Law &
Policy is a definitive reference which will be appreciated by experts in
the field as well as an excellent survey for those being introduced to it
for the first time.
The book has been eagerly awaited. The author is the Thompson
G. Marsh Professor of Law, Director of the International Legal Studies
Program, and Vice Provost for Internationalization at the University of
Denver, 2and has been a scholar and teacher in the field of interna-
* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law;
J.D., University of Michigan; B.A., Harvard College.
1. See discussion in George W. Pring & David Joeris, Book Review: Various
International Environmental Law Collections, 4 COLO. J. OF INT'L ENVTL L. & POLi'
422 (1993); George W. Pring & Geoffrey Sweitzer, Book Review: Freer Trade, Pro-
tected Environment: Balancing Trade Liberalization and Environmental Interests, 23
DEN. J. OF INT'L L. & POLY 227 (1994); George W. Pring & Brian S. W. Tobias,
Book Review: International Environmental Law and World Order, 23 DEN. J. INT'L L.
& POLVY 599 (1995).
2. Dr. Nanda is also currently the vice president of the World Jurist Associa-
tion and a past-President of the World Association of Law Professors.
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tional environmental law since its emergence with the United Nation's
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972.
Like other international environmental law treatises, 3the book
begins with a traditional introductory chapter on "The Nature and
Scope of the Challenge" this particular field of law faces-in Professor
Nanda's words, nothing less than the challenge to "avert the catastro-
phe of continuing environmental degradation."" The chapter discusses
the sources of international environmental law as well as its problems,
including inadequate scientific knowledge, state-centered sovereignty,
and the "piecemeal" development of the law.
Following that, the book takes an innovative approach, "front-end-
loading" three subjects generally considered to be advanced interna-
tional environmental law and often relegated to the final chapters or
neglected entirely in modern treatises. The three are: "The Global
Commons," "International Trade and the Environment," and "The
Environment and Human Rights."5
The "global commons" discussed in Chapter 2 are territories out-
side any one nation's jurisdiction, such as Antarctica, the atmosphere,
oceans, and outer space; these are the frontiers for legal as well as
physical exploration and are forcing us "to rethink traditional public
3. Given its youth, the field has not produced an abundance of legal treatises.
Some of the others of high quality are PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATION-
AL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1995), vol. I (analysis), vols. IIA and IIB (international
documents), and vol. III (EC documents); PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT (1992 [1994 corrected]); ALEXANDRE KISS
& DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1991); EDITH BROWN
WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRI-
MONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989). Collections of essays and articles on
international environmental law are somewhat more abundant, including INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY (eds. Anthony D'Amato & Kirsten Engel
1996); A LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (eds. Alexandre Kiss & Frangoise Burhenne-
Guilmin, 1994); ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (ed. Alan E.
Boyle 1994); ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ed. Edith Brown
Weiss 1992); TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW (ed. Michael Bothe, 1980).
Political science treatments are also available, e.g., LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND, ENVI-
RONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: NEGOTIATING MORE EFFECTIVE GLOBAL AGREEMENTS (1994);
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT (eds. Andrew Hurrell & Benedict
Kingsbury 1992); LYNTON CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: EMER-
GENCE AND DIMENSIONS (2d ed. 1990).
One of the best references (with extensive bibliographies on every conceivable
topic) is a law school casebook: GURUSWAMY, PALMER & WESTON, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK (1994).
For a guide to the collections of international environmental legal documents, see
Pring & Joeris, supra note 1.
4. VED P. NANDA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 1 (1995)
(hereinafter NANDAI.
5. This is one of the strengths of this book. KIss & SHELTON, supra note 3, for




international law," according to the author. 'That perspective serves
as an excellent vehicle for presenting some of the book's major themes-
the role of economics, the "development vs. environment" problem, the
difficulties posed by multinational enterprises, and the author's pro-
posed "fundamental principles" for development of the law.
International trade, the subject of Chapter 3, has traditionally
been viewed in a vacuum, divorced from its impacts on the environ-
ment, a situation Professor Nanda rightly criticizes. 7The North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and their progeny are examined in some
detail in reaching the conclusion that trade "must recognize environ-
mental concerns if it wishes to continue to be successful."8
Human rights is one of Professor Nanda's areas of significant
expertise,9 and in Chapter 4 he illustrates how closely interwoven
human and environmental rights are. Despite the Stockholm
Declaration's pronouncement of a fundamental right to "an environ-
ment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being," the
book concedes that there is still much debate over whether such a
right exists or should and cautiously concludes that the "human right"
to environmental quality exists but requires formal United Nations
recognition to become firmly established as law.
Chapters 5-9 present the history and institutions of international
environmental law. In 10 pages, Chapter 5 takes the reader through
an abbreviated look at the law's conventional and case development, a
complex process that would justify a book in itself. The 1972
Stockholm Conference and subsequent U.N. environment programs are
dealt with in Chapter 6; the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment
and Development in Rio de Janeiro, in Chapter 7; the work of the
International Law Commission, in Chapter 8; and the environmental
law of the European Union, in Chapter 9. The author cannot be ac-
cused of over-optimism: the pithy "Appraisals" that end each of these
chapter highlight the questionable "precedential value" of the early
legal pronouncements, "0the severe underfunding and lack of enforce-
ment power of U.N. programs, "the compromises and "disappoint-
6. Id. at 11.
7. See Pring & Sweitzer, supra note 1.
8. Id. at 59.
9. For an example of Professor Nanda's works in the field of human rights, see
VED NANDA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT (1985); VED NANDA,
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY (1989); Ved Nanda, The Protection of the Rights of Mi-
grant Workers: Unfinished Business," 2 ASIAN AND PACIFIC MIGRATION JOURNAL 161
(1993); Ved Nanda, Human Rights and Environmental Considerations in the Lending
Policies of International Development Agencies-An Introduction, 17 DENy. J. INT'L L.
& POLY 29 (1988).
10. NANDA at 82.
11. Id at 101.
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ment[s]" of Rio, "the failure of the ILC to "keep pace with the inter-
national community's needs," '3and the law-"overwhelmed" institu-
tions of the EU."
'Chapters 10-12 present in some detail three of the environmental
arenas of concern: the upper atmosphere, oceans, and international
watercourses. Thorough descriptions of stratospheric ozone depletion
and global warming regimes are presented in Chapter 10, with par-
ticularly useful sections on the domestic U.S. response. Chapter 11
distills the law of the sea down to its essence and contains trenchant
criticisms of the treaty's shortcomings. The ILC's 1990 Draft Articles
on Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses are analyzed
in detail in Chapter 12. This is a more upbeat portion of the book, as
Professor Nanda finds "cause for optimism" with all three legal re-
gimes.'5
The book concludes with a 13th chapter on "The Unfinished Agen-
da." This is particularly welcome, because there has been so little
analysis of the last four years since Rio, the 1992 U.N. Conference on
Environment and Development. The chapter documents the accom-
plishments of the new Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)
and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) in implementing Agenda
21 and the necessity for increased financial aid. Professor Nanda fore-
sees the next essential steps in law development to be protection of
global commons, management of biotechnology, liability and compensa-
tion rules, environment and trade harmonization, controls on human
settlements, and technology transfer.'"But this will not be enough; he
forthrightly concludes that "the rhetoric at Rio ... has not been
matched by action," 'and, until we face the "formidable task" of deal-
ing with issues like population, consumption, unsustainable develop-
ment, poverty, economic imbalance, and sovereignty, "the goal of slow-
ing and eventually reversing the rate of environmental degradation
will remain illusory."8
Professor Nanda's International Environmental Law & Policy is a
significant contribution to the field. No single-volume treatment of
such a diverse field can satisfy every reader: this reviewer would have
liked to see coverage of the laws on transboundary air pollution, toxics
and hazardous wastes, environmental impact assessment, biological
diversity, and compensation and liability for environmental harms.
12. Id. at 130-31.
13. Id. at 183.
14. Id. at 207. One criticism is that this book does not introduce in detail the
many other governmental and nongovernmental international legal organizations in
the field.
15. Id. at 256, 268, 297.
16. Id. at 304.
17. Id. at 308.
18. I& at 299.
VOL. 24:2,3
"But, while other treatises deal in depth with some of these issues,
"they lack this volume's coverage of the very important emerging is-
sues of the global commons, human right to environment, and trade vs.
environment, major strengths of this book. It is a welcome addition to
the growing literature on international environmental law and an
important reference Ufor every scholar, lawyer, and lay person inter-
ested in the field.
19. In fairness, the book does address these issues, but does so only in the con-
text of the European Union's laws. Id. at 193-204.
20. E.g., the Kiss & Shelton and the Sands treatises, supra note 3.
21. Another of its strengths is that it contains a remarkable 2,679 endnotes
covering 129 pages, as well as a bibliography of over 150 books and articles, making




MILLER, RICHARD, NAZI JUSTIZ: LAW OF THE HOLOCAUST,
Greenwood Publishing (1995). ($39.95); ISBN 0-275-94912-5; 248pp.
(hardcover).
Over fifty years after the world's realization of the true nature of
the atrocities that occurred in the concentration camps of Nazi Europe,
most scholars have chosen only to examine the horror of that time
from the perspective of statistical analysis and first-hand descriptions
from concentration camp survivors. While this kind of examination
may be essential in trying to understand the amount and kind of de-
struction inflicted on the European jew, it is not helpful in understand-
ing why this atrocity was able to take place.
Richard Miller's Nazi Justiz attempts to do just this. In analyzing
the Nazi legal system, the author sets up the framework on which the
Nazi policies of genocide and mass murder were carried out. The
events of World War II were neither static nor isolated from the social
conditions that led up to the war years. The legal system set up by
Adolf Hitler shortly after his rise to power, while from the outset dis-
criminatory to jews, took many years to develop into the system which
openly exterminated those which it opposed. Above all else, it should
be remembered that the Nazi legal system played an essential role in
promulgating genocide, enabling mass extermination in an organized
and non-disruptive manner. The evolution took place in five distinct,
yet overlapping, areas. These include: identification, ostracism, confis-
cation, concentration, and annihilation.
Central to the Nazi's persecution of jews was their need to define
what a jew was. Despite the racial determinist theories of the time, the
jewish population was not different enough in appearance to simply
separate them from the population as a whole. Under the legal system
of Nazi Germany, judaism was not a question of culture, but one of
blood and ancestry. This mix of biological and cultural characteristics,
while by today's standards impossible to comprehend, created a class
of undesirable despite their outward appearance or actions. Many
persons who believed themselves to be "Aryan" and actively participat-
ed in Nazi activity, only later found, to their chagrin, that they were
jewish because of some distant relative's blood.
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Once a defining characteristic could determine a jew from an
"aryan", it was possible to ostracize those considered undesirable by
the state. This, as the first active step towards discrimination, was one
which, above all else, brought racism to a bureaucratic, democratic
level. No longer was anti-jewish sentiment left to the whims of vigilan-
te mobs, but was now mandated by law and party policy. This took
several forms in ostracism. The first was that of economic boycott, and
represented the fundamental principle of Nazi policy to remove jews
from all areas of the national economy. Not only, then, were German
employers prohibited from hiring jews, but jews were also banned from
buying or selling even the most essential commodities, such as food
and clothing. Thus, not only were jews deprived of a means of income,
but even if they had some money, they were not allowed to purchase
anything. Beyond this fundamental deprivation also entailed their
revocation of legal rights. In this case, jews were deprived access to
laws and police protection, making them an easy target for private
hostility and government discrimination alike. Like blacks in the
American south during the first half of the Twentieth Century, jews
were also prohibited from all essential and recreational activities of
social life that involved their contact with "aryan" citizens.
The second step Nazi's utilized in jewish extermination was the
confiscation of property owned by jews. So what started as denying
jewish people an income evolved into a system which "aryanized" jew-
ish property without any compensation to former owners. The logic of
the time dictated that in order to protect the economic value of the
business, it was essential to confiscate this property from jews and run
it by aryan owners.
The penultimate step to mass extermination was that of concen-
tration, a relatively easy step in the process since by this time nearly
all jews still in Germany had been deprived of their jobs and property.
This phase represents the time in which jews, now isolated in regions
of the city, are scrutinized by the government officials and ignored by
the population in general. This process began by excluding jews from
rural areas in Germany, and once migration to the cities was complete,
they were concentrated even further into blocks and neighborhoods of
entirely jewish population. This step related directly as a continuation
of the policy set forth with identification, ostracism, and confiscation,
since concentration not only told jews were they had to live, thus tak-
ing away their right to movement, but also was a method of facilitat-
ing the destruction process which was to follow.
The final, and most commonly examined, aspect of the extermina-
tion of the jews, was the process of forced birth prevention and inflic-
tion of torture and death which comprised the fundamental goal of
Nazi policy up until that time. Direct limitations on marriages, as well
as the indirect limitations on employment and health standards, un-
dermined the jewish culture's ability to procreate and thus pass on
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their culture to their offspring. However, as if to say that this policy
was not efficient or fast enough to accomplish the goals of the state,
the official party attitude to the "useless lives" of non-aryans, combined
with the growing bureaucratic stake in promoting policies which would
eliminate the "criminal jew", mass extermination and genocide were
close on the heels.
Nazi Justiz, in providing a legal history of the holocaust, is impor-
tant for two reasons in understanding international legal regimes of
today. First, it offers a model of explanation for what was the most
tragic chapter in human history. With this understanding, it is possi-
ble to comprehend how an entire nation can condone such atrocities.
Secondly, underlying this analysis is the fundamental notion that any
government, particularly one bent on the destruction of a portion of its
own population, must resort to laws in order to prevent chaos from
ensuing. Without the legal definition of what constituted a jew in Nazi
Germany, mass hysteria, revenge killings, and unlawful confiscations
would have abounded, thus forming the destruction of the German
state. The very fact that the elimination of millions of people could
occur without the disruption of one of the most powerful countries of
the time is a testament to the necessity of these laws. However brutal
the fascist rule of Hitler was, a failure to recognize that law existed
and guided policy at the time would be to painfully misinterpret and
underestimate the Nazi regime. For the sake of preventing future
atrocities, this should never be done.
Thomas F. Muther, Jr.
JEAN SALMON, MANUEL DE DROIT DIPLOMATIQUE, Pr~cis de la
Facultd de Droit de Universit6, Etablissements Etmile Bruylant, Brus-
sels, (1994). ($); ISBN 2-8027-0900-3; 678 pp. (pbk)
More than a "manual", Salmon's book is in part a systematic ar-
ticulation of "black letter" principles,part analysis of the development
in (and continuing questions arising out of) those principles, part bibli-
ography and decision overview. The first part gives a broad overview of
the sources and general historical development of diplomatic law, fol-
lowed by an examination of traditional bilateral diplomatic relations,
approaching the subject from numerous directions such as the organi-
zation of diplomatic services and of individual missions and accredita-
tion process. Salmon focuses in on the role of the Chief of Mission and
the scope of his official and unofficial relationship with the accredited
State. Also analyzed is the array of quasi-diplomatic missions, includ-
ing those operating as intermediaries between States themselves lack-
ing formal relations.
A section on diplomatic privileges and immunities look both at estab-
lished and inconsistent practices in diplomatic treatment, in particular
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regarding freedom of communication between mission and accrediting
State, and regarding the accrediting State's use of the mission locale. A
title on sanctions for violations of diplomatic law focuses both on such
sanctions in the context of an individual diplomatic agent and the
larger issues of diplomatic rupture of relations and its juridical conse-
quences.
Part Two briefly compares diplomatic and consular relations, ad hoc
diplomacy, and statutes regarding foreign heads of state. The bulk of
this part is devoted to multilateral diplomatic relations, such as the
structure of permanent missions within the U.N. and the European
Community system.
Salmon's systematic treatment of his subject makes the book straight-
forward without ignoring the complexity of the area. The analysis is
woven in the context of over 700 judicial decisions nd extracts from
bilateral agreements. Salmon pays particular attention to the 1960
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to gauge the translation of
customary law in modem practice and various departures. Overall, the
book provides a provocative resource for the specialist in the area, and
a detailed treatise for the interested scholar.
Marco Madriz
MINEAR, LARRY and THOMAS G. WEISS, HUMANITARIAN POLI-
TICS, Foreign Policy Association Headline Series, Foreign Policy Asso-
ciation, New York, NY (1995). ($5.95); ISBN; 72 pp. (pbk).
Humanitarian Politics provides a good introduction to humanitari-
an relief and its interaction with political concerns. The authors focus
particularly on the post-Cold War era and the additional problems that
arise out of the changing political conditions. A significant new devel-
opment is the changed nature of armed conflict. In the contemporary
world, most conflict occurs within, rather than between, states, a prob-
lem which complicates the formulation and implementation of solu-
tions to the humanitarian problems that these conflicts create. Emerg-
ing along with this political complexity is a new urgency. Minear and
Weiss point out that the number of people involved in humanitarian
emergencies rose dramatically in the 1990's, making effective solutions
to humanitarian crises all the more critical.
Having established the importance of effective humanitarian ac-
tion, Minear and Weiss sketch the basics of existing approaches and
the actors who implement them, and then set out the principles of
their preferred model for humanitarian politics. While in the past,
humanitarianism has been subordinated to political interest or vice
versa, the correct approach, the authors contend, is for humanitarian-
ism and politics to proceed on parallel tracks. This parallelism de-
scribes both the connection and the separation which Minear and
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Weiss believe to be essential. The two tracks need to be aware of each'
other but if they become entangled and confused, goals and means
become muddled and unlikely to succeed.
Throughout the book, Minear and Weiss support their argument
with examples from historical and contemporary events. They conclude
their book with recommendations about the implementation of their
model by the UN and other international actors and a discussion about
the implications for U.S. foreign policy. In addition to surveying the
relationship between humanitarianism and political realism, Humani-
tarian Politics provides the reader with an annotated reading list cov-
ering a variety of relevant topics in human rights, humanitarian relief
and international security. The authors also include discussion ques-
tions for use in seminars or classroom settings.
Amy Eckert

